PAULINE KERR | GEOFFREY WISEMAN

DIPLOMACY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

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THEORIES and PRACTICES

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Second Edition

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With love to:
Jimi, Daisy, and Charlie (PK)
Brady and Dylan (GW)

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PREFACE

We are delighted to offer readers the second edition of *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*. Under the deft guidance and encouragement of Executive Editor, Jennifer Carpenter (Oxford University Press [OUP]/New York), and a readily apparent flourishing of interest in diplomacy internationally in recent years, we undertook this new edition with great enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was reinforced by student and teacher response to the first edition and by the positive feedback from OUP's reviewers for the new edition. On the latter score, we are grateful to Matthew Bolton (Pace University), Renato Corbetta (University of Alabama at Birmingham), and Paul Webster Hare (Boston University) for their comments.

Our contributing authors revised their chapters to include the most recent research on their original topics. Moreover, this updating has been enhanced by the inclusion of three new chapters on topics of great significance to the study, teaching, and conduct of diplomacy: diplomacy and the use of force, women in diplomacy, and bilateralism and multilateralism from the perspective of "practice theory."

This second edition takes note of the increasing complexity of global, international, and domestic contexts and the consequential effects this complexity has on diplomatic practices and theories. Thus, the answers to the three questions posed in the first edition—"how is diplomacy changing, why, and with what implications for future theories and practices?"—are more complicated today than they were just a few years ago. As editors, we argue that a good part of the answer to the book's three recurrent questions lies in developing the concept of "complex diplomacy."

The book is organized into four parts: Part I describes diplomacy's historical evolution; part II outlines contemporary diplomatic concepts and theories; part III evaluates contemporary diplomacy's structures, processes, and instruments; and part IV assesses today's national, regional, and international diplomatic practices. The revised analyses in the book's four parts combined with the pedagogical tools in each chapter contribute, we believe, in a unique way to students' understanding of the debates about the nature of diplomacy in a globalizing and electronically mediated world and to the value of understanding these modern dynamics through a “complex diplomacy” lens. Finally, this second edition continues to confirm our normative belief that diplomacy should be, to cite Martin Wight (1979: 113), “the master-institution of international relations.”

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Once again, we had the privilege of working with a team of dedicated people. Jennifer Carpenter, Scott Bledsoe, and Andrew Blitzer, from OUP were unfailingly supportive throughout the project. Patricia Berube, from SPi Global, kept the book on schedule and Wesley Morrison, a US-based freelance copyeditor, thoroughly reviewed the manuscript. Mary-Louise Hickey, Publications Editor at The Australian National University (ANU), assisted us with the bibliography, glossary, and front matter with her trademark patience and professionalism. In a multitude of ways, the chapter authors reinforced our optimism about a manifest surge of interest in diplomatic studies. The Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) at the ANU, where we both work, provided financial support for the book’s production. Last, but certainly not least, our families once again tolerated weekends without company and responded to our pleas for time with something akin to sainthood.

We are, again, endlessly grateful to you all.

Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman
The Australian National University
September 2017

ABBREVIATIONS

AI	artificial intelligence
APCD	Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AQIM	Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BP	British Petroleum
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAN	Andean Community
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEO	chief executive officer
COP21	Conference of the Parties 21
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
DExEU	Department for Exiting the European Union
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFID	Department for International Development
DNS	Domain Name System
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Communities
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FTA	free trade agreement

FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
G77	Group of Seventy-Seven
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HDI	Human Development Index
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	information and communication technology
IFDT	International Forum on Diplomatic Training
IGF	International Global Forum
IGO	intergovernmental organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	international organization
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet protocol
IR	international relations
IS	Islamic State
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
LCC	London Cycling Campaign
MAD	mutual assured destruction
MAI	Multilateral Agreement on Investment
MEO	mutually enticing opportunity
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MFA	ministry of foreign affairs
MHS	mutually hurting stalemate
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	national diplomatic system
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPC	National People's Congress
NSC	National Security Committee
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODE	Office of Digital Engagement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRC	People's Republic of China
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
ROC	Republic of China

SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SICA	Central American Integration System
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USIA	US Information Agency
WiFi	wireless technology
WO	way out
WPS	women, peace and security
WTO	World Trade Organization

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
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AUSTRALIA
SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN
Easter Island (CHILE)
URUGUAY
ARGENTINA
SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) (administered by U.K., claimed by ARGENTINA)
Tasmania
NEW ZEALAND
Antarctic Circle (66°33')
SOUTHERN OCEAN

Diplomacy in a Globalizing World

INTRODUCTION

Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Complex diplomacy
- Historical background, contemporary trends, and challenges for diplomacy
- The book's structure, chapter summaries, and pedagogical features

COMPLEX DIPLOMACY

Since the publication of the first edition of *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices* in 2013, the field of diplomatic studies has advanced significantly with the publication of new books, journal articles, and a new journal.[1] Much of this activity is driven by increasing recognition that in a globalizing world diplomatic management of major international problems is the preferred, and often the only, way to manage or mitigate those problems. Paradoxically, sweeping arguments about diplomacy's decline—often associated with claims about the diminishing relevance of the state and state-based concepts, such as sovereignty, and related claims about the rise of non-state actors—are difficult to substantiate empirically as the demand for more diplomacy intensifies. Furthermore, many of these new publications confirm our observation in the first edition: "Diplomacy is changing . . . [yet] [e]xactly how, why, and with what implications for future theories and practices of diplomacy, is puzzling." We termed this situation the "diplomacy puzzle,"[2] and our inductive findings from the first edition's focus on that puzzle confirmed how complicated diplomacy is today, leading us to embrace more forcefully the concept of "complex diplomacy."

In this second edition, then, we want to further develop the "complex diplomacy" concept, showing its theoretical and practical dimensions and therefore, we hope, its value to scholars and practitioners. Conceptually, we argue that complex diplomacy, in the **trans-Westphalian** era during which we now live, is characterized by three interlinked constituent qualities: hyperconnectivity, adaptivity, and diversity. *Hyperconnectivity* refers to the increased interaction, made possible by modern communications technologies, between an increasing number of international actors whose routine behavior shows considerable deference to the essential processes of diplomacy—communication, representation, reporting, and negotiation.

The Internet, social media, as well as faster air, land, and sea communication and transport systems are among the technological advances that connect these actors more rapidly and more often than at any other period in the past.

The second constituent dimension of complex diplomacy is *adaptivity*. Arguably, the contemporary context (both domestic and international) is more uncertain and complex than in previous eras, though other periods, for example, the fifteenth-century European shift from the moral and social order of *Pax Christiana* to the secular order of the Westphalian nation-state foreshadowed historic uncertainties and complexities requiring adaptation. From its ancient origins over 4,000 years ago to the present, diplomacy has adapted to changing political, social, and economic contexts, through innovative practices, such as the resident ambassador and the foreign ministry. As Cohen's chapter in this volume points out, some forms of ancient diplomacies in the Middle East, Greece, Italy, Byzantium, and modern Europe can still be seen in contemporary diplomacy. Recognition that diplomacy involves this mix of old and new processes is captured in such recent theoretical propositions as "integrative diplomacy" and "hybrid diplomacy" (Hocking et al. 2012; Hocking and Melissen 2015). Moreover, the adaptivity dimension of complex diplomacy draws heavily on our assumption that the actions of *agents* (diplomats) have consequential effects on the *structure* (the international system). Thus, state-based diplomats, but also non-state actors, constantly create, modify, and even undermine international and domestic institutions. Robert Jervis's (1997) view that political actors act within a complex system, where, as Stephen Walt (1998) explains, "everything is connected to everything else," speaks to the interaction between agents and their structural contexts. In a similar vein, Jervis's most recent book, *How Statesmen Think*, highlights the point that "only when we look at the social setting in which individuals are bathed and *which they produce by their interactions* can we gain a well-rounded appreciation for what is happening" (Jervis 2017: 2, emphasis added). Such dynamics of adaptivity increase complexity.

The third dimension constituting complex diplomacy is *diversity*. By this, we mean both that the *practice* of diplomacy now has more diverse and varied forms (for example, bilateral, multilateral, and transnational) but also that the way scholars, activists, and others *think* about diplomacy is markedly more diverse and varied than in previous times. In comparison to the state-centric focus of diplomatic practices and theories during the Westphalian period (roughly 1648–1989), there is much more diversity today, to the point that the term "plural diplomacy" is common, at least among scholars of diplomatic studies. Central to these broader theories of diplomacy is the view that new actors, new issues, and new technologies ought to be incorporated into theories about diplomacy and, moreover, that different disciplinary theoretical perspectives—such as sociology, anthropology, and geography—help us better capture the essence of diplomacy. In effect, such theoretical and practical diversity adds complexity.

Our observation is that the nexus between burgeoning diplomatic practices and theories of diplomacy is even more complex than commonly recognized. Scholars of most disciplines, usually the theory makers, give insufficient attention to the diplomatic practices and norms that are the primary daily preoccupation of practitioners, both state and non-state. Their world, which is one of practical hyperconnectivity, adaptivity, and diversity (of methods, contexts, and actors, for example), is increasingly complex. And in this way, as Peter Varghese, a former Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), has said, diplomacy is "the compass by which Australia makes its way in the world" (quoted in Byrne, Conley Tyler, and Harris Rimmer 2016: 581). Moreover, the demands on diplomats are great, as Caitlin Byrne, Melissa Conley Tyler, and Susan Harris Rimmer (2016: 581) explain about a middle power but which can be similarly applied to virtually all states:

> The reality is that Australian diplomacy is in a state of flux, responding and adapting to constant shifts [in] today's interconnected global landscape. At every level of analysis, the demands on Australia's diplomats are growing in intensity, complexity and urgency. Aspirations for the nation's diplomatic performance are high in all contexts—global and regional, multilateral and bilateral—and Australia's interests and activities span the breadth of high to low politics. At the same time, the rising expectations of public audiences at home and abroad have brought new pressures, modes of engagement and unconventional actors to the fore.

Former British ambassador Paul Webster Hare (2015) argues that scholars need to give more attention to analyzing the practices of diplomats, including from the perspective of the diplomat. Certainly, diplomats believe strongly that what they do matters. As another former long-serving ambassador and later foreign minister of Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa (2016), stated, diplomacy is a process based on dialogue and persuasion, and he remains convinced of diplomacy's power and efficacy for practically managing problems in a globalizing world.

In this second edition, we suggest that the complexity of the theory/practice nexus will be better informed by our focus on "what diplomats do." Adding practitioners' descriptive, analytical, and normative insights to those of academics about the processes of diplomacy will support another important level of analysis. With this in mind, we invite readers to undertake a journey with us into the relatively undeveloped territory of linking academic theorizing about diplomacy with diplomatic practices. In this spirit, we welcome Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut's argument, in their new chapter for this volume, that "diplomatic practices *do* things; that is to say, they produce effects" (see chapter 10). Pouliot and Cornut, along with others from the International Relations discipline, are already developing "practice theory" and leading the discipline toward understanding the value of what diplomats do to inform some of the practices that constitute international relations (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015).

In addition to developing these conceptual and practical dimensions of complex diplomacy in the ways described above, this second edition does several other things. First, it incorporates our first-edition authors' updated research on their original chapters, and it presents three new chapters on important topics: gender and diplomacy, diplomacy and the use of force, and—connecting to diplomatic practices mentioned above—a chapter on bilateralism and multilateralism from a practice theory perspective.

Second, as before, we continue to note the everyday understanding of diplomacy as a social practice, its ancient origins, and the debate about continuity and change in contemporary state practice. For most people, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933:

385–86) definition that diplomacy is "the management of international relations by negotiation; the methods by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys" probably suffices. The release by the transparency advocacy group WikiLeaks during 2010–11 of **diplomatic cables** sent from US **missions** to the US Department of State, however, would perhaps surprise those who hold images of **ambassadors** and **envoys** as unfailingly tactful and articulate professionals making the case for world peace, and with a distaste for the dark and warlike side of world politics. Behind such popular perceptions of diplomacy and diplomats, however, is a much more intricate and fascinating story about the evolution of diplomacy. A story that arguably began thousands of years ago, in Mesopotamia, now modern Iraq, and evolved over time in Europe, Asia, and the world's other regions, and which, excitingly for students of diplomacy, is now beginning one of its most extraordinary chapters. Today, as the complex diplomacy concept implies, complex empirical and intellectual developments in world politics challenge our understandings of diplomacy. **Globalization** processes, including revolutionary means of communication and accessing information, are generating debate about the nature of contemporary diplomacy and whether traditional understandings and practices still work for managing today's issues. It is now widely debated whether the centerpiece of diplomacy, the **sovereign** territorial state, is declining or adapting to the demands of the twenty-first century and, therefore, whether the traditional institution of diplomacy—diplomats in **ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs)** and missions abroad, who **represent**, **report**, and **communicate** their state's interests—is also adapting or sinking into irrelevance. As noted above, it is also widely debated whether, under conditions of adaptation or decline, officials from other ministries as well as non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other **civil society groups**, and corporations are taking on roles that are changing traditional diplomatic practices—or, indeed, taking on roles that can reasonably be considered diplomatic ones.

The third feature of this second edition is that while remaining aware that diplomacy can be studied in many ways, we continue to endorse our original academic approach. We concentrate our analysis on the questions outlined earlier: How is diplomacy changing, why, and with what implications for future theories and practices? And as discussed earlier, we develop the concept of "complex diplomacy" as a potentially helpful rubric for thinking about diplomacy. We adopt a contemporary, comparative, and comprehensive approach drawing out similarities and differences, and continuities and changes, in diplomacy over time and space and across different issues. Thus, we compare historical and contemporary developments in diplomacy and in Western and non-Western contexts (part I); contrast theoretical understandings of and methodological approaches to diplomacy (part II); examine changes and continuities in the structures, processes, and instruments of diplomacy (part III); and outline different national, regional, and international institutional practices of diplomacy (part IV). Wherever possible we also introduce more focused examinations of "what diplomats do" to start the journey toward understanding how diplomats help construct the processes of diplomacy and influence its possible effects. In doing so, we add empirical ballast to the complex diplomacy concept. And finally, we give special weight to recent research by scholars studying diplomacy. Research-led teaching is what students expect and deserve. In a nutshell, our approach to resolving the diplomacy puzzle, and to developing the complex diplomacy concept, is contemporary, comparative, comprehensive, and research-driven—and always with an eye to balancing breadth with depth.

Given the feedback on the first edition, we remain convinced that our academic approach provides insights about diplomacy that are needed by students, scholars, and practitioners. We are inspired by the increasing number of teaching and research programs on diplomacy and the continuing centrality of diplomatic management in global affairs, as noted earlier by Ambassador Natalegawa. Likewise, another former ambassador, Nicholas Burns, Director of the Future of Diplomacy Project at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, cautions the Trump administration to follow the path of previous US secretaries Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and John Kerry and continue to "return diplomacy to the center of American foreign policy" (quoted in Oswald 2016). This centrality of diplomacy for the US, even in its continuing role as the world's major military superpower, is evident from John Kerry's (2016) view, reiterated many times, that the Syrian conflict requires a political solution and that the US is "pursuing diplomacy because those are the tools that we have."

Equally telling is the explosion of training programs for diplomats, run either by MFAs or outside organizations. Some 100 training academies are now members of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT). The forty-third meeting of the IFDT hosted, by the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) in October 2016, was attended by some forty diplomatic representatives from such programs, many established over the past few years. Increased focus on training diplomats—on what it is that diplomats do and ought to do—shows that research by scholars and practitioners will be needed for advancing the professional skills and standards of diplomats and other actors involved in complex diplomacy.

Armed with this approach, we invite you as students of diplomacy to engage critically with the analysis in this book. This critical engagement should also challenge the premise that we are moving irreversibly toward a globalized world. The rising tide of nationalist populism, currently so prominent in many parts of the world, obliges us to reconsider our assumptions about globalization. We hope this many-sided conversation will inspire and excite you to continue and to develop the discussion toward new and better practices and theoretical propositions about diplomacy. If that happens, then we believe the world will be a much-improved place. This is our normative view about the potential for diplomacy as an important—if often misunderstood—foundation of world politics.

In the remainder of this introduction, we sketch the historical and intellectual background of diplomacy and several contemporary trends within and challenges for it. Diplomacy is controversial, having both advocates and critics. That said, the main international contextual trends—globalization and interdependence, alongside regionalization, the continuing use of force, and power shifts in world politics—make diplomacy not just an imperative but perhaps the only sustainable option for managing differences between political entities, be they state or non-state actors. In the final part of this introduction, we outline the structure of the book, its constituent chapters, and pedagogical features.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CONTEMPORARY TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES FOR DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has a long, historical background, even if its earliest manifestations did not carry the name. As Raymond Cohen points out in the opening chapter of this book, “Since the dawn of recorded history 4,500 years ago, sovereigns have conducted their relations through official emissaries.” Inscribed records of diplomacy that date to about 2500 BC and are “[w]ritten in wedge-shaped, cuneiform script in the Sumerian language [. . .] refer to relations between city-states.” Later, these records or official documents were called *diplomas*, a folded piece of paper, and the people who stored them in archives were called *diplomats*. Sometime after that, the term “diplomacy” became associated with the practices of officials who represented their sovereigns, be they kings or states, in their exchanges with other sovereigns beyond their borders.

Over time and up to the present, countless volumes have described and analyzed these exchanges. These include detailed “diplomatic histories” that describe and analyze countries’, and often their leaders’, victories and defeats during times of war but, increasingly, also their international relationships on many other issues, such as trade during periods of peace. In both war and peace, diplomatic language and culture play a key part. The last few years have seen more historians of ancient and early modern history contribute fascinating insights about early diplomacy that have contemporary relevance. For example, under the label of “new diplomatic history,” a collection of essays in the *Journal of Early Modern History* examines how “Europeans sought new ways of conducting diplomacy in the changing environment of the early modern world . . . [and how] increasingly globalized diplomatic agents deployed symbolic and rhetorical languages that could be shared among different participants” (Osborne and Rubiés 2016).

With a few exceptions, most diplomatic histories, past and present, are a mix of a country’s foreign policy and its diplomacy. There is a difference between the two activities that many, but not all, scholars of diplomacy emphasize. For Ernest Satow, “foreign policy is formulated by government, not by diplomatists,” while diplomacy is to carry out foreign policy by diplomats (cited in I. Roberts 2011: 3). For Harold Nicolson (1946: 164–65), “foreign policy is based upon a general conception of national requirements . . . Diplomacy, on the other hand, is not an end but a means; not a purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation and exchange of interests, to prevent major conflicts between sovereign states.” Even today, especially in the United States (D. Clinton 2011), the distinction is overlooked, and the two types of analyses are conflated, as exemplified in Henry Kissinger’s (1994) tome *Diplomacy*. Yet in varying degrees, a number of contemporary scholars insist on making the foreign policy–diplomacy distinction so heavily emphasized by Satow and Nicolson. Renewed policy and scholarly interest in the distinction is, arguably, a minimum condition for the growth of diplomatic studies as a field.

The history of diplomacy is not only long but also controversial. Sir Henry Wootton’s oft-quoted view of an ambassador as “a man of virtue sent abroad to lie for his country” was left open to at least two interpretations, one of them highly unflattering to the craft of diplomacy. Joseph Stalin’s Machiavellian cynicism about diplomacy and diplomats was certainly not ambiguous: "A diplomat's word must have no relation to actions, otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it. Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water and wooden iron" (Dallin 1944: 71). Some scholarly traditions in international relations thinking are also skeptical about diplomacy. In chapter 3 of this volume, Paul Sharp points to the implied place of diplomacy in the three main schools of international thought—realist, rationalist, and revolutionary: "'Classical' and 'neoclassical realists' [. . .] see diplomacy and diplomats as instruments of foreign policy and elements of state power, respectively"; for rationalists, "both diplomacy and diplomats [ultimately] fail [. . .] because they act as servants of states"; and for revolutionary thinkers, "diplomacy and states serve established concentrations of power, no matter what the sources of this power are in any given epoch."

The authors in this book are well aware of the importance of these critical claims about diplomacy. However, they are interested in debating and analyzing contemporary diplomacy with the aim of advancing it through better, including critical, understandings. Their advocacy of diplomacy is grounded in scholarly thinking about international relations and diplomacy, perhaps amassed most astutely in the English school of international relations theory. The claim made by one of the school's original and most influential members, Martin Wight (1979: 113), that "the diplomatic system is the master-institution of international relations" supports their confidence in diplomacy as a necessary, if not sufficient, process for stabilizing world politics, and certainly one in need of constant improvement.

Among diplomacy's advocates today, there are different understandings of diplomacy and debate about the respective merit of claims being advanced. Canvassing just three of these claims, all of which are represented in this book, gives a flavor of the debate. One is that diplomacy is a state-based institution involving professional, accredited diplomats who work in foreign ministries and embassies or consulates and who generally adhere to diplomacy's most comprehensively formalized international agreements, the **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (1961) and the **Vienna Convention on Consular Relations** (1963). These "traditional" diplomats represent, negotiate, and communicate the interests of their territorial and sovereign state with diplomats from other states and seek, if they deem it necessary, the views of others—perhaps officials or non-officials—in advancing state interests. Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (2013) describe this elitist and hierarchical view of diplomacy as "club diplomacy." A second claim is that diplomacy is partly the state-based institution described earlier but, as Brian Hocking argues in this volume, is more accurately conceptualized as being part of a broader "national diplomatic system" (NDS) involving many other actors who wield influence, often through **policy networks**. Cooper, Heine, and Thakur (2013: 21–24) argue that contemporary diplomacy has shifted from club diplomacy to network diplomacy. They emphasize the role of civil society in diplomacy, perhaps more than Hocking's NDS version, a conclusion that resonates with Geoffrey Wiseman's (1999) concept of "polylateralism" that describes increasing state–non-state relations. A third claim is that diplomacy is not the exclusive activity of **sovereign states**; indeed, in a globalizing world, it is becoming less so. Rather, diplomacy is a process of communication and representation that facilitates social interaction between all human beings organized into groups that want to remain separate from, but have diplomatic relations with, other groups. Thus, as suggested by Costas Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp (2016), editors of *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, it may be more accurate to think about there being "diplomacies" rather than a singular notion of diplomacy. But while pluralizing or democratizing the diplomacy concept sounds appealing, such reconceptualizing carries the risk, according to Ann-Marie Slaughter, that "[t]oday readers of the popular press could be excused for thinking that diplomacy is conducted by everyone else but diplomats" (2015: 451).

Contemporary Trends and Challenges

In the first edition, we suggested that five current contextual trends make diplomacy an imperative and yet present it with enormous challenges. While we believe these trends and the challenges they pose continue to be relevant, we also take account of the increasing complexity and uncertainty in international and domestic contexts.

The first trend is globalization and its practical effects. In the ancient past, as Cohen points out in chapter 1, borders were "divinely ordained and inviolable," a norm that continued to hold sway for centuries. In the contemporary globalization context, borders, theoretically, are neither as divine nor as inviolable as they once were. Anthony Gidden's (1990: 64) description of globalization offers one insight into why this is so—namely, that globalization is "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring in other parts of the world and vice versa." Different types of connections are being forged between a whole range of entities with influence or standing in world politics—states, nations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals. Using technologies provided by the revolutions in communications (for example, emails, mobile phones, and social media), information (for example, the Internet and cable and satellite news), and transportation (for example, rapid air travel), not only are these entities becoming more numerous but their interactions with each other are becoming more frequent. More actors, more issues, twenty-four-hour news coverage, and more bloggers make for greater complexity in world politics and put unprecedented demands on state institutions, including diplomatic ones.

One conceptual challenge posed by the influence of non-state actors on states' policies is how to understand the principle of **sovereignty** that is the foundation of the modern institution of diplomacy. Events such as the British public's 2016 referendum vote in favor of leaving the European Union (EU) and the 2016 election of Donald Trump as US President appear to constitute a populist trend toward renewed support for the sovereignty principle and diminishing interest in globalization. Civil society in these cases exercised electoral influence over the type of governance the United Kingdom and the United States pursue, and this has implications for diplomacy—for example, the United Kingdom's numerous treaties with the EU and the United States' diplomatic relationship with China. More generally, what remains apparent is that the different interests or values of many non-state actors challenge states' control over the ranking of their interests, over what is deemed to be high and low politics. Shifts in the status of diplomatic issues to be negotiated are evident; for example, diplomats are now negotiating ways to reduce the impact of climate change more robustly than in the past. The success in 2015 of the twenty-first session of the United Nations (UN) Conference of the Parties on climate change in Paris was an outcome due in no small part to decades of expert research and lobbying by environmental non-state organizations of states' foreign and environmental ministries and to the ensuing execution of the widely praised diplomatic strategy by the French hosts, in particular the French foreign minister Laurent Fabius. The public's opinion matters to diplomatic practices today more than it did in the past, but exactly how much it does so is still unclear. How much it should, and over what issues, is controversial in many parts of the world.

A second challenging trend for diplomacy is how global actors will manage the shared problems of the more interdependent world resulting from globalization. **Interdependence** may still be a contentious concept, but it accurately explains the present situation in which countries depend on each other to resolve problems they have in common, such as economic instability, energy security, climate change, international terrorism, and at times, pandemics. Moreover, the practical management of these shared problems shows that there are multiple interdependent stakeholders—public actors, such as governments and IGOs, and private actors, such as NGOs, corporations, and civil society groups, including terrorists. Among the challenges that interdependence poses for diplomacy is how are the collective interests of multiple stakeholders to be negotiated? Is inclusive multilateral diplomacy involving all kinds of stakeholders concerned with a particular issue an effective way of management? If not, what are the options? Are international organizations, such as the UN, which have taken the lead on collective interests, capable of effective diplomacy? Even though the UN's diplomatic consultation for the Sustainable Development Goals was the largest in the its history, and the seventeen goals negotiated and agreed upon by 150 world leaders at the 2015 UN Summit provide unprecedented legitimacy, will this help the UN's diplomatic implementation of such a diverse and demanding set of goals? Is the **Group of Twenty (G20)**, as a novel, informal IGO representing the economic collective interests of states, capable of diplomacy that reflects the often uneven economic interdependence of societies in both developed and developing states? (See Woolcock, chapter 12 in this volume.) More fundamentally, is the British public's support for Brexit and President Trump's election explained by Adam Watson's (1982: 181) percipient observation that interdependence is "destroying the validity of such concepts as national interests, and such cherished ideals as independence and freedom, or even undermining the state as we know it"? In short, conflicting trends in globalization and interdependence make the international context more complex and pose significant challenges for diplomats.

A third challenging trend for diplomacy is how it will balance the often competing forces of globalization and regionalization. Some regional institutions are playing a greater diplomatic role today than in the past. Despite recent worrying developments, the EU remains the most developed hub of regional diplomacy. While still a work in progress, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its head, the EU's High Representative for foreign, security, and defense policies (currently Federica Mogherini), have unprecedented diplomatic roles—for example, routinely coordinating and representing twenty-eight (expected soon to be twenty-seven) member countries' interests and values on a myriad of issues to the rest of the world (see Bátora, chapter 17 in this volume).

Other regions are not as coherent as the EU, and indeed, some, like the Middle East, are marked by complex traditional interstate and intersocial diplomatic tensions, often complicated by the violent intervention of national and international non-state rebel groups (of which Islamic State is just one) as well as traditional outside powers (including Russia). Tragically, violent conflict in many parts of the Middle East appears resistant to both regional and global diplomacy.

East Asia is the fastest-growing economic region, and its economic diplomacy is both regionally and globally focused. However, its regional economic diplomacy is based more on national interests than on principles of East Asian integration and an East Asian community—far from the best aspirations of the EU model. This tension between national and regional interests is arguably accentuated by the relationship that regional institutions have with the UN, especially with regard to diplomatic management of conflict. The main Southeast Asia institution, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, had to rely on the UN for managing the 1999 crisis in East Timor, and the UN had to rely on the Australian government and the Australian Defence Force to lead the intervention into what was then an Indonesian province. Globalization has by no means ruled out considerable regional variations in the conduct of diplomacy.

A fourth challenging trend for diplomacy is that more and more global actors are demanding that diplomacy, rather than military force, be used to settle differences. There is a growing view, captured by Nicholas Burns at Harvard's Future Diplomacy Project, that what we are seeing is "the return of diplomacy as the principle vehicle for international politics today" (Future of Diplomacy Project 2010). However, as realists readily remind us, and as North Korea's nuclear program and the ongoing wars in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa demonstrate, using force remains an option frequently adopted by state and non-state actors. Moreover, the connections between the diplomat and the soldier, as Raymond Aron (1966: 5) noted many years ago, are symbolically close: "The Ambassador, in the exercise of his duties, is the political unit in whose name he speaks; the soldier on the battlefield is the political unit in whose name he kills his opposite number." Most contemporary diplomats would be reluctant to surrender their option of last resort, **coercive diplomacy**: a strategy of sticks, comprising the threat or the limited use and demonstration of force, balanced with appropriate incentives and carrots. An entirely different perspective of the relationship between diplomacy and force is the present conundrum that diplomats confront when new (bad) non-state actors prefer to use violent means (for example, suicide bombing and improvised explosive devices) to achieve their objectives rather than to negotiate.

A fifth challenging trend for diplomacy in the contemporary global context is that the world is undergoing major power shifts, primarily from a US-centric world to a world of many powers (Christensen 2015; White 2015), and diplomats will need to figure out what role they can play in the emerging world order. The fastest-rising power is China, and following behind it are emerging economies such as India and Brazil. How and why China is responding to the contemporary and largely

US-dominant international order of norms, law, conventions, regimes, and practices is a hotly debated question. Another is how China is relating diplomatically to its own regional neighbors, and even to distant partners in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Already, many countries in East Asia justify their defense budgets, force structures, and military strategies—implicitly or explicitly—on the basis of their assessment (generally provided by diplomats) of the evolving tense China-US diplomatic relationship. At the same time, regional countries "hedge" diplomatically, mindful of China's attractive economic diplomacy overtures. China's plans to build the infrastructure for two new Silk Roads—linking it by land to central Asia, Russia, and Europe and by sea to the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Middle East—is described as "the largest program of economic diplomacy since the US-led Marshall Plan" (Clover and Hornby 2015). The plan, sometimes called China's Great Game, a putative reenactment of Britain's and Russia's nineteenth-century battle for control over central Asia, could bolster China's **soft power** credentials and make it attractive to neighboring countries and many others further afield.

Nonetheless, the diplomatic management of China's maritime claims is becoming more challenging. In recent years, China's militarization of its claims in the South China Sea, based on its proposed and widely contested historic nine-dash line concept, is seen by many to be mounting evidence of China's provocative and assertive big power diplomacy. Concerns that China is not adhering to international conventions and law were raised by the Chinese foreign ministry's reaction to an international tribunal's ruling in 2016 against the legal validity of the nine-dash line. From China's perspective, the ruling is "null and has no binding force," and China "neither accepts nor recognizes it" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China 2016). It will be important for the United States and all regional countries to reflect on their own diplomatic practices and compliance with international law. They will need to consider measures that avoid hints that their own assertive diplomacy is not so different from China's. That said, China needs to appreciate the international conventions that have enabled its rise and the diplomatic concerns of the United States and its East Asian neighbors. More broadly, the uncertain power dynamics highlight the importance of understanding Asia, particularly East Asian approaches to diplomacy. Students of diplomacy will need to develop the intellectual and practical foundations to help understand the complexities of East Asia in order to manage major structural power change.

In sum, these five trends in the global context are becoming increasingly complex, and together, they are creating a level of uncertainty that presents challenges for diplomacy and diplomats. Exacerbating the situation is the uncertainty generated by the mixed messages about US international policy from, on the one hand, the Trump White House and, on the other, US agencies, notably the Department of State, whose influence appears diminished (Morello and Gearan 2017). Increasing complexity and uncertainty confirm rather than disconfirm the importance of measured diplomatic engagement and management. Other means, such as using force, are unlikely to be as effective. This book's premise, as stated earlier, is that the present context makes diplomacy perhaps the only sustainable option for managing differences between sociopolitical entities (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010).

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy has a long, complex, controversial, and fascinating history, one that predates the rise of the European state system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
- Today, several empirical trends—changing processes of globalization and interdependence as well as regionalization, the continuing use of force, and power shifts in world politics—are increasingly complex and challenge diplomacy yet also make it an imperative in world politics.

THE BOOK'S STRUCTURE, CHAPTER SUMMARIES, AND PEDAGOGICAL FEATURES

Part I

The book's four parts aim to encourage students to search for answers to the key questions we have raised. The first part explores some historical benchmarks against which we can analyze contemporary diplomacy. Chapter 1, by Raymond Cohen, begins diplomacy's story at its ancient origins some 4,500 years ago in Mesopotamia, now Iraq. When reading this chapter, students might ask such questions as: Do some of the rudimentary structures, processes, and instruments developed then and those that evolved subsequently—as part of the Western state system—have continuities with those in the present day? In what ways are the ancient and contemporary contexts different or similar? Does this long view suggest that some recent "innovations" are less revolutionary than we sometimes think?

Chapter 2, by Suisheng Zhao, establishes more recent historical benchmarks of diplomacy in another region of great contemporary importance, East Asia. It sketches how in the nineteenth century, Britain's introduction of Western state-based diplomacy, established in part on formal negotiated treaties, undermined China's ancient tributary system of relations with regional countries. The chapter then shows how in later periods, up to the end of the Cold War, the great powers in East Asia implemented their foreign policies through diplomatic practices that were connected to power politics, threats and the use of military force, and the negotiation and implementation of treaties that benefited the most powerful countries. Does diplomacy today continue to have these characteristics, or does it have different features? When thinking about "what diplomats do"—in this case, during the period prior to the Cold War—would the international order provided by the Washington treaty system have endured if in 1935 the US Department of State had followed the advice of its Ambassador to China, John Van Antwerp MacMurray? And was the decline of the Washington system an indication of competitive dynamics between states dominating possible cooperative international regimes?

Part II

Part II examines understandings of contemporary diplomacy from different theoretical and methodological perspectives. It invites readers to compare and contrast international relations theories that emphasize power politics, sociological understandings that stress relationships and norms, theories of globalization and global governance that highlight multiactor policy networks, and theories of diplomatic negotiation. It also invites readers to consider to what extent academic theories of diplomacy reflect the day-to-day world of practitioners and, if not, what might it add to academic understandings of the theory-practice nexus.

Part II begins with an analysis in chapter 3, by Paul Sharp, that canvasses how social theorists make sense of diplomacy. It examines the attractions and limitations of doing social and other types of theory. Some of the questions that this chapter pursues are: Does the sociological insight that, where people live in groups, feel separate from one another, and want to be so, mean there will be a need for good diplomacy now and in the future? If it does, can we also point to a diplomatic theory of international relations and human relations? How does this understanding of diplomacy compare with those in the realist, rationalist, and revolutionist traditions of international relations thinking? What does this comparison suggest about the theoretical evolution of diplomacy?

Chapter 4, by Geoffrey Allen Pigman, canvasses more broadly some of the principal academic debates surrounding contemporary diplomacy. These debates consider what counts as diplomacy, how it has changed over time, and how theory relates to practice. It challenges readers to consider how such debates might be resolved and how their resolution, or lack thereof, affects diplomatic practice. Do readers agree with the chapter's argument that, whether as voters, investors, shareholders, members of civil society organizations, or as practicing diplomats, members of the global public are all stakeholders with an interest in effective diplomacy? If so, what does this understanding of multi-stakeholder diplomacy imply for the question of which actors wield influence and for diplomacy's future boundaries?

Chapter 5, by Bertrand Badie, examines the contextual factors of contemporary diplomacy, globalization, and global governance, again from a sociological perspective. It focuses on new non-state social actors and what is conceptualized as their new "social routes," suggesting that such pathways indicate an emerging global order that incorporates a new set of relationships, or what might be called "intersocial relations," between peoples, groups, and sovereign states. If, as this chapter argues, social actors are emancipating themselves from state control and influence, then students may wish to consider not just how much influence these actors have over states today but also how this development compares with more traditional perspectives of diplomacy (for example, those established in part I and in the next chapter).

Chapter 6, by I. William Zartman, invites readers to consider a particular traditional perspective of contemporary diplomacy which argues that diplomacy in a globalizing world is primarily about negotiation and that negotiation is the primary business of foreign policy and international relations. To appreciate this perspective, the chapter examines different strategies of negotiation and mediation and the challenges these processes confront in trying to resolve contemporary issues such as intrastate conflicts, which are the cause of much human insecurity, and problems that involve many stakeholders and require multilateral negotiation. Globalization has also given rise to a new challenge for diplomatic negotiators, international terrorism. Given these challenges, will the future of diplomacy—understood as negotiation—depend on prevention—that is, on handling conflicts before they become violent, keeping violent conflicts from escalating, and moving conflicts and problems from management to resolution? More broadly, might this understanding of diplomacy-as-negotiation be reflected in subsequent chapters, such as the idea, advanced in chapter 12, that negotiation is the essential definition of economic diplomacy? Another consideration is how might diplomats affect the practical processes of negotiations—for example, how the three senior women diplomats involved in the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran were instrumental in the successful outcome, despite the differing views on gender between Iran and other countries.

Part III

Building on the previous historical and theoretical parts of the book, part III analyzes in detail the arguments and evidence for answering the key questions about diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Each of the eight chapters in this part analyzes particular structures, processes, and instruments of contemporary diplomacy, including their evolution, potential, limitations, and future. Readers are invited to consider whether the arguments and evidence about diplomacy in a changing, globalizing world sustain the concept of complex diplomacy.

Chapter 7, by Brian Hocking, explores the best-known, and still the most significant, diplomatic structure: the ministry of foreign affairs and its network of overseas missions, the traditional sites of state-to-state representation and the preferred, professional habitat of diplomats. However, in the present context, where the conduct of international policy takes place in overlapping and integrated foreign and domestic spheres, Hocking argues that the foreign ministry is a subsystem of a broader and dynamic "national diplomatic system" (NDS) comprising many actors and issues. How are professional diplomats adapting their diplomatic structures and roles to operate in this new environment of change and continuity and multiactor policy networks? Does the growing intricacy of the integrated foreign and domestic spheres that the NDS term encapsulates suggest that there is, indeed, value in our complex diplomacy conceptualization?

Chapter 8, by Jovan Kurbalija, examines the impact of the Internet and new technologies on diplomacy. It argues that the Internet significantly affects the environment in which diplomacy is conducted, that the diplomatic agenda is being expanded by Internet-driven topics, and that Internet-driven tools affect the practice of diplomacy. Yet, are the changes so substantively different and of such a scale that contemporary diplomacy has little in common with previous practices? Or perhaps, as chapter 1 implies, innovative developments are less revolutionary than we assume, regardless of such change? As the chapter concludes, technologies have brought about change, yet examining what diplomats do shows that they also continue to perform the core diplomatic functions. Is this an example of the mix of old and new practices that complex diplomacy incorporates?

Chapter 9's examination of ancient consular processes and the role of consuls—protecting nationals and promoting trade—is the historical background against which contemporary practices are analyzed. Halvard Leira and Iver B. Neumann show that consuls perform important functions in the international system. However, their roles are not well understood, and they are often seen as subordinate to diplomats. But should the functions of consuls be examined from a diplomatic perspective? Do changes toward a less sovereignty-oriented, globalizing world of commercial transactions and travel, as well as increasing international legal structures, indicate that the importance of consuls is being recognized at last? If so, what does this suggest for our understanding of contemporary diplomacy?

Chapter 10, by Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut, explores bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through the lens of what is called "practice theory," an intriguing intellectual effort to narrow the theory-practice divide by theorizing, rather than isolating, practice. As the authors describe, practices are socially meaningful and organized patterns of routine activities. Significantly, the chapter argues, routine practices can help explain larger phenomena in world politics, such as war and cooperation. Bilaterally, the chapter demonstrates how everyday reporting practices in selected embassies in Cairo during the 2011 popular uprising impacted foreign-policy decision making and crisis management in home capitals. Multilaterally, the chapter argues that the behavior of permanent representatives to international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, helps explain the sources of informal hierarchy on the world stage. Thus, when these multilateral diplomats go about their daily diplomatic business, they do not interact with other diplomats in ways that mirror their country's relative power capabilities (as realists would predict); rather, they (re)produce through individual agency an informal hierarchy of influence known as the "international pecking order."

Chapter 11, by Jan Melissen, discusses one of the most vibrant debates in current diplomacy studies: the reemerging practice of public diplomacy. The chapter traces the evolution of public diplomacy to its present practices and shows how it can involve many different actors besides states. Students might ask if such a divergence of actors and processes suggests that public diplomacy is a difficult area around which to place definitional and practical boundaries. If it is, then does this substantiate the argument that diplomatic practice is constantly in flux, moving forward rather than always connecting with past processes, as some previous chapters, particularly those in part I, suggest? Or does it suggest that although diplomatic practice is often in flux, it also simultaneously maintains many practices from the past, as the complex diplomacy concept suggests? This question might be informed by the observation in the chapter that examining how diplomats use interactive social media tends to support the view that their two-way interaction with publics, domestic or foreign, continues to be limited.

Chapter 12, by Stephen Woolcock, examines economic diplomacy. The chapter stresses that the term should be understood as a process of decision making and negotiation in core issues of international economic relations. It shows that in the recent past, economic diplomacy has become even more important as the international (or global) economy becomes increasingly multipolar, requiring negotiated outcomes among states with diverse interests. Furthermore, economic diplomacy involves a wide variety of actors beyond professional MFA diplomats and should focus on negotiations that support an open, rule-based international economic order. The chapter asks whether there is something distinctive about economic diplomacy as opposed to general diplomacy (chapter 9 raises similar questions about consular diplomacy). Does the fact that economic diplomacy involves such a diverse range of actors, is shaped by and shapes developments in markets to such a degree that markets become "actors," and is more concerned with negotiating regimes mean that it is different from general diplomacy? And does this aspect of economic diplomacy suggest an interaction between context—in this case, the market—and the diverse range of actors involved in economic diplomacy? If so, what is the effect of this interaction? Readers also might compare the arguments in this chapter and in chapter 9 about the centrality of negotiation and consider their implications for understanding contemporary diplomacy.

Chapter 13, a new contribution by Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns, examines women's participation in diplomacy, arguing that historically and contemporaneously, diplomacy is a gendered institution. The gendered nature of diplomacy is explored through three dimensions: as an institution, as a process of continuity and change, and as a practice. The chapter's focus on the practice of negotiation raises important questions about the conditions under which it may be possible to distinguish gender styles and trace their effect on diplomatic processes and outcomes, a subject that, while requiring much more research, will help students appreciate the debate about the extent to which diplomatic negotiators have agency within negotiations. Does the concept of complex diplomacy help to highlight gender-based agency, and if so, to what extent are structures gendered?

Chapter 14, another new contribution, by Australian scholar-diplomat Michael L'Estrange, centers on the puzzle of whether force and coercion are stark alternatives to diplomacy or whether force and coercion are better seen as viable policy options on a force-diplomacy continuum that, when judiciously combined with diplomatic instruments, can lead to more coherent strategy. The question goes to the heart of the meaning of diplomacy at a time of change, when states dealing with intrastate, violent non-state actors and international terrorists do not always have a monopoly over the use of force or control over territorial sovereignty. Changing, and also continuing, contexts help to shape the interaction between diplomacy and force and show how twenty-first century diplomats have additional challenges in managing different levels of violence beyond that of a state-to-state war.

Part IV

The book's fourth and final part examines three levels of contemporary diplomatic practice: the national practices of two major states, the United States and China; the diplomatic practices of several regional institutions; and the practices of the most important international institution, the UN.

Chapter 15, by Alan K. Henrikson, traces and assesses the conceptual foundations and progression of American diplomacy from the Cold War period to the present day through the lenses of three major US foreign policy ideas: containment, transformation, and engagement. It suggests that the United States now is diplomatically "engaged" almost everywhere, arguing that the term "engagement" has become almost a policy in itself. The chapter analyzes why this has happened and whether "engagement" has its limits, especially with large, powerful, and non-like-minded states. Students might ask if diplomatic process ever substitutes for foreign policy—for actual strategy aimed at well-targeted objectives—or must the goals of policy be well identified for engagement diplomacy to succeed? And how will the Trump presidency impact American diplomatic engagement with the world?

Chapter 16, by Zhang Qingmin, revisits China's diplomacy, building on the historical examination in chapter 2 and analyzing that country's contemporary practices. The chapter traces China's changing diplomatic goals and strategies since 1978, when Beijing widened its diplomatic engagement with the world. It argues that China's diplomacy is concerned with the implementation of its foreign policies and that its diplomacy changes with changes in foreign policy. China's diplomacy, it is argued, was and continues to be most focused on China's economic construction, one of its core national interests. A number of actors, particularly the Chinese Communist Party and the President, have a stronger role in the implementation of China's policies than does the Chinese MFA. Looking ahead, of much interest to readers is President Xi Jinping's call in 2014 for "a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting [China's] role as a major country . . . conducting diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision" (*People's Daily* 2014a). What does this statement tell us about China's diplomacy in general, and in comparison to that of the United States, does it challenge American hegemony? To what extent does this apparent change in China's diplomacy reflect China's changing domestic and international contexts, and is complex diplomacy's focus on adaptivity helpful in this respect?

Chapter 17, by Jozef Bátora, gives an overview of the diplomatic structures and processes within several regional institutions to provide a much-needed analysis of "regional diplomacy." It argues that there is a global trend toward increased regional diplomatic institutions and processes, often inspired and catalyzed by developments in the EU, although not necessarily slavishly copying the European "model." One question that students may wish to ask is, if the relationship between regional institutional diplomacy and state-based diplomacy is often a tense one, then can effective regional diplomacy be realistically pursued?

Chapter 18, by Geoffrey Wiseman and Soumita Basu, traces the evolution of diplomatic activities at the UN from its founding in 1945, including the growing significance of NGOs. Can we now understand UN diplomacy not so much from the perspective of a traditional, exclusive diplomatic corps but as an emerging, inclusive "diplomatic community"? The chapter considers the extent to which the norms of the UN diplomatic community are capable of transcending national interests and thereby securing more broadly conceived goals of international peace and progress.

Pedagogical Features

To further engage students and teachers, and in keeping with other volumes in the same series, the book offers two pedagogical tools. The first (found at the back of the book) is a general glossary of widely used diplomatic and international relations terms, as well as some special short glossaries of terms peculiar to certain chapter topics (found within those chapters). The glossaries are important because one of the challenges of a book compiled by many authors is that some key terms are used in different ways. For example, terms such as "nation-state," "sovereign state," and "statecraft" are the subject of debate among our authors, just as they are in other literatures on diplomacy and international relations. We believe that such contestation is to be encouraged and is part of the intellectual milieu that students will encounter when studying diplomacy. To help students appreciate the complexity and subtlety of such debates, we have put key terms in quotation marks where the meaning is reasonably clear from the text and put other key terms, not fully defined in the text, in bold typeface and compiled them in the two types of glossaries just described. The second pedagogical tool comprises a "reader's guide" (at the beginning of each chapter), "key points" (at the end of each chapter section), as well as "questions" and a "guide to further reading" (at the end of each chapter). There are also brief introductions at the start of each of the four parts of the book which remind students about the big questions and how each part orientates them to find answers.

We hope readers will enjoy this second edition as much as we enjoyed producing it!

NOTES

1. The new journal is *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, published by Brill. Recent publications include Bjola and Murray (2016); Bjola and Holmes (2015); Bjola and Kornprobst (2013); Cooper, Heine, and Thakur (2013); Constantinou, Kerr, and Sharp (2016); Hare (2015); Hocking and Melissen (2015); Pouliot (2016b); Robertson (2016); and Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann (2015).
2. The "diplomacy puzzle" refers not to a situation that is counterintuitive or apparently contradictory but to one that is unclear, confusing, and often the subject of debate.

PART I

The Historical Evolution of Diplomacy

In this first part of the book, we provide some historical accounts that will help place our contemporary examination of diplomacy in an empirical and theoretical context. We have two aims.

The *first* is to offer an account of the ancient practices of diplomacy in Europe and what is now known as the Middle East; explain how these practices evolved into a complex practical institution in Europe integral to the seventeenth-century Westphalian sovereign-states system; and show how these transformed practices were introduced to, and subsequently adopted by, East Asian countries in the nineteenth century. By tracing continuities and changes in diplomatic practices across historical time and geographic space, readers will be in a better position to compare and contrast how diplomatic practices have evolved and adapted in different contexts and how they are likely to evolve in future.

The *second* is for you to consider the extent to which such historical perspectives inform the important claim that we can theorize diplomacy as being more than relations between sovereign states. In this view, diplomacy is a broad institution designed to communicate and represent both the interests and identities of sovereigns of all political units (tribes in the past, sovereign states today), and it is performed by a special group of individuals, or accredited representatives. These representatives can variously be located at home or abroad, adhering to agreed-upon conventions and enjoying special immunities. The many elements built into this claim will serve as theoretical benchmarks for judging the increasing complexity of contemporary diplomacy, which we suggest the concept of "complex diplomacy"—with its focus on hyperconnectivity, adaptiveness, and diversity—helps to explain.

CHAPTER 1

Diplomacy through the Ages

Raymond Cohen

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Ancient Near Eastern diplomacy
- Classical diplomacy
- European diplomacy
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter presents the "big picture," tracing the history of diplomacy from earliest times. It shows how some of the major tools of diplomacy already existed in rudimentary form thousands of years ago and evolved very gradually in response to changing needs. By taking the long view, we place modern-day diplomacy in perspective, suggesting that some recent "innovations" are less revolutionary than we sometimes think.

INTRODUCTION

Since the dawn of recorded history 4,500 years ago, **sovereigns** have conducted their relations through official emissaries. From the beginning, they attached the utmost importance to relationships with other sovereigns, because they considered themselves to belong to an extended family and needed things, both intangible and tangible recognition and approval as well as goods and soldiers, from each other. Since they could hardly communicate in person, they were obliged to do this through surrogates.

This chapter tracks the development of diplomacy since the emergence of urban civilization long ago in ancient Mesopotamia. Clearly, the **norms**, institutions, and instruments of diplomacy have evolved over time. Diplomats rely today on digital means of communication rather than clay tablets. At the same time, diplomacy's main tools, such as **protocol**, the **note**, and the **treaty**, are marked by surprising continuity. This, then, is an exercise in political embryology: observing the progress of an organism from its first appearance to its latest manifestation in accordance with a certain consistent, internal logic.

ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN DIPLOMACY

The earliest evidence of diplomacy appears in royal inscriptions dedicated to the gods found in the ruins of ancient cities dotting the fertile plains between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers of southern Mesopotamia, now modern Iraq. Written in wedge-shaped, cuneiform script in the Sumerian language, they date to about 2500 BC and refer to relations between city-states. Armed struggles, coalitions, border disputes, and "arbitration" awards—the settlement of a dispute by a third party—are among the subjects touched upon. Royal "envoys," or messengers, are explicitly mentioned. A king of Lagash sends his envoys to Umma, calling on the city to surrender or face annihilation. Yet for all the warfare, there is a strong normative sense of order. In the rhetoric of the inscriptions, borders are divinely ordained and inviolable. Only defensive war is permissible. The kings of Lagash and Uruk agree to establish brotherhood between them (Altman 2004).

A diplomatic message from this period written on a baked clay tablet using wedge-shaped, cuneiform characters was sent from Ebla in Syria to Hamazi in Iran. The royal envoy carried it in a pouch slung around his neck on a round trip of 2,000 kilometers. On arrival, the messenger would have been received in audience, read out the message, and then expanded on it orally, answering questions. The tablet reflects basic features of early "cuneiform diplomacy": a network of city-states served by messengers, sometimes traveling long distances; a working relationship between kings bound by ties of brotherhood; the obligation to reciprocity; a palace bureaucracy that dispatched (and received) envoys, and recorded and filed documents; a code of correct international custom—"protocol"—including polite forms of address; an ethic of communication and negotiation; a system of correspondence based on conventional forms and the use of an international language; and the exchange of gifts.

Underpinning the transaction is the apparatus of Mesopotamian governance: states, the brotherhood of kings, a set of norms governing royal relationships, bureaucracies, and scribal schools teaching cuneiform script, not to mention far-flung land routes and extensive trade. Although the outward appearance of ancient Near Eastern diplomacy may be rudimentary, its assumptions about the world of interstate relations prefigure our own international system. It was so well adapted that it lasted for 2,000 years.

Cuneiform diplomacy entered a new phase with Sargonic hegemony, in the period 2334–2113 BC. At its height, Sargon of Akkad's dynasty governed a vast empire, from Iran to the Mediterranean. Akkadian became the international language for 2,000 years, and cuneiform diplomacy was refined and spread across the ancient Near East and beyond. The Sargonic dynasty introduced the international treaty, consisting of parallel declarations made separately by both kings to each other's envoys. One treaty is believed to involve a marriage **alliance** and contains what was to become the classic formula: "Your friend is my friend; your enemy is my enemy." Another contemporaneous treaty from Ebla in northern Syria contained commercial provisions, granting foreign merchants **extraterritorial rights** and dealing with taxation of foreigners, trade, and damages. The parties to the treaty were the city-states and not their kings. If this reading is correct, then this implies that states were considered legal personalities—advanced legal thinking for the time (Altman 2005).

An oath and a contingent curse strengthen the treaties' force. Archaeologists found a treaty in a ruined temple. These measures reflected the primacy assigned by the peoples of the ancient Near East to the role of the gods in interstate relations. A ruler represented the god of his city on earth, and the deities controlled human affairs. At the heart of public life was service to the gods; religion and politics were intertwined. From 2000 BC Ur, there is evidence of foreign envoys regularly participating at major festivals. Because some names occur repeatedly in the records, T. M. Sharlach (2005) suggests that although not permanently resident, their regular presence may indicate the existence of an identifiable "diplomatic corps," a community of ambassadors in the one city, possibly receiving accommodation and certainly enjoying hospitality from the palace, including rations, servants, and gifts. Foreign affairs were handled by a state secretariat responsible for sending royal emissaries. It also assisted foreign ambassadors, interpreted for them, and mediated between them and other officials. The treatment of ambassadors was strictly regulated by protocol. Significantly, the same word was used for both correct international custom and proper cultic practice in the temple.

From the archives of Mari (ca. 1700–1670 BC), contemporary with the Babylonian lawgiver Hammurabi, we observe an even more advanced stage in the development of ancient Near Eastern diplomacy. Envoys are now ranked from plain messenger to "ambassador plenipotentiary," an individual who could negotiate and conclude an agreement. Important delegations may consist of hundreds of people—secretaries, guards, and servants. Some officials are explicitly called the king's "personal representatives" and receive the prostrations due to their sovereign. Bertrand Lafont (2001) argues that ambassadors enjoyed inviolability according to correct international custom. David Elgavish (2000) agrees that they were entitled to protection from harm but doubts that they possessed formal **diplomatic immunity** in the modern sense and could have been detained.

An early **diplomatic passport** and **letters of accreditation** identifying their bearers were found at Mari. There was also a guesthouse for visiting diplomats. The simultaneous presence of the emissaries of different kings at royal audiences again suggests the existence of a diplomatic corps. Some remained for many years at their post and were effectively resident. Besides public audiences, there were also closed encounters, where secret diplomacy might be conducted. Diplomatic hints were dropped through nuances of protocol. Banquets, governed by minute etiquette, were occasions for bestowing favors, such as ceremonial garments, scented oils, and choice delicacies. Royal gifts were exchanged. Tearing a ceremonial garment expressed extreme displeasure.

Three hundred years after Hammurabi, a truly multicultural diplomatic system spanning three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa—came into existence. The Age of the Amarna Archive (named after the village in Middle Egypt where hundreds of cuneiform tablets from the fourteenth century BC were discovered) was a period of unprecedented stability. For the duration of the system (ca. 1460–1220 BC), only one major war broke out. Six "great kings" are mentioned in the Amarna letters, each with his own language, culture, and gods. Their **vassals** were not allowed to maintain independent diplomatic relations. Small trading states also played a part.

Several factors have been credited with maintaining peace: Parity between the powers, spheres of influence, and buffer zones all doubtless contributed. Contemporaries did not think in **balance of power** terms but resisted expansionist powers. There was a strong sense of brotherhood among the "great kings." The legitimacy of one strengthened the other. Their letters concern both family and politics. Dynastic marriages, visits by envoys to life-cycle events, gift giving on a grand scale, the dispatch of physicians and cultic objects, and a plentiful supply of Egyptian gold all helped to cement ties. By now, there was also a body of customary law, deriving from treaties, norms of conduct, and extensive precedent, regulating interstate relations and facilitating trade (Cohen 1996).

At the heart of the Amarna great peace was the **emissary**, possessing refined diplomatic skills. When he completed a mission, his counterpart accompanied him on the way home. As a negotiation proceeded, the two colleagues would travel back and forth between their respective capitals. The Amarna Archive has preserved the names of such a pair of highly esteemed envoys—Mane and Keliya—negotiating a marriage alliance between Egypt and Mittani.

Ancient Near Eastern diplomacy lasted for another 600 years, although it never regained the ecumenism of the Amarna Age. With the rise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire (911–612 BC), the international system shifted from one of strategic parity to imperial **hegemony**. Reciprocity remained a central ethic, but now it was protection in return for loyalty. Nevertheless, the themes of the old diplomacy remained—the brotherhood of kings, a foreign service run by the palace, the to-and-fro of messengers and emissaries, gift exchange, dynastic marriages, treaties under oath, correct international custom, and the intertwining of diplomacy and ritual.

The "great tradition" is prominently displayed in the Bible, where the diplomatic activities of the kings of Israel and Judah conform to the operating procedures of ancient Near Eastern diplomacy. King David (ca. 1040–970 BC) sends a delegation to Hanun, king of Ammon, to offer condolences on the death of his father. This is a conventional family life-cycle visit intended to initiate brotherly ties—that is, diplomatic relations—between the thrones. Ammonite officials accuse David's men of being spies and cut off half their ceremonial garments and beards, a diplomatic rebuff. They do not physically harm them. Still, war results.

Under David's son Solomon, the united kingdom of Israel and Judah is accepted as a legitimate diplomatic actor. On Solomon's accession, Hiram, the king of Tyre, sends a delegation to the new king, thereby recognizing him diplomatically. They then negotiate terms for building the temple: timber delivered on site in exchange for wheat and oil. Solomon subsequently allies himself with the king of Egypt by taking his daughter's hand in marriage, another act typical of the ancient Near Eastern diplomatic tradition, although unprecedented for Pharaoh, the mighty Egyptian god-king.

There was a linguistic shift in the eighth century BC when Akkadian—old Assyrian—was displaced by Aramaic, which used a consonantal alphabet, not cuneiform. The significance of communication in the new international language is reflected in the biblical account of the Assyrian siege of Jerusalem in 701 BC. The Assyrian official Rabshakeh addresses the Jerusalem populace from outside the wall. Speaking in Judean, he attempts to persuade them to surrender with a mixture of threats and promises. This direct appeal bypassing officials is an early example of public diplomacy. King Hezekiah of Judah's officials beg Rabshakeh to address them in the diplomatic language, saying, "Please speak to your servants in Aramaic, which we understand, and not in Judean to the people on the wall." Rabshakeh declines, presumably to keep up the pressure on the palace. Assyria eventually withdrew when Hezekiah agreed to pay a huge tribute.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomatic messages and treaties have been found by archaeologists in the Middle East dating back to around 2500 BC, the period when urban civilization emerged.
- Diplomacy took the form of the exchange of letters and gifts carried by royal envoys; a body of customary law and protocol governed it.
- Kings used diplomacy to promote their personal relations and the interests of the city-states over which they ruled.

CLASSICAL DIPLOMACY

The Neo-Assyrian Empire was eventually conquered by Babylonia. With the rise of Cyrus the Great (558–529 BC), Assyria and Babylonia became provinces of the vast Achaemenid Persian Empire. Darius I (522–486 BC) added Egypt and northern India to the imperial crown and invaded Greece.

The substance of Persian statecraft was conquest and dominion, not negotiation with equals. Still, the forms of ancient Near Eastern diplomacy were maintained, and Darius adopted Aramaic as the official language of administration. To rule the empire, a continental network of roads was laid and a royal mail organized. Envoys traveled safely from the Persian capital Susa to Kandahar, a distance of 2,000 kilometers. Persia's attitude toward the quarrelsome Greek polities was patrician, and even the Greeks called the Persian monarch the Great King. Persia shifted its support from one polity to another and occasionally arbitrated in quarrels between them. Vassal **satraps** ruled Greek communities in Asia Minor, but supervision of mainland Greek affairs was left to the leading Greek power. Treaties of peace or alliance were made at different times, such as a series of treaties with Sparta in 412–411 BC. Their texts lack customary ancient Near Eastern formulas, such as affirmations of love and brotherhood, but there is ample evidence of Greek familiarity with the interstate treaty.

The Persians were bemused by Greek customs, such as the central role of oratory in their public life, disregard of correct international custom, and undiplomatic effrontery. Cyrus listened in astonishment to a Spartan herald's impudent speech, Herodotus tells us. When Darius I sent his emissaries to demand tribute of Athens and Sparta, they were put to death. At a later date, the Spartans attributed a series of calamities to their impious act and sent volunteers to offer themselves as scapegoats in expiation of the sin. Received by Xerxes (486–465 BC), the Spartan envoys declined to prostrate themselves before the king of kings. This was not their custom, they said; they had come to make atonement with their lives. Appalled at their lack of sophistication, Xerxes refused the offer. He would not imitate Spartan ignorance of "the law of mankind" (Herodotus 1925).

At the very end, following his defeat in 333 BC by Alexander of Macedonia at the battle of Issus and the seizure of his mother, wife, and children, Darius III finally adopted the language of diplomatic parity. Writing to Alexander as a brother Great King, he offered to renew their fathers' "ancient friendship and alliance." But Alexander now considered himself Darius's superior and contemptuously rejected a final offer of vast lands, a fortune in gold, and his daughter's hand in marriage, bringing the curtain down on 2,000 years of ancient Near Eastern diplomacy. Greek culture had supplanted that of Asia.

Diplomacy in ancient Greece was designed to handle matters among the Greek polities rather than to conduct international affairs. At one time, though, according to Hans Güterbock (1983), Achaean Greece, on the northern Peloponnese coast, belonged to the fourteenth-century BC brotherhood of Amarna states. Greek treaty terminology confirms this. The unusual Greek term for treaty, literally "bond and oath," follows Hittite legal idiom, as did the injunction "to serve or to help with all one's might and power, with all one's heart and soul." There is also the expression in intra-Greek alliance treaties and loyalty oaths, first appearing in third-millennium BC treaties as noted earlier, "to be a friend to friends and an enemy to enemies" (Weinfeld 1973: 198).

Structural factors limited the scope of Greek diplomacy. There were hundreds of Greek polities preoccupied with local concerns. They did not consider diplomacy a distinct role of government, and decisions were made by public assembly, ruling out secret diplomacy. There was no system for collecting and collating intelligence or preserving records. Envoys were worthy citizens sent on single missions, rarely experienced diplomats. They were given simple, brief instructions with little scope for initiative, and returning envoys might have the fruits of their mission overturned in assembly. Classical Greek had no specialized vocabulary of statecraft and used the same word for envoy as for elder: *presbeis* (Osborne 2008: 218).

The practice of Greek diplomacy was quite rudimentary. Until the Hellenistic era (ca. 323–146 BC), formal letters—the hallmark of the Amarna Archive—were not sent. **Envoys**, often well-known orators, engaged in advocacy rather than in negotiation. Treaties were brief and generalized. Other major divergences from past international custom were the relative absence of protocol and formal procedure, low-key hospitality, and avoiding gifts. A shared feature, though, was the swearing of treaty-oaths and the sanctity of the herald, who was protected by the gods. He declared war, requested a truce, and opened peace talks (Osborne 2008: 217). Nevertheless, diplomats were not inviolate, and Sparta and Athens occasionally put each other's envoys to death (Adcock and Mosley 1975: 172, 229).

Compared with Persian cosmopolitanism, Greek diplomacy was provincial and unpolished. Yet it did possess forward-looking institutions. Besides the provision for dispute settlement by arbitration, there was the resident consul, or *proxenos*, a citizen of the host state whose job was to look after visitors from the state he represented (also see Leira and Neumann, chapter 9 in this volume). Most original was the practice of multilateral diplomacy. Invented by Sparta in the sixth century BC, multilateral alliances were meant to provide security or maintain the common peace. The Second Athenian Confederacy (378–355 BC) was set up as a defensive alliance against Sparta. Based on the principles of freedom and autonomy, Athens had a decisive voice, although the confederacy also had a common assembly in which each member state had one vote (Adcock and Mosley 1975: 239–43).

English-language historians of diplomacy begin their story with the Greeks because of familiarity with the classics and lack of acquaintance with ancient Near Eastern texts. Greek diplomacy is interesting in its own right and sometimes anticipated modern diplomacy. Well into the modern age, authors mined the classical Greek historians for lessons and precedents. Greek diplomacy is one link between the Mesopotamian and European traditions.

Rome rose to world power through war but was ready to achieve its goals peacefully. During the Republic (509–44 BC), Rome conquered the Italian peninsula by war interspersed by diplomacy, which was less wasteful and provided a breathing space. By 264 BC, more than 150 treaties of alliance had been concluded (B. Campbell 2001: 4). With the onset of empire, diplomacy became largely the vehicle for managing relations with subject peoples. Caesar Augustus (27 BC–AD 14) received numerous embassies during his reign, from provinces, client states, and even places as distant as Britain, Ethiopia, and India. But they came to pay tribute, request favors, or pay homage (Millar 1988: 349–51). The key word was *amicitia*, friendship, signifying loyalty to Rome. Foreign kings were "friends," not brothers.

Roman diplomacy borrowed from Greek practice. The Republic used Greek models, including arbitration, in its alliances with Greek states. It adopted the Greek formula "friendship for all time" in the peace of Apamea concluded with the Seleucid Empire in 188 BC (Gruen 2004: 259–60). Greek was the administrative language of the Roman Empire in the east and was the diplomatic language used in Roman official contacts with Parthia and Sassanid Persia. Roman embassies, like those of Greece, were ad hoc; high-ranking court officials and generals were chosen for important diplomatic missions. Unlike Greece, Rome had no need for the *proxenos* system of resident consuls. At any one time, imperial Rome housed numerous foreign dignitaries. These had no representative function but received a Roman education in preparation for their return home as loyal friends, imbued with Roman culture. Assemblies of the people did not receive embassies, even under the Republic. Later, the emperor received embassies in person, which could be awkward if he was on tour. Traditionally, the senate was also supposed to send and receive embassies, but this practice gradually atrophied. Provincial governors often sent diplomatic delegations.

Imperial Rome paid great attention to pomp and circumstance. Visiting ambassadors were received with meticulous protocol. They were entitled to a safe conduct, respectful treatment, and their upkeep. Rome had no time for rough-spun Greek hospitality. After Roman envoys were disrespectfully received by Corinth in 148 BC, the army sacked the city and subjected formerly autonomous Greece to Roman authority. On state occasions, foreign dignitaries were received in splendor. Gifts were exchanged to oil the wheels of a relationship.

War and peace were traditionally framed by sacred ritual. In the early days of the Republic, the Fetial priesthood, which administered the rituals special to foreign relations, solemnly declared war and administered oaths accompanied by a sacrifice at the conclusion of peace. As Rome extended its empire, the mutual swearing of oaths by the parties to an international treaty fell into disuse. Foreign nations, but not Rome, were expected to guarantee their promises by providing high-ranking hostages, demonstrating their subordinate status. There is no known case of such hostages ever being harmed, even when a treaty was broken (A. D. Lee 1991: 366). The momentous adoption by the emperor Constantine (306–37) of Christianity as the state religion was to transform the mission of empire but not diplomatic practice.

With the decline of Roman power in late antiquity (fourth to sixth centuries AD), diplomacy played an increasing role. In 363, the emperor Julian was killed fighting Sassanid Persia. With the empire embroiled in wars on other fronts, his successor, Jovian, was forced to conclude a humiliating peace, under which he conceded territory and fortresses to the Persians and renounced Roman interests in Armenia. For the first time, hostages were *exchanged* as surety (A. D. Lee 1991: 369). Payment of subsidies to the Persians and others, condemned by contemporaries as tribute and extortion, became a growing feature of Roman policy (Blockley 1985).

About this time—the mid-fourth century—the Master of the Offices, one of the key imperial officials, who controlled access to the emperor and ran the imperial courier service, acquired the responsibilities of a secretary of state. His department was now the regular channel of communication between the emperor and foreign rulers. It dealt with foreign ambassadors from their arrival to their departure and handled foreign correspondence, drawing on a pool of official interpreters (Boak 1924: 32–35). This was the turning point when diplomacy became an organized instrument of statecraft on a par with war.

The permanent division of the Roman Empire after 395 into Eastern and Western halves, and then the fall of Rome to the barbarians in 476, transferred the imperial center of gravity to Constantinople, formerly Byzantium. For the next thousand years, the Byzantine Empire played a vital role in international relations, its importance magnified by its pivotal location between Europe and Asia, and its longevity. It was the conveyor belt transmitting the traditions of diplomacy from the classical to the modern worlds.

The Byzantine Empire seamlessly continued the administrative and legal practices of the undivided empire. With the loss of its Latin-speaking provinces in the late sixth century, Greek became the sole official language. Revitalized by Christianity, the empire acquired an acute sense of God-given superiority. At the same time, curving in a vast arc around the eastern Mediterranean, it faced unremitting external dangers. The great challenge was to preserve its holdings in southeastern Europe, Anatolia, southwestern Asia, and North Africa. Its problems and opportunities included immensely long borders (but short internal supply lines), control of the trading routes from Asia to Europe, great but not limitless resources, a plethora of fractious pagan neighbors to the north, and the invariable threat of a rival empire to the east—first the Persians, then the Muslim Arabs, and finally, the Muslim Turks.

Diplomacy was a major plank of Byzantine grand strategy, and this engendered a diplomatic machine of formidable scope and quality. The Master of the Offices emerged as one of the great ministers of the empire. In addition to his diplomatic duties, he controlled the imperial secret service and was a permanent member of the supreme advisory council. In 443, he was given oversight of the troops and fortifications of the eastern defenses (Boak 1924: 38). At his disposal were a matchless network of official and unofficial agents reporting on developments in neighboring regions and a diplomatic service of messengers, emissaries, and interpreters able to conduct negotiations in all required languages. Not surprising, therefore, that written reports, a mainstay of European diplomacy, were a Byzantine innovation (Queller 1967: 141).

The purpose of this machine was to manage the empire's relations with its neighbors, preferably through negotiation rather than war. Byzantine goals were to thwart potential threats; coexist with its great power neighbors if possible, since it could not destroy them; strengthen and exalt the civilized Christian world centered on Constantinople; and foster the prosperity of the empire through trade (Obolensky 1963).

The first defensive goal entailed constructing a system of alliances that could deflect invasions, balance rival coalitions, and destabilize enemies. With this in mind, the Byzantine Empire skillfully managed the balance of power—shifting its weight from one contending party to another to maintain equilibrium. To advance the goal of coexistence, Byzantium willingly conciliated rival great powers. In 562, Petrus, the Master of the Offices, successfully negotiated a peace treaty with the Sassanid Persians after the fall of Antioch. Neither the substance of the negotiation nor the arguments used would shame modern negotiators.

Byzantine diplomacy was indebted for its methods and ideas to Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, and Christianity. From Mesopotamia, it took the concepts of a family of kings (albeit with the emperor as their father), dynastic marriage to cement an alliance, refined protocol and hospitality, and the development of trade by merchant-ambassadors. From Greece, it took the use of rhetoric in negotiation and influence over local clients through **soft power**, their admiration for Byzantine culture. From Rome, it took the tactics of divide and rule, buying mercenary allies (to fight its wars) and buying off troublemakers, overawing visitors with the grandeur of the court, and providing aid to allies in the form of great civil engineering projects. From Christianity, it took the conviction of its own supreme legitimacy and the mission to convert heathen peoples and win them over as allies to Constantinople.

Until the late eleventh century, the Byzantine Empire not only held its own thanks to its vast alliance system but even expanded into the Caucasus and Syria. From then on, however, it was worn down by waves of invasions. In 1453, Ottoman Turks finally captured Constantinople, putting an end to an empire that had survived for a thousand years, thanks not least to its adept diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Ancient Greek diplomatic practice influenced later European thought via the classics but was crude compared with Persian diplomacy, mostly serving parochial needs.
- Roman diplomacy at the height of empire was not concerned with negotiating agreements on an equal basis but with imposing its will and managing client states.
- As their empire declined, the Romans increasingly resorted to negotiation and conciliation. This more flexible tradition served the successor Byzantine Empire well for a thousand years, contributing to its survival.

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

Fifteenth-century Renaissance Italy is usually seen as the seedbed of modern European diplomacy. Yet as Garrett Mattingly (1955: 17–25) acknowledges, Western diplomatic institutions were already highly developed by 1400, including a body of rules regulating diplomatic relations, immunities, negotiations, and treaties. During the late Middle Ages (1200–1500), the modern sovereign state, run by a central government enjoying exclusive jurisdiction within its borders, was still taking shape and had no monopoly on diplomacy.

Enveloping the medieval ruler was the feudal world of the *respublica Christiana*, a Christian commonwealth headed by the pope and made up of overlapping jurisdictions, patchwork territories, and "countless ladders of patron-client ties." Religion was inseparable from politics (Jackson 2007: 30). Exclusive sovereignty was not considered at the time to be a prerequisite of diplomacy. Besides kings and popes, a variety of dignitaries and corporate bodies in the late Middle Ages, such as dukes, cardinals, cities, military orders, and trading organizations, sent and received **nuncios, legates,** and **procurators**—envoys marked by fine distinctions, and beginning to be dubbed **ambassadors** (Queller 1967: 68–74).

Medieval Europe was a hive of activity, and principals drew on or adapted familiar diplomatic practices to conduct their business, whether that was promoting trade, protecting merchants, performing homage, seeking allies, settling disputes, making dynastic marriages, appointing bishops, or claiming territory. Venice, which cut its diplomatic teeth negotiating trading charters with the Byzantine Empire, had by 1361 given its "baillie," the official administering the Venetian merchants' quarter in Constantinople, the functions of a resident ambassador representing the doge before the emperor (Nicol 1988: 291).

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, Venice seamlessly maintained a diplomatic presence in Constantinople and beyond. Besides Venice, other European polities, such as Aragon, Catalonia, and Genoa, sent emissaries to the Muslim world under much the same ground rules as governed diplomacy among Christians. During the Crusader period, there were regular diplomatic and trading relations between Christian rulers and military orders and the Mamluks and Mongols. At least nine truces from the thirteenth century survive. With exceptions, they are of limited duration in the Muslim legal tradition, which prohibited permanent peace between a Muslim and an infidel ruler.

Throughout the period, the German Hanse, a league of trading cities in northern Europe, sent its emissaries far and wide negotiating trading access, preferential customs duties, and legal protections. It had its own lingua franca, a pidgin of Lübeck German. Anticipating modern commercial negotiating, it deployed contractual claims, financial resources, and the threat of trading sanctions to defend its members' interests (Lloyd 1991). It also arbitrated differences among them and, by a treaty of 1289, became arbitrator for all conflicts between Norway and Denmark (Ralston 1929: 176–77).

When it came to peacemaking, the **papacy** was a diplomatic powerhouse, working to preserve the harmony of the *respublica Christiana* through mediation or arbitration. When mediating, it helped the parties themselves negotiate an agreed solution. When arbitrating, it rendered its own balanced judgment after hearing both sides. In 1298, the papacy arbitrated between the kings of France and England, and in 1319 between the French and the Flemings (Ralston 1929: 174–76). When arbitration became unacceptable, the popes offered their good offices as mediators. Between 1344 and 1355, they launched a series of initiatives to mediate a peace settlement between the English and French kings, and in 1454 brokered a peace between Venice and Milan.

It is sometimes erroneously believed that modern international law began with Rome. The Romans did have *ius gentium*, a law of nations. This, however, refers to the laws governing treatment of foreigners, especially provincial subjects, and not polities. It was the papacy that formatively influenced the development of international law, since the *respublica Christiana* rested on religious law. Hence, the canon law of contract, the use of oaths, and the crucial assumption that promises are binding (*pacta sunt servanda*) fed through into later treaty law (Steiger 2001). The papacy, with its pivotal role, also shaped diplomatic procedures and immunities, including an early version of extraterritoriality.

Renaissance Italy did not invent diplomacy and was hardly cut off from the wider world; indeed, it was a center of commerce, science, and art. But the Italian peninsula did constitute a compact regional subsystem, very much like ancient Greece, with neighboring polities closely tied by culture, religion, and language. They engaged in intensive commerce, alliance making, and turbulent rivalry. For all these reasons, during the fifteenth century, Italy saw the consolidation of two of the characteristic institutions of European diplomacy: the resident ambassador and the chancery, a nascent foreign ministry.

"Resident ambassadors," envoys who stayed at their post until replaced, were introduced in the second half of the fifteenth century, most likely by Venice. Because they were on the spot, these ambassadors could cultivate connections and acquire local knowledge (Berridge 1995: 3). In a world without newspapers, where information was avidly awaited back home, they became indispensable intelligence gatherers, reporting on the arrival of cargoes, the situation at court, the state of an alliance, military preparations, the atmosphere in the market, political gossip, and diplomatic to-and-fro. Mostly, ambassadors' sources were open; sometimes, they used spies.

Resident ambassadors were also good at handling routine matters, such as maintaining working relations with the host government, but they were not ideally suited to negotiating important questions requiring high standing and close personal ties with their principal. For this, a statesman or aristocrat was better suited. Notables would also be best in high-level representative roles, personifying the dignity of the ruler at life-cycle ceremonies, such as weddings and funerals. On completion of their mission, they returned home (Mallett 2001: 64–65).

To administer a permanent diplomatic network required an organization that could formulate foreign policy, prepare instructions, collate information, and keep records. Gian Galeazzo Visconti, first Duke of Milan (1395–1402), who was his own foreign minister, used his "chancery," originally the office producing official documents, as an embryonic foreign ministry. By the middle of the fifteenth century, all the major Italian states had chanceries capable of sustaining a coherent and continuous foreign policy and diplomatic service. With the establishment of the Most Holy League in 1454, such machinery became more important than ever. A defensive alliance set up by Florence, Venice, and Milan to bring peace to Italy, the league quickly broadened to take in all the major Italian powers (Mattingly 1955: 74, 87–88, 101). Italian technical innovations were quickly taken up by the great powers of the time, which were drawn willy-nilly into Italian affairs, and spread throughout Europe. The resident ambassador quickly became the main feature distinguishing the European—meaning Christian—from the non-European practice of diplomacy. He also signified membership of an international society linked by religion and culture. Neither China nor Japan was prepared to receive resident missions until the nineteenth century (see Zhao, chapter 2 in this volume). The Ottoman Empire, however, whose armies reached the gates of Vienna in 1532, was an integral part of the European system.

Most of the major European powers had permanent missions in Constantinople by the end of the sixteenth century. Yet for 200 years, the sultans contented themselves with dispatching ad hoc missions only to Europe. J. C. Hurewitz (1961: 146–47) puts this down to Muslim introversion, lack of commercial motive, and a sense of cultural superiority. He adds that negotiations in Constantinople could be conveniently conducted in Turkish, on Ottoman terms, and on familiar ground. In 1835, a declining Ottoman Empire opened its first resident embassy in Paris, shortly followed by permanent missions in other European capitals.

The framework in place by about 1500 recognizably anticipates, in its essentials, modern diplomacy. In order to remain effective, it obviously had to develop in tune with changing needs. The forces shaping that gradual evolution were many and varied: the ever-growing power of the state; the Reformation and the replacement of the *respublica Christiana* by an international system of sovereign states; expanding trade and industry; the expansion, and then breakup, of the European empires; the worldwide spread of diplomacy; the slow but steady expansion of political consciousness from the aristocracy to the people; system-altering wars; and a vast increase in global contacts and transactions.

Traditional forms sometimes concealed underlying changes. The kind of qualifications that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century authors required of the "ideal diplomatist," for example, are not very different from those listed by Sir Harold Nicolson (1939: 126) in his pre–Second World War essay on diplomacy—for example, modesty, charm, and tact. They read like code words for good breeding and an expensive education, evoking an age before industrialization and universal suffrage, when aristocrats still dominated diplomacy. In fact, from about the mid-nineteenth century onward, the middle classes increasingly entered the diplomatic service thanks to administrative reform, competitive entrance examinations, and more rigorous training, all aimed at the "professionalization of diplomacy." As Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne (1995: 104) note: "The composition of Europe's diplomatic services tended in the end to reflect the political structure of the societies they represented."

The nineteenth century saw the heyday of the resident ambassador, his responsibilities increasing commensurately with the expansion in foreign relations. Because of slow communications, an ambassador might have to negotiate without fresh instructions. Despite such technical innovations as the steamship and telegraph, he retained considerable discretion until 1914. After the cataclysm of the First World War, ambassadors rarely conducted negotiations independently, that task being increasingly performed in multilateral settings or by ad hoc delegations. Jet travel further restricted their role. A distinguished American statesman, George Ball (1982: 452), when offered any embassy he desired in 1977, demurred with the comment that he did not wish to end his days "as an innkeeper for itinerant congressmen."

With the rise of French power in the seventeenth century (and the use of French as the diplomatic language), growing emphasis was put on the organization directing diplomacy. In 1626, Cardinal Armand Richelieu, Louis XIII's chief minister, set up a ministry of foreign affairs to ensure the unified, harmonious administration of French foreign policy. This has been the ideal—imperfectly realized in practice—ever since; it has not been possible or advisable to keep, say, ministries of finance and defense out of foreign affairs. Richelieu was careful to cultivate public opinion and also stressed the inviolability of a state's promises, "*pacta sunt servanda*." Why else would states negotiate agreements?

The consolidation and codification of international law as a special area of law were crucial to the peaceful management of European affairs. From the sixteenth century onward, a law of nations emerged out of a patchwork of medieval laws and customs. As the *respublica Christiana* faded away, it became vital to answer certain fundamental questions, including, who has the legal right to make war and peace, to send ambassadors, and to conclude treaties? Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), the Dutch humanist, determined that treaties between republics were always binding (as distinguished from personal treaties between rulers, which might not be) and continued to bind the successors of the original signatories (Lesaffer 2000). The 1648 Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War marked an important stage in the evolution of an international system of sovereign states. But it was only at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the defeat of Napoleon, that it was finally resolved that *only* sovereign states could participate in the international legal order.

By the seventeenth century, theorists agreed that "ratification"—the signing and sealing of treaty documents by plenipotentiaries—constituted the treaty, not, as under canon law, the sworn oath. The concept of comprehensive diplomatic immunity steadily gained ground from Grotius onward. In 1709, the British Parliament passed legislation protecting foreign diplomats from court proceedings. The principle of inviolability eventually extended to the diplomatic mission's premises, servants, property, and mail.

Arguments over precedence and procedure dogged diplomacy throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There were constant arguments over the placement of diplomats on official occasions. At peace conferences, enormous effort was invested in ensuring that no important ambassador was seated in an inferior position to a rival. As late as 1812, the French representative in Naples fought a government-approved duel with his Russian counterpart over precedence. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, agreement was reached on a system of ranking. Finally, the 1961 ***Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*** definitively codified the rules of diplomatic practice (M. S. Anderson 1993: 56–68).

The single most significant innovation of European diplomacy was the introduction of the international conference. Under this system, national delegations assemble in a formal setting to negotiate. Peace congresses were convened at Arras in 1435 and Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. In scope and scale, the Congress of Westphalia (1643–48) entailed a striking departure from previous diplomatic practice. Richelieu initially conceived of a congress so that France and its numerous German allies might confront the Holy Roman Empire with a united front and thereby frustrate an imperial strategy of divide and rule. "Prenegotiation," or bargaining over the procedure to govern the conference, stretched over nine years, because the parties were acutely aware that concessions on form had substantive implications. Sweden, seeking equality of status on the continent of Europe, insisted on equal treatment at the congress. Spain at first refused safe-conduct passes to Dutch representatives, because it considered the Dutch Republic to be in a state of rebellion (Colegrove 1919). The five-year duration of the congress also hints at the complexity and gravity of the issues negotiated. The system of European states was reshaped. The papacy yielded authority to secular rulers. Catholic and Protestant German states alike acquired effective independence from the Holy Roman Empire. Dutch and Swiss independence was also recognized. Rules for the peaceful settlement of disputes were formulated. With the eclipse of the papacy as a political force, international law was finally divorced from its religious background (Croxton 1999; Gross 1948).

The 1815 Congress of Vienna marked a further watershed between a world where the great powers met collectively only to make peace and one where their representatives meeting in conference managed international affairs on a continuous basis. This was the system known as the **Concert of Europe**. Great peace congresses continued to be held, at Paris in 1856 and Berlin in 1878. Now, however, European ambassadors also met in conference to settle such matters as the independence of Belgium (1830–39), the carve-up of Africa (1883–84), and the settlement of Balkan questions (1912–13). The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 codified the laws of war and set up the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

In January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States proclaimed a fourteen-point plan for a postwar settlement. Self-determination, diplomacy in the public view, popular consent, and a "general association of nations" were henceforth to guide international affairs. They set the parameters on twentieth-century diplomacy—no longer just European but, by the end of the century, global. English, a language spoken on four continents, eventually supplanted French as the international vernacular. Establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 institutionalized conference diplomacy within a parliamentary framework. The United

Nations replaced the League in 1945; after decolonization, its membership embraced the nations of the world.

Over the years, a multitude of specialized international organizations were set up to deal with regional and functional issues—for example, human rights, health, trade and development, finance, children, refugees, and telecommunications. Thus, legitimate international change was to be achieved by general consent, not force. Multilateral negotiation became the order of the day, empowering weak states and placing the onus on consensus building. The outcome has been a vast expansion of diplomatic activity and the emergence of a truly global society served by a global diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Christian Europe from the ninth century onward inherited the "great tradition" of diplomacy virtually intact.
- Major organizational innovations included the resident embassy, the diplomatic service, the foreign ministry, and the training of diplomats.
- Crucially, public international law emerged, together with the international conference and multilateral institutions.
- It was only after the dissolution of the great empires in the late twentieth century, however, that diplomacy began to overcome its old, culture-bound attitudes and habits and expanded into a truly global system.

CONCLUSION

What counts in history is the long run, and diplomacy is no exception. Its story is one of evolutionary change over millennia. Some features of diplomacy display remarkable continuity; others, such as foreign ministries, had to be reinvented. There were bursts of creativity, but it is hard to find total innovations. There is nothing new about trade diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, non-state actors, multilateral alliances, and competing government agencies. In its time, the Amarna system was inclusive and multicultural. Rabshakeh conducted an exercise in public diplomacy outside the walls of Jerusalem in 701 BC.

From time immemorial, emissaries were sent out by their principals to perform such tasks as conveying and receiving messages, explaining, persuading, observing, reporting, and negotiating. Obviously, ambassadors today no longer perform the range of duties that they carried out before the communications revolution. The news media cover the news now in real time, specialists conduct negotiations, and leaders regularly fly in to meet their counterparts in person. This is not to say that ambassadors do not remain extremely useful—well placed to glean high-level views not reported in the media, to express their government's position, promote their country's image, and foster good relations with their host.

Ambassadors are also indispensable in a vital way. They represent, and in some sense embody, the authority and honor of their principal, whether the president, an elected assembly, or the people. Other agents, such as private individuals, celebrities, and ex-presidents, may seize the limelight and put an issue—for instance, the prohibition on land mines—on the agenda. Corporate leaders may make international business deals. In the final analysis, though, arms control treaties are made by states, and governments set the rules of trade. Only states are legal personalities in international law.

Representation is an obligation that has solemn, even sacrosanct, features. Ambassadors were traditionally thought to have a quasi-sacral character. For millennia, they concluded treaties within a framework hallowed by rites and oaths in the name of the divinity. That explicitly supernatural element is no longer there. Nevertheless, ambassadors today stand alongside other representative figures amid the symbols and shrines of the state as part of the paraphernalia of the civil religion with which nations solemnize their existence. Representing their sovereigns, ambassadors are there to lend their dignity to such state occasions as national days, state weddings and funerals, and inaugurations. Violation of their immunity is a sacrilegious offense against the sovereign they personify.

Finally, it is not by chance that one of the first acts of a newly independent state is to send its ambassador to the United Nations. The same social imperative that bound together the royal houses of ancient times in a brotherhood of great kings still impels modern nations to seek the approval and acceptance of their peers in the international community. The ambassador remains the symbol of peoplehood among the nations.

QUESTIONS

1. "Nothing's new under the sun." Is this true of diplomacy?
2. What have been the invariant features of diplomacy throughout history?
3. What were some limitations of historical diplomatic systems?
4. How effective is diplomacy today compared with the past?
5. Does diplomacy depend on a balance of power?
6. How have changes in communications technology throughout history affected the conduct of diplomacy?
7. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 2

Past Diplomacy in East Asia

From Tributary Relations to Cold War Rivalry

Suisheng Zhao

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Collapse of the traditional East Asian order and the tributary system
- Japan's military expansion and the diplomacy of imperialism
- Cold War diplomacy in East Asia
- Diplomacy during the deterioration of the East Asian bipolar system
- Diplomacy of the strategic triangle
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter briefly explores the history of diplomacy in East Asia from early times to the end of the Cold War. With the introduction of Western diplomacy and the rising power of Japan, the Chinese tributary system deteriorated during the diplomacy of imperialism. After the defeat of Japanese aggression during the Pacific War, East Asia found itself in the midst of bipolar Cold War diplomacy, in which the functional role of each state was conditioned by security alliances or blocs. The increasing diplomatic power of China in the 1970s led to the deterioration of the rigid bipolar system and created a strategic triangle in the 1980s. The tendency toward a coalition between two of the three countries (China, the USSR, and the United States) and the fear of such an alliance constituted the main dynamics of triangular diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

Compared with their Western counterparts, East Asian countries were late to the game of modern diplomacy. Prior to its defeat by Great Britain in the Opium War of 1840–42, China was a proud empire that had maintained ethnocentric tributary relations for centuries. The decline of the Chinese empire gave rise to an "anarchic system" in which imperialist powers and newly emerged nation-states pursued their own interests in the ways they judged best—and most often by military force, if they were capable of doing so. The constant warfare left almost no room for "modern diplomacy," by which nation-states settle their disputes and defend their **sovereignty** by diplomatic bargaining and negotiations. Instead, from the late nineteenth century through much of the twentieth century, diplomacy in East Asia can be understood as "diplomacy of imperialism," followed by "Cold War bloc diplomacy," and then "triangular diplomacy." After analyzing the dynamics of the tributary system, this chapter traces the events that sustained these three periods of diplomacy and led to various treaties and agreements being negotiated, some to the detriment of small or weak nations.

COLLAPSE OF THE TRADITIONAL EAST ASIAN ORDER AND THE TRIBUTARY SYSTEM

The traditional East Asian order was China-centered. The Chinese emperor was a centrally recognized authority, known as *tianzhi* (the Son of Heaven). All territories arranged themselves hierarchically. China was at the center, followed by the most nearby and culturally similar tributaries—Korea, Vietnam, and the Ryukyu Islands—which were ruled by the Chinese empires on and off in history. The next tier was inner Asia, usually including Tibet and central Asia. At a farther distance over land or sea, there were *wai-i* (outer barbarians), including Indochina and Southeast Asia (see figure 2.1).

China's centrality was a function of its civilization, culture, and rulers' virtue, although military means were also used to defend and expand the Chinese empire. In contrast to the Western diplomatic **protocol** with its emphasis on legal equality, the China-centered East Asian order was sustained by a heavy stress on ethical orthodoxy. Correct conduct according to the proper **norms** could move others by its example, perhaps a practice that relates to contemporary notions of **soft power**. Clear legal boundaries of jurisdiction and power simply did not exist. Traditional East Asian order was maintained for centuries mostly by the strength of the Chinese civilization, because many societies in East Asia were developed within Chinese cultural boundaries and strongly influenced by Confucian ideas about family and about social and political order. The influence of Chinese political and cultural institutions was especially strong in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

The traditional East Asian order was institutionalized in a "tributary system," which was primarily developed during the Ming and Qing periods. Korea, the Ryukyus, Annam (Vietnam), Burma, Laos, and Nepal sent tributary missions regularly to China (see figure 2.1). During the Ming dynasty, tributary relations were supervised by the Board of Rites Reception Department. Relations with certain tribes of aborigines along China's cultural frontiers were managed by the Department of the Board of War. After the establishment of the Qing dynasty in 1644, the Li-fan Yuan (Barbarous Affairs Department) became an integral part of the tributary system.


1820 China empire
Contemporary international borders
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
KAZAKHSTAN
MONGOLIA
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
PAKISTAN
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
JAPAN
BEIJING
CHINA
Shanghai
NEPAL
BHUTAN
INDIA
BANGLADESH
MYANMAR (BURMA)
HONG KONG
LAOS
VIETNAM
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
PHILIPPINES
0 kilometres 1,000
© Carto-GIS 11-178 KD
Australian National University
40°N
20°N
80°E
100°E
120°E

Figure 2.1 The Chinese empire, 1820

It used the rites and forms of the traditional Confucian Chinese system to conduct relations with the "barbarians." The tributary diplomatic relationship was always **bilateral**, never **multilateral**: one partner and China. The tributary system operated in a very ceremonial way. The tributary missions bore tribute with them and were escorted to court by the Chinese officials. Performing appropriate ceremonies at the Qing court, notably the *kowtow* (three kneelings and nine prostratings), they presented tribute memorials and a symbolic tribute of their precious native products and then were given imperial gifts in return. Usually, they were also granted certain privileges of trade. Finally, Chinese missions were sent to visit in return.

The tributary system was valuable diplomatically, economically, and politically for both the tributary states and China. For the tributary states, the presentation of tribute enabled them to conduct controlled but important trade with China and simultaneously receive validation for political power from the Chinese emperor. China also benefited from the system: China's power was substantiated through tributary nations' recognition, and China was able to trade with them for items necessary to its economy without breaking the myth of China's self-sufficiency (Y. S. Yu 1967).

China's self-sufficiency and imperial position were never seriously challenged until the nineteenth century, when European gunboats arrived and requested diplomatic recognition. When European traders and missionaries reached the shores of

China, Chinese imperial bureaucrats perceived them as no different from their East Asian neighbors who "should observe the rules of the tributary system and fit themselves into the civilized Sino-centric world order in their pursuit of foreign trade" (So and Chiu 1995: 34). The Chinese court assumed an aloof and patronizing attitude toward early European traders, keeping them confined to the southern port cities of Macao and, later, Guangzhou (Canton). China's rulers professed little need for Western goods and ideas. This pattern of trade relationship was known as the "Guangzhou system," in which Westerners were confined to a dozen buildings, called factories, beyond the walls of Guangzhou city and forbidden to trade outside of them.

When Britain came to dominate world trade in the early nineteenth century, the constraints under the Guangzhou system became intolerable to the British, who had to find new commodities to solve the growing gap in the balance of trade payment. Opium was discovered. As the trade balance began to turn in favor of Britain and the Chinese court became aware of the devastating consequences of the opium trade for China's society and national wealth, political tensions between the British and the imperial court in Beijing mounted. An uncorrupted official, Lin Zexu, was appointed as the commissioner to oversee the Guangzhou trade in 1839. Lin's draconian measures to stop the drug trade forced the British to surrender vast stores of their opium stocks. The British government demanded an indemnity for the loss from China. After the Beijing court refused, the Opium War broke out in 1840. China was defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, which stipulated that China cede Hong Kong to the British; that five Chinese ports be opened to foreign trade; that foreign, rather than Chinese, laws apply to foreigners living in the foreign "concessions" on Chinese soil; and that China pay Britain a huge amount of silver as compensation for the opium destroyed by Chinese officials.

The Opium War was a heavy blow to the Chinese sense of superiority. In the years following its humiliating defeat, the Chinese government was forced to sign one treaty after another with foreign powers, leading to the transition from the tributary system to a "treaty system," in which former tributary states became European colonies and the Qing court was forced to accept the Westphalian concept of diplomatic equality among **sovereign states**, shattering the fictive remnants of the ancient cultural superiority in the tributary system. Within the treaty system, China began to accept European diplomatic practices as foreign **diplomatic missions** were established in Beijing. China's recognition of the diplomatic status of other states was borne out by Emperor Xian Feng's imperial edict sanctioning the Treaty of Tianjin in 1861 as well as the compulsory acceptance of **diplomatic representation** of Western powers in Beijing and the initiation of "Zongli Yamen," a government office created to handle diplomatic relations with Western powers and act like the Chinese foreign ministry.

China and its former tributary states were thus brought into the Western-dominated sovereign nation-state system. By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly all East Asian countries were opened to Western trade and diplomacy, and many of them became the colonies of Western powers. A global network of economic and military outposts critical to Western domination of East Asia was established. China was no longer a central power but a target of European imperialist powers. Britain carved out a **sphere of influence** in the Yangtze Valley, France in Guangzhou, and Germany in Shandong. As a newly arrived imperial power, the United States, in September 1899, dispatched the famous Open Door Notes to major European powers and Japan, requesting that they grant traders of all countries equal treatment with respect to harbor dues and railroad charges. As a consequence, a legal provision, known as the "most-favored-nation clause," was inserted into every treaty signed by China. Concessions granted to one foreign country by China would automatically be extended to the others.

China and its East Asian tributaries no longer constituted a world unto themselves but a part of the legal and diplomatic international system dominated by the Western powers. Although China now accepted formal diplomatic equality with the other states, it was not treated equally by the victorious Western powers. The treaties that it signed with the Western powers thereafter were soon labeled in Chinese political discourses as the "unequal treaties," because the formal diplomatic equality masked a host of provisions that disadvantaged China and set limits on its sovereignty. These included the provision of extraterritorial rights, which meant that foreign rather than Chinese laws would apply to foreigners living in China, as well as those that placed its economic interests under foreign control. By adapting to Western diplomatic practices and ceding its tributary states, China entered into the modern world under the threat of imperialism and thus became a zealous defender of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, an important underpinning of the nation-state system.

KEY POINTS

- The traditional East Asian order was China-centered, and a tributary system based on different principles than modern diplomacy was the institution of interstate relations.
- After the collapse of the China-centered East Asian order, modern diplomatic practices were introduced and accepted by China and other East Asian states.

JAPAN'S MILITARY EXPANSION AND THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM

While China began to accept the idea of equality among nation-states and struggled to defend its sovereignty, the world had come under the domination of imperialist powers that did not treat weak nations as equals. In the age of imperialism, the status of a country was determined mostly by its military strength, and diplomacy was an instrument of imperialist expansion at the expense of small and weak nations. The great powers attempted to conquer small and weak countries by force and to trade their interest with other great powers by diplomacy.

Japan was the first East Asian country to rise to the status of a great power. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 started Japan's modernization and also set a course of Western learning, including the emulation of European-style imperialism to create Japan's own empire in East Asia. Japan's expansion began with annexing the Ryukyu Islands in 1874, but its first major target was Korea, China's long-standing tributary state and Japan's springboard to continental Asia. Using military intimidation, Japan forced the Koreans to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876, opening two ports to Japanese trade. By recognizing Korea as an independent state, the Kanghwa Treaty ignored China's exclusive claim to suzerainty over that nation. To the Japanese, "the Western idea of sovereign statehood was a convenient tool with which to start the process of breaking the bonds uniting Korea and China" (Nelson 1945: 126). This treaty paved the way for the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. After a series of swift victories, the Japanese drove the Chinese forces out of Korea and forced China to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea, on April 7, 1895'. China also agreed to pay an indemnity; to cede Taiwan, the Pesadores (Penghu) Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan; and to open up a specified section of the Yangtze River to Japanese commerce and four ports to Japanese trade.

While Russia generally remained neutral during the Sino-Japanese War, it was threatened by Japan's acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula, a strategically important foothold on the Asian mainland. On the initiative of Russia, Germany, France, and Russia sent a joint memorandum to Japan on April 23, 1895, six days after the signature of the Shimonoseki Treaty, advising the restitution of Liaodong to China. Faced with what was known as the Triple Intervention, Japan was militarily too weak and diplomatically too isolated to resist and had to sign a supplementary convention on November 8, 1895, which stipulated that within three months of China's paying of a supplementary, the Japanese troops would evacuate Liaodong. The Triple Intervention helped Russia establish a stronghold in China. Russia's influence was further increased by the conclusion of the secret Li-Lobanov Agreement in 1896, by which China consented to the construction of a railway across Manchuria toward Vladivostok. The Treaty of St. Petersburg in March 1898 further empowered Russia through the right to lease Port Arthur and Dalian for twenty-five years.

Japan then turned to Great Britain, the czar's ubiquitous competitor, to find a counterweight to Russia. On January 30, 1902, the British agreed to the formal Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the first military alliance between an Asian nation and a European power, in order to maintain the balance of power in East Asia. With Britain on its side, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, sinking virtually the entire Russian squadron at anchor. Two days later, Tokyo issued an official declaration of war. While the Russo-Japanese War was a veritable life-and-death struggle for the small island nation against a large European power, Japan had the advantage of fighting close to its main supply sources and had control of the sea. With Great Britain on Japan's side to deny the Russian's use of the Suez Canal, Russia's Baltic fleet had to make its way around the world to reach the Tsushima Strait, which separates Japan from Korea. The Japanese warships were already waiting there and readily demolished the Russian fleet.

The first victory of an Asian nation over a major European power, the result of the Russo-Japanese War established Japan as the peer of Western imperialist powers. With the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by the United States on September 5, 1905, Japan obtained Russia's recognition of its paramount interests in Korea and Manchuria by possession of the Changchun-Dalian portion of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway and the transfer from Russia of the Liaodong Peninsula. To protect these newly acquired rights, a Kanto (East Manchuria) army was created as the symbol of Japan's continental imperialism.

Japan's pursuit of continental expansion led to Western fears of Japanese domination in Asia. Although Great Britain took a passive attitude, the United States protested the Twenty-One Demands on the grounds that they contradicted the principles of equal opportunity and the Open Door policy. Taking advantage of the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in November 1921, the United States called for a historic conference in Washington to restore peace and stability in East Asia.

The Washington Conference produced a series of treaties signed by Japan, the United States, and major European powers, and it represented a multilateral diplomatic attempt to redefine East Asian international relations through a concert of powers. As a latecomer to the great power competition, however, Japan felt that it was unjustly denied its rightful place, because its expansion beyond Korea and Taiwan ran into opposition from the Western powers. Although Kijuro Shidehara (Japan's minister of foreign affairs, 1924–29) guided Japan's foreign policy in line with the conference agreements, senior Japanese army leaders began to pose serious challenges to the Washington Conference system when they took foreign policy into their own hands and exploited a series of events to provide a pretext for military actions against China in the early 1930s. (See box 2-1.)

BOX 2-1

What Diplomats Do: The Washington Conference, 1921–22

According to Alan Henrikson,

> A key figure in the Washington Conference, on whom US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes relied for his treaty knowledge and also his Asia expertise, was John Van Antwerp MacMurray, the Chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs. He had served both in China and Japan as well as, earlier, in Siam. For MacMurray, as for Hughes, the Washington treaties—the "Washington System," as it has come to be called—was a system of order. He saw it not as a rigid system, but as a flexible system, and one that depended for its "continuance" on cooperation among the signatories, including the signatory powers' diplomatic representatives. Unfortunately, soon after the treaties were concluded, MacMurray noted, some of the signatories, including the Chinese and the British, in their pursuit of "national" interests began to act unilaterally, making or demanding concessions separately, without consultation.
>
> In a later memorandum, which among scholars of the subject has become famous, MacMurray lamented that, as "the intended system of cooperation" created by the Washington Conference "was allowed during 1925–1929 to fall into desuetude, the formulation of principles upon which it was to have been based has inevitably lost authority. The Washington Treaties have therefore ceased in practical fact to be available as a means of accommodating such strains as may arise from the changes in equilibrium that lately have taken place in the Far East." He was referring of course to the Japanese military 1931 takeover of Manchuria, in defiance of the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty.

According to Arthur Waldron, author of *How the Peace Was Lost,* MacMurray's memorandum

> boldly challenged the view that Japan was an unprovoked aggressor and that the United States should support Nationalist China [. . .] the State Department in 1935 ignored the ambassador's analysis [. . .] George Kennan later wrote to MacMurray saying, "I know of no document on record in our government with respect to foreign policy which is more penetrating and thoughtful and prescient than this one."

SOURCES: Henrikson (2016); Waldron (1992: 6, 167).

When Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931 in response to the Mukden Incident, the Chinese government instructed the military commander of the northeast not to retaliate but to rely on an appeal to the League of Nations, which, however, was powerless to intervene. Although the League agreed to send a committee under Britain's Lord Lytton to investigate the events in Manchuria in December 1931, the committee did not issue a report until one year later, and the League did not adopt the report until February 1933. The report rejected Japan's pretext as an unjustified intervention but fell short of calling for implementing collective security sanctions against Japan as the aggressor. Although the League of Nations did nothing to punish the Japanese aggression, the Japanese delegation still walked out and announced Japan's resignation from the League when the report was adopted. Consolidating its control over Manchuria, Japan extended its invasion to Shanghai in January 1932. Western powers, hit by the Great Depression, were too involved in their domestic problems to block Japanese aggression, and facing no meaningful resistance, Japan launched a large-scale invasion of China. An undeclared but full-fledged Sino-Japanese War started in 1937.

Without real resistance from the United States and the other great powers, the idea of moving south toward the Pacific gained currency among Japanese military leaders after the outbreak of war in Europe in the late 1930s. Japan started with a diplomatic maneuver by signing the Tripartite Mutual Defense Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, to deter US intervention in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict. Japan's diplomatic offensive reached a new height when the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. Receiving the assent of the pro-Nazi Vichy government in France, Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina and were now ready to carry out Japan's southward strategy. This' southerly expansion to seize the mineral resources of the European empires in Southeast Asia set Japan on a collision course with the United States due to the perceived linkage between the war in Asia and the war in Europe. The United States had to take action to check the Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Washington had already placed an embargo on shipments of aircraft, arms, and other war materials to Japan in the summer of 1938, abrogated its commercial treaty with Japan in July 1939, and terminated the export of scrap iron and steel to Japan in the fall of 1940. After the Japanese attack on Indochina in July 1941, the United States froze Japanese assets and imposed an embargo on the export of oil to Japan. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth nations, and the Dutch East Indies followed suit, cutting ninety percent of Japan's oil imports. This escalation of threatening economic diplomacy was intended to deter Japan from further rashness but had precisely the opposite effect, because the Japanese government made a quick decision to wage war against the United States.

Without oil imports, Japan's war machine would come to a halt within a matter of months. In the choice between abandoning military expansion and a war with the United States, although a victory in that war was uncertain, the alternative of submitting to the demands of the "white imperialists" was equally hard to accept. After conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy and the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, Japan launched a preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, 1941. Counting on the element of surprise, the Japanese plan was to force the larger and stronger America to come to the negotiating table before it could mobilize its full strength.

Until Pearl Harbor, Japan fought mostly an East Asian war. Now, a genuinely Pacific-wide war started. Shocked by the surprising attack and the heavy losses of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the United States quickly mobilized its potential to fight back. The Pacific War was fought between Japan, which attempted to redefine the East Asian order on its own terms, and the United States, which eventually came to deter Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Asia. The final result of the war was determined primarily by the American industrial capacity to support a protracted naval strategy at long distance. The Japanese government surrendered unconditionally to the Allies after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

KEY POINTS

- During the age of imperialistic diplomacy in East Asia, the status of a country was determined mostly by its military strength, while diplomacy was an instrument of imperialistic expansion and often used to negotiate unfair treaties.
- Japan's victory over Russia and the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth were historically and diplomatically significant, because both demonstrated the power of an Asian nation over a European country.
- Threatening forms of economic diplomacy by the United States and some other Western countries failed to deter Japan's move southward to the Pacific and consequently the start of the Pacific War.

COLD WAR DIPLOMACY IN EAST ASIA

Although the Americans and Soviets at the Yalta Conference pledged to reshape postwar peace at the end of the Pacific War, East Asia soon found itself in the midst of a global Cold War bipolar rivalry as distrust and hostility developed between these two superpowers. The United States led one pole, in which Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and several Southeast Asian countries were dependent partners. On the other pole, the Soviet Union played the dominant role, with China as a junior partner and North Korea and North Vietnam as dependent partners. Due to an increased emphasis on the ideological division between the two sides, the bipolar system became tight and eventually formed rigid alliances, or blocs. Cold War diplomacy was centered on the building and maintenance of the two alliances as well as the diplomatic management of crises and conflicts, most notably the limited war in Korea and the crisis across the Taiwan Strait.

The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, was the starting point of Cold War diplomacy in East Asia, because it had a great impact on the regional as well as the global balance of power. The Sino-Soviet alliance emerged when Mao Zedong made the historic announcement on June 30, 1949, that China would "lean to one side" in the struggle between imperialism and socialism (Mao 1969: 415). The Sino-Soviet alliance would give the communists control of the Eurasian landmass stretching from the Baltic Sea to the South China Sea.

The Moscow-Beijing alliance preceded the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. At the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union occupied Korea with the Thirty-Eighth Parallel as a temporary line to fix responsibility.

Once the occupation was established, however, these countries competitively set up two rival governments, and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel was thus turned into a political line dividing Korea into two states. North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung visited Moscow twice in 1949 to gain Stalin's support for a takeover of the South. Kim convinced Stalin that the war could be won quickly, before the United States had time to become involved. Mao was in Moscow in the winter of 1949–50 and approved Kim's plans, saying that the Americans would not intervene since the war was an internal matter that the Korean people would decide for themselves (Khrushchev 1970: 367–69). With these assurances, the North launched a massive attack on June 25, 1950, advancing rapidly southward. Within six weeks, North Korean troops occupied most of the Korean peninsula.

Perceiving the North Korean move as a Soviet-sponsored attack against the free world, the United States was forced to redefine its security interests in Korea. On the US initiative, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted two resolutions on June 25 and 27, 1950, authorizing a UN force to restore peace in Korea. The successful amphibious landing of US Marines at Inchon on September 15, 1950, altered the entire course of the Korean War. On October 20, 1950, the American-led UN forces captured Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea. A week later, the first American troops reached the Yalu River, the border between Korea and China. General Douglas MacArthur's "home by Christmas" dream, however, was shattered by a massive Chinese intervention in November. Pyongyang was recaptured by Chinese troops on December 4, 1950. With the Chinese intervention came a heightened danger of a general war, and the United States searched for a settlement through political means. On July 27, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed that restored the status quo, and Korea remained divided after the fighting stopped.

The immediate consequence of the Korean War was the American policy adjustment to end the occupation in Japan. In September 1951, a peace conference was held in San Francisco. On the morning of September 8th, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan signed a peace treaty with the United States and forty-seven other countries that restored Japanese sovereignty. That same afternoon, he signed a bilateral, mutual security treaty secretly negotiated with the United States, which was designed to protect an independent but weak Japan as a countervailing force to the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although Yoshida earlier indicated his preference for a "two-China" approach in Japan's diplomatic and economic policies, he was compelled to sign a bilateral peace treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan on the same day that the San Francisco treaties came into effect in 1952. These arrangements, known as the "San Francisco system," symbolized the beginning of American containment policy in East Asia. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accord bound by the principle of reciprocal obligation, the American-Japanese security treaty stipulated Japan's unilateral and unconditional dependency upon American protection. It was just one link in the chain of bilateral treaties that the United States signed with countries in the region to contain communism. The containment system represented the recognition of Asia's strategic importance because of the demonstrated threat of the North Korean and Chinese military forces to American interests. (See box 2-2 for an insight into North Korean diplomats' efforts at public diplomacy during the Cold War.)

BOX 2-2

What Diplomats Do: North Korean Public Diplomacy during the Cold War

Throughout the 1970s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) waged an intensive diplomatic campaign to attract new supporters abroad, including in the United States, and participate in the international community. Pyongyang launched public diplomacy campaigns in approximately fifty countries and funded some 200 "friendship" organizations abroad. Through "people-to-people diplomacy," North Korea hoped to improve its standing in the international community and foster support for its positions in the United Nations General Assembly.

(The DPRK became a member of the United Nations General Assembly in 1991.)

SOURCE: Wilson Center Digital Archive (2017a).

After the Korean War, Taiwan became a focal point of Cold War diplomacy in East Asia. One of the first decisions made by the Harry S. Truman administration after the North Korean attack on the South was to dispatch the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait. This decision forced Beijing to delay its offensive campaign against the offshore islands and Taiwan. After the Korean cease-fire agreement was reached, China began to bombard the islands of Jinmen and Mazu on September 3, 1954. In response, President Dwight Eisenhower, in January 1955, submitted the Formosa (Taiwan) Resolution to Congress, which gave the president the right to order military aid for the defense of the offshore islands.

China's leadership was alarmed by possible American armed intervention. In response, Premier Zhou Enlai made a public statement on April 23, 1955, expressing that "the Chinese government is willing to sit down to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area" (Waijiaobu Yanjiushi 1960: 2250–51). Despite there being no diplomatic relations between China and the United States, on August 1, 1955, Chinese and American representatives began ambassadorial-level talks in neutral Geneva. These diplomatic negotiations, which involved seventy-three meetings, lasted for more than two years. The primary item on America's agenda was to get back American prisoners of war being held in China and to persuade the Chinese government to renounce military force in its policy toward Taiwan. The Chinese hoped to resolve essential problems in Sino-American relations, including the long-standing Taiwan issue. No agreement was reached at Geneva, however, and talks were officially terminated on December 12, 1957. Although official talks ceased, there is evidence that unofficial talks between ambassadors were conducted from 1955 to 1970 (see box 2-3). The official termination gravely disappointed the Chinese leaders, who decided to bombard Jinmen and Mazu for a second time in the summer of 1958. In response, President Eisenhower instructed US naval forces to implement the convoy-escort plan and amassed in the Taiwan Straits the largest single concentration of nuclear support forces in history in September of that year.

BOX 2-3

What Diplomats Do: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1955-70

As the Wilson Center Digital Archive states,

> Although China and the United States were without formal diplomatic relations until 1979, the two countries agreed to maintain communications through a special mechanism, the Sino-American "Ambassadorial Talks" in Warsaw, Poland, which lasted from August 1955 through to February 1970.

The Wilson Center Digital Archive includes documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives on the first fourteen meetings of the Ambassadorial Talks. Below is an example of a document from this collection, a response by Mao Zedong to a meeting summary from Zhou Enlai:

> Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:
>
> Your letter dated the night of the 18th has been received. It is indeed very good. [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] have gained the initiative. Please take due actions immediately. Please also pass your letter and my reply here at once to Comrades Wang Bingnan and Ye Fei. Make sure that they understand [the key to] our new policy and new tactics is holding the initiative, keeping the offensive, and remaining reasonable. We must conduct our diplomatic struggle from a far-sighted perspective so that it will develop without any difficulty.
>
> Mao Zedong
> 4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

SOURCES: Wilson Center Digital Archive (2017b); Mao (1958).

KEY POINTS

- The founding of the PRC was the beginning of Cold War diplomacy in East Asia, because it had a great impact on the regional as well as the global balance of power.
- The intensified bipolar competition defined Cold War bloc diplomacy, in which the functional role of each state was conditioned by security alliances, or blocs.
- Although Cold War diplomacy was characterized by incessant confrontation and recurrent crises, these were well controlled to avoid escalating into a general war between the two superpowers, which conducted diplomatic maneuvers rather than fighting, or fought a limited war rather than a major war, to pursue their interests.

DIPLOMACY DURING THE DETERIORATION OF THE EAST ASIAN BIPOLAR SYSTEM

Starting in the 1960s, the bipolar Cold War system in East Asia experienced some subtle but important changes. The first was the Sino-Soviet split. Then, Japan reemerged to play a more active role in East Asian regional affairs. Finally, to pull out of Vietnam with honor, the United States accepted China as a legitimate player in East Asian power relations. These developments led to a geopolitical revolution that produced the rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 1970s.

The Sino-Soviet split, misleadingly clad in an ideological garb at the time, was fundamentally an assertion of Chinese national interests against the Soviet Union. The first serious evidence of the conflict emerged at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Nikita Khrushchev's bitter denunciation of Stalin's cult of personality exasperated Mao, whose rule in China had many similar features (Li 1994: 118). The Soviet Union then abrogated the 1957 agreement, in which the Soviets pledged to assist China in developing nuclear weapons, in 1959 and terminated its economic and military assistance in 1960. Moreover, during the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1959–62, the Soviet Union sided with India instead of supporting the PRC. Khrushchev's policy for "peaceful coexistence" further deepened Beijing's suspicion that the **détente** between the Soviets and the West might foster the encirclement of China (Z. Yu 1994: 18–19). These events contributed to the Sino-Soviet split, which in turn led to the emergence of China as an independent power to conduct an independent diplomacy.

The rise of Japan as an economic giant was another key factor that contributed to the deterioration of the bipolar system in East Asia. With a focus on economic development under America's military protection and nuclear umbrella, Japan quickly industrialized again. It was accepted into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the so-called rich nations' club, and held the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1964. The Japanese government achieved its first diplomatic success with the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty in 1965. In light of the "Asian Marshall Plan," Japan also began to be actively involved in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. In 1966, it played a crucial rule in the founding of the Asian Development Bank. With these advances, Japan began to assume a more active role in East Asian diplomacy.

The failure of the US intervention in Vietnam also contributed to the deterioration of the Cold War system in East Asia. The American involvement in Vietnam was formulated according to a rigid, anticommunist ideology to roll back Chinese and Soviet aggression. The Vietnam War nevertheless exacerbated friction between China and the Soviet Union, with Moscow counseling Hanoi to pursue a diplomatic track while Beijing advocated armed struggle. With Washington and Beijing were both concerned about the danger of Soviet expansionism, however, it was during the tense period of the early 1970s that a delicate Sino-American rapprochement started, as each sought to use the other country to balance Moscow's influence.

President Richard Nixon astounded the world by announcing on July 15, 1971, that Henry Kissinger had taken a secret mission to Beijing to arrange the president's trip to China. Although Americans were uncomfortable with secret diplomacy and its association with European aristocracies, this bias toward openness had not prohibited President Nixon from adopting secret diplomacy in negotiating with China, a communist state full of secrecy in domestic as well as diplomatic practices. Following Kissinger's secret mission, which produced an "announcement that shocked the world," President Nixon arrived in Beijing on February 21, 1972, for a week of talks that "changed the world": an effort by the leaders of the world's most populous nation and the world's most wealthy nation to "bridge a gulf of almost 12,000 miles and 22 years of non-communication and hostility" that had riven the East Asian political landscape since the Korean War (Solomon 1981: 2). Shaking hands with Nixon at the Beijing airport, Premier Zhou told his visitor that "your hands have crossed the widest ocean in the world" (Wei 1994: 85). Indeed, Nixon's visit caused a geopolitical revolution, in which the United States agreed to abandon the long-standing containment of China. In May 1973, China and the United States opened liaison offices in each other's capital. On January 1, 1979, the two counties officially established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

The most dramatic diplomatic consequence of the Sino-American rapprochement was the sudden normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The announcement of Nixon's visit to Beijing was so unexpected in Japan that it was referred to as the "Nixon Shock," which was so profound Japan reacted by starting its own rapprochement with Beijing right away to restore the nation's self-respect and international standing. The government was ready to move fast to outdistance the United States in exchanging ambassadors with China.

The Chinese were equally eager for normalization with Japan, partly because the United States proved to be a tough negotiator on the issue of diplomatic recognition. Beijing suspected that the i less committed Japanese would prove more amenable to their wishes. Even with the complicated historical issues in the relationship, the Chinese leaders chose not to press Japan on the war-guilt issue or to demand huge reparation payments, because they judged that it was a crucial time to consolidate the momentum of the Sino-American détente by adding Japan to the picture. On September 29, 1972, five months after Nixon's China trip, a joint communiqué was signed in Beijing declaring that Japan and China had established diplomatic relations. The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations completed the geopolitical revolution and offered China the greatest diplomatic opportunities since 1949.

KEY POINTS

- The deterioration of the rigid bipolar system in the 1970s made the US-Soviet relationship a less dominant axis of East Asian diplomacy and created conditions for some East Asian nations to play a more independent diplomatic role.
- The Sino-Soviet split led to diplomatic rapprochements between the United States and China and between China and Japan.

DIPLOMACY OF THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

The last decade of the Cold War in East Asia was distinguished by a significant degree of strategic interdependence among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, known as a "strategic triangle," which meant that each bilateral relationship was contingent upon each participant's relations with the third. The triangular relationship was qualitatively different from and more vital than any other relationship in East Asia, because other relationships were usually deemed as functional to the relations among the three states. For example, although Japan had a powerful economy, its strategic importance could be figured only in alliance with the United States or China. Therefore, each country was compelled to carefully assess its respective position with regard to the triangular relationship.

China was significantly less powerful than the two superpowers, and its importance in the triangle was not solely a function of its military capabilities but also derived greatly from its diplomatic practice: a demonstrated and remarkable flexibility in its alignment policy. According to one account, China was the only major power to have actually switched sides in the post-1945 East-West confrontation, except for Egypt's break with the Soviet Union in 1972. China was also the only major country to have engaged in military conflicts with both superpowers, and the only major power, again excluding Egypt, to have been militarily allied with both. Even more, China was the only major power to have simultaneously opposed both superpowers (Garver 1993: 32–33). Unlike France and Great Britain, whose commitment to the West eliminated any ambiguity concerning their diplomatic positions, China maintained a sufficient flexibility so that both Moscow and Washington were not sure what diplomatic posture Beijing would take next. As a result, China assumed exaggerated diplomatic leverage.

The triangular diplomacy was formally unfolded after Nixon's historic visit to Beijing. As a counterweight to the impact of Sino-American rapprochement, the Soviet Union took dramatic actions in advancing détente with Washington by signing two arms control accords in May 1972. In response, Beijing intensified its diplomatic efforts to build an "international anti-Soviet united front" and aligned China "with the strategic objectives of the United States, Japan and Western Europe" (Lieberthal 1984: 59). The Americans were at first reluctant to convert to China's united front and sought to pursue an "evenhanded policy," hoping that American interests would be best served by seeking to improve relations with both Moscow and Beijing simultaneously (Oksenberg 1982: 176–95). Yet such a policy was not successful, because both China and the Soviet Union resented an American approach from which only Washington would benefit. As a result, while Beijing-Washington relations stagnated, no significant progress was achieved in Soviet-American détente. This failure resulted in a shift from "evenhanded" diplomacy to a "balance of power" diplomacy (Oksenberg 1980: 318). After intensive negotiations, the United States and China reached an agreement to establish diplomatic relations as Washington acceded to "three conditions" that Beijing had demanded since 1975: *chejun* (withdrawal of all US military forces from Taiwan), *huiyue* (termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual Security Treaty of 1954), and *duanjiao* (severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan) (Harding 1992). Beijing also made important concessions, such as agreeing to normalize relations even though Washington would continue supplying weapons to Taiwan according to the Taiwan Relations Act enacted by the US Congress in April 1979 to preserve and promote commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan after America shifted its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Upgrading the Chinese Liaison office in Washington and the US Liaison Office in Beijing to full embassies was followed, however, with a Sino-Vietnam War that complicated the US-China diplomatic achievements.

Although China and Vietnam were allies for many years during the US-Vietnam War, the relationship between the two countries plummeted after the Americans began withdrawing their forces. While Chinese leaders felt apprehensive toward Vietnam's ambition in Indochina, Vietnam worried about Beijing's intentions over Southeast Asia. Joining the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in

November 1978, Vietnam called for the formation of a special relationship with the other two Indochinese countries of Laos and Cambodia. When the Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) regime rejected the proposal, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978. China was caught by surprise and would not tolerate the insolence of Vietnam, a tributary state in China's orbit for many centuries. Perceiving Vietnam's action as part of the Soviet southward strategy to encircle China, Deng Xiaoping ordered the People's Liberation Army to cross the border into Vietnam on February 14, 1979. The invasion was costly to China, and only two weeks into the war, China was suggesting a truce and general cessation of hostilities. On March 4, 1979, China captured the town of Long Son and subsequently claimed victory. The following day, China announced a formal troop withdrawal, and all Chinese troops left Vietnamese territories on March 16th.

The outcome of the Sino-Vietnam War was a disappointment to both the Chinese and the Americans. Within months of the euphoria of normalization, China was disappointed in its new partner's military and diplomatic passivity. To the United States, the unilateral Chinese resort to "pedagogical war" in defense of a morally indefensible client demonstrated that Beijing either could not understand or did not care much for American sensibilities. China's conduct during the invasion also showed the backwardness of China's armed forces.

At this point, the Russians began seeking an improvement in their relationship with China. During a speech in March 1982, Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union posed no threat to China's security and, unlike the United States, had consistently supported "the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan Island." He also offered to discuss a resolution to the border dispute and to resume economic, scientific, cultural, and political relations across the Sino-Soviet frontier (Jones and Kevill 1985: 176). Although the initial Chinese response was guarded, in August 1982 General Secretary Hu Yaobang reassured Moscow that China would adopt an "independent foreign policy" and would never "attach itself to any big power or group of powers" (Y. Hu 1982: 59), implying that China was to move away from the notion of a united front with the United States against the Soviet Union and toward a peaceful coexistence with both superpowers. That October, with a considerably more flexible and conciliatory posture, China resumed the bilateral negotiations that had been suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the new round of talks, China repeated the three demands that Hu Yaobang had raised earlier: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and cessation of Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.

Although the talks ended without success, Brezhnev's death in early November 1982 offered an opportunity for Sino-Soviet contacts at the highest level. A study of the "funeral diplomacy" that resulted from the rapid succession of Soviet leaders Yuri Andropov in November 1982, Konstantin Chernenko in February 1984, and Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 provided interesting insights about the momentum of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. At Brezhnev's funeral, Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua held talks with his counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, but Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, met only Leonid Ilichev, a vice foreign minister. At Andropov's funeral, China was represented by Wan Li, a Politburo member and vice-premier, signaling China's positive assessment of the deceased Soviet leader as well as hopes for better relations in the future. For Chernenko's funeral, Beijing sent Vice-Premier Li Peng, who was educated in the Soviet Union and spoke Russian. Gorbachev received him twice and reaffirmed the Soviet Union's desire that Sino-Soviet relations improve in a major way (Su 1989: 111–12). This development intensified after Gorbachev's succession: The two sides began referring to each other as comrades, "a word suggesting that no serious ideological difficulty exists between them" (Huan 1986: 8).

Sino-Soviet relations improved drastically after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. In his highly publicized Vladivostok speech on July 28, 1986, Gorbachev spoke approvingly of China's reformist objectives and noted that Chinese and Soviet domestic priorities were similar. He indicated a willingness to negotiate with China a balanced and mutual reduction of the remaining forces along the Sino-Soviet border (Harding 1988). Carrying his speech on the front page of *Renmin Ribao*, Beijing welcomed Gorbachev's initiatives. In a September 1986 broadcast of the US news program *60 Minutes*, Deng offered to meet Gorbachev if the Soviet Union was willing to persuade the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. Hanoi's announcement in early 1989 to withdraw all its forces in September cleared the way for a summit meeting between Deng and Gorbachev in Beijing in May 1989, the first Sino-Soviet summit in thirty years. By the time Gorbachev's China policy produced fruit, however, the collapse of Soviet power minimized its strategic significance, and the end of the Cold War eventually eliminated the triangular relationship. The strategic triangle thus became the last diplomatic drama during the Cold War years.

KEY POINTS

- The strategic triangle formed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China shaped the diplomatic decisions of the three nations as well as those of all other nations in East Asia during the 1970s and 1980s. The tendency toward a coalition between two of the three countries and the fear of such an alliance constituted the main dynamics.
- Although China was significantly less powerful than the two superpowers, both the United States and the Soviet Union took China very seriously because of its demonstrated diplomatic flexibility in its alignment policy during heightened Cold War competition.
- Improved Sino-Soviet relations and the end of the Cold War brought triangular diplomacy to an end.

CONCLUSION

After the downfall of the tributary system in the nineteenth century, diplomacy displayed distinctive characteristics in East Asia during different periods. One of the major diplomatic challenges during the age of imperialism was to balance the power of an anti–status quo state so that it could not create a universal empire. Therefore, diplomacy of imperialism was characterized by the constant change in balancing and counterbalancing actions. During the Cold War period, the balance of power between the two blocs was at the heart of diplomacy. Détente diplomacy emerged as a new way to protect the interests of major powers through peaceful political and diplomatic means after the deterioration of the rigid bipolar system in East Asia. This process began with the Sino-American détente. The Sino-Soviet détente coincided with the end of the Cold War and the start of a new era of post–Cold War diplomacy (see Zhang, chapter 16 in this volume).

QUESTIONS

1. With the decline of the Chinese empire came the introduction of the Western idea of the nation-state system. Where did we see the adopted idea of national and territorial sovereignty play out in the past? How is it applied in East Asia today?
2. What political, military, and diplomatic factors led to Japan's domination of East Asia from the Meiji Restoration until the end of the Pacific War?
3. Describe the key elements of imperialist diplomacy, Cold War diplomacy, and triangular diplomacy.
4. How was US containment policy structured in East Asia, and how was it different from the containment policy in Europe?
5. To what extent was the functional role of small and weak states in East Asia conditioned by supranational factors such as security alliance and superpower competition?
6. Discuss how the strategic triangle affected diplomatic decisions toward the end of the Cold War era.
7. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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PART II

Concepts and Theories of Contemporary Diplomacy

This part of the book provides an overview of some key concepts and theories that underpin complex diplomacy. The four diverse yet interconnected chapters discuss how international relations and other disciplines theorize diplomacy, how these discussions galvanize and cohere into major debates, how globalization is transnationalizing diplomatic theories and practices, and how diplomacy can still be seen as being primarily about negotiation and mediation.

Our *first* aim in this part of the book is for readers to reflect more deeply on the uses and limits of theory, to consider why different disciplines take such different approaches, and to make judgments about the descriptive, explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive (or normative) advantages of certain theories over others.

Our *second* aim is to encourage students to notice the gap between those who theorize about diplomacy (scholars) and those who practice it (professional diplomats). Scholars tend to see the big picture without appearing to understand the pressures of daily diplomatic life or what diplomats do in practice. Diplomatic practitioners tend to be overwhelmed by the immediate demands of the day and are often reluctant to draw abstract generalizations about their everyday practices. While this part of the book reveals the current theory-practice gap, it also offers insights about what diplomats actually do. Our aim is to reimagine the gap in ways that might help us study practices as patterns that have effects and that, potentially, can be generalized. These insights further illuminate the complexity of contemporary diplomacy and support our objective to develop the "complex diplomacy" concept.

CHAPTER 3

Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Other Disciplinary Perspectives

Paul Sharp

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction: the attractions and limitations of theory
- Diplomacy in international theory
- Diplomats in social theory and practice theory
- Diplomatic theory
- Postpositivist diplomatic theory
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter examines how social theorists make sense of diplomacy. Social theory is concerned with explaining and understanding how people live in societies and, in this case, how those societies relate to one another. The introduction sets out the attractions and limitations of doing social theory, outlines different types of theory, and considers the uses of theory. The first section examines the place of diplomacy in three main traditions of international theory. The second section looks at sociological and anthropological studies of diplomats, what they actually do, and how they see themselves. The third section shifts the focus from theories of diplomacy to diplomatic theory, the rules and conventions that regulate professional diplomatic conduct. The final section looks at how developments in international relations have made possible a revival of interest in diplomacy, to the point where diplomatic theory of international relations and human relations in general may be possible. The chapter concludes that the world is becoming more plural. Where people live in groups that feel separate from one another and want to be so, there will always be a need for good diplomacy and, thus, good theorizing about diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION: THE ATTRACTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THEORY

Diplomats tend not to like "theory"—in the sense of formulating general, and often abstract, propositions that help people to explain and understand both how they relate to one another and how they might do so. Theory seems to have little to do with their jobs as they experience these on a daily basis (Oglesby 2015; Sharp 2015). Academics, in contrast, tend to like theory, for it promises better understandings and better explanations of why the world is the way it is and what people ought to do. As some academics say when they want to frighten their undergraduates, there is no escape from theory. Every time you offer an explanation of a puzzle you find interesting or a description of how things happen, you are employing theoretical assumptions and making theoretical arguments. The only real question is whether one theorizes well or poorly.

Although it may be true, the claim that one cannot escape theory is probably not as important as it sounds. Theory is not always for someone or some purpose in a political sense, although it can always be put to good or bad use by someone else (Cox 1987: 128). Nor is it the case that if we all theorized better, by making our assumptions explicit and our arguments internally consistent, then the world would be a more peaceful and just place. Look at the fights good theorists get into with each other and, more important, how the arguing does not stop and the arguments do not dry up (Bull 1966). Human beings are creatures of emotions, instincts, and egos as well as creatures of reason. Indeed, all four are bound up with one other. Many of our greatest life choices—for example, whether to marry, whether to have children, or whether to attack Pearl Harbor—attest to this. We jump in, and sometimes it is not clear that a systematic accounting of the factors in play and the relationships between them would provide a better way of deciding what to do. Besides, as diplomats would be among the first to remind us, the world does not stop and wait for us to complete our theoretical exercises. It goes right ahead using whatever fragments of explanation and understanding seem to fit the purpose at the time.

On the whole, however, the world is better off for having a few people who take social theorizing seriously, even if it rarely generates the sort of hard-and-fast laws of cause and effect observable in some of the natural sciences. Social theorists are useful for four reasons. First, they perform a "critical function." It is useful to have people who can point out inaccuracies in assumptions, fallacies in inferences drawn from them, and inconsistencies in the arguments that follow when these occur (Ashley 1989; Cox 1987; Der Derian 1987; Rosenau 1990).

Second, some theorists perform a "descriptive/explanatory function." They seek to identify a world of conditions, correlations, causes, and consequences that is not always visible to those who live entirely within the terms and understandings of everyday life (Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Morgenthau 1948; Singer 1961). For example, despite the common belief that treaties are not worth the paper they are printed on, research shows that states actually do work hard to keep their promises or, at least, to square their actions with the commitments they have made. Research also shows that states in which women enjoy higher social status and legal standing are generally less likely to respond violently to certain challenges than states where women enjoy less standing in these terms (Hudson et al. 2008).

Third, some theorists perform a "constitutive/constructive function." Rather than identifying general patterns, they explore the way in which our understandings of the social world are produced by our thoughts and actions, and the extent to which it is meaningful to talk of a distinction between a social world somehow "out there" and our thinking about it (Constantinou 1996; Wendt 1999). In their view, we should not be exploring the consequences of living in a world of sovereign states, and we should not accept the latter as an unambiguous given from which we proceed to reason. Instead, we should be asking how the idea that we live in a world of sovereign states is produced and circulated, how that idea gains and loses its dominance over other ways of thinking about the world, what problems thinking in these terms solves, which ones it does not address, and which ones it makes worse. Why, for example, do most of us assume that the only answer to the current problems of the Syrian people involves somehow achieving an agreement about who is in charge of the Syrian state as a whole, with most of the argument being about who that should be?

Finally, there is "normative theory," which is concerned with what we "ought" to be doing in a moral sense. This can engage moral questions directly—for example, are there circumstances in which it is right for diplomats to dissemble or lie? Or, the engagement can be indirect, considering the assumptions upon which certain moral principles are based—for example, diplomatic immunity—and the consequences of people maintaining such principles. In the indirect sense, it is probably more useful to see normative theory as a dimension to, or an aspect of, the other forms of theorizing rather than as a form in its own right (Nardin 2009).

The distinctions between these types of theorizing are not watertight. Each has its strengths and its weaknesses. Everyone likes an exposé of big claims, but no one likes a critic if all he or she does is criticize. Description leading to general causal explanation promises the most in terms of prediction, problem solving, and power. If only we could specify the economic conditions and political conduct that nearly always lead to war, for example, then surely we could avoid war more often, and even get rid of it. Yet this sort of causal theorizing often assumes a hard-and-settled character for both general categories and specific instances of social constructs that invites us to beg important questions and leave important avenues unexplored. How, for example, can one advance claims about the peaceful nature of liberal states if people cannot agree on what it means to be peaceful, liberal, and a state, or even on whether particular states fit these categories, however one defines them?

Uncovering the way social worlds are "constructed" and "constituted" can be emancipating. It allows us to escape the tramlines of conventional theoretical argument and to see our present in terms of larger and less familiar contexts. Having had the constructed character of social realities and the interdependence of the ideas that hold each social ensemble together demonstrated, however, we might still want to know why the social world is constructed in one particular way rather than another (Mearsheimer 1994/95). And we might still struggle to say much of interest or use to other people without climbing back inside the old frameworks. The idea of a rogue state rejecting international norms is a social construct, for example, and rogue states do not exist in the way they are conventionally presented. They are not more likely to act violently than most of their respectable counterparts. However, knowing this does not make Iran, North Korea, and their vexatious relationships with the United States disappear, and it is hard to enter the public debates over what to do about them by simply rejecting the premise—that there are rogue states—on which the debate is based (Litwak 2000; Sharp 2009).

So what use is social theory? It is unlikely to make you or your country more powerful, more efficient, or more competitive in the marketplace. What it can do, however, is uncover truths, explode "Truths," and provide alternative ways of looking at what seems to be settled and familiar. Joseph Nye's ideas about **soft power**, for example, alerted large numbers of people to the extent to which the use of rewards and punishments is not the norm in international life (Nye 2004). It may be the theorists' conceit to maintain that the unexamined life is not worth living. However, most people, even diplomats, like to reflect in some way on how things are, how things might be, and their place in the scheme of things. And given the inescapability of theorizing, most seem to benefit from being able to recognize when theorizing is more and less well done.

KEY POINTS

- Social theorizing about diplomacy is important and interesting. It helps us better understand diplomacy and the assumptions on which opinions about it are based.
- There are different types of theorizing—critical, causal, constitutive, and normative—but they all seek to generate general propositions about how diplomacy (in this case) works and why it does so.
- Social theory is not necessarily "useful" in instrumental terms, but since most accounts of how and why the world works as it does rest on theoretical claims, it is useful in helping recognize when theorizing is more and less well done.

DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY

Until recently, diplomacy has been at the margins of international theory and social theory. Academics have noted the resistance of diplomacy to being theorized (Neumann 2003). Diplomats, when asked to reflect on this state of affairs, have generally expressed satisfaction with it. Nevertheless, theorizing about diplomacy and diplomats highlights important differences in the way people think about both. To demonstrate this, it is necessary to shift from characterizing theorists by the form of their approaches to characterizing theorists according to the content dictated by their basic assumptions. The balance of this section will examine what international theories say or imply about diplomacy. The next section will look at what social theory more broadly conceived has to say about diplomats.

International theory is conventionally divided into three schools, or traditions, of international thought: **realist**, **rationalist**, and **revolutionary** (Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Wight 1991). There are dangers of oversimplification in doing this, but treating the three traditions not as competing and mutually exclusive truth claims but, rather, simply as ways of thinking that surface again and again when scholars and practitioners reflect on international relations further mitigates those dangers.

"Realist" thinkers focus on the use of power in the pursuit of interests (Morgenthau 1948). They do so because of their understanding of human nature and the nature of any social system in which no one exercises supreme authority. In these conditions of **international anarchy**, like the **sovereign state** system, realists are generally more interested in states than in any other actors, because in the world as they present it, states have the most power and pursue the highest, most inclusive interests. Diplomacy and diplomats stump realists. Are they elements of state power, instruments of foreign policy, or merely means of communicating both to others?

"Systemic" or "structural" realists, who focus on properties of international systems, plump for the latter view (Waltz 1979). Diplomacy and diplomats are concerned with communication. Communication in an international system is important insofar as someone has to undertake it, but communication is unimportant in that variation in it cannot account for variations in important systemic outcomes. The degree of stability present in a bipolar international system, for example, will not depend on the degree of effectiveness with which its diplomacy is conducted.

"Classical" and "neoclassical" realists, in contrast, focus on the insecurities they see in human nature and tend to see diplomacy and diplomats as instruments of foreign policy and elements of state power, respectively. For classical realists such as Morgenthau, individual statesmen and ambassadors can vary in their effectiveness with significant consequences. For neoclassical realists, the internal character of states can vary, with differences in national education systems, for example, giving rise to more or less effective diplomatic services (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). Are liberal states, which value tolerance and compromise, more likely to produce better diplomats (Keens Soper 1974)? Some sort of autonomous power is being ascribed to diplomats by classical realists, but what sort? Is it simply intelligence and clarity of vision, operating in the way that a chess player with more of both will generally beat a chess player with less? Or does it reside in their powers of persuasion and negotiation, the so-called gift of the gab? If so, then diplomacy involves far more than effectively communicating interests and the supporting promises of rewards and threats of punishment.

In communicating with one another on behalf of their states, diplomats also seem to be doing their "own thing." And as realists are quick to point out, their own thing does not always jibe well with conceptions of the state as a strategic actor whose interests are paramount. Diplomats, in their view, are far too keen on sacrificing the national interests of their own state and appeasing the interests of others in accordance with some dangerous idea of preserving peace.

"Rationalist" thinkers share with most other people a commitment to the idea that the application of reason to human relations can make existing ones work better and develop new ones by which human needs and wants may be better satisfied. In addition, they proceed from the moral and empirical primacy of individual human beings. They stress the importance of accepting rules for protecting rights, enforcing duties, and regulating competition. And they stress the superiority of rational and representative deliberation over the exercise of power in the service of particular wills as a way of making collective decisions. Diplomats, therefore, as the builders and operators of orders, institutions, and **regimes** at regional, international, and global levels, are expected by rationalist thinkers to be their natural allies in bringing reason into the conduct of international relations. The emergence of the modern sovereign state system provides a compelling but incomplete story in these terms. In it, diplomats are presented as initially providing a more reliable means by which their **sovereigns** could communicate with each other than existed in the past. Then, they develop a specifically diplomatic system with its own priorities and assumptions in regard to the importance of **resident embassies**, **diplomatic immunities**, and **continuous dialogue**, which ensures that the process of conducting relations itself does not become an unwanted source of tension.

So far, so good, but here, the problems emerge. Rationalist thinkers do not constitute a homogeneous bloc. They can be distinguished from one another by the distinctively political, economic, and legal avenues of thought that they apply to making sense of international relations. However, these do not always fit well with one another. For example, political concerns with stability and fairness may suggest measures designed to redistribute wealth and regulate production that are at odds with economic concerns about maximizing efficiency and encouraging competition. And the priorities of both political and economic thought pose problems for legal reasoning's focus on laws designed to specify right conduct and to secure just outcomes. At a certain point, therefore, diplomacy is seen as parting company with the march of reason along these avenues. Political rationalists see diplomats as paying too much respect to illiberal forms of power like Asian dictatorships and Middle Eastern monarchies. Economic rationalists see diplomats as having too much respect for the inefficient national economies of the political communities in which, as a result of historical accident, we happen to live. How can they ignore the law of comparative advantage, for example, in order to defend agricultural subsidies in rich countries? And legal rationalists see diplomats as having too much respect for the practice of using the law when it serves but ignoring the law when it does not on grounds of prudence. If one state is to be sanctioned for protecting terrorists, then should not every state that does so be sanctioned?

Ultimately, both diplomacy and diplomats fail, according to rationalist thinkers, because they act as servants of states, a function that rationalists believe is becoming both more difficult and less important to undertake in an era when the information technologies and cultures of globalization are said to be rapidly transforming international relations.

Why are diplomats and diplomacy so tied to states? The historical record provides one sort of answer in terms of the expansion of the West and its characteristic form of political organization, states. Another is provided by "revolutionary thinkers" who claim that diplomacy and states serve established concentrations of power, no matter what the sources of this power are in any given epoch. Where systems of social relations involve exploitation and domination, and where centers of exploitation and domination compete with one another, diplomacy helps to cover the contradictions between the way these systems present themselves and their underlying realities and between both of these and the universal desire of humankind for peace and justice. Who bribes the father in Joseph Conrad's *Secret Agent* (1907) into getting his simpleton son to carry out a bomb attack in London for their own obscure purposes? The diplomats of another great power. Who thwarts the aspirations of the Iranian people for the true freedom of an Islamic republic? The "nest of spies" at the American embassy. Who funnels money into Kiev to support demonstrations against Ukraine's previous, pro-Russian government? The embassies of the West. And who reduces an environmental conference full of hope for real progress on carbon emissions into a selfish gridlock of competing demands for derogations? The diplomats. Why? Because diplomacy and revolution are, to paraphrase Martin Wight (1991), enemies. According to Leon Trotsky (1930), come the revolution, there would be no need for foreign ministries and embassies. One could simply issue a few proclamations and "shut up shop."

History was to show James Connolly's (1915) highly critical and, perhaps, cynical characterization of diplomacy to be just as applicable to ruthless revolutionaries (see box 3-1). And it proved Trotsky wrong, although not in the way that people often assume. To be sure, the Bolshevik revolution became a Russian state-building project (with all the attendant dangers to carrying out a social revolution, of which Trotsky was well aware). As a consequence, the Soviet state required conventional **diplomatic representation**. However, like the capitalist economic and political liberal revolutions in England, France, and the Americas that preceded them, and like the anticolonial revolutions in South Asia and Africa that followed,

BOX 3-1

James Connolly, Diplomacy as Damnation

Writing in 1915 in the midst of the First World War, the Irish revolutionary James Connolly maintained that diplomacy in general, and British diplomacy in particular, was

> hypocrisy incarnate. [. . .] The diplomat holds all acts honourable which bring him success, all things are righteous which serve his ends. If cheating is necessary, he will cheat; if lying is useful, he will lie; if bribery helps, he will bribe; if murder serves, he will order murder; if burglary, seduction, arson or forgery brings success nearer, all and each of these will be done. And through it all the diplomat will remain the soul of honour—a perfect English gentleman.

SOURCE: Connolly (1915).

socialist revolutions (such as those in Russia in 1917 and China in 1949) influenced the way people think about states and diplomacy. Indeed, the establishment of the modern state system in seventeenth-century Europe can be regarded as a revolution in which diplomacy was centrally involved, resolving questions about diplomatic representation and who was entitled to claim it. Diplomacy's involvement continues in the great revolutions of globalization and regionalization that the world is currently undergoing. As revolutionary thinkers are quick to point out, diplomats are often to be found representing the status quo and slowing down processes of social transformation on its behalf. However, diplomats are also to be found representing new claims to membership and standing in international society and facilitating efforts to build a **global civil society** of problem solvers. As the long view of history shows, in any plural society, social transformation does not drive out diplomacy. It increases the demand for it, as arguments about identities and ideas are added to the ones about interests that diplomats represent and undertake in settled times.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy and diplomats have been resistant to theorizing by international relations scholars.
- When considered in terms of traditions of thought (realist, rational, and revolutionary) rather than types of theory, we can better see what international theory has to say about diplomacy.
- Realists see diplomacy as an instrument of policy, but a suspect one given the priority diplomats accord to the interests of other states and the preservation of peace.
- Rationalists see diplomacy as an imperfect ally in their efforts to dilute nationalism, maximize prosperity, and strengthen the rule of law.
- Revolutionaries see diplomacy as the enemy, prepared to do anything that will preserve the status quo.

DIPLOMATS IN SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE THEORY

International theorists try to place diplomacy in their understandings and explanations of how international relations work. Other theorists, primarily **sociologists** and anthropologists, are more likely to focus on diplomats as human beings engaged in a particular kind of social practice. One approach is to imagine early encounters between simple peoples in an anthropological fiction mirroring the use of the "state-of-nature" convention in political theory. Harold Nicolson, for example, imagines an encounter between "savages" who wish to communicate with each other but are prevented by taboos placed on having nothing to do with outsiders who want to talk (Nicolson 1963: 6).

Social theory makes it easier to imagine how standard rules for dealing with outsiders were suspended by notions of diplomatic immunity so that different groups might communicate with one another. However, there are problems with encounter narratives, including the assumption of peoples living completely separate from one another with which these narratives usually begin the story of diplomacy. More empirically based and comparative anthropological studies make these shortcomings clear while, at the same time, seeking to demonstrate that wherever separate communities in relations with one another exist, there also people engaged in diplomacy will be found (Foster 1985).

This underlying concern of the anthropologists with "building up" so-called primitive societies in our understandings of them is less evident in how sociologists treat diplomats. In the literature on the idea of strangers, for example, diplomats are presented as a type of outsider. Other sociological approaches contrast conventional ideas of diplomacy as an esoteric and mysterious practice undertaken by quiet, sophisticated, and possibly cynical heroes with close studies of how actual diplomats see themselves and spend their working days.

There is a "tear-down" element in this to be sure. Some theorists work hard to dispel the esoteric view of diplomats by emphasizing the banal side of their everyday lives (Neumann 2012). There is also, however, a "build-up" element in choosing what people actually do as diplomats, as opposed to some abstract idea of what diplomacy involves, to be the starting point for theorizing. Several scholars have adopted what is sometimes known as a "micro-sociology" approach in an attempt to capture how the everyday practices of diplomats shape and influence the international world (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, 2015). Vincent Pouliot (2016b), for example, looks at the way in which the activities of diplomats produce and reinforce the place of the states they represent in conceptions of an international "pecking order" (2016b). Adler-Nissen (2014a) looks at how diplomats representing states that do not fully participate in all European Union common policies nevertheless contribute to the idea that full participation is the norm. This focus on practice is particularly important in times of social transformation or uncertainty. Then, the idea of practice as theory or, more prosaically, trying to establish practices rather than following established practices becomes important as people struggle to make sense of an expanding range of hyphenated diplomacies—for example, public-diplomacy, private-diplomacy, military-diplomacy, field-diplomacy, and citizen-diplomacy. Andrew Cooper (2008b, 2015), for example, has written on the roles of celebrities as diplomats as well as on the diplomatic "afterlives" of former presidents and prime ministers.

KEY POINTS

- Social theorists and anthropologists have been interested in diplomacy, although not for the same reasons as international relations theorists.
- Anthropologists have been interested in the possible origins of diplomacy in encounters between simple societies and the presence of different forms of diplomacy in non-European societies past and present.
- Social theorists have examined the lived-life experiences of actual diplomats to see how personal, bureaucratic, and professional **cultures** shape the way diplomats respond to the challenges that confront them.

- Practice theorists have used the techniques of micro-sociology to demonstrate how the detailed, everyday work of diplomats actually produces the international world.
- Both lines of inquiry raise questions about saying that only accredited officials representing sovereign states can be properly regarded as conducting diplomacy.

DIPLOMATIC THEORY

Hyphenated diplomacies raise the question of what is diplomatic about the activity so identified. If one accepts that diplomacy is what diplomats do, then answering this question may not matter. It does matter, however, to diplomatic theorists, those who theorize about diplomacy in what they see as its own terms. There exists a formal body of diplomatic theory pertaining to the rights, duties, and forms of conduct of diplomats in their relations with one another and with those whom they represent. The **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (1961) and the **Vienna Convention on Consular Relations** (1963) are the guiding documents in this regard. They present a set of practical understandings to facilitate the smooth operation of the diplomatic system. However, they also imply a set of claims about who and what are important in international relations, what may properly be regarded as diplomacy, and thus, who can properly be regarded as diplomats. Students of diplomatic theory such as G. R. Berridge and Alan James , as a consequence, reject the broader conception of diplomacy implied by its new hyphenated variants, because, in their view, diplomats must be accredited representatives of sovereign states conducting relations between them and because, as accredited professionals, diplomats enjoy more legitimacy and are better at conducting international relations than are other people (Berridge 2011: 1–3).

Other theorists of diplomacy, such as Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall (2005), Paul Sharp (2009), and Geoffrey Wiseman (1999), regard this position as untenable, because the proportion of international relations conducted between states by formally accredited diplomats relative to all international relations appears to be shrinking. However, this creates the problem of how to make sense of the rest. Is it all diplomacy, and so "diplomacy" simply serves as a synonym for "international relations" as it did in the past, when diplomats actually conducted most international relations? Theorists of diplomacy have tried to answer this question in a number of ways. Some have tried to identify a distinctive activity or set of activities. Thus, Berridge and James (2001), following Nicolson (1963), identify negotiation as the key to understanding what diplomats do (see Zartman, chapter 6 in this volume). Sharp (1999) focuses on diplomats' roles as representatives of both the interests and the identities of those for whom they act. Philip Seib (2009) sees them as communicators and receivers of interests and values. And Brian Hocking (1999a) presents them as catalytic coalition builders of interest groups occupying strategic nodal points in the networks of international interaction. Other theorists of diplomacy have tried to identify a distinctive problematic that captures diplomacy's essence. Jönsson and Hall (2005), for example, focus on the attempt to mediate between the self and others or between the particular and the universal. The trouble with each of these, however, is that while they may yield important insights about diplomacy, they do not reveal what is distinctive to it.

Other people negotiate, represent, report, build coalitions, and seek to reconcile particulars with universals, and selves with others, without obviously being diplomats or engaging in diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomatic theory, traditionally understood, is the formal body of conventions and understandings that regulate the conduct and specify the rights and duties of professional diplomats as set out in the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.
- Diplomatic theory nevertheless engages definitional questions like "What is diplomacy?" and "Who may be properly regarded as diplomats?"
- Answers to these questions generally stress particular diplomatic functions like negotiating, representing, or reporting; the necessary qualifications for those undertaking diplomacy; or the problematic within which diplomacy operates.
- None of these answers is entirely satisfactory because each is not exclusive to diplomacy and can be found in other kinds of human relations.

POSTPOSITIVIST DIPLOMATIC THEORY

What follows if defining what diplomacy is, who diplomats are, and what they do does not matter? **Postpositivist** theorists of diplomacy begin by relaxing the assumption that our understanding of diplomacy must be grounded in the relations of sovereign, territorial states (see box 3-2). Instead, they ask in what sort of circumstances

BOX 3-2

Costas Constantinou's Interpretation of Diplomacy

Costas Constantinou is interested in the way language is used to produce the social world in which we all live. Language is an unreliable instrument, however: People are not always aware of what they are doing when they choose their words, and words have lives and histories of their own, with all sorts of meanings and uses packed into them. "Diplomacy," with its sense of mystery, ambiguity, deception, and veiled power, is one such word. Conventionally, we think it belongs to the world of states and their power politics. If we look at the history of the word "diplomacy," however, and of related words like "embassy" and "ambassador," we can see how they are bound up with words like "theory" and with notions of discovery, both of ourselves and others. In some ways, ordinary human life is much more like diplomacy as we conventionally understand it—we are engaged in representing and negotiating on behalf of ourselves as ambiguous and shifting identities. Yet in other ways, Constantinou argues, we can see the potentials for diplomacy as a humanistic practice in which we seek to explore and negotiate new possibilities for ourselves and others.

SOURCES: Constantinou (1996, 2013).

do people start reaching for words like "diplomacy" and "diplomats" and, indeed, in what sort of circumstances were the words actually created.

"Diplomacy" and "diplomat" are terms called in when people find themselves in relations with others, or those whom they wish to declare as others, from whom they feel and wish to be separate. Postpositivist theorists of diplomacy view this "separateness" in different ways. It can be viewed as a process by which other people are made strange, and by which this strangeness is actively maintained, so that they can be exploited, dominated, and harmed. James Der Derian (1987) presents diplomacy and diplomats as mediating **estrangement**. Diplomats may bring people together to resolve their differences, but they often do so in such a way as to make sure that the people represented by them remain estranged. Thus, even a great diplomatic coming-together like the United Nations General Assembly's annual opening underlines the separate and sovereign terms on which the peoples of the world actually do come together. Separateness can also be viewed as a condition in which people do not realize, have forgotten, or have had obscured the commonalities that unite them. David Wellman (2004), for example, argues that the sacred writings of Christians, Muslims, and Jews share stories about how peoples should live if they are to remain in harmony with their natural environment. In this view, diplomats and diplomacy, at least potentially , have a role in facilitating the (re)discovery of these commonalities.

However, separateness, if not the forms it takes, can also be seen as a permanent condition, and one people should be glad is so. In this view, the task of diplomacy and diplomats is not just to handle the difficulties that arise in relations between different groups. It is also to maintain, extend, and explore the different ways of life that these groups actually and potentially embody.

Diplomatic Theory of International and Human Relations

Together, these insights make possible a shift away from seeing diplomacy only as a way of conducting relations between states—that is to say, as a distinctive sector of international relations with arguably wider application. Instead, our attention is directed toward the potentially diplomatic element in all international relations and, indeed, all human relations. The simple inside-outside thinking where all the relations within states are of one kind and all the relations between states are of another is replaced by a more complex understanding with potentially liberating, potentially unsettling, but fewer imposed consequences. In this broader view of diplomacy, wherever there are groups, relations within them will differ from relations between them. People will believe themselves to be under fewer moral and legal obligations to the members of other groups than to members of their own, and they will feel less emotional attachment to others than to their own. They will also likely understand others less well than they understand their own. Hence, relations between groups will be more difficult to undertake than relations within groups, especially if the desire is to avoid misunderstanding, conflict, and violence. The successful handling of these relations will involve the elements of a "practice"—the bundle of assumptions about how the world works, what is important in it, and the techniques for achieving what is important—that are associated with diplomacy. This is true for relations between any and all of the aggregates in which people and peoples find themselves living, although whether a special class of practitioners—diplomats—is required is by no means as clear.

KEY POINTS

- Postpositivist theorists of diplomacy relax two assumptions: that diplomacy is conducted only by states, and that diplomacy needs to be precisely defined.
- These theorists ask how and with what consequences people's ideas about diplomacy and what diplomats do are framed at different times and in different places.
- Some postpositivist theorists suggest that diplomacy is involved not in bringing people together but in marking the boundaries between them and keeping them estranged from one another.
- Others are more concerned with how conventional diplomacy supports a pattern of international life that is based on assumptions and priorities that are not environmentally sustainable. They call for a new diplomacy that creates and maintains a system of communities that are more in tune with the requirements of their environments.

CONCLUSION

Theory generally follows practice. Theorists think about problems that practical life throws in the way of people. One hundred years ago, it was possible to maintain that diplomacy and international relations were synonymous. Liberal and Marxian political economists might have disagreed and maintained that great magnets under the chessboard of international diplomacy were regulating the moves of the major players. This was not how it seemed to most people, however. If you understood the rules of diplomacy, both formal and tacit, then you would understand what was important to know in order to make sense of international relations. Those who studied international relations agreed.

This view was shaken by the sense of diplomacy's failure to prevent the First World War and a host of ideological arguments of political, economic, and legal provenance to the effect that international relations, and the challenge of avoiding another war, could not, and should not, be left to diplomacy and diplomats in the future. For the balance of the twentieth century, it was thought that peace would be better preserved by creating and sustaining the right sort of political, economic, and legal order, populated by the right sort of states. This would be achieved by example where possible and by force where necessary. As a consequence, those who thought about international relations did so in terms that excluded diplomacy, or took for granted what it continued to accomplish, while highlighting its shortcomings. Diplomatic theory in particular acquired an air of obsolescence, focused as it was on defending old forms and practices as still valuable, while the exciting bits of diplomacy like **crisis management**, **summitry,** and **bargaining** were hived off by subfields like foreign policy analysis and strategic studies with other priorities.

The end of the Cold War began a process of change in terms of reinstating diplomacy and raising the level of academic interest in it. Paradoxically, however, a classic obstacle to diplomacy—the presence of an apparently hegemonic power that did not need to negotiate—provided a boost for diplomacy when the United States engaged in a number of wars that exposed the limits to what force alone could achieve. The United States' rediscovery of diplomacy under Barack Obama's administration restored interest in it in those places where most of the study of international relations is undertaken. In the short to medium term, however, shifts in the distribution of power that remind us of the classical balance of power and diplomacy's role in making it work may have more lasting consequences. Already, scholars are beating paths to China and India to hear what they have to say about international relations in general and diplomacy in particular. When power shifts, one has to pay more attention not only to the capacities and interests of the beneficiaries but also to how they think about the world. For example, does China want to be a great power, and if it does, how might the Chinese understandings of what it is to be a great power and of great power diplomacy differ from the American or European ones (see Zhao, chapter 2, and Zhang, chapter 16 in this volume)?

The case for insisting that we live in a single global system with a homogeneous primary membership, a single formal level of interaction, and a shared vision of how the world should be is weakening. The case for accepting the opposite—a plural world of multiple societies, existing at different levels, and with heterogeneous memberships and many visions of the Good—is strengthening. At any given time, there are theorists who insist that the social world is not as solid as it appears, that it is produced by people as much as it produces them, and that this opens up a host of possibilities in terms of the ways we might live. In settled times, such theorists are largely ignored. They secure an audience only when the cracks are showing to everyone else. We seem to be entering such a time. A sense is growing that attempts to establish the right sort of international or global order with the right sort of membership create as many problems as they solve. If this is so, then the attempts of theorists to make sense of what diplomacy and diplomats do in accordance with their respective theoretical positions on how the world is constituted and works may become less important than they are at present. More important will be the attempts of diplomatic theorists to help develop the techniques by which the identities and interests of the inhabitants of emerging worlds can be represented as peacefully as possible and without unwanted tensions and conflict. Most important, however, may be the efforts of theorists of diplomacy to help wean the rest of us off the compulsion to impose an overarching order on the world, whether conceptual or actual, in order to help us feel more at ease with living in, and exploring ways of living in, increasingly untidy and ambiguous conditions—in short, to help each of us become aware of the diplomatic dimension to our lives and become better diplomats.

KEY POINTS

- Theory seems to follow practice. Theorists examine the problems and puzzles that trouble people.
- What theorists think about things changes with time and place.

CHAPTER 4

Debates about Contemporary and Future Diplomacy

Geoffrey Allen Pigman

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction: debating diplomacy
- Debating what we mean by "diplomacy"
- Debating continuity and change in contemporary diplomacy
- Debating theory and practice in contemporary diplomacy
- Conclusion: how debates about diplomacy are, or are not, resolved

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter examines principal academic debates surrounding contemporary diplomacy, addressing how the debates affect diplomatic practice. The first debate involves questions of what is to be included in what scholars and practitioners consider to be diplomacy. The second debate addresses the extent to which contemporary diplomacy can be considered to have changed from its historical practice and the implications of such change for practitioners. The third debate explores how theory relates to practice in diplomacy. The chapter concludes by asking by what means academic debates over diplomacy might be resolved and how their resolution, or lack thereof, affects diplomatic practice. The chapter is intended to frame these debates for readers and to provide the tools that readers need to take positions in the debates for themselves.

INTRODUCTION: DEBATING DIPLOMACY

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, diplomacy came to be widely debated not only by practitioners, policy experts, and academics but also in the popular press and among the general public. One of the most significant debates concerned whether diplomacy had been or would be successful in preventing the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein from possessing (or continuing to possess) weapons of mass destruction. Between 2001 and 2003, it appeared that most of the **global public** who were in a position to read a newspaper, watch television, or surf the Internet had formed an opinion, irrespective of whether they knew who was involved or how the diplomacy in question was being conducted. The US government of President George W. Bush and US allies, including the United Kingdom and Italy, were criticized by numerous other governments and **civil society organizations** for deciding on their own that multilateral diplomacy under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) had failed and hence to take military action against Iraq.

This debate about diplomacy raises a number of questions that point to underlying, scholarly debates about contemporary diplomacy that have significant implications for how it will be practiced in the future. The first question is a definitional issue with **epistemological** underpinnings: What is to count as diplomacy, and what is not? That these questions are fundamental to the study of diplomacy shows that the longstanding consensus about "what we mean by diplomacy" is now breaking down. The second, overlapping debate is about the extent to which diplomacy in the contemporary period has changed and is different from, or similar to, diplomacy in the past. Key to unpacking this debate is an understanding of what constitutes continuity and change. The third debate concerns the rôle of theory in diplomacy: What is the relationship between theorizing and practicing diplomacy? The most intellectually challenging of the three debates, it perhaps has the most far-reaching implications for how we understand and engage in diplomacy in the contemporary environment.

That these questions engender debate rather than consensus is a result of different sorts of knowledge and understanding being apposite to different issues. Some issues have emerged because of new empirical information that challenges previously held understandings. Others have arisen as a result of competing modes of analysis of information. Yet others, such as the theory and practice debate, arise when more radically different and incompatible theoretical and epistemological approaches come into contention. The following discussions make reference to which of these causes appear relevant to each particular debate. The concluding section addresses approaches to resolving them. Understanding the debates and their main positions should help students of diplomacy to develop their own criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of diplomacy in the future.

DEBATING WHAT WE MEAN BY "DIPLOMACY"

The debate over what diplomacy means is important, because it defines the bounds of what can be analyzed under the rubric of diplomatic studies: who are considered diplomats, and who are not; what are diplomatic practices, and what are not; and more broadly, what counts as part of the study of diplomacy, and thus, by extension, what does not.

In earlier times, diplomacy as a term was used much more **unreflexively** than today. Early modern usages since the seventeenth century generally referred to a process: the art of negotiation, and how to use negotiating effectively to achieve objectives of state. But over the past century, diplomacy came to be understood more broadly than as just the practical art of representing the sovereign and conducting negotiations on his or her behalf. Scholars in the early twentieth century began to study diplomacy as a vehicle for understanding what was becoming known as "international relations": the relationships between **nation-states** in the **international system**, and the characteristics of the international system of nation-states itself.[1] This occurred in part because of a felt need to understand the causes of the Great War (or the First World War, 1914–18) and the subsequent pitfall-strewn processes of creating international institutions, such as the League of Nations, to prevent a repeat of the war's ruinous consequences. British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson, a founder of the modern academic discipline of diplomatic studies, in his core text *Diplomacy* (1939) endorsed the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of diplomacy as "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist" (Nicolson 1963: 4–5).

Nicolson's definition acknowledged a broader range of diplomatic processes than only negotiations, including the range of representative and consular functions, as well as the role of the practitioners: the ambassadors, envoys, and other professional diplomats. Another British diplomat-turned-scholar, Adam Watson (1982), characterized diplomacy more generally as "the dialogue between states," a definition encapsulating the balance between diplomatic actors (the nation-state governments) and processes.

Since the end of the Cold War's overweening global focus on the balance of nuclear and conventional power between the US and Soviet superpowers, an awareness has grown among scholars and the general public that perhaps the prevailing understanding of diplomacy was still too restrictive. Latterly, as an increasing share of global economic activity is involved in cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, labor, knowledge, ideas, and culture, and as technological advances have made a growing share of global communications immediate, a wider range of actors than governments of nation-states can be seen to engage in diplomacy through a broader range of processes than those envisioned by Nicolson and Watson. For example, transnational firms such as ExxonMobil, Deutsche Bank, and Toyota represent themselves to, and negotiate with, governments of nation-states much in the way that other governments do. Multilateral institutions such as the **World Trade Organization (WTO)** have created ongoing venues and multilateral conferences for more specialized and often technical types of diplomacy, for example, the agreement and implementation of rules for international trade (Pigman 2016).

More recently, scholars such as Paul Sharp and Christer Jönsson have conceived of diplomatic actors and processes by understanding diplomacy as consisting of two core functions or activities: representation and communication (Sharp 1999; Jönsson and Hall 2003; Pigman 2010). Representation begins with the notion of the diplomatic actor, asking how the actor represents itself to others with whom it wishes to establish and maintain a relationship. Does a sovereign ruler represent him- or herself at a meeting or negotiation directly, in person? Does he or she appoint a special envoy to undertake a diplomatic mission? Does the sovereign appoint a **permanent representative** or ambassador to reside at the location where representation is needed? Does he or she establish regular or emergency communications channels, such as a weekly videoconference or a telephone "hotline"? How do these choices vary if the sovereign is not the head of government of a nation-state but instead the chief executive officer (CEO) of a large global firm like Microsoft, the head of a civil society organization like the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the secretary-general of an international organization like the UN (Sharp 1999)?

In order for diplomatic representation to achieve its intended purposes, authorities in the territory must understand, accept, and respect the representative's mission. Since the seventeenth century, a common understanding of the purposes and functions of diplomatic representation, at least between the governments of nation-state actors and, latterly, multilateral organizations, has emerged. Formal codification of customary international law governing the rights, protections, and responsibilities of diplomatic representatives began at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Representatives of nation-state governments are afforded comprehensive protection under international law by the **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (1961), a treaty negotiated under the aegis of the UN that codified the customary practices of diplomatic relations over the preceding two centuries. The convention guarantees diplomatic representatives' physical security and immunity from civil and criminal prosecution in the host jurisdiction under most circumstances. The property, archives, and documents of representative missions are also protected. By contrast, representatives engaging in diplomacy on behalf of non-state actors, such as global firms and civil society organizations, must rely for their protection upon the good faith of the receiving entity (whether a government, another firm, or organization) and the authority controlling the territory in which the receiving entity is located.

An actor's representation of itself to others also raises questions of how the actor represents itself to itself: the problem of identity. Choices about how, and to whom, to represent oneself play a direct role in who or what one is and becomes. They form part of the social construction of a diplomatic actor's identity and interests. By deciding to join the WTO in December 2001, the People's Republic of China's government chose to subject itself to a set of norms of international trade favoring open markets and less government intervention, as well as to established procedures for resolving disputes and for further liberalizing trade. Joining the WTO had consequences for China's own trade policy process that the Beijing government was not necessarily able to foresee. Becoming a member of the WTO strengthened the economic position of those interests within China favoring membership, notably large exporting manufacturing firms and financial institutions, even whilst weakening opponents, such as heavily subsidized industries. This in turn shifted the domestic balance of political power within China on trade policy and, in so doing, reconstructed a significant aspect of China's identity as a diplomatic actor on the global stage.

The other core diplomatic function or activity—communication—is distinct, although inseparable, from representation. Communication by its nature takes place not between collective entities such as nation-states, multilateral organizations, or global firms but between individuals entrusted with representing or speaking for them. The contemporary media's unparalleled power and reach have both enriched and complicated processes of communication greatly by conveying large quantities of information, accurate or not, with or without context, to huge segments of the global public. "Diplomacy is bargaining," as Thomas Schelling wrote in 1966. "It seeks outcomes that, although not ideal for either party, are better for both than some of the alternatives." (1) The idea of communication as a core diplomatic function begins with this original understanding of diplomacy as the art of negotiation, but it recognizes that diplomacy comprises a much broader range of communications. An ambassador presenting credentials to a head of state upon arrival at a new post, a queen hosting a state dinner for a visiting president, or a commerce minister touring a new technology park and export processing zone with the CEO of a global management consulting firm all exemplify the maintenance of diplomatic communication no less important than a high-level negotiation over a border dispute or an economic development agreement. In the current technology-enabled age, a wider range of communication techniques has become significant for conducting public diplomacy (see Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume). A government-business partnership to promote a country as an investment destination through a multimedia website, a government-funded cultural foundation hosting an exchange of performances by local folk musicians, or an airdrop of MP3 players with prerecorded messages aimed at a population in a hostile state during a military conflict are examples of such techniques (Bull 1977; Jönsson and Hall 2003).

The power of communication, in all its guises, as a core function of diplomacy lies in its ability not only to achieve its primary objectives—resolving a conflict, maintaining a relationship, promoting socioeconomic exchange—but also, in so doing, to modify the interests and even the identity of the actors communicating with one another. When Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat flew from Cairo to Jerusalem in October 1977 to meet Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and address the Israeli Knesset, he transformed the Egypt-Israel relationship from one of enmity over thirty years since Israel's founding into one of peace and (albeit limited) commerce. In negotiating and signing a bilateral peace treaty the following year, Sadat and Begin reprioritized their respective states' major interests. Israel sacrificed its occupation and "settlement" of the Sinai Peninsula in return for peace with an Arab state. Egypt sacrificed solidarity with Arab neighbors in return for repossession of the Sinai, financial gain from reopening the Suez Canal, huge foreign aid flows from the United States, and enhanced security flowing from peace with Israel. Beyond modifying their respective interest preference orderings, however, Egypt and Israel altered their identities as nation-states. Israel abandoned its expansionist Zionist identity for that of a state willing and able to trade land for peace. At that point, Egypt gave up its identification with pan-Arabism and the destruction of Israel for the relative economic and political gains of being a state at peace with its neighbors.

Understanding what the study of diplomacy encompasses requires both a clear sense of the objects of study and a solid sense of what diplomacy is not. Of particular importance is the distinction between diplomatic studies and foreign policy analysis. The study of diplomacy differs from the study of foreign policy, in the sense that foreign policy is generally analyzed from the perspective of the state engaged in making and executing it. Those studying foreign policy ask empirical questions: What is Russia's policy toward the United States? Normative and prudential questions may be asked, for example, does the European Union (EU) have an ethical obligation, and would it be wise, to deploy troops to defend human rights in Kosovo or Darfur? Policies once executed are then evaluated: Which Chilean approaches to achieving agricultural trade liberalization in the WTO **Doha Development Round** have succeeded, which have failed, and why?

Students of foreign policy may be studying the same issues and events as students of diplomacy, but the focus in diplomatic studies is different. Like foreign policy analysis, and unlike some other approaches to international relations, diplomatic studies emphasizes the link between individual agents (representatives) and the collective actors (states, multilateral organizations, and firms) that they represent or on whose behalf they make decisions. But even as they ask similar empirical and analytical or evaluative questions about these relationships, scholars of diplomacy tend to focus on the interactions (communications, negotiations, conflict resolution measures) between the actors rather than on particular actors for their own sake. How do China and the United States represent themselves to one another, through traditional approaches such as the exchange of embassies in Washington, DC, and Beijing, and through other public and private channels? How do they communicate, and how effective is their communication at achieving their respective objectives? Normative questions are also asked, both ethical and instrumental, but usually about the prevailing system and practices of diplomacy and the structure of the system of states and other actors within which diplomacy is practiced. Was the classical approach of conducting diplomatic negotiations in secret ethically objectionable, as US president Woodrow Wilson and the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin both contended in the early twentieth century? Were the different modes of "open" and "revolutionary" diplomacy they advocated respectively more effective at achieving the objectives of the negotiators (Wiseman 2005)?

KEY POINTS

- The first major debate, which concerns what diplomacy means, defines the bounds of what can be analyzed under the rubric of diplomatic studies: who are considered diplomats, what are diplomatic practices, and more broadly, what counts as part of the study of diplomacy.
- Diplomacy can be understood as consisting of two core functions: representation and communication.
- Diplomatic studies focuses upon interactions between actors, whereas foreign policy analysis examines and evaluates processes of policy making and implementation from the perspective of particular actors.

DEBATING CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY

To what extent has the nature of diplomacy changed since the early twentieth century? The significance of apparent changes in how and where diplomacy is done, as well as in who engages in diplomacy, has posed a challenge for scholars accustomed to thinking about diplomatic actors and processes and about diplomatic culture in terms of received images of nineteenth-century diplomatic practice. New actors, including multilateral institutions like the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), global firms such as Oracle and Wipro, civil society organizations like

Médecins Sans Frontières and World Vision, and diplomatic venues such as the WTO, the World Economic Forum, and the UN Conferences on Women all invoke a diplomacy more diverse than ritual meetings between ambassadors of nation-states and occasional multilateral conferences. Some scholars have preferred to define interactions involving new types of diplomatic actors and newer forms of diplomatic venues as not constituting diplomacy at all (Berridge 2010). Others argue that, if the idea of diplomacy is to remain useful, the profusion of types of actor and venue implies that our understanding of what diplomacy is, and who does it, needs to be broadened accordingly (D. Lee and Hudson 2004).

The first question for debate over how much diplomacy has changed focuses on the degree of change in the range of diplomatic actors as traditionally conceived and in broadly recognized historical practices and processes. The recognition of representatives mediating **estrangement** between sovereign bodies became a defining element both of the international system and of the diplomacy that took place within it (Der Derian 1987: 116–33). The familiar traditional category of diplomatic actors, the governments of nation-states, were in effect identified and defined through recognition by their peers (Sharp 1999). Yet nation-state **sovereignty**, whilst still important, no longer implies functional equality for nation-states as diplomatic actors in the way it did during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The number of formally recognized sovereign nation-states in the international system has increased dramatically since the end of the Second World War, owing to processes of decolonization and internal collapse of multiethnic or imperial states. An equally dramatic differentiation has appeared in the size, attributes, and capacities of these nation-states (Strange 1994). Many of the more than 100 newer nation-states are small in territory and population and are impoverished. Whilst formally equal as diplomatic actors, many of these states are unable to perform many core functions of diplomatic representation and communication to the same extent as their larger, wealthier, and older neighbors. Limited in their ability to train and pay professional diplomats, many new states send and receive far fewer permanent bilateral diplomatic missions and operate a much smaller ministry of foreign affairs, with far more circumscribed capacities. The impact of this shift away from the functional equality of **sovereign states** has been mitigated substantially by the growing role of multilateral organizations as diplomatic venues (D. Lee and Smith 2008). Governments of smaller, less wealthy nation-states increasingly focus their limited resources on representation to, and communications with and through, major multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the WTO, and regional integration and development finance institutions.

Not only have nation-state governments as diplomatic actors become more different from one another, but they are no longer the only type of governmental actor engaging in diplomacy. Subnational regional governments such as Catalonia and supranational actors such as the EU are recognized as diplomatic actors in their own right. For example, regional governments like that of Wales maintain missions to the EU in Brussels. For its part, the EU maintains missions in major world capitals like Washington, DC (see Bátora, chapter 17 in this volume). Moreover, governments of large metropolitan urban areas, such as London, Tokyo, Mexico City, and New York, have begun to exchange representatives with other diplomatic actors and communicate over issue areas ranging from crime prevention to attracting international expositions and sporting events.

Another arguably significant change is the convergence between diplomatic actors and venues for diplomacy. Until the twentieth century, the notion of a venue for diplomacy referred primarily to the site or location where negotiation or other communications between sovereigns or their accredited representatives took place. However, with the emergence of major multilateral conferences, or "congresses," for conducting ongoing diplomatic business in Europe in the nineteenth century, the notion of a venue for diplomacy began to take on a somewhat different aspect (Constantinou 1996: 31–32). The Concert of Europe, a multilateral system for maintaining the peace in Europe, was generally acknowledged as successful for the best part of the century following the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The physical location of such conferences varied, but the standing of the participants was fixed and understood in the context of the particular purpose for which the conference assembled, rather than in the context of an ongoing bilateral diplomatic relationship.

The emergence of permanent multilateral organizations for conducting diplomacy since the late nineteenth century was the next step in the evolution of the diplomatic venue. Such organizations initially were small and specific to particular issues or needs. The Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902, for example, created the Permanent Sugar Commission tasked with monitoring compliance with convention obligations by signatory countries and non-signatories alike (Pigman 1997). After the Great War, institutional venues for multilateral diplomacy became the norm. The League of Nations was the first great multilateral experiment in entrusting some core elements that constituted traditional national sovereignty, such as protection against attack and the maintenance of peace, to a permanent institution charged with fair administration of mutually agreed rules of state behavior. Not long after the founding of the league came the establishment of the International Chamber of Commerce, the first multilateral venue for diplomacy constituted not by governments but by civil society actors, specifically international businesses. The history of the League of Nations and the raft of multilateral institutions following it—the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Bretton Woods "triad" of international economic organizations (the World Bank, IMF, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT])—showed how governments and other actors became comfortable with using multilateral venues to pursue different types of diplomatic objectives in different ways. By midcentury, multilateral venues for diplomacy had become part of diplomatic culture and international society. Multilateral institutions, as they have evolved, have taken on diverse diplomatic functions, ranging from serving as venues for communication about major global issues such as security and world peace to mediating between nation-states over much narrower economic and technical matters.

Beyond modifying traditional processes of diplomatic relations between governments, multilateral institutions have generated a more fundamental change. Although far younger than many nation-states, multilateral institutions, in developing as diplomatic venues since the mid-twentieth century, have evolved gradually toward becoming diplomatic actors in their own right. Each institution has come to take on aspects of diplomatic "actor-ness" in its own right to varying degrees. For example, League of Nations **mandates** and UN **trust territories** reflect assumption of (albeit temporary) authority by the respective institutions over the governance of territories in the process of moving toward self-government. Beginning as creatures of their founding nation-state governments or other constituents, multilateral institutions over time have developed their own identities. Managers and staff of these institutions shape, and ultimately generate, their own institutional interests and play a greater role in setting their own agendas and issue priorities, as David Mitrany (1966) foresaw in his mid-twentieth-century arguments for **functionalism**. The institutions then find themselves faced with many of the same diplomatic challenges as nation-state actors themselves. They must represent themselves to, and communicate with, other diplomatic actors: governments of nation-states and non-state actors, including other multilateral institutions. Member governments of the UN normally send a permanent representative to New York to represent their interests on an ongoing basis. Many members of the WTO now have a permanent mission to the WTO headquarters in Geneva. The World Bank and IMF often have permanent or long-term representation in the capitals of nation-states in which they are funding major projects. The EU now sends a permanent representative to the UN, who functions independently from, albeit cooperatively with, the permanent representatives to the UN of each of the EU's member states.

The qualitative nature of the change to diplomacy occasioned by the emergence of multilateral institutions' diplomatic "actor-ness" is subtle but evident nonetheless. Not only does the extent of each institution's "actor-ness" vary, but differences between institutions and other types of actors (whether governments, firms, civil society organizations, or otherwise) inevitably limit some of the ways in which diplomatic representation and communication between them take place. But the overarching significance of the evolution of multilateral institutions is that these venues, initially created by nation-states to facilitate representation and communication between them, have now themselves become subjects engaging in diplomatic representation and communication. The result of this addition of a new layer of diplomatic actors is that the core functions of representation and communication are becoming different rather than easier. While facilitating representation and communication, new institutions increase the number of significant diplomatic actors and add a layer of complexity.

The advent of television, video, global mobile telephony, and the Internet has changed how governments and other diplomatic actors choose to represent themselves by changing how they are able to be perceived by global publics. These new technologies have altered how diplomatic actors communicate, both by changing the available channels for communication (secure satellite links and multiple media outlets) and by increasing the speed at which communication is possible and at which choices may have to be made (hotlines, teleconferencing, email). Transformation of communications technologies has also had a deeper impact upon the relationship between diplomatic actors and the constituencies that constitute and legitimate them. When voters can find out most information about their government through competing media organizations, governments that wish to remain in office must adjust how they make foreign policy, how they conduct diplomacy, and how they communicate about it to their own constituents so as to build and retain public support and legitimacy for their actions. When stockholders and consumers of global firms can learn about corporate policies and diplomacy in a similar way, managements of firms must adapt their strategies of communication to their stakeholders accordingly. Managers of large civil society organizations face a similar challenge in communicating to donors and members.

Underlying the conversation about the extent of change in diplomacy is a deeper debate over to what degree the latest developments in diplomacy are truly new rather than merely recent instantiations of long-running practices. Is the multilevel diplomacy between EU member state governments and the EU governmental institutions in Brussels a new phenomenon? Or is it more a contemporary analogue of the diplomatic relationships in the eighth and ninth centuries between the emperor Charlemagne and the provinces of his empire, which he conducted through appointed emissaries known as "missi." Is the diplomacy between firms like Citigroup and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom really a departure, or is it better understood as a more current version of the diplomacy that took place between the British and Dutch East India Companies and governments in Europe and Asia in the seventeenth century? This "metahistorical" debate over what constitutes change not only matters to scholars and students for its intrinsic interest but is equally important for practicing diplomats. A well-grounded understanding of when circumstances have changed may suggest, or even demand, a real change in practice. More than a century and a half ago, Britain's Foreign Office decided to hire a night clerk following the invention of the electric telegraph. Today, as the speed of communications technology and range of channels increases rapidly, a ministry of foreign affairs seeking to respond to matters now deemed urgent in a timely and efficient manner might decide that staff need to be reorganized in order to process incoming emails, voicemails, and text and video messages around the clock.

KEY POINTS

- The debate over how much diplomacy has evolved is focused on change in the range of diplomatic actors, practices, and processes.
- International institutions, such as the WTO, are evolving toward becoming diplomatic actors in their own right, because they face many of the same diplomatic challenges as nation-state actors.
- Rapid communications are accelerating the speed at which diplomacy is done and causing operational changes in foreign ministries.

DEBATING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY

Why theorize about diplomacy at all? In this primary debate over the relevance of theory, proponents argue that it can serve a number of purposes: to analyze and understand better what diplomacy is and what diplomats do; to generate an understanding of best practice; and to understand the role of diplomacy in the broader range of global interactions that fall under the rubric of "international relations." Since the Second World War, two broad approaches to theorizing about diplomacy have emerged: the first, a generally **positivist** approach, places diplomacy in the context of interstate security relations, and the second, a **post-positivist** view of diplomacy, encompasses a broader range of actors and processes and problematizes the core diplomatic functions of representation and communication.

Scholars in the first camp have played a major role in constructing our contemporary idea of diplomacy through their theorizing. Theorists of diplomacy from positivist presuppositions, from Nicolson to Watson and G. R. Berridge, have articulated a canonical understanding of diplomacy as fundamentally about relations between nation-states, concerned with matters of *haute politique*, or high politics, of Renaissance European lineage and possessing a trans-historical, or perhaps ahistorical, character that has persisted despite major change in the international system. Diplomacy, through this perspective, evolved along with the emergence of the nation-state and the idea of state sovereignty. The Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 were themselves both a major product of the emergence of diplomacy as we know it and a significant building block in the nation-states system that reified and reinforced diplomatic practice. Those treaties, and others that followed, were what diplomacy was supposed to be about: *haute politique*, the dominance of the discourse of security over other political discourses. *Haute politique* conceives of sovereignty in a particular way, as referring to territory, borders, and about populations, ultimately even conquest and colonization, and conceives of economic issues only within the constructs of the security discourse. Is there access to enough oil and food for the army and navy first, for the general public second? Is the power grid able to supply power to the heavy industries that can supply the armed forces? This variety of theoretical claims about diplomacy is at least in principle capable of empirical measurement and verification: warheads counted in an arms reduction treaty, barrels of oil in a strategic reserve.

Since the late 1980s, another group of scholars, including James Der Derian (1987), Costas Constantinou (1996, 2013), Brian Hocking (1999a,b), Richard Langhorne (2004), and Donna Lee and David Hudson (2004), have argued for a more reflexive understanding of contemporary diplomatic practice. These scholars' post-positivist reading of diplomatic history finds that the canonical understanding of diplomacy downplays, marginalizes, and omits key components of the work of contemporary diplomacy. The traditional canon minimizes, when it does not omit altogether, the economic and the cultural at the expense of the security discourse at several levels. The state-centric, rationalist focus on the high politics of the Westphalia system has also privileged the position of state actors in the international system over other types of actors, for example, domestic interest groups or social classes, subnational political units, or non-state actors like firms. This focus makes only scant allowance for the role of multilateral institutions and downplays the significance of the role of non-state actors, irrespective of all the consular work, **commercial diplomacy**, export promotion, and business facilitation that most governments have always undertaken. From the Anglo-Portuguese Methuen Treaty in 1702 to the Treaty of Marrakech that created the WTO in 1995, historically many of the most important diplomatic missions, the most crucial negotiations, and the most significant bilateral and multilateral treaties have been about international trade.

The debate over theory turns in part on the question of how to model the ways in which diplomats understand their own mission. For example, scholars generally agree that in the nineteenth century and for much of the twentieth century, governments and their diplomats did not view trade and economics as constituting the core of international relations. Instead, they argue, diplomats regarded economics as a tool to gain political advantage, or to limit threats, or to increase security. Many, if not most, traditional diplomats historically disdained commercial diplomacy, finding negotiating trade agreements degrading and beneath their usually more noble station. Historian D. C. M. Platt (1972: 374) described why diplomats at the British Foreign Office in 1870 were only too happy to abandon negotiated trade liberalization treaties in favor of a policy of unilateral free trade:

> Noblemen, bored, dispirited, and inexperienced in matters of commerce and finance, found in laissez-faire exactly the rationalization they were looking for; they could avoid a distasteful contact with the persons and problems of trade financiers, merely by referring, in good faith, to the traditions of non-intervention, Free Trade, and open competition. And it was true that *haute politique*, at their level and in the society with which they mixed, *was* far more interesting.

Diplomats in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries perceived, often correctly, that commercial postings in the foreign ministry would be damaging to the progression of their careers. William Ewart Gladstone, one of Britain's greatest prime ministers, openly scorned the haggling and hucksterism of commercial diplomacy, which he associated with tradespeople. Yet ironically, Gladstone must be considered one of the greatest commercial diplomats of all time for signing the Anglo-French Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, a proto-GATT of sorts that triggered a wave of bilateral commercial treaty signings that lowered tariffs across Europe more than fifty percent and changed the economic, political, and social face of Europe. Gladstone would have argued that he signed the treaty to lower military tensions building between England and France in the late 1850s (O'Brien and Pigman 1992). But while scholars may agree on how diplomats historically tended to understand their mission, the different theoretical camps diverge over whether or not this understanding has served the interests of those whom they represent.

The positivist intellectual biases and interest preferences of postwar US academics, which tended to reflect the political, economic, and cultural norms of the day, were instrumental in shaping the dominant paradigm for diplomatic studies, just as they were for the broader discipline of international relations. Scholarship in diplomatic studies articulated, reinforced, and reified the traditional representations of who did diplomacy and on what they focused, foregrounding issues such as the division of Germany, the Cuban missile crisis, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the struggle over how many Soviet republics and which China to seat at the UN, President Richard Nixon's visit to China, and US-Soviet **détente** (Kissinger 1994; Schelling 1966; Watson 1982). Research also focused on the negotiators who engaged in resolving Cold War conflicts (Kissinger 1994). Yet the global political economy was evolving, and diplomacy itself was changing functionally along with it.

Throughout the Cold War period, the neorealist, bipolar security paradigm shared a bed with the ballooning neoliberal discourse of globalization. **Neorealism**, with its theoretical focus on security, and **neoliberalism**, with its focus on international cooperation, shared state-centric assumptions and a rationalist, empirical methodology. The emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s did not so much change traditional representations as reinforce them, even if in more nuanced ways. Neoliberalism focuses on the emergence of multilateral institutions as facilitating prospects for cooperation between nation-states. Cold War era scholarship in diplomatic studies has understood these institutions as venues for diplomacy between states. Understanding such institutions as facilitating cooperation might seem a good theoretical fit for updating the ways of explaining diplomacy as representation and communication between states to mediate between interests and minimize conflict. But neoliberalism also embodies within it a particular notion of international economics that presupposes the same separation of international from domestic, public from private, politics from economics. This perspective removes from the possibility of political contestation the international economic objectives of free trade in goods and services, free flows of capital and investment across borders, and the primacy of market pricing of goods and services. Hence neoliberalism facilitates the return of the focus of nation-state diplomats, and the scholars who study them, to issues of *haute politique*. Governments of states negotiate trade agreements for politics-as-security objectives. Neoliberalism ends up marginalizing all non-state diplomatic actors, even the multilateral institutions themselves, by viewing such institutions as impartial venues in which states interact (D. Lee and Hudson 2004).

Donna Lee and David Hudson (2004) argue that the effect of the positivist, rationalist paradigm upon the theorizing of diplomacy has been to render commercial diplomacy “present-but-invisible.” According to Lee and Hudson, commercial diplomacy has always been at the core of diplomatic representation and communication since long before the emergence of the Renaissance city-states in the Italian peninsula. Trade missions have been taking place since ancient times. Making arrangements for payments between polities and between different monetary systems has long been part of the core business of diplomatic relationships. Even since the emergence of modern diplomacy as understood by diplomatic studies, commercial activities have occupied the majority of the time of diplomatic missions and the ministries behind them. Lee and Hudson argue that the activity of commercial diplomacy by its nature integrates the domestic and the international, the private and the public, the economic and the political. Business leaders of global and local firms sit down with government officials to plan export promotion strategies; investment tours are organized; and foreign economic policies are debated politically between social groups with significantly different interests.

Lee and Hudson also contend that diplomacy is portrayed unreflexively as Eurocentric. The classical idea of diplomacy as a building block of the European nation-state system seats diplomacy within the frame of a particular culture and a particular historical period, even as it posits the actors, objectives, and functions of diplomacy as timeless and ahistorical. But to view diplomacy in this way excludes other cultures and the organized processes of representation and communication between cultures that have taken place across much of the world since ancient times (D. Lee and Hudson 2004). Kishan Rana’s *Inside Diplomacy* (2002b) offers a compelling account of contemporary diplomatic practice from an historical perspective of

India's diplomacy extending back at least as far as the third century BC. The positivist approach to studying diplomacy discourages study of these interactions, because, among other things, it does not recognize pre-Westphalian governments as having equivalent standing to nation-states.

Constantinou (1996: 31–62) challenges the notion that theorizing about diplomacy can be undertaken independently of diplomatic practice. Problematizing the idea of **agency**, Constantinou argues that diplomacy, as a process, is not only functional and structural but also, by its nature, **intersubjective**. Diplomatic subjects or actors do not exist prior to and independent of diplomacy but are themselves constructed socially through the mutual recognition and interaction of diplomacy. Constantinou argues that we need to ask how representative action is personified in the representative, which requires an exploration of the politics of the accreditation process that authorizes one to speak in the name of a sovereign subject. Constantinou proposes as a metaphor language itself as a kind of embassy, a diplomatic representative from the sender to the receiver, from the writer to the reader, from the speaker to the hearer. The envoy—language—brings theory from the sender to a foreign place, which makes theory both diplomatic and politicized.

Understanding diplomatic actors and the acts of representation in which they engage has direct implications for how diplomacy is practiced, according to Constantinou. French theorist Jacques Derrida, Constantinou observes, regarded philosophical discourse as acts of embassy, in which presence, or "Being," is transported. By being sent from the sender, presence, or "Being," is represented to the receiver. According to Derrida, the diplomatic credentials of these linguistic envoys of theory are always subject to question, because they are not the sovereign itself but only representatives of the sovereign. Hence, diplomats should refuse to accredit envoys who claim the truth of their origin and the origin of their truth. When diplomats convey communications from their sovereign, the meanings of their messages are always open to interpretation. Diplomatic messages may not always be what they appear to be. Likewise, diplomats may not hear what they want to hear, so they may interpret messages in such a way as to please their own sovereign or advantage themselves. When Iraqi diplomats communicated to their US and British counterparts in 2002 that Saddam Hussein's government did not possess weapons of mass destruction, some American and British diplomats did not believe the Iraqis, whilst others did believe them. It then became a political decision for US and UK leaders which interpretation to accept and how to act upon it.

The embassy of theory can still be valid, according to Constantinou, but only if we recognize that it is a messenger possessing no sovereign authority. To be valid, diplomatic theory has to use the stratagems and discourses of diplomacy: it must persuade and convince. Theory has to become the object of diplomacy itself, always reflecting on the terms and categories that it is using. Constantinou's logic (1996: 31–40; 2013) invites us to think about diplomatic practice as always constituting diplomatic theory to the extent that practice reflects upon itself, and to the extent that neither diplomats nor scholars assert diplomatic communication as authoritative and beyond interpretation.

Ultimately, the positivist and post-positivist approaches to theorizing about diplomacy differ with respect to what they prioritize regarding diplomatic actors and practice and in terms of how they think about the role of theory itself. The traditional, positivist approach to diplomatic studies has made important contributions to our understanding of contemporary diplomacy, but perhaps only up to a point. Beyond that threshold, post-positivist theoretical approaches may be needed for making sense of the recent evolution of diplomacy and the challenges it faces in the near future.

KEY POINTS

- Theorizing about diplomacy can assist in analyzing and understanding what diplomacy is and what diplomats do, generating an understanding of best practice, and understanding the role of diplomacy in global interactions.
- Some scholars of diplomacy have embraced a positivist theoretical approach focusing on the security of nation-states in the international system, whereas others have adopted a more reflexive, post-positivist approach taking into account identity politics, non-state diplomatic actors, and the centrality of economic and social issues in diplomacy.
- Scholars such as Constantinou argue that to practice diplomacy is, by definition, to theorize diplomacy, in that effective diplomatic practice reflects upon itself.

CONCLUSION: HOW DEBATES ABOUT DIPLOMACY ARE, OR ARE NOT, RESOLVED

This chapter has argued that several important scholarly debates about diplomacy remain open, and that which position one takes in these debates has a significant impact upon how one understands diplomacy and, for practitioners, how one engages in it. The conclusions that practitioners draw about the outcomes of academic debates, whether they are aware of doing so or not, matter very much in terms of the outcomes of diplomatic interactions, in that the underlying assumptions about diplomacy deriving from the academic debates will affect diplomats' effectiveness in choosing and achieving objectives. For example, a government whose senior officials take a view that diplomacy has not changed to such a degree as to warrant recognizing some multilateral organizations as diplomatic actors in their own right may choose not to send as high level a permanent representative to the WTO as a government whose leadership takes the opposite view. This choice might result in significant budgetary savings for one government but substantially more efficient communications with the WTO for the other. This observation supports Constantinou's argument that to practice diplomacy *is* to theorize diplomacy.

The question then arises of whether these open-ended debates about diplomacy can ever be resolved. Academic debates admit of different methods of resolution, and debates about diplomacy are no different in that regard from other debates in the social sciences. Some of the questions debated, such as those concerning the extent and impact of change, may be able to be resolved through careful empirical observation and analysis. The turnaround time in communication between two governments using email, instant messaging, and text messages during a crisis can be measured, for example, and outcomes compared with analogous cases from earlier times when messages were sent by post or telegraph. Numbers of meetings between government diplomats and representatives of non-state diplomatic actors can be counted, compared with earlier periods, and analyzed. A more reflexive method of research for resolving questions surrounding what diplomacy is would take a different approach, such as gathering the perceptions of diplomats through extensive interviewing and making generalizations about their shared meanings and understandings of diplomacy.

Yet to reach conclusions through research that scholars and practitioners with widely diverging theoretical and epistemological stances are likely to accept as authoritative enough to consider a debate "closed" in many cases may prove elusive. What might be more likely to resolve such debates is an effective comparative analysis of how diplomats have acted by operating on one set of assumptions, understandings, and views with how diplomats operating from an alternate position have performed. For example, have diplomats working in foreign ministries who confine their interactions to foreign ministry colleagues and counterparts of other governments' foreign ministries been less effective than those who spend time working cooperatively with colleagues from other government ministries now involved in diplomacy as well (for example, agriculture, energy, and education)? Have diplomats assigned to upgraded and enhanced public diplomacy responsibilities achieved measurable results? If the answer to these two questions is affirmative, it provides strong support for those who argue for a broader understanding of what contemporary diplomacy is against those who favor the narrower, more classical understanding. In a recent case of diplomacy reflecting awareness of changing distributions of power in multilateral institutions, governments of the great powers, seeking to resolve the 2008 financial crisis, convened a summit meeting of the **Group of Twenty (G20)**, composed of leaders of the great powers and large developing country governments, in November of that year. Rather than convening a meeting of the smaller, more exclusive diplomatic club of **Group of Seven (G7)** major global financial powers, global leaders decided that effective management of a contemporary global financial crisis required not only the G7 to continue to meet on a regular basis but also regular meetings of the broader G20 to become part of the operational structure of economic diplomacy. Without the full and active participation of emerging economic powers such as China, India, and Brazil, the G7 alone would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to agree on and implement global monetary and financial measures needed to stem financial panic that can move from country to country and from bank to bank in real time (see table 4.1 for relative economic data on the G20).

This more indirect, two-step method could be the only potentially viable approach to resolving debates about the relationship of theory and practice in diplomacy, which given the nature of the issue is going to divide those coming from different theoretical perspectives. Thus, following Constantinou's argument, in the diplomacy of the age of a heterogeneous collection of post-Westphalian nation-states and other non-state actors, sovereignty is less important than power over outcomes. This is an argument about diplomatic effectiveness. A subnational regional government able to negotiate to bring a major investment by a global energy firm to its region with the cooperation of an international environmental organization may be deemed to be more skilled at diplomacy than the relatively ineffectual federal government that is sovereign over the territory but whose economic development ministry played no role in making the deal. As Hocking (1999a,b) argues, traditional diplomatic institutions such as foreign ministries increasingly are likely to be bypassed in the real world of diplomatic practice to the extent that foreign ministries attempt to hold on to their traditional role as gatekeepers for other government ministries that need to interact with their foreign counterparts. Only to the extent that they are willing to function as "boundary spanners" that bring together and facilitate contacts between the many organs of a government and ministries of other governments (as well as representatives of non-state actors) will they retain a rôle at the core of diplomatic practice.

Ultimately, whether or not these major debates are considered to remain "open," those who study diplomacy need to decide where they position themselves with respect to each debate and act accordingly. Whether as voters, investors, shareholders, members of civil society organizations, or practicing diplomats, members of the global public are all stakeholders with an interest in effective diplomacy. Our actions, and the understandings of diplomacy that they reflect, have an impact upon all of the polities to which we belong, upon the representations and communications that constitute the diplomacy between them, and upon the peace and stability (or lack thereof) that diplomacy engenders.

Table 4.1 The G20

COUNTRY	2015 GDP (US$, BILLIONS)
US	17,947
European Union	16,229
China	10,866
Japan	4,123
Germany	3,356
United Kingdom	2,849
France	2,422
India	2,074
Italy	1,815
Brazil	1,775
Canada	1,551
Republic of Korea	1,378
Australia	1,340
Russia	1,326
Mexico	1,144
Indonesia	862
Turkey	718
Saudi Arabia	646
Argentina	540
South Africa	312

SOURCE: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart.

QUESTIONS

1. Is it important for scholars and practitioners to agree upon a working understanding of diplomacy? Why, or why not?
2. How does the study of diplomacy differ from the study of foreign policy?
3. To what extent has diplomacy changed over the past two centuries? In what principal ways?
4. To what extent, and with what effect, have venues for diplomacy become actors in their own right?
5. To what extent have changes in technology affected diplomatic processes?
6. Can one theorize diplomacy independently of diplomatic practice?
7. How important is it for professional diplomats to understand and take positions on major contemporary debates about diplomacy?
8. What are the implications in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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Lee, D., and D. Hudson. 2004. "The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy." *Review of International Studies* 30 (3): 343–60.

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NOTE

1. The terms "nation-state" and "nation-state system" or "nation-states system" throughout this chapter follow James Caporaso (2000). Nation-states in this context refer to the political units that have been understood to be sovereign and equal as diplomatic actors in the international system that, scholars of diplomacy argue, prevailed from the Treaties of Westphalia until sometime in the second half of the twentieth century. Thereafter, as this chapter goes on to suggest, these state actors have ceded their exclusivity as diplomatic protagonists to multilateral organizations, global firms, and other non-state actors.

CHAPTER 5

Transnationalizing Diplomacy in a Post-Westphalian World

Bertrand Badie

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- From interstate toward intersocial diplomacy
- Non-state actor participation in world politics
- Intersocial diplomacies versus interstate diplomacies
- Global governance and the declining resilience of the state
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

Globalization is transforming world order. Sovereign states have lost their monopoly on international power, and non-state actors are becoming important players in world politics, even though states are still inclined to see them as unwelcome guests or even intruders. The emerging global order incorporates a new set of relationships, or what might be called "intersocial relations," between peoples, groups, and sovereign states. In these complex new relationships, social issues are becoming dominant, and international social integration among the various international actors is becoming an accepted norm of diplomatic activity. Under these changing circumstances, social actors, such as private individuals, peaceful or even violent social networks, and firms or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are acquiring new instruments and resources for participating—sometimes directly and sometimes not, but always more and more autonomously in diplomatic activities. In sum, they are emancipating themselves from state control and influence. Students of diplomacy need to take into account these new actors and the new social routes through which they act and which bridge the multiple sovereignties of multiple actors in the world diplomatic system, and they need to examine how traditional interstate and emerging international diplomacies interact with or confront each other. Students will also need to consider whether these developments inform processes of global governance.

INTRODUCTION

Even though expanding **globalization** and growing **transnational** relations challenge the realist's traditional theory that the sovereign state is dominant in world politics, these two challenges have not abolished diplomacy (see box 5-1). Rather, they have made international relations richer, denser, and more sophisticated. States have by no means disappeared in the global world, but they do have to adapt to new roles and new activities, perhaps even reconsidering their privileges and institutional conventions, such as sovereignty.

In fact, the global world is characterized by **new diplomacy**, which must be added to the traditional diplomacy associated with a world of more than 190 sovereign states (Kurbalija and Katrandjiev 2006). In this new diplomacy, societies (of individuals, peoples, and groups) are actively producing what I conceptualize as intersocial diplomacy (see box 5-5). In my understanding, new diplomacy, which may differ from other conceptualizations in this book, consists partly of state actors and partly of non-state (or transnational) actors. Importantly, it leads to a double competitive dynamic: on the one hand, between the different actors, and on the other, between the two kinds of diplomacy, intersocial and interstate. This competition creates new roles, new functions, and new prospects for diplomatic achievements and, possibly, **global governance** (see box 5-1).

My sociological argument about the nature of new diplomacy obviously challenges various realist notions of international relations—notably, the "Westphalian paradigm" of the territorial, sovereign state and the political approach to international relations grounded in Hobbesian political theory (see box 5-2). My argument analyzes the international arena beyond these power politics theories and moves from a political science perspective to a sociology of international relations. The sociological perspective in the discipline of international relations is mainly rooted in the "solidarist" approach, which originated at the beginning of the twentieth century and is associated with French sociologist Émile Durkheim (see box 5-3). Political actors, such as Léon Bourgeois, Aristide Briand, and Albert Thomas, as well as lawyers, such as Georges Scelle, promoted this approach. They argued that states and societies were becoming increasingly dependent on each other, and that this development could be conceptualized as compenetration (see box 5-4) (Badie 2008). In the mid-1960s, David Mitrany (1966) argued that international stability depended less on military instruments and more on the ability to satisfy human and social needs. According to this reasoning, traditional political diplomacy between states will have to coexist with a new social diplomacy promoted by an emerging and more active international public opinion. States will strive to achieve benefits from this new competition by trying to shape and control it. At the same time, states will try to restrain this new world order by opposing changes and considering new non-state actors as unwelcome guests, intruders into the international arena.

BOX 5-1

Globalization and Global Governance

Globalization

Globalization commonly describes the process by which an integrated world market grows and mediates between national economies and the global market. However, it would be inaccurate to limit this concept to the economic dimension. Globalization includes not only growing economic interdependence between national societies but also new communication technologies, by which everyone can interact rapidly with others around the world. Globalization accelerates these interdependencies at multicontinental distances, strengthens the global density, and thus undermines the political functions of distance and weakens the role of territory and borders, which in turn challenges traditional state theory. A globalizing world is made up of a vast and growing number of transnational relations that can be defined as relations between social actors, participating in the international arena by transgressing state sovereignty, ignoring borders, and circumventing state control, whether deliberately or not. When they recur over time, these relations can be said to be transnational flows. Migration, international trade, information, humanitarian cooperation, and religious networks are relevant examples of these flows.

Global Governance

Invented during the 1970s, the concept of global governance appears as the main challenge to the Westphalian order and realist theory, because it claims that governing the world implies a close association between public and private actors, even beyond institutions as well as sovereignty rules. As such, governance may be promoted below (involving local actors), above (through regional and international organizations), or around the state (through transnational actors, such as firms and NGOs). This association reduces any notion of hierarchical order and priorities, which are considered as less efficient. Governance has to be distinguished from government, which strictly refers to sovereignty rules.

BOX 5-2

Thomas Hobbes and the Treaties of Westphalia

In his book *Leviathan*, published in 1651, the great English philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived of sovereignty as the most efficient way to protect individuals against the dangers they faced. Because they are sovereign and thus free from any compliance requirement, sovereigns compete in the international arena like gladiators, seeing wars as normal state behavior. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 and ending the Thirty Years' War, is commonly considered the starting point of the modern international system, mainly constituted by sovereign territorial states.

BOX 5-3

Émile Durkheim and the Durkheimians

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), the most famous French sociologist, is the author of *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) and *Suicide* (1897), among many other works. The cornerstone of his sociology is not to be found in power (contrary to Max Weber who considers power as one of the major sociological concepts) but in social solidarity and integration, which are conceived as prerequisites of social life and ways for preventing conflicts. This perspective was enlarged to international relations by French politicians Léon Bourgeois (1821–1925) and Aristide Briand (1862–1932), who were French prime ministers, founding fathers of the League of Nations, and Nobel Peace Prize winners (1920 and 1926, respectively). Albert Thomas was the creator of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Also promoting the application of this way of thinking to international relations were scholar of international law, particularly Georges Scelle, who, with his publication of *Précis du Droit des Gens* in 1931, opened the way to a "solidarist" interpretation of international law. The adaptation of the Durkheimian sociology to international relations helps us not only understand globalization but also appreciate new forms of international conflicts that arise from social pathologies and a lack of social integration. This approach highlights the proliferation of transnational social actors. Conversely, an exclusively political approach risks blinding us to the social dimension of globalization, and keeping us limited to the state dimension of the international game.

BOX 5-4

Compenetration

The concept of compenetration, elaborated by Georges Scelle, is an amalgam of the Latin word *cum* and the word "penetration." While classical international law stressed the role of sovereignty as its cornerstone, Scelle was probably the first international lawyer who emphasized how national societies were more and more bound together and involved in each other's affairs. He sought to adapt international law to this interpretation of transnationalization.

This trend toward a new social diplomacy involves enlarging the definition of diplomacy. New diplomacy incorporates the concept of separateness, which, as described by Paul Sharp (2009), applies to relations between states, groups, and societies (see box 5-5). Thus, diplomacy now includes separateness between societies as well as between states. It also covers separateness of cultures, and of systems of meanings, which diplomacy also has to manage. Intersocial and intercultural diplomacies have to mobilize new actors and new instruments for reducing social gaps in the international arena, not least because these groups generate many internal and international conflicts (see box 5-5).

BOX 5-5

Separateness of Groups, and Intersocial and Intercultural Diplomacy

Separateness

Sharp uses the concept of separateness to highlight the diplomatic field's specificity. Diplomacy is a kind of social relationship that is characterized by a clear structural gap separating groups of people. The Westphalian order introduced sovereignty as the main feature of the modern international system. In contrast, as Sharp 2009: 10) argues, "[T]he diplomatic tradition thus presents peoples as living in conditions of separateness from one another, and even when they are not physically separated, a sense of separateness remains a dimension of their relationship."

Intersocial and Intercultural Diplomacy

Intersocial diplomacy designates a form of diplomacy between state and non-state actors, or among non-state actors, that manages the gap separating civil societies from each other. The main issues addressed by intersocial diplomacy actors are social, not political. Transnational diplomacy can be defined as exclusively conducted by transnational actors—that is, sovereignty-free actors, such as religious players, economic players, or NGOs. Intercultural diplomacy appears as a special case of intersocial diplomacy; it manages cultural separateness and can be run by state or non-state actors.

To make this argument, the chapter first elaborates further upon the nature of intersocial diplomacy. Second, it explains the strategies that non-state actors adopt to execute intersocial diplomacy. Third, it examines the relationship between intersocial and interstate diplomacies. Fourth, it discusses the declining yet resilient state that constrains intersocial diplomacy. Finally, it sums up the argument and its implications for future diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Sovereign states have not disappeared in a globalizing world, but they are adjusting their roles.
- Traditional interstate diplomacy associated with sovereign states must now contend with an emerging new intersocial diplomacy involving both state and non-state actors.

FROM INTERSTATE TOWARD INTERSOCIAL DIPLOMACY

The new global world has three main properties that clearly supersede the Westphalian pattern of interstate relationships and thicken the aspects of "globalism" that could previously affect our world (Keohane and Nye 2002). First, the new ways of communication enable people all around the world to communicate, bargain, and interact without political mediation or control by the state, as the "Arab

Spring" beginning in December 2010 showed. Nearly seven billion individual actors who manage their separateness more or less autonomously potentially constitute the new international arena. Second, the social behavior and social strategy of these individuals, or social actors, are intruding into the international arena as major determinants. This is clearly the case with economic actors, firms, and NGOs, but also with violence entrepreneurs, commonly called "terrorist groups", who structure their agenda independently from, but often in a more decisive manner than, states. Third, as the global world is increasingly interdependent, security is connected less to national defense and more to global human and social needs, a central point in the United Nations (UN) Development Programme's *Human Development Report 1994* (UN Development Programme 1994).

These new global social developments are transforming international agendas, weakening power politics, and highlighting the need for "international social integration." From a Durkheimian perspective, international social integration describes how societies are merging in a global world, contributing to shape what is commonly designated as a **global civil society**. It points out how "social pathologies"—social factors, such as poverty and overpopulation, that tend to inhibit personal adjustment and worsen wider social problems—in one country are more or less jeopardizing all others, and it suggests that a lack of international social integration implies a high danger of conflict and instability. Thus, problems faced by Pakistan or many African societies should be considered factors predisposing to war. As Durkheim observed, the higher the social density, the higher the risk of social conflict. If globalization creates an increasing social density and social inequality at the international level, then it will generate conflicts. Such a large social gap inside the world system creates a new kind of social separateness that must be managed through diplomacy (Badie 2008, 2016). Poverty, starvation, and inadequate housing—reflected in low scores on the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI)—create social tensions that have a direct impact on international relations and especially on international violence.

The objective of international social integration must be sought through material and symbolic integration. "Material integration" is the ability of individuals to have equal access to material goods, such as food, health, and education. Hunger no longer has the same meaning it did a few decades ago. Then, victims of starvation lived in rural zones, did not protest, and were not politically mobilized. Today, starvation is more evident in urban spaces, where it fuels protests and riots and creates conditions for conflict, which is increasingly internationalized in its consequences, and triggers the mobilizing capacity of violence entrepreneurs, such as Boko Haram or AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). Moreover, in the victims' consciousness, the international community and, especially, the richest countries are responsible for providing relief. "Symbolic integration" is concerned with the respect people show each other. For example, such integration was clearly absent when Western governments and public opinion hardly reacted to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis of Rwanda, during which nearly one million people were killed. The same is perceived when thousands of migrants fleeing the Middle East or Africa drown in the Mediterranean, or when Muslims are stigmatized or mocked in Western countries (for example, cartoons of the Prophet and denunciation of headscarf wearing). All these issues are increasingly topping the international agenda, stirring up transnational mobilizations and violence. In a global world, alterity—the notion that all people ought to recognize each other equally—is a source of great tension (see box 5-6). Cultural gaps are a source of dangerous separateness. Bridging cultural and, more broadly, historical and economic differences is a new task for diplomacy, especially when failure to do so generates humiliation and aggressive radicalism (Cohen 2002).

International social integration requires entrepreneurs who are not limited to interstate diplomacy but who also do not take advantage of the lack of social integration. Some non-state actors, unfortunately, do this and become violence entrepreneurs (see box 5-6). Terrorist networks, or other such radical movements, can easily expand their membership and activities by manipulating social pathologies and using perceptions of humiliation to mobilize their followers. For example, radical movements in Palestine, Iraq, the Sahel region of Africa, Pakistan, and Afghanistan denounce such pathologies as poverty, limited access to water, refugee flows, civilian casualties, and anti-Muslim behavior on the battlefield and in Western countries. Violence entrepreneurs also exploit social disasters—for example, those caused by starvation (in Africa's Sahel), floods (Pakistan in 2010) or earthquakes (Egypt in 1993). That is why we can postulate an international market of violence that is

BOX 5-6

Alterity, Violence Entrepreneurs, and Social Routes

Alterity

Alterity is the notion that all people should recognize each other equally despite their ethnic, cultural, religious, or philosophical differences. In earlier international systems (for example, in the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century), representatives of sovereign states recognized each other as diplomatic representatives. However, there were no real cultural gaps between them, because they all came from similar social strata. In a global world, these differences are more apparent and are likely both to become greater and to be perceived as such. This new perception of difference carries risks of tensions. For these reasons, cultural hegemony by a single actor triggers conflicts and fuels humiliation by others, a perception that is nowadays a main factor of war and international violence.

Violence Entrepreneurs

From a Weberian perspective, a violence entrepreneur is an actor who invests in social pathologies to transform them into political violence that can be managed for optimizing the actor's advantages, position, and goals in the international arena, particularly for publicizing his "messages" (Richardson 2006).

Social Routes

Social routes are defined as specific new diplomatic "pathways" by which the social field (actors, resources, and issues) will be mobilized for bridging two or more states in conflict. They can be distinguished from the classical political paths, or routes, that use traditional political and military instruments.

nowadays different from classical interstate violence. It is much more fragmented, being "managed" by social actors who have little experience of collaborative partnerships and who are poorly connected to the state's classical instruments of diplomacy or contained by the state's use of force.

These new developments imply new diplomatic processes that we could designate as social routes (see box 5-6). This is a real change involving not just different actors but also different actions. Such "transnationalizing diplomacies" and "intersocial diplomacies" can be handled by states, but only by meeting three requirements: changing their current agenda, diversifying the levels of their interventions, and opening their diplomacy to new actors.

In regard to the first requirement, changing their agenda is a tough option for states, because their legitimacy is built on many ceremonial and privileged conventions of diplomacy and on Hobbesian tenets. Such classical diplomacy has a code of behavior well captured by French theorist Raymond Aron's (1966) famous coupling of "the diplomat and the soldier," representing a dialectical relationship between the threat of force (the diplomat) and the use of force (the soldier). As such, each state considers other states its exclusive partners, and the notion of separateness is accounted for only at this political level. Today, intersocial diplomacy requires an enlargement of the classical agenda to involve a very large range of social issues—for example, human development, job security, and migrations. States usually transform these social issues into political ones, thus misinterpreting their real meaning. The challenge is to deal with social issues such as hunger, transnational health risks, and environmental pollution without reconceptualizing them as instruments of an interstate political competition. In short, diplomacy has now two parallel agendas, the intersocial and the interstate, with two different languages, logics and principles (Badie 2012). The challenge is to merge these two contending agendas without sublimating one to the other. The roots of the "new international conflicts" are deeply anchored into the lack of social integration, either in Iraq (the exclusion of the Sunni community), in Mali (the exclusion of Arab or Tuareg populations), or in Nigeria (widespread economic exclusion).

A second requirement for state diplomacy is for states to diversify their levels of intervention. The new international issues must be dealt with by using social instruments, constructing new partnerships among local actors, and moving from the state-to-state level to a multilevel game that includes the spectrum of social structures (Putnam 1988). As new international conflicts are increasingly connected to internal, or domestic, social pathologies, these conflicts can only be managed by treating them as social issues. Military instruments will not work. The conflict in Afghanistan, which also involves Pakistan, can be analyzed either using a traditional strategic approach or by examining the social pathologies currently afflicting Afghan and Pakistani societies. If we take into account the low redistribution of foreign aid to the Afghan people, the urban victims of starvation in Pakistan, or the youth suicide rate inside Karachi, we become aware of the social direction that diplomacy should follow. From this perspective, social treatment is a much better instrument for solving conflict than are political negotiations or military measures. Peace builders and diplomats need to wear the sociologist's clothes, embrace intersocial diplomacy, and mobilize transnational diplomacy, which is promoted by transnational actors (NGOs for the main part).

A third requirement for successful intervention in the international social field is that states open their own diplomacy to new actors. This approach to diplomacy is already promoted in many international institutions through such measures as open multilateralism, or complex multilateralism (see box 5-7). Former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan strongly supported an enhanced role for non-state actors, not least as a way of balancing the power of the states, particularly the members of the P5 (the five permanent members of the Security Council) (Knight 2000; O'Brien et al. 2000). Nowadays, more than 3,000 NGOs are accredited to the United Nation's Economic and Social Council. Most are very active in the Human Rights Council. The Arria Formula, coined by Diego Arria, the former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, even made it possible for some NGOs to participate in certain Security Council deliberations (see Wiseman and Basu, chapter 18 in this volume). At Annan's instigation, the "Delivering as One" report (UN 2006) opened the way for associating civil society organizations with the UN system. All these initiatives clearly include societies and social actors in the conflict-solving process. They even support a degree of social treatment of crises and, as such, are pioneering a new intersocial diplomacy.

The same can be said about the role of NGOs in supporting and even writing international conventions. For example, Handicap International was a main author of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the International Federation of Human Rights League actively contributed to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. Some UN institutions are even structured around a partnership shared by state and non-state actors, perhaps the best known being the International Labour Organization (ILO) with its tripartite membership of states, unions, and employer associations.

Multilateral diplomacy promises more avenues for participation by non-state actors than does bilateral diplomacy, which tends to give priority to state actors and considers opening the door to others as a sign of weakness. States can also become more hospitable to non-state actors and work with them on cultural diplomacy (see Leira and Neumann, chapter 9 in this volume) and public diplomacy (see Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume), which are more open to the media, public opinion, and

BOX 5-7

Complex, or Open, Multilateralism

Multilateralism is an interstate form of diplomacy involving more than two states, the best-known modern example being the UN. With increasing globalization, many actors and scholars advocate the expansion of multilateralism to include non-state actors, particularly private firms and NGOs. Former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan played an important part in promoting this "open multilateralism." Scholars such as Robert O'Brien et al. (2000) refer to a "complex" multilateralism for stressing the relevance of a multiactor approach.

intellectuals. In addition, economic diplomacy (see Woolcock, chapter 12 in this volume) is increasingly more open to firms, and this, too, can open up the state's historically closed nature. Decentralized interactions of these kinds (see Hocking, chapter 7 in this volume) produce an important role for local actors, cities, and regional institutions (Hocking 1999b). All these emerging diplomacies are bridging separated systems by using social instruments and mobilizing social actors. They are, however, limited, and even contained, by the state's hierarchical and still dominant position. One important question remains: Are the "violence entrepreneurs" incentivized to participate in the diplomatic game, since diplomacy aims to ease violence—the technique that is their raison d'être? Tragically, this is a highly relevant issue that could not be contemplated during the Westphalian era.

KEY POINTS

- With globalization, international social integration, including material and symbolic integration, is one of the major international challenges.
- There are two social routes for reaching this aim: intersocial diplomacy, promoted by states in taking social issues into account, and transnational diplomacy, conducted by non-state actors. Both are binding states and non-state actors in achieving these goals.
- Open, or complex, multilateralism promises new avenues in that direction.
- All these developments inform processes of global governance.

NON-STATE ACTOR PARTICIPATION IN WORLD POLITICS

Directly or not, and autonomously or not, non-state actors are now in the international arena. Their participation in world politics is generally regarded with suspicion by states that fear being dispossessed and deprived of their privileges, or at least having to submit to new norms and rules they are less able to shape to their own interests. This is why non-state actors are perceived as intruders that create uncertainty inside the international arena. This "diplomacy without diplomats" is far from a homogeneous process, however. Non-state actors adopt quite different strategies from each other when they participate in world politics. We can detect four such strategies today: the diplomacy of denial, marginal diplomacy, parallel diplomacy, and non-conscious diplomacy (Hara 1999).

The "diplomacy of denial" may be seen as a non-state strategy that explicitly rejects diplomacy as a legitimate mode of international action. This strategy is highly destabilizing, creates great uncertainty, and aims to increase separateness between state and non-state political entities. Terrorist networks, warlords, militia, and private armies practice this strategy. As mentioned earlier, they act as violence entrepreneurs committed to special rules that leave no room for diplomacy. Unlike state armies, private violence entrepreneurs may even consider violence as a goal, as a way of promoting some specific aims, but not as a **Clausewitzian** instrument of state politics. Creating separateness between state and non-state actors, then, is a goal of violence entrepreneurs: Separateness is not to be contained but preserved and even widened, as it is a resource for these particular non-state actors. For these reasons, violence entrepreneurs deny diplomacy and only sometimes seek to get involved in negotiations or conflict-solving, and then in a very informal way—for instance, when bargaining over the release of hostages or ceasefires. When they do formally come to negotiate, they move to the status of "pre-state actors" (for example, anti-colonial revolutionaries) or "public actors" (for example, FARC in Colombia). They oppose state countermeasures, such as counterterrorist measures, and use them to fuel their fight and mobilize radical supporters.

"Marginal diplomacy" is a strategy practiced by non-state (and non-political) actors in the international arena for promoting transnational interests without trying to achieve diplomatic goals. As such, they are managing different kinds of separateness relations. Religious actors, ethnic entrepreneurs, and identity group managers belong to this category. For example, religions operate beyond state borders, and religious leaders often maintain stronger authority over their believers than do state authorities. As such, these non-state actors are displaying an active transnational role that can weaken state diplomacy, in the sense that citizens are asked to be loyal to an entity, or belief, outside the state. The main activities of participants in marginal diplomacy are clearly oriented toward a non-diplomatic process of extending and strengthening their transnational influence that may have some marginal diplomatic functions but still be within the interstate order. For example, Saudi state diplomacy is clearly backed by a powerful network of Wahabi preachers, particularly active in the Middle East and Africa. The same could be said of some "new religious movements" and sects in Africa or Latin America which are more or less connected to the US government. Russia can use the help of Orthodox churches even beyond its own national territory, in the Balkans, Greece, and Orthodox **diaspora**. These functions may be positive for peace processes when religious actors are influential enough to play a mediation role. This was evident in the role of the Sant'Egidio Community in settling several conflicts, as in the Mozambique conflict, when the community's representatives participated in the October 1992 peace agreements as mediators. Interestingly, Sant'Egidio's success was attributed to its lack of **hard power**, and its influential role in this case illustrates the importance of social power (Nathan 2001).

When religious and identity actors are involved in shaping world order, however, there are significant risks. The "clash of civilizations" thesis is based on active transnational mobilization of social groupings. It redraws the social map of the world by stressing new divisions that acquire a new political meaning. This type of separateness is much tougher than interstate competition, because a religious world order is not a Westphalian one. Nor is it compatible with the territorial or the coexistence principle. So, this separateness is likely to generate instability if uncontained by an institutionalized partnership that gathers religious and identity actors into a common institution, similar to the UN.

Non-state actors, particularly NGOs, promote "parallel diplomacy" that acts as a substitute for state diplomacy (Devin 2002; Fagot Aviel 2011; Hara 1999; Hocking 1999b). Parallel diplomacy is characterized by three activities: communication and fact-finding, pressure activities, and advocacy. Fact-finding is probably the core NGO function, as NGOs are open to accepting and acting on a wider range of information than are state actors. Whereas state actors must consider international conventions and diplomatic sensibilities, NGOs have the latitude, for example, to publicly criticize and stigmatize a dictator, report on human rights violations, and highlight sensitive aspects of a conflict. NGOs are able to promote an autonomous public diplomacy that can create new bridges and may well weaken state international action. For example, private actors often map human rights politics, whereas states often appear unwilling, or unable, to report them openly and to exercise their power to correct human rights abuses. NGOs denounce China's human rights record, whereas states refrain from doing so for diplomatic and geopolitical reasons. NGOs played an active role in exposing the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal in Iraq. And in 2010, NGOs highlighted the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip by commissioning a flotilla of private vessels to challenge the Israeli blockade, helping to reduce at least somewhat the goods that Israel could prevent from entering Gaza.

Such pressure activities build on the fact-finding actions of NGOs. When NGOs reveal significant human rights violations, they put pressure on public opinion and the ruling elites to create new directions and different diplomacy processes. Campaigns for bringing political criminals to justice or for abolishing the death penalty put pressure on many states' foreign policies. Increasing interdependence among all kinds of actors integrates transnational actors in the international arena with such a density that they participate increasingly in tangible processes of global governance. The Basel informal agreements between regulators on capital adequacy standards (1998 Basel capital accord, Basel II, and Basel III) grant power and autonomy to economic and financial actors and illustrate that states cannot rule exclusively by themselves even if they had to bail out the private sector, as was the case during the 2008–9 financial crisis, when business actors were integral to both the problem and its solution.

Some NGOs are also undertaking activities that states ought to be fulfilling. NGOs are now involved in writing international law. During dangerous periods of civil wars, when embassies or consulates are closed, NGOs are often the only foreign witnesses, performing functions usually carried out by state agencies. During the worst moment of the war in Chechnya, NGOs were still active. The Russian government subsequently denounced and expelled them, because they became embarrassing eyewitnesses of Russia's tactics. Similar situations occurred in Afghanistan during the Russian campaign (1979–88). During the 1990s civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and, after, in Darfur, NGOs played key roles in the absence of states. NGOs often take charge of functions that states do not dare—or want—to perform in critical situations.

A fourth way that non-state actors participate in world politics is through a strategy of "non-conscious diplomacy." Many transnational actors are performing latent diplomatic functions without necessarily being aware of it. The media are a typical example, as the Arab Spring uprising gives evidence, when Al Jazeera (the Qatari broadcast network) played an important role in citizen mobilization and in setting the international agenda. As transnational actors, they help to reduce separateness by filling the communication gaps in the international arena. The way they select news also helps to shape the international agenda: Some conflicts are left in the shadows, as was the case when the Indonesian army invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975. It was not until a 1991 British Broadcasting Corporation report, with dramatic pictures of the Indonesian army shooting participants at a funeral in Dili, that the conflict became internationalized and the international community was forced to respond. The media reshapes (consciously or not) international politics by selecting and prioritizing particular events as news.

KEY POINTS

- Non-state actors adopt different strategies for participating in world politics.
- They may act by denying or contesting the diplomatic instruments.
- They may also produce their own diplomacy, which can be described as marginal, parallel, or non-conscious.
- Such activities of non-state actors, especially NGOs, are integral to understandings of global governance.

INTERSOCIAL DIPLOMACIES VERSUS INTERSTATE DIPLOMACIES

The transformation of world order makes the two diplomacies—intersocial and interstate—compete. Intersocial diplomacy bridges societies in a decentralized and fragmented way, so no one appears as the legitimate and unique representative of a social system. This diplomacy can be identified through the issues at stake, through the population concerned, and through the actors involved. These actors are sovereignty free (Rosenau 1990), although states interfere, as previously mentioned. By contrast, state diplomacy bridges states through specialized actors (notably, professional diplomats) who can be identified easily and who strive to distinguish themselves from those they usually consider to be intruders in diplomacy. However, all social actors strive to influence interstate diplomacy through pressure activities, lobbying, public protests, and demonstrations (Tarrow 2005). In these ways, the two diplomacies interact.

In this interaction, however, states and state actors have a great advantage over non-state actors. From a **neoliberal institutionalist** perspective, states have a common interest in cooperation, in reaping joint benefits through international organizations, and an exceptional ability to build formal partnerships and to participate in formal negotiations and established institutions. With this power, states can act as mediators in the intersocial arena. They may even take the upper hand in a proactive manner. However, states have so few social resources that while powerful in one sense, they are dependent, and even dispossessed, in another. That is, states are often circumvented by social actors that are frequently better informed and, in some cases, considered more legitimate.

States' strongest advantage is their ability to mediate among social actors. States retain the privilege to negotiate, to write, and to sign all international conventions, even those regarding social life. This privilege has some exceptions, as previously discussed, but even then, states must give their agreement, albeit at times under pressure. Some international institutions have indeed granted positions and roles to non-state actors. The ILO, which promotes regulation of labor conditions, was established because of pressure from French trade unions and employer associations. "Social forums," gatherings of NGOs in parallel with UN intergovernmental meetings, are examples of how non-state actors participate in and around state-based conferences, a good example being the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit on the environment and development. Non-state actors participate in many summits, at least in some form, even if these are held and organized by the UN.

Social forums organized around major international conferences convened by the UN demonstrate the state's mediating role. Although these forums focus on social issues, they are limited to making recommendations or demands. States still make the final decisions and dominate their implementation. States are thus in the position of mediator, deciding among competing demands and interests. This mediation cannot be considered neutral: States are connecting and reinterpreting the issues at stake according to their national interest and to rulers' real interests. When facing new issues, states act to protect their dominant role in the international arena.

The failed 2009 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen is a particularly clear instance of such a strategy. The conference dealt with an issue that put social and economic demands on the table, which could have been aggregated over time to promote global public goods for all humankind. But these issues were taken over by self-interested political actors representing competing states, and the demands for common goods were retranslated into political terms and fueled interstate competition. Other issues—national economic capabilities, competition among industrialized and rising powers, and relations between China and the United States—became more important than global warming. The conference moved from a social and technological debate to a political one. States were able to (mis)lead players in the game by rearticulating demands and interests. The Copenhagen conference shows how states achieve their goals through political containment of a transnational issue.

States are even able to gain the upper hand by instrumentalizing, or coopting, non-state actors in the same way. States consider intersocial diplomacy an instrument of their own foreign policy. States currently use their own national firms, NGOs, and even media as a way of penetrating the international arena, to strengthen their **soft power**, to promote their own diplomacy, or even to obtain new material advantages. This was demonstrated during the 1980s, when US diplomacy used soft power to balance anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Arab world. Coca-Cola and famous American television shows were used to assist US state diplomacy. During the nineteenth century, Presbyterian or Evangelist missionaries were used to penetrate the Middle East, Far East, Africa, and Latin America. The same could be said about Roman Catholic missionaries who helped to expand French influence. In addition, Anglican Church missionaries helped British foreign policy in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. And Freemason lodges contributed to Western political penetration in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia during the nineteenth century and later. Nowadays, Shia and Wahabi networks actively help Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, state cooption of non-state actors does not always have welcome outcomes, because the non- state actor has partial autonomy that can often cause embarrassment to the co-opting state—as with many Saudi NGOs seen to be actively supporting radical Islamist networks. Otherwise, the more the non-state actor is perceived to be different from the host or national state, the more the intended audience will accept the message. These actors are clearly accepted as emerging from civil society, not as political tools of the state. We can thus easily understand the success of religious networks and their ability to mobilize people around the world.

Under some circumstances, states may appear to be dependent actors. In other words, when states operate abroad, their perceived effectiveness can vary according to the support they receive from non-state actors. Taking this argument further, states could ultimately be dispossessed of their current sovereign prerogatives and roles. Thus, while sovereign in their own territory, states often lack symbolic resources and social support when they work on the international plane. Ironically, to reach foreign civil societies, the state needs to be assisted by civil, or social, actors who have their own social and transnational goals. Thus, this private diplomacy, conducted by non-state actors, may in the future transform state foreign policies such that they will ultimately become disconnected from a so-called unified national interest.

KEY POINTS

- Interstate diplomacy and intersocial diplomacy compete for influence in the international arena.
- In this competition, states have a strong advantage, because they are widely seen as retaining the rights to negotiate and to sign legal agreements, such as conventions and treaties, but also to organize the basic institutional structures in the international arena.
- Successful global governance in the future will require a growing interaction between the two diplomacies.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE DECLINING RESILIENCE OF THE STATE

In a way, the state transformation described so far supports visions of global governance promoted at the twentieth century's close (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). But at that time, globalization supporters had unrealistically idealistic and optimistic expectations. In reality, public and private interests are slow to converge, and states, as I have argued, are determined to maintain their prerogatives. The state's resilience is thus an important constraining parameter of transnationalizing diplomacy: it contains the emergence of new forms of diplomacy, it triggers new kinds of state policies, and has new ways of restraining social actors. Moreover, the most common reflex of many states is to use military instruments against violence entrepreneurs, carrying the risk of fueling state predisposition to violence.

The interplay between the two diplomacies I am describing has nonetheless opened the way to a new game. The well-known Hobbesian gladiator fight between states has been progressively converted into a subtle triangular system in which states have to compete, deal, and sometimes make a pact not only with transnational actors but also with "identity providers," or those actors who offer various identities—cultural, ethnic, religious—that are prior to, or more important than, allegiance to a sovereign state. The last two categories of actors differ from each other, and their orientations and strategies need to be differentiated. Transnational actors are inclusive and open to a global market. Identity providers exclude those who do not share the same political, religious, or ethnic affiliation. They are not committed to a fixed national territory and instead have a flexible notion and use of space, creating provisional territories such as Daesh (Islamic State) has done in northern Iraq and Syria while penetrating other territories through well-connected local actors.

The three actors in this triangular system have different commitments: states to citizenship, transnational actors to utility, and identity providers to primordial allegiance. Each has its own way of mobilization, and each competes for an individual's primary allegiance. Because in a global world none of the actors can enforce its own rule on the others, each has to deal, and compromise, with its partners. This new triangular diplomatic game is fragile and unstable, however, and generates uncertainties. For states, it implies a real regression, as it jeopardizes their sovereign foundations and endangers the main principles on which they were created—institutions, centralization, national will, and a monopoly on violence—while also questioning their ability to build up partnerships (Badie 2001).

That is why states pursue a resilience strategy, one supported by the nature of international law, the progress of intergovernmental organizations, and the military resources of states. Promoting such strategies is a way for states to contain social pressures and keep the upper hand in the new triangular international game. This new state attempt at hegemony is not only a pathway to interstate competition but also an ineffective vertical instrument for containing pressures from transnational actors and identity entrepreneurs. Moreover, states have several levels of hegemony: the international (superpower), the regional (regional power), and for some, club membership in elite organizations like the P5, the **Group of Seven (G7)**, or the **Group of Twenty (G20)**. All these positions enhance the states' political resources and provide a way to claim their capacities and their hierarchical authority over transnational and identity actors. This hegemonic device is obviously much more efficient among political systems having a strong state tradition and culture, while it is less adapted to those built on a strong and powerful civil society. "Jacobine" countries like France, inspired by the French Revolution and conceptualizations of the state as an instrument of emancipation, are thus oriented toward state diplomatic overachievement, because the state is regarded as the expression of national will. By contrast, "Lockean" countries like the United Kingdom and the United States draw mainly on the capacities of their civil societies which are expected to act on their own in the international arena (Badie 2011).

State hegemony or political overachievement tragically leads to an underestimation of societies and a dangerous ignorance of their international role. In a classical realist vision, a focus on societies would have no meaning, because there is a fundamental separateness between societies and domestic affairs on the one hand and states and international affairs on the other. Rulers, according to realist logic, should not be concerned with social demands or social actors when handling international issues. Nowadays, such blindness to societies is one of the major sources of instability and uncertainty in the international arena—first, because international conflict is predominantly based on pathological social patterns stemming from a lack of international social integration or from insufficient national integration that weakens the state, and second, because these pathologies cannot be overcome without drastic treatment of social issues instead of a military reaction.

International society is becoming more aware of this new social orientation that is transforming the concept of security. When the UN Development Programme pointed out the new relevance of **human security** in its 1994 report, it noted that national securities were becoming interdependent and merging into a global security that would be less political—and less achievable through military instruments. We live in a global world in which security has to be appreciated in social terms. Our security is threatened primarily by hunger (food security), diseases and epidemics (health security), natural disasters (environmental security), cultural tensions (cultural security), and economic crisis (economic security) (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Klare and Thomas 1994). All these securities cannot be managed without close cooperation between specialized social actors and social institutions. The main danger to such cooperation comes from the traditional dilemma of states: State survival and the reproduction of rulers with power are closely bound to a political and military interpretation of international conflicts and international issues and a dismissal of conflict's social nature. Political rulers around the world accept the goal of enforcing interstate diplomacy at the expense of intersocial diplomacy. Interstate diplomacy is based on club diplomacy, which moves intersocial diplomacy to a marginal, or protest, position. Being on the margins, intersocial diplomacy increasingly adopts an autonomous role and operates without any rules and constraints, becoming more radicalized and triggering a world order of turbulence, or what James Rosenau (1990) describes as a complex interplay between states and non-state actors. Instead of being a regulating diplomacy, intersocial diplomacy denounces the material world order.

Nonetheless, this intersocial diplomacy is potentially functional and has all the attributes recognized in interstate diplomacy. In a globalized world, we must admit that societies not only are separated but also have a strong and dangerous desire for separateness, a point that Sharp (2009: 84) has made about states. While globalization generates increasing communication, it also highlights social contrasts, cultural gaps, and specific identities. Those who feel threatened by the evolving, globalizing world use these factors as instruments of protection. In other words, cultural gaps and identity constructions are symptoms of a lack of world integration. Their management must be a priority in the new international agenda setting and must be handled through cooperation between states and social actors.

This new kind of social separateness requires measures usually associated with diplomacy: bridging particularities (Jönsson and Hall 2005), managing encounters and discoveries of others (Sharp 2009; see also Sharp, chapter 3 in this volume), and achieving international integration. But diplomats, traditionally considered credible state representatives, cannot pretend to represent their own society with the same credibility. First, the new global order grants societies an unprecedented level of autonomy. Second, we easily perceive a growing differentiation between public and private interests. And third, states face an increasing crisis of representation. These trends are evident among developing countries in the **Global South**, where failing or authoritarian states prompt citizens to seek other means of identification and mobilization. And they are occurring in developed and postindustrial societies of the **Global North**, where citizens build up multiple, and often volatile, identities and are increasingly involved in transnational networks.

This crisis of representation is thus jeopardizing the new intersocial diplomacy. According to a dangerous vicious circle, the more this crisis develops, the more states strive to protect themselves by trying to recover their monopoly of power and sovereignty. The deeper the crisis, the more the political class is prompted to neglect its social dimension by translating it exclusively into political terms. These processes are more than obvious in situations of civil war, for example, in Afghanistan, or in situations of socioeconomic crisis that become internationalized, as happened, for example, in the 2010 Greek economic crisis, which was dealt with through political and intergovernmental initiatives within the European Union without consideration of the social actors, which were prompted to radicalize their movement. The reluctance to admit social actors into multilateral arenas is a failure of open multilateralism, and it blocks this new way of global governance.

KEY POINTS

- Interstate and intersocial diplomacies compete with each other.
- States retain strong assets in this competition, countering early visions of the future of global governance.
- However, state resilience is decreasing, as states (particularly Lockean ones) are short on symbolic resources.
- New ways of global governance are being obstructed by the reluctance of states to admit social actors comprehensively to multilateral arenas.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that intersocial diplomacy is no longer an anecdote, no longer hearsay, and that it plays a major role in global governance in several ways. It represents active and decisive international interests, bridges social gaps that are increasingly internationally relevant, and creates new ways of transnational (and international) communication. As such, intersocial diplomacy plays an increasing role in internationalizing domestic conflicts and local issues.

I have further argued that my concept of intersocial diplomacy is based on three factors: concessions, constraints, and repression. States give concessions to non-state actors that are thus free to play a regulating role in interstate relations. Private credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's have the power to pressure and regulate the credit distribution to indebted states. The relevance of their function was particularly obvious during the 2010 Greek crisis. In the same way, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, constituted by private banking regulators from around the world, has the authority to define the banking liquidity rules that partly shape world economic growth. Constraints on intersocial diplomacy come from states that regard many non-state actors as unwelcome guests or intruders in world politics. Many states are especially suspicious of violence entrepreneurs, but also of religious actors, community organizations, identity entrepreneurs, and even sometimes noncompliant transnational corporations. These entities operate as sovereignty-free actors and appear to feel free of any commitment to rules. Finally, intersocial diplomacy is challenged by a strategy of state repression that aims to contain, impede, or control its advance. This desperate behavior is rarely successful, even against violence entrepreneurs. On the contrary, it fosters tensions, isolation, and even humiliation inside societies and provides an opportunity for more radical initiatives. The social roots of non-state actor radicalism cannot be circumvented.

My final argument is that the necessary convergence between interstate and intersocial diplomacy closely depends on the way these three factors evolve. The more social dynamics are repressed, the less likely the convergence. The less the non-state actor interventions can be regulated, the less relevant the diplomatic orientation of intersocial diplomacy. The future progress of transnationalizing diplomacy is thus still an imaginary balance between expected and necessary social representation and the ability to get involved in partnership and global governance. Making open multilateralism accessible to social actors is the prerequisite for a functional intersocial diplomacy.

QUESTIONS

1. Is transnational diplomacy exclusively bound to a globalized world, or is it deeply rooted in history?
2. Are non-state actors able to build up transnational relations by themselves, or do they need state help?
3. Can non-state actors ever be free from some degree of state control?
4. Do sovereignty-free non-state actors exist in authoritarian political systems?
5. How can states open up to intersocial diplomacy while maintaining their sovereign control of diplomatic institutions and processes?
6. What are social pathologies, and can the concept be used in an analysis of international conflicts?
7. What are the implications of intersocial diplomacy for understandings of global governance?
8. What are the implications in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 6

Diplomacy as Negotiation and Mediation

I. William Zartman

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Negotiation and diplomacy
- Expanding the scope of diplomacy
- Challenging the processes of negotiation: mediation and multilateral diplomacy
- Facing the future of diplomatic negotiation: prevention
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

Diplomacy is primarily negotiation, and negotiation is the primary business of foreign policy and international relations. Negotiations take place when needed—that is, when a party (state) feels it cannot handle a problem or conflict by itself and the problem/conflict needs handling (in other words, it is troublesome and costly). Many problems/conflicts involve third parties, or crutches of trust, who can carry communications between the involved parties, supply ideas and formulas for agreement, and even improve the benefits available with an agreed outcome. **Multilateral negotiations** are frequently used to set up international regimes, agreed-upon norms, rules, principles, and expectations to handle issue areas of common concern. The biggest challenge to diplomacy is that of prevention: to handle conflicts before they become violent, keep violent conflicts from escalating, and move conflicts and problems from management to resolution.

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is, above all, negotiation, either direct or mediated. Harold Nicolson (1939: 4) defined it authoritatively as "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist." A century and a half earlier, Fortune Barthélemy de Felice (1778/1976: 47, 48) said it more expansively:

> The term "negotiation" means the art of handling the affairs of state as they concern the respective interests of the great and supposedly independent societies interacting in a free state of nature. [. . .] However, negotiation is not limited to international affairs. It takes place everywhere where there are differences to conciliate, interests to placate, men to persuade, and purposes to accomplish. Thus, all life could be regarded as a continual negotiation. We always need to win friends, overcome enemies, correct unfortunate impressions, convince others of our views, and use all appropriate means to further our projects.

Diplomacy and negotiations are the daily practice of relations among states, taking up more time but less money than the occasional lapses of these relations into war. When those lapses do occur, negotiation and diplomacy continue to be present and absolutely necessary in order to bring them to an end (Aggestam and Jerneck 2009; Berridge 2010; Charillon 2002; de Callières 1716/2000; Jönsson and Hall 2005; Lauren 1979; Satow 1979). As noted by de Felice, diplomatic negotiation reaches beyond state-to-state relations, down to domestic and up to global relations and across from (international) law to war as a means of conducting international relations. It includes conflict management and prevention, but also involves the peaceful pursuit of conflict on one level and the constructive and constraining work of international institutions on the other. And although it uses official negotiators and diplomats driving on "**track-one**," it also increasingly involves activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on an optimally parallel "**track-two**." Over time, the two tracks of diplomacy have gradually come to terms with each other, with official diplomacy finding that unofficial efforts can be helpful on occasion in providing the context for official actions or entering situations where official penetration could be viewed as intrusive and unofficial practitioners recognizing that state auspices are needed to conclude binding agreements.

As democracy spreads its effects around the world, the need to take public opinion and non-governmental interest groups into account in the conduct of diplomacy increases greatly (see Pigman, chapter 4, and Badie, chapter 5 in this volume). As a result, diplomacy and negotiation are more important to states than ever before as a means of conducting external relations and pursuing domestic policies and broad notions of security. Of course, most broadly, diplomacy (particularly in its adjectival form) refers to smooth wording and good manners by anyone (a kind tribute to the officials with whom this behavior is associated); the usage here will be more specifically state-oriented, as noted.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy is primarily negotiation, and negotiation is the primary business of foreign policy and international relations.
- Although officially conducted by state representatives, negotiations and mediation can also be carried out by private groups and NGOs, often needing state participation at the end to become officially binding.
- Negotiations also take place vertically between state representatives and domestic groups and interests.

NEGOTIATION AND DIPLOMACY

States are **sovereign,** self-centered entities that are morally responsible to their citizens for their defense and promotion of their security and welfare. In the evolution of the modern world, neither self-centeredness, **sovereignty**, nor security can be the absolutes that they once (if ever) were purported to be (Annan 1998; Boutros-Ghali 1995). Increasingly, states need cooperation from others to achieve their objectives, and decreasingly are they able to claim sovereignty as an indivisible value that protects their freedom to do anything with their own population without interference.

The ideal type of the process by which relations among states are carried out can be referred to as "normal diplomacy"—that is, ongoing communication between formally equal parties for the purpose of maintaining relations, doing business, and preventing and handling conflicts as they may arise. Increasingly, normal diplomacy is used to help other parties out of their conflicts and to join other parties in devising cooperative agreements to solve multilateral problems. Normal diplomacy is responsible for defusing the literally innumerable conflicts that have not occurred or turned violent, and for conducting the day-to-day trade, tourism, culture, and communications that take place. It is conducted by both permanent and occasional representatives in bilateral and multilateral channels (Zartman 2015; see also Pouliot and Cornut, chapter 10 in this volume).

The primary charge of accredited ambassadors and their staff is the maintenance of good relations between their home and host countries; the second task of diplomats is to gain support from the host country for policy positions of importance to the home state. In dealing with internal conflicts, this situation creates obstacles to creative policy in circumstances referred to as "diplomacy as usual," for it leads the ambassador to adopt the host state's position on the rebellion and turn a blind eye to the fact that, whatever their merits, rebellions are generally an indicator of a problem. This challenge troubled US policy during the second half of the 1990s as the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko collapsed in Zaire, and it continued to limit a positive US role in the subsequent phases of the succession war in that country.

Negotiation is the process of combining divergent positions into a joint decision. It takes place when the parties realize that they are blocked in their attempts to arrive at their preferred, unilateral solution to a problem or conflict and see this stalemate as the worst possible outcome, creating a situation of **ripeness** for negotiation to begin (see box 6-1). They need to arrive at a joint solution with the other parties

BOX 6-1

Some Terms Associated with Negotiation Theory

Mutually enticing opportunity (MEO): a situation where (both) conflicting parties feel that a cooperative solution is possible, are willing to work toward it, and are thereby pulled to an agreement. Also referred to as a **way out (WO)**.

Mutually hurting stalemate (MHS): a situation where (both) conflicting parties feel that they cannot escalate the conflict to a unilateral solution at an acceptable cost, and that this impasse is costly to them, and are thereby pushed into considering negotiating a cooperative solution.

Positive sum: an outcome where all parties' gains (or the total of each party's gains and losses) are positive, or where each party gains something from the outcome (although not necessarily equally), as opposed to **negative sum**, where all lose.

Relative gains: gains that are measured in comparison to another party's gains or by interparty evaluation (in contrast to **absolute gains**, which are measured in relation to a party's own goal or by intraparty evaluation).

Ripen: making a conflict or problem ready for negotiation by increasing the parties' perception of an MHS and WO.

Ripeness: a moment when both MHS and WO are present in the conflicting parties' perceptions.

Zero sum: an outcome where one party's gains are made at the cost of the other's losses (I win, you lose).

to save themselves from a continued deadlock that is costing them in money, lives, and relations without bringing them a favorable outcome (Brams 1985; Druckman 2007; Goldstein 2010; Hopmann 1996; Snyder and Diesing 1977). In principle, the perceived need to escape the deadlock, or **mutually hurting stalemate**, forces the parties to think and try to define a **positive sum** solution (see box 6-1). If the mutually hurting stalemate pushes the parties into negotiation, their challenge is to devise a **mutually enticing opportunity** to pull them into agreement (see box 6-1).

Parties perceive two sorts of situations—zero-sum, where one party's gain is the party's loss, and positive-sum, where both/all parties gain. Zero-sum encounters in their unbalanced outcomes leave little prospect of stability and a bad impression on the loser, who looks to improve its relative gains either in the next round or elsewhere (see box 6-1). If negotiations were a one-shot affair, parties could drive the hardest bargain possible, sign, and run. But diplomacy is the business of managing ongoing relations. Even if a party feels the need to prevail in a particular diplomatic negotiation, it is preferable to do so in such a manner that the outcome does not impel the other party above all to seek revenge. "Diplomacy," said Cardinal Armand Richelieu, "should aim, not at incidental or opportunistic arrangements, but at creating solid and durable relations" (Freeman 1997: 71).

Positive-sum perspectives are those in which parties do not win at the expense of each other but all gain in some measure. They do not have to gain equally; the allocation of the gains is another, often distributive, matter. Positive-sum diplomacy seeks to provide something for the other party not for goodness' sake but to give that party an incentive to keep the agreement from which the first party also benefits. Negotiating is "giving something to get something," and positive-sum attitudes reflect its basic nature: "If you can't take it, you must buy it." Or, in a mercantilist formulation, give to get. Negotiation, then, is the process of setting the price. Positive-sum attitudes also correspond to the perception of "absolute gains"—as opposed to relative gains—where each party finds value in the stakes that matter to it rather than in trying to beat the other party (Powell 1991).

Parties can achieve positive sums either through "compensation" or through "construction" (reframing). Compensation refers to "giving to get," an exchange of concessions on different matters; one part "pays" for a favorable outcome in one matter by granting the other party a favorable outcome on another matter. According to "Homans' maxim," the key to successful negotiation is the situation where stakes can be put into two piles (those that are more valuable to one side and less costly to the other, and vice versa) and then the two piles are traded against each other (Homans 1961). An illustrative case involved South West Africa (now Namibia). In the 1970s, the United States demanded South Africa leave that territory because it had lost its United Nations (UN) mandate, but with nothing to offer, not even approval of the regime. In 1988, however, an agreement to end the conflict in Namibia and Angola was reached by "purchasing" a withdrawal of South African troops from South West Africa (and its consequent achievement of independence) with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and vice versa, thus achieving a full realization of both parties' goals (Zartman 1989). The situation of Homans' maxim was also present in the early 1990s in South Africa, where the growing perception of an unacceptable stalemate enabled the parties—the ruling minority represented by the National Party and the excluded minority represented by the African National Congress—to negotiate a new and beneficial outcome (Zartman 2000). And it was also present in an interesting twist during the P5+l negotiations with Iran over nuclear proliferation that came to an agreement in 2015. When the European Union states were demanding a halt to Iran's nuclear weaponizing, they were the *demandeurs* with nothing to exchange. When the P5+1 (nuclear states plus Germany) imposed sanctions, however, the game changed, and Iran became the *demandeur*, bargaining over how much non-proliferation it would take to buy off the sanctions—a case of compensation negotiations. The problem, of course, is that not all stakes are Homans-divisible, still leaving a distribution or zero-sum problem for those that are not. In such cases, compensations become particularly important as side payments, involving items outside the original stakes. The P5+1 negotiations were also interesting for another reason: the increasing role of women negotiators in international negotiations (see box 6-2).

Construction or reframing refers to a redefinition of the stakes in such a way that both parties can find an interest in the outcome instead of defining it distributively. It is unlikely that reframing can totally recast the stakes to the elimination of all distributive concerns—that is, stakes not open to compensation but only to a zero-sum outcome—but it can provide superordinate goals and a cooperative atmosphere that make distribution less contentious. When the parties to what is considered the last territorial conflict in Latin America, between Peru and Ecuador, began to focus on the development of the poor and isolated region in contest rather than

BOX 6-2

What Diplomats Do: Women Negotiators in the P5+1 Agreement with Iran

"When a historic nuclear accord was reached in Vienna, Austria, on 14 July between Iran and the P5+1, the Iranian negotiators could not shake the hands of their female interlocutors due to the country's strict religious customs.

Three Western women—two European and one American—were central to a comprehensive deal reached to curb Iran's nuclear programme.

Leading the political side of the negotiations was Federica Mogherini, the European Union's chief diplomat and former Italian foreign minister. . . Ms. Mogherini had faced criticism when she first started as chief diplomat—many said she was too young and inexperienced. . . But by crunch time, she had earned herself a reputation as a tough negotiator.

Alongside her was her deputy, Helga Schmid. Credited with having immense technical knowledge, her colleagues have called her a 'linchpin' in the negotiations and 'the ringleader'. . .

At the table for the Americans was Wendy Sherman, her country's first female undersecretary of political affairs and a veteran of nuclear negotiations. She was one of the chief architects of the Clinton administration's North Korea nuclear policy and had taken the lead on the US team's nuclear talks with Iran since 2011."

According to Mogherini, " 'The fact of having many women at the table in key positions helped us be concrete and pragmatic the whole way.' "

"But the Islamic Republic of Iran has strict rules about interactions between men and women—customs that diplomats follow regardless of whether or not they're in the country.

'We couldn't shake hands, couldn't touch in any way at all,' Sherman said."

[Nonetheless] she says "being a woman was not a barrier in her progress in the negotiating room."

SOURCE: Kianpour (2015).

on the legalisms of their contending claims, they were able to reach a settlement in 1998 (Herz and Nogueira 2002; Simmons 1999).

KEY POINTS

- Normal diplomacy is the daily exercise of interstate relations that handles most problems and conflicts between/among states.
- Ripeness is required for states to turn their attention from attempts to solve/win a conflict or problem by themselves and toward attempts to seek a solution in cooperation with the opponent or other concerned party.
- Positive-sum outcomes are preferable to distributive or zero-sum outcomes, because they tend to be more durable, with each party getting something from the agreement.
- Concession or division, compensation or exchange, and construction or re-framing are the three means of arriving at an agreement over stakes at issue in a conflict or problem.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF DIPLOMACY

In the globalized era, the subjects of negotiation spread upward from single-state security to international security and downward from state security to “human security”. Concern for human security—the security of people, populations, and human lives—is reflected in the significant rise in importance of humanitarian conditions, human rights, emergencies, and intervention, penetrating into the interior of the state and holding the state responsible for the plight of its citizens (Human Security Report Project 2008). Humanitarian efforts are the turf of NGOs, both as direct interveners and as advocates who seek to mold public opinion and state policy. But they are also the stuff of state actions, as they lead diplomacy into areas that were earlier considered out of bounds. States now find themselves drawn into conflicts where they have no direct interest at all but where the horror of the human condition compels a response. The 2011 intervention in Libya is a debatable example: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states were drawn in to save lives, although some would claim they had other interests as well. Some states, like Norway, develop a vocation of mediations, offering help in the conflicts of El Salvador, Israel, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and South Sudan, among others, with varying degrees of success.

The end of the Cold War brought the monopoly and centrality of state power and authority in the economy, society, and polity into question in much of the Third World and Second World. Democracy legitimized opposition; free enterprise encouraged competition; and structural adjustment shattered a centralized economy. The end of **bipolarity** undercut foreign support for single-party regimes and shredded the philosophical support for democratic centralism. In addition, attempts to create a state-nation (a state that creates a new identity for its people) in the absence of a nation-state (a state based on a community of people sharing a common identity) offended traditional nations, tribes, and ethnic groups, who then reasserted themselves to contest state authority. The result has been an absolute rise in the numbers of internal, often ethnic, conflicts during the 1990s, and again in the first decade of the twenty-first century, to challenge the weakened state, foster the collapse of postindependence social contracts, and pose new problems for diplomatic negotiation (Minorities at Risk Project 2010; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2017). At the same time, interstate war has become rare, even in some deep-seated cases such as India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, North and South Korea, Iran-Israel, Russia-Georgia, and Russia-Ukraine, among others, where stalemates of nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) reminiscent of the Cold War have frozen these conflicts and prevented a cataclysm from erupting.

These developments pose problems for diplomatic negotiations. Intrastate conflicts, often referred to as asymmetric, challenge the basic assumptions of formal equality and legitimacy of the parties in negotiation. They involve parties that are unequal in terms of both power and legitimacy: The state is the stronger sovereign, legitimate actor, which means that the rebels have to lead a triple struggle against odds—for attention, for power, and for legitimacy—with violence as their only currency with which to buy a new outcome. They claim legitimacy as spokespeople for their deprived and discriminated population, and they contest the **legitimacy** of the state as ruler of the whole political system (Montville 1990; Zartman 1995). Commitment is their equalizing source of power until their violence can balance that of the state. And unlike a state, their cause is their only cause, and they are dedicated fanatics in its pursuit. It is hard to move from the zero-sum situation of conflict to search for some positive-sum outcome.

Not only the conflict but the outcomes of intrastate negotiation differ from interstate wars. Peace between two sovereign states, whose existence is usually not challenged in the conflict, involves resolution of the issues (for example, boundaries or even regimes) that started the conflict and then the return to the states' daily business, a far cry from internal settlements that tend to involve the creation of a new political system and the readjustment of social groups' roles and practices. The economy needs rebuilding, which often involves social restructuring, ethnic inclusion, military integration, infrastructural reconstruction, and new investments. The polity and military have to be restructured to involve former excluded or contesting forces, and new institutions must be devised to fit. Conflict management diplomacy has produced some successes in overcoming these challenges. Mozambique and South Africa in the early 1990s are important instances of internal conflict management and even resolution diplomacy. UN mediation in the intrastate conflicts in El Salvador during the 1980s and in Cambodia and Guatemala during the early 1990s was a new challenge both for the world organization and for the resolution of internal conflicts.

There is a high tendency for such outcomes not to last (the **conflict trap**). Durability of peace agreements requires continuing third-party diplomatic attention, including international monitoring, reconstruction, and assurances of peace dividends to handle initial and conflict-driven grievances (Collier et al. 2003; Fortna 2004; Gartner and Melin 2009; Toft 2010; Walter 2002; Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). The challenge for conflict diplomacy is to maintain attention and engagement in the conflict area long after the peace agreement has been signed, a demanding requirement in the face of donor fatigue and distraction by other new or renewed conflicts. The story of Haiti is instructive, where it took a full collapse of the peace process of the mid-1990s to finally get a long-term international commitment for sustained attention in the 2000s, only to be overwhelmed by the 2009 earthquake. Similar problems from a lack of sustained commitment have weakened peace diplomacy in Palestine, Congo, Kosovo, Senegal, and Somalia, among others.

These negotiations to deal with internal conflict, with its humanitarian and strategic concerns, have carried with them new diplomatic norms. One concerns the basis of self-determination, returning to state criteria rather than human security. After the end of the First World War, the overriding policy guideline was national self-determination, whereby the creation of new states' was based on the approximate territorial limits of major nationalities. Originally, the application of this doctrine was restricted to the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. After the Second World War, the term "national" was given an equally limited definition, referring only to constituted colonial territories and thereby slipping into a new guideline defined as state self-determination (the creation of a new state on the basis of a former administrative unit) (Emerson 1960), which was locked in by the application of *uti possidetis* (possession is nine-tenths of the law) to sanctify often badly drawn colonial boundaries and launch the process of constructing a state-nation (Gordon 1971; Shehadi 1993; Starovoitova 1997; Thompson and Zartman 1975).

State self-determination strengthened its hold after the Cold War, dominating the settlements over the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and in Africa (Eritrea, Somaliland, and—stretching it—Southern Sudan) and disregarding the human (ethnic) criteria contained in national self-determination. Negotiations over Namibia in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Eritrea in the early 1990s, East Timor and Kosovo in the late 1990s and 2000s, and Southern Sudan in the 2000s all ended in independence (in 1988, 1993, 2002, 2008, and 2011, respectively), but most often without fully terminating the conflict. Many ethnic groups were crammed into states dominated by one majority, pieces of which were often assigned to other states as well. Yet self-determination claims by Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs in Kosovo, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Indians in Chiapas, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Diolas and others in Casamance have been rejected. Diplomacy eschewed national self-determination, which would have caused major squabbles and conflicts over the shape of the new units. However, as in Zanzibar in 1964, creative negotiations led to various autonomy agreements short of independence in Mindanao (Philippines) in 2004, 2015, and Aceh (Indonesia) in 2005.

The need to deal with internal conflict and human security has also brought major reorientations in the norm of sovereignty. The doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P)—in which sovereignty is defined as a state's responsibility to care for its own people, to help other states do the same, and to intervene if another state does not carry out its own responsibility—has been posited to replace the previous doctrine of sovereignty as protection of the state, accepted since the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 (Ban 2009; Deng et al. 1996; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS] 2001; Zartman 2010; also see Wiseman and Basu, chapter 18 in this volume). Both doctrines carry great dangers. The first gives the state the right to do what it wants with its population and thus protects it from external interference, especially by stronger states, whereas the latter gives others—particularly stronger states—the right to intervene to protect the population against its own state. The dangers are evident, to the people in the first case and to the smaller states in the second. International diplomacy has not yet worked out the limits and thresholds of this new doctrine, and the risks involved have—paradoxically—caused it to take a less prominent place in interstate politics and discussion since it was adopted by the UN Summit in 2005 (Zartman, Anstey, and Meerts 2011).

KEY POINTS

- Globalization is expanding the subjects of negotiation for standardization and regularization.
- Human security expands the concept of state security to refer to the inhabitants of the state and their safety and well-being as a concern of diplomacy and negotiation.
- Internal conflicts pose a challenge to diplomacy, since they involve one state's interference in another's internal matters.

- Self-determination criteria have shifted from the nation to the already constituted state unit, which avoids problems of drawing new boundary lines but overlooks problems of divided nationalities.
- The conflict trap is a destabilizing effect of conflict in developing nations (states), where conflict tends to perpetuate itself by weakening the state's already weak ability to handle the security of its people.
- R2P reinterprets the notion of sovereignty to protect people rather than states and to hold states responsible for the welfare of their own people, thus legitimizing other states' interference in domestic affairs.

CHALLENGING THE PROCESSES OF NEGOTIATION: MEDIATION AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Negotiation's defining characteristics include unanimity as the decision rule, formal equality of parties, mixed motives (common and conflicting interests), and the process of exchanging offers/demands within a threefold decision choice (yes, no, or continue talking) (Iklé 1964). These defining characteristics of the negotiation are under strain and often bent out of shape in an era of globalized diplomacy. The increase in internal conflict has pulled outside states, both great and small, and even NGOs into mediation (any type of third-party involvement) and conflict management diplomacy (Rubin 1981; Saunders 1999). Distant events have an increasingly direct effect on great powers' and even superpowers' concerns and welfare, but other states, too, have made mediation a vocation.

The decline of superpowers' preemptive interests in distant conflicts produced a withdrawal after the Cold War similar to that which followed the end of the colonial era, liberating Third World countries from the constraints of their protectors and freeing them to pursue their own conflicts. Yet the result has been unsettling to world stability and values, and external states are drawn into internal conflicts to promote negotiation among the parties. The United States is drawn into Sudan, Somalia, the Philippines, and the Sahara and Sahel by concern about globalized terrorism, and into Congo, Korea, and Burma by concern for stability in strategic and unstable neighborhoods. But other great powers and members of the UN Security Council find responsibilities for themselves in dampening the course of events in troubled areas such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Congo, Palestine, and Sudan, because their concept of interests goes beyond their immediate neighborhood. Striking examples are found in the first two humanitarian interventions justified by the UN in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 and Somalia in 1992, and then Libya in 2011 and South Sudan after independence that the same year.

Mediation

States pursue a diplomacy of mediation in their own interest (Zartman and Touval 2007). When parties alone are unable to perceive a ripe moment—that is, a mutually hurting stalemate and potential of a way out—they need a third party to enable them to do so (see box 6-1). Parties in conflict need help; they rarely are able to negotiate their way out of the conflict by themselves. Sometimes, the mediators do seek an outcome favorable to themselves, but much more frequently, they are motivated by a desire to end a conflict that is disturbing to them as well, or to improve relations with one or both of the conflicting parties. Thus, the international mediator does not have to be neutral and unbiased (as it may in labor relations or domestic counseling) but simply to be a trustworthy message carrier and encouraging of the parties' efforts to find a stable solution. If the mediator does have favorable ties with a party in the conflict, however, the assumption is that it will deliver that party's assent to the evolving outcome.

Entry is a particular challenge for internal conflict management (Maundi et al. 2006). The intervened state generally resists mediation, since that is interference in internal affairs and implies that the state cannot handle its own problems. Mediation is generally a boost to the weaker, internal party, and it raises the question of recognition and position as equals in the negotiations, the prime goal of the rebels.

Because parties begin negotiations under the pressure of a (perceived) mutually hurting stalemate, the mediator's first challenge is to help the parties develop that perception (Touval 1982). Ripening, or heightening the parties' realization that they cannot escalate their way out of the conflict and that staying in it imposes increasingly burdensome costs, is the ticket to mediation. If this is not possible and the mediator's interests make a resolution important to it, then positioning is the best policy in order to be available when the parties become aware of their costly and unproductive stalemate, when it develops. The highly qualified UN mediators in Syria—Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura—failed to bring about meaningful ceasefire, let alone peace negotiations, because they could not convince the parties that they were in a stalemate that hurt both them and their populations, some 400,000 of whom had died in the conflict by the end of 2016 (Hinnebusch and Zartman 2016).

Parties need help not only in formulating conflict management outcomes but also in the process of reaching them. In internal conflicts, diplomacy and negotiation are generally beyond the experience of the rebels and beyond the intentions of the state. At least initially, the rebels are a badly organized, inchoate body, with any political sense subsumed under the military demands of the struggle. They frequently are simply not prepared to act and think as negotiators and need training to be able to participate in conflict management. Furthermore, as negotiations to end a conflict move toward either success or failure, paradoxically, rebel movements tend to fractionate. Success brings new splinter factions that break ranks to hold out for their own benefit or, sometimes, to race to an agreement before the main body. Failure brings up the tactical question between factions over more flexibility or more violence as the proper strategy (Zartman and Alfredson 2010; Levkowitz 2016). Proliferation was destructive to negotiations in Liberia and Darfur (Brooks 2008; Mutwol 2009; Zartman 2005). Unlike states, which generally remain intact and continue basic operations when they make peace among themselves, the parties agreeing to end an internal conflict are under deep internal strains and have to construct new relations and, often, enter a new political system. During a decade of armed struggle, Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) had little idea of what it was fighting for, as opposed to what it was fighting against, and needed training and coaching to negotiate with the government. The same problem faced the several Darfuri rebel groups in Sudan, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola. Even when the goal (independence) was clear in the rebels' minds, the requirements of give-and-take in a situation where their victory was not acquired were foreign to the rebels' experience, as in the case of the Polisario in Morocco, Hamas in Palestine, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Thus, mediation is needed not only to bring the parties together on an agreeable outcome but also to train the parties how to act in looking for such an outcome.

Once mediation has begun, the mediator's job varies according to the type of obstacle that prevents the parties from seeking an agreement. If the parties are unable to hear and get messages to and from each other, they need a communicator (sometimes termed "facilitator") as a mediator, serving only as a clear telephone line between the parties, as the Vatican did in the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile. If the parties are so engrossed in their conflict that they cannot think of a way to overcome the deadlock of opposing demands in a coordinated solution, they need a "formulator" as a mediator, injecting ideas of its own and persuading the parties of the need and opportunity for a positive outcome. The United States has done this in its successive mediations during the Middle East peace process in 1974–91, for example. But if the obstacle to an agreement is the absence of sufficient payoffs to attract the parties away from their conflict, or the absence of sufficient equality of strength between the parties for them to come to a balanced and stable agreement, then the need is for a "manipulator" as a mediator, as with the huge US foreign aid promise to Egypt and Israel in 1975, making the second Sinai disengagement attractive to them. The manipulator's role may increase either the cost of the stalemate or the gain of a joint outcome; it contains the greatest degree of involvement and is also the most dangerous for the mediator.

Multilateral Diplomacy

The other direction of expansion in the practice of diplomatic negotiation concerns the higher levels of multilateral cooperation (see Pouliot and Cornut, chapter 10 in this volume). In the area of non-military security, involving economic, social, legal, and other matters, multilateral diplomacy has expanded its activity exponentially since the end of the Second World War and the creation of the UN (Kjellén 2008). States come together to enhance their security by resolving common problems and reducing transaction costs through negotiated regimes or rules, regulations, norms, and principles to govern expectations and responses in specific issue areas.

Regime negotiations can be universal, such as the Law of the Sea, negotiated over twelve years and finally contained in a treaty signed in 1985, or the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Or they can be quite limited, such as the oil pricing regime of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which contains only half the oil producers but sets prices as a referent for all of them. Regime negotiations can involve an international organization, like OPEC, or merely a body of norms without even a secretariat, like the Law of the Sea or the Kyoto Protocol. And they can be expressed in **soft law**, again like the guidelines attached to the Kyoto Protocol or the UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, or in a succession of political decisions, again like the OPEC actions. Regimes are not **hard law** that pose the sharp choice of compliance or infraction as the only options but, rather, are recursive negotiations to examine and correct the course of the norms and regulations (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997; Spector and Zartman 2003). Correction is necessary because of the shifting power and interests of the parties, the injection of new information and events, the impact of interest groups and domestic implementation within the parties, and changes in the nature of the problem itself

Regime-building and adjustment are conducted by **multilateral negotiations,** which in important ways are quite different from the processes of bilateral diplomacy (Crump and Zartman 2003; Hampson with Hart 1995; Zartman 1994). The basic challenge of multilateral negotiation is to manage the complexity of multiple parties, multiple issues, and multiple roles to enable a consensual decision. The most frequently used mechanism for such management is the formation of "coalitions" of both parties and issues. Negotiators seek to package, pair, or link several issues in order to simplify decision-making (Sebenius 1984). Negotiators also seek to build coalitions of the whole, minimum winning coalitions, blocking coalitions, or single issue coalitions, and serve as mediators between coalitions or generators of coalitions. In short, coalitions are the main method of analysis and collective decision-making in multilateral negotiations.

The creation of international regimes is related to a redefinition of states' interests, moving from national interests that are qualified as "narrow" to those termed "enlightened." The first have long dominated diplomatic and realist thinking, as expressed in the doctrine of "sovereignty as protection." Narrow national interests relate to a unilateral concern for national independence, territorial integrity, and protection of the country's way of life and standard of living (Morgenthau 1948). Enlightened interests concern the maintenance of collective agreements and reciprocal security, under the liberal or institutionalist perspective that reciprocity (rewarding a concession with another concession—namely, compensation) is an important element in the assurance of mutual security (Ikenberry 2001). Thus, it is important for states to cooperate in managing far-flung conflicts and to conceive of their interests in terms of mutual assurances of security and stability. Security then becomes a collective responsibility that states negotiate to promote. In a memorable statement, Ambassador Christopher Hill (2005) indicated that the purpose of the Six-Party Talks, involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, was to convince North Korea that its security would be better assured by taking its place in the international community than by unilateral measures, such as developing nuclear weapons, that only threaten the other members of that community. Managing distant conflicts and creating international regimes build on an international community with reciprocal obligations that reduce conflict and justify intervention.

KEY POINTS

- The processes of negotiation are being challenged by contemporary demands for mediation and multilateral diplomacy.
- Mediation refers to any type of peaceful third-party involvement to overcome blockages in negotiation and is usually necessary in conflicts, and especially internal conflicts, since parties are too deeply involved to think of ways out of it.

- States are drawn into mediation for direct national interests and also for enlightened or humanitarian interests.
- Types of mediation are differentiated according to the type of obstacles it is needed to overcome: communicators when the parties cannot talk to each other, formulators when they cannot come up with resolving ideas, and manipulators when they do not see large-enough benefits to outweigh costs in current resolution outcomes.
- Multilateral negotiations involve a large number of state parties in search of solutions for current international problems and are conducted by creating coalitions.
- International regimes are rules, regulations, norms, and expectations established by recursive multilateral negotiation to deal with international problems that no single state can handle.

FACING THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION: PREVENTION

Normal diplomacy functions to resolve conflicts and, by extension, to prevent them (Zartman 2015). It works, as testified by the literally innumerable conflicts that have not taken place or have not escalated into worse violence, and by some specific cases where negotiation was the means of prevention. The two preventive interventions in Macedonia in 1992 and 2001 are frequently cited as models. Russian diplomatic intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994 brought a management of the conflict that still holds, providing a potential basis for resolution (Hopmann and Zartman 2010; Mooradian and Druckman 1999). The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave rise to some notable cases of **preventive diplomacy** in the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Tatarstan and Tajikistan (Hopmann 2001; Jentleson 2000).

Prevention means keeping conflict from escalating into violence rather than the elimination of conflict per se, since conflict is the simple incompatibility of positions and quite normal in its passive state. But passive conflict may contain a potential to be activated by efforts to prevail through confrontation and violence (Zartman, Anstey, and Meerts 2011). Conflict of positions is the ground for negotiation; conflict through violence is the object of prevention. It is necessary to examine and deal with conflicts before they become violent, in order to prevent crises but also to understand the source of the violence when it threatens or occurs. Therefore, the aim of diplomacy is to attend to conflicts before they escalate into violence, fend off conflicts that are in the violent stage, and mend conflicts that have been de-escalated from violence (Albright and Cohen 2008; Boutros-Ghali 1995; Hamburg 2008; Zartman 2010).

Conflict management refers to efforts to keep the conflict from escalating beyond the political level; conflict resolution refers to the removal of the incompatibilities that give rise to the conflict. Conflict prevention then addresses both the violent measures and the incompatible ends of conflict. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–61) was the postwar leader who pressed the notion of preventive diplomacy; his much later successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–96), brought it back into prominence, after a Cold War interlude. (Deng et al. 1996; Jentleson 2000; Lund 1996; Lute 1997; Zartman 2001). Academic and diplomatic paths of attention came together in the Canadian-sponsored ICISS, whose 2001 report declared, in bold type, that "prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect," divided into structural or root-cause prevention and direct (operational) or conflict prevention (ICISS 2001: xii–xiii, 22–27, 47–69). These concerns then found their place, along with the R2P doctrine, in the Secretary-General's Report of the High-Level Panel that was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and were further elaborated by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (Ban 2009).

Since then, the doctrine of prevention has run aground on the same sorts of difficulties as the doctrines of R2P and human security. As in the previous case, the shoals are both practical and conceptual. Practical difficulties concern the implementation of prevention. The UN doctrine on peacekeeping, which is not written in the charter but referred to informally as "Chapter VI.5," is that peacekeeping forces are rigorously held to keeping a peace already agreed to rather than intervening in situations of violence. The Mission of the UN in Congo stretched this doctrine toward intervention when it learned that no peace had been agreed to in Eastern Congo, but possible UN prevention was dodged in 1997 in Congo-Brazzaville on the grounds that peace had not taken hold (Zartman 1998, 2000). Preventing conflicts from escalating into violence, a rising emphasis of the prevention doctrine, is even more difficult, for it amounts to telling sovereign states not to pursue their conflict with external or, more seriously, internal enemies (Zartman 2010; Zartman, Anstey, and Meerts 2011). Because intrastate conflict often arises from deprivations imposed by a narrowly based government or from discriminations imposed on internal rivals, such advice and efforts to implement it are sharply resented by target states and their leaders. Governments carrying out a policy of violent conflict against an identified—and, almost necessarily, demonized—internal or external enemy likely will not take kindly to external attempts to prevent their efforts to defend the country or regime. Even more controversial are the means to prevent a conflict or a problem that is merely on the horizon, foreseeable but lying deep within domestic conditions and state relations. Between large-scale structural prevention, such as development aid against poverty, and targeted operational prevention, such as relief deliverance to oppressed minorities, lies a large field of uncharted, unclear, and unwelcome policies of intervention.

KEY POINTS

- Prevention, referring to efforts to keep conflicts from escalating to violence, is the most difficult challenge of diplomacy and negotiation, since the pressure of ripeness is weakest and the prevention efforts are the most intrusive.
- However, normal diplomacy and some exceptionally intense efforts in its absence have been remarkably successful and have kept conflict violence to an exceptional occurrence.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the twentieth century, under the colonial and Cold War systems of world order, great power concerns always extended beyond their immediate neighborhood. By the end of that century and the beginning of the present one, those concerns have become enmeshed into a complex global system, without any clear notion of the particular structure or mechanism to preserve world order (Zartman 2009). Responsibility lies all around, as large states weigh their responsibilities and small states play major roles, internal conflict outpaces interstate conflict, and still immature diplomatic norms such as R2P toddle forth to slay established practices without yet being strong enough to define new ones. States and other international actors establish international regimes in an effort to coordinate rules, norms, and expectations to handle international issues based only on unenforceable and fragile consensus (Friedman 2007). The most notable effect of globalization is the rise of a multinational corporation named al-Qaeda (the Base), with a secret and mobile headquarters, a corporate culture, multinational branches and international cadres, funding from diaspora and organized criminal sources, information technology and electronic communications, and state security penetration operating to attack a worldwide range of targets. Only momentarily successful, it has been followed by a so-called Islamic State (*khilafa)* that claims a diminishing territory but sponsors and inspires a widespread, free-wheeling network of agents involved in worldwide terrorism, operating as individual jihadis against civilian targets. This is the world in which modern diplomatic negotiation must operate, and in doing so, it has the enormous advantage of flexibility, an appropriate counter to the global system's complexity. While the practice has followed a number of concepts, as presented here, that make its scope and process more understandable, they best serve as a springboard for creativity rather than as rigid restraints. Both normal diplomacy and "diplomacy as usual" contain constraints that can hinder free passage along track-one and prevent productive intersection with track-two. Yet the salient conflicts that have been managed successfully and then, once managed, that have moved to resolution, nested in the infinite number of conflicts that have been prevented by the creative exercise of negotiation, testify to the importance of diplomatic negotiation in rendering violent conflict the exception rather than the rule in a globalizing world.

QUESTIONS

1. How can conflict violence be prevented and non-violent conflicts be tended without the pressure of violence?
2. What issue areas have been the subject of international regimes, and what new issues can be usefully developed?
3. How can ripeness be induced ("ripening") into parties' perceptions in long-standing conflicts such as Israel-Palestine or India-Pakistan?
4. What can be done to exercise R2P before physical intervention into another state's affairs becomes necessary?
5. What are the advantages of state versus national self-determination?

6. How can a mediator reframe/construct a solution when exchange/compensation is not possible? Provide examples for your answer.
7. When can a mediator be only a communicator/facilitator? When does a mediator have to be a formulator? When a manipulator?
8. Looking around you, what daily experience have you had or noticed that provide parallels and insights into diplomatic practice.
9. What are the implications in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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PART III

Structures, Processes, and Instruments of Contemporary Diplomacy

In this part of the book, we examine some of the key structures, processes, and instruments of contemporary diplomacy. We again have two aims. Our *first* is for you to become thoroughly familiar with each of the eight aspects of diplomacy analyzed in the chapters: the foreign ministry, modern technology, consular tasks, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic practices, outreach to foreign publics, economics, the role of women in diplomacy, and the relationship between force and diplomacy. Each of the chapters allows readers to trace how these aspects have evolved over time and in different world regions, and to consider what this evolution means for future practices and theorizing about that particular aspect of diplomacy. We know that in practice, diplomacy's structures, processes, and instruments overlap, and that debates take place about how to conceptualize them. Indeed, we emphasize these debates in each chapter. Moreover, we are keen for you to consider the extent to which globalization and the accompanying communication and information revolution shape the diplomatic world.

Our *second* aim is for you to consider the extent to which we can refer to these eight aspects collectively in order to make some general observations about the nature of contemporary diplomacy. That is, while each chapter is a story about an important individual diplomatic structure, process, or instrument, when taken together they provide insights into the big question: What, exactly, is contemporary, complex diplomacy?

CHAPTER 7

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System

Brian Hocking

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- The ministry of foreign affairs (MFA): diplomatic perspectives
- The MFA and the national diplomatic system (NDS)
- The emergence and evolution of the MFA
- The MFA and the NDS in the twenty-first century
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

The ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) has come to assume a central reference point for both the study and the practice of diplomacy. During the evolution of state-based diplomacy, national governments developed a set of tools for interaction with their external environments and for implementation of their international policy objectives. This is represented in the form of what is termed, in this chapter, the "national diplomatic system" (NDS). Traditionally, this system has been equated with the MFA and has often, misleadingly, been regarded as synonymous with it. But whatever form the NDS has assumed, it is now becoming more complex as a result of domestic and international factors. This results in seemingly paradoxical tendencies. On the one hand, pressures flowing from the global environment place a premium on sound policy advice and effective overseas representation. On the other, the MFA's credentials as the logical point of interface with the international system are questioned, as the constitution of "foreignness" itself seems harder to grasp in a rapidly changing world. Against this background, the chapter explores the nature and functions of the MFA and its place in the changing NDS.

INTRODUCTION

> Foreign ministries are at a tipping point between being more relevant than ever before and being lost in irrelevance as other agencies step into the foreign policy space.
>
> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (2011).

For many observers of diplomacy, the MFA and its associated structures of diplomatic representation suggest an obvious and natural focus. After all, they constitute one of the most characteristic habitats of the diplomat, providing us with valuable insights concerning the practice of diplomacy and the ways in which national governments are responding to the complex pressures of managing international policy. And yet, as the observation from an ongoing working group of MFA representatives cited above suggests, all is not well in the corridors of foreign ministry buildings. In part, this reflects a crisis of identity rooted in an environment where the conduct of public policy is increasingly complex and fails to accord with traditional assumptions based on the separation of "foreign" and "domestic" spheres of activity. Consequently, MFAs confront significant questions regarding their role and the appropriate structures needed to deliver international policy.

Against this background of uncertainty and introspection, this chapter examines the MFA and its functions in the broader context of what is termed the "national diplomatic system" (NDS), or the structures that states maintain during a particular period for the management of their international environments. It is argued that as these structures adapt to changing requirements, MFAs are required to redefine their role within these systems. Pursuing this theme, the chapter considers the emergence and development of the MFA, its nature and functions, and its responses to the pressures exerted on it in the context of the changing NDS.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA): DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVES

While the MFA is a common feature of national bureaucracies, there are marked differences among both academic observers and practitioners of diplomacy concerning its role and importance. At the academic level, this reflects differing approaches to the nature and significance of diplomacy in contemporary world politics (Hocking et al. 2013). Not surprisingly, state-focused narratives of diplomacy tend to assign particular importance to "state-based" agents of diplomacy, especially MFAs and their networks of overseas missions (Berridge 2010; Hocking 1999b). In contrast, "globalist" argumentation proclaims the growing marginalization of the state and its institutions (Bisley 2007; McGrew 2008). At one level, this is a reflection of dissatisfaction with the institutions of diplomacy, reflected in a growing skepticism regarding their relevance and a heightening level of introspection within MFAs concerning their role (Bátora 2008; Berridge 2010; Hocking 1999b).

What we might term "postglobalist" approaches to understanding the nature of diplomacy have identified a range of normative-analytic images of global governance architectures in which diplomacy may play varying roles (see Badie, chapter 5 in this volume). Furthermore, globalization is recognized as constituting more than just a set of external systemic forces: it can also be viewed from an inside-out perspective, as the "**globalized state**" adapts its functions and structures to new realities (Clark 2008). In this light, the MFA has acquired a more ambiguous status. On the one hand, it can be seen as a significant component of a broader NDS comprising an increasingly diverse range of players. On the other, many of its working practices, norms, values, and organizational structures have attracted close scrutiny and criticism (Copeland 2009; Riordan 2003; C. Ross 2007; Neumann 2012).

Additional insights into MFAs have come from sociology and organization theory (Bátora 2008; see also Sharp, chapter 3 in this volume). This helps us to understand their culture and responses to changing domestic and international environments. In large part, the MFA culture reflects the accumulation of assumptions and traditions surrounding the conduct of diplomacy, its divorce from the realm of domestic policy and politics, the significance of secrecy, an emphasis on a closed community of transnational professionals working within understood codes of conduct, and the continuing legacy of a formerly aristocratic elite largely transformed into a meritocracy. Consequently, the MFA and its foreign service are usually portrayed as having a well-defined, strong culture that is partly derived from its position at the juncture of state-focused diplomacy and the "global diplomatic system," or a common field of diplomatic action through which much—but not all—international interaction is mediated (Steiner 1982). Hence, the "foreignness" of the MFA is a critical component of its culture and reflects the fact that diplomats usually serve overseas for a considerable part of their working lives (Gyngell and Wesley 2003).

Furthermore, the MFA is also often regarded as an outsider in its home environment, distinctive from other government departments and lacking natural domestic constituencies. These two modes of "outsideness" are reinforcing. The role of the diplomat, as part of the transnational diplomatic community, feeds back into headquarters, whose functions are partly determined by the needs of servicing the overseas network. This helps us to understand one of the defining problems of diplomacy in general and of the MFA in particular—namely, its legitimacy. Not only has the status of diplomats frequently been problematic in terms of their activities in host countries, but their value has also consistently been questioned at home. Added to this is the impact of a changing public service culture that questions the distinctiveness of the MFA, applying to it such devices as measurable performance targets (Rana 2007b).

KEY POINTS

- MFAs are characteristic features of the structures developed by governments to manage their international policy environments.
- However, alternative approaches to understanding diplomacy assign to them differing roles and significance.
- Looking at globalization from inside the state, the current condition of the foreign ministry offers a useful perspective on the organization of the "globalized state."

THE MFA AND THE NATIONAL DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM (NDS)

In one sense, MFAs represent a major bureaucratic success story, as their presence in countries large and small testifies. Nevertheless, there are differences between them, one of the most obvious being size and funding (see table 7.1). But beyond this are variations reflecting the obvious fact that states differ in their forms and functions as well as in their engagement with the international system.

A more complex security environment blending the demands imposed by globalization and regionalization, environmental issues, fragile states, transnational terrorism, and the uncertainties following the 2008 financial and economic crisis has redrawn the diplomatic landscape in terms of both its processes and structures. One manifestation of this situation is the recognition that **policy networks**, rather than formal, hierarchical bureaucratic structures, are indispensable in managing increasingly complex international and domestic policy environments (Robinson 2008; Slaughter 2004). Consequently, MFAs, may occupy differing positions within their discrete national settings. Furthermore, their relationship with other actors—both governmental and non-governmental—involved in international

Table 7.1 Foreign Ministry Spending Comparisons

International comparisons with similar bodies, excluding aid spending where body is also the main aid agency

COUNTRY	SPEND IN LOCAL CURRENCY	SPEND IN £ MILLIONS	RANK OF SPEND PER HEAD OF POPULATION	YEAR SPENDING RELATES TO
United States	US$25.0 billion	17,469	1	2014
Finland	€0.38 billion	284	2	2015
New Zealand	NZ$461 million	219	3	2014–15
Canada	CAD$2.52 billion	1,404	4	2013–14
Germany	€3.64 billion	3,202	5	2014
France	€2.82 billion	2,305	6	2015
Australia	AUS$1.77 billion	811	7	2014–15
United Kingdom (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)	£2.18 billion	2,183	8	2013–14
Ireland	€163 million	137	9	2015
Sweden	SEK 1.9 billion	151	10	2015
South Africa	ZAR 5,754.3 million	787	11	2014–15
India	INR 9,662	4,027	12	2012–13

SOURCE: Figures compiled by the House of Commons Library in British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2015).

policy processes is changing in response to the challenges presented by the complexities of fluid policy environments.

From this perspective, it is, as mentioned earlier, more instructive to think in terms of a set of institutions and actors—a *national diplomatic system*—configured for the management of a state's international environment (see box 7-1). The MFA is part of, but not coterminous with, this system. Indeed, it can be regarded as a subsystem within the broader NDS possessing distinctive characteristics and interacting with its other constituent actors. Even defining the MFA involves more than simply the home department identified as the "ministry" but also includes its network of **overseas posts** together with its political leadership. This points to a fluctuating and complex set of relationships that span the bureaucratic and political realms. Particular national requirements are likely to result in a specific configuration of tools within the NDS. In China, for example, it is suggested that the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has declined for two reasons. First, the changing global environment has increased the number of domestic foreign policy actors in the country, and second, the foreign minister's power base in the Chinese Communist Party has lessened since 1998 (Z. Chen 2016; Jakobson and Knox 2010; see also Zhang, chapter 16 in this volume).

In the United Kingdom, the outcome of the June 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) illustrates dramatically how a sudden change in the policy environment demands adaptation in the NDS (see box 7-2). The creation of a new Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) with up to a 1,000 staff to oversee Britain's withdrawal for the EU represents one of the most significant peacetime challenges for the British government. Amongst the questions immediately debated was the desirability of a dedicated department as opposed to strengthening individual departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth

BOX 7-1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System

MFAs—such as the Department of State in the United States, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) in Germany, and the Ministry of External Relations in Brazil—are that part of the government machinery formally charged with the management of a state's foreign or external relations. Together with the network of overseas **diplomatic representation**, the MFA forms a subsystem in the national diplomatic system. This latter term reflects the enhanced complexity in the management of governments' international policy agendas, growing involvement of agencies outside the MFA, and a consequent degree of uncertainty as to its role and structure. Thus, rather than assuming that one government department has a dominant role in managing foreign affairs, the concept of the national diplomatic system sees this as involving increasingly complex networks, and it recognizes the linkages between diplomacy, development, and defense as well as the need to establish close working relations between a range of "domestic" government departments in specific policy areas, such as the environment and global health.

BOX 7-2

Managing Britain's Withdrawal from the European Union

- British withdrawal from the EU could present government departments with the challenge of scrapping, or copying into law, up to 12,295 EU regulations and involve costs of about £5 billion.
- By July 2016, a Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) comprising some 1,000 staff was being fashioned. Initially, this included senior public servants from the Cabinet Office, Treasury, Foreign Office, and Department for Business Innovation and Skills. Expertise from other departments is to be added as negotiations with the EU develop.
- The major problem lies in trade negotiations, which are an EU responsibility. Consequently, after forty years of EU membership, the United Kingdom lacks skilled trade negotiators—estimated by a former permanent head of the FCO at around 20, contrasted with some 600 in Brussels. Drafting in private sector personnel offers one (expensive) option for meeting this skills deficit.
- However the challenges are met, the FCO clearly is but one element in adapting the NDS to this huge challenge—and one whose role is uncertain.
- By August 2016, there were reports of a "feud" between the FCO and the Department of International Trade over the latter's demand that the FCO's economic diplomacy team be transferred to it and the FCO focus on "diplomacy and security."

Sources: Compiled by the author from reports in *The Financial Times*, *The Economist* and *The Guardian*, July–September 2016.

Office (FCO). Not surprisingly, by August 2016, turf wars over roles and competences of the key departments—notably, the FCO and the Department of International Trade—were being reported.

From a broader perspective, the environment in which the NDS operates does not match the "command and control" principles on which the conduct of Cold War foreign policy institutions were based. Key assumptions of that era, such as the separateness of foreign and domestic policy and the importance of secrecy, have been eroded. Consequently, the delineation of the NDS and the relationship between its component elements need to be reexamined. For example, the increasingly critical link between diplomacy and development poses questions of organizational form and the degree to which development and foreign policy should be linked. While most governments integrate their aid programs and their foreign ministries, the trend in the United States and the United Kingdom since the late 1990s has been to separate them. Thus, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is not fully integrated into the US Department of State, and the British Department for International Development (DFID) is separate from the FCO (Hyman 2010). Reinforcing the link between diplomacy and development through strengthening what former US Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton termed "civilian power" was a central theme of the State Department's first *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (H. R. Clinton 2010; US Department of State/US Agency for International Development 2010: vi–vii).

From a broader NDS perspective, we can begin to appreciate the past and present role of the MFA in a somewhat different light. Rather than preoccupations with relative dominance versus decline—a popular theme in discussion of MFAs—attention centers on the shifting character and composition of the NDS and on how the MFA fits into it, the requirements for the management of international policy, and what added value the MFA is able to provide. Whether it survives in its familiar form is a secondary issue. Concerns with diminishing resources, familiar from much MFA internal analyses, also may not be the most significant issue here. Rather, role definition, organizational issues, and relationships with the growing diversity of actors in the diplomatic milieu may be more important. One analyst of the US State Department has suggested the need for a broader perspective than that of resource depletion in appreciating its problems. This should be based on a recognition of the Department's changing functions:

> The deficiencies of the State Department cannot be attributed to shrinking or static resources. The reason for the perceived failings and ineffectiveness of the State Department, instead, lie elsewhere. While poor leadership and misguided policies can obviously impede even the best organizations, consideration must also be given to how existing and expanded resources have been allocated—particularly the expansion of the State Department's focus beyond its traditional remit and the emphasis on those non-traditional responsibilities. (Schaefer 2016: 5)

But to understand better the current status of the MFA and its place in contemporary diplomacy, we need to appreciate its origins and functions.

KEY POINTS

- While the MFA has emerged as a characteristic element of the structures associated with state-based diplomatic processes, it is a component of a broader bureaucratic system, the NDS.
- Interpreting the role and importance of the MFA has been associated with more general approaches to diplomacy as an institution of the international order and the ways in which states are responding to the major changes in that order.
- The purpose of the NDS is to provide a "tool kit" for national governments in their interactions with their international environments and in the pursuit of their international policy goals. Its form is conditioned by both international and domestic environmental factors and is responding to the changing demands of the post–Cold War order.

THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MFA

The MFA needs to be viewed in the light of its evolution as one element in the emergence of the "foreign" domain. Its development as a component of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state is part of the process by which domestic and foreign policy became increasingly separated from the seventeenth century onward. As Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne (2011) have noted, until the early eighteenth century, it was common practice to combine both foreign and domestic policy in the same department. It was the recognition by Cardinal Richelieu, in seventeenth-century France, of the need for continuity and coordination in the management of French foreign relations in an increasingly complex system of states that led to the emergence of a separate foreign ministry. In the case of Great Britain, up until 1782 the Northern Department and the Southern Department dealt with both domestic and foreign policy. However, the increased demands imposed by the international environment—and the inefficiencies and frictions that two, often competing, departments could create—resulted in the formation of two departments, one for home affairs and the other for foreign affairs (Tilley and Gaselee 1933).

More generally, the evolving states system required an enhanced capacity at two related levels. First, the resources to communicate internationally and to project national interests through the development of networks of overseas representation were needed. Second, the ability to interact with these networks and the broader diplomatic environment and to support the shaping of international policy at home was required. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these requirements resulted in the professionalization of diplomacy through formalized recruitment processes and the introduction of examinations and training programs. It would, however, be wrong to view the MFA as the sole, or even the dominant, agency through which a national community interacted with the international arena. In some cases—Canada and Australia are two examples—trade ministries assumed greater significance in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Allowing for such variations in the evolution of the MFA, two broad trends marked the NDS as it evolved during the twentieth century. These can be identified as "fragmentation" and "concentration." The first trend relates to a diversification of the NDS, as line ministries found their responsibilities acquiring enhanced international dimensions As a result, transgovernmental patterns of diplomacy developed. This could be seen as early as the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the rise of international agencies such as the International Telegraph Union and multilateral conferences such as the International Aerial Navigation Conference of 1910 involving specialists and domestic government agencies (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011: 136).

The second trend affecting the constitution of the NDS, concentration, relates to the enhancement of the foreign policy capacity of central agencies, particularly prime ministerial and presidential offices. While this was partly a reflection of the growing significance of heads of state and government in diplomacy, it was also a recognition of the potential costs of lack of coordination in the management of international policy and a desire to minimize those costs by centralizing policy-making functions. Densely textured policy arenas such as that of the EU, with its multilayered diplomatic environment, demonstrate these developments to a high degree. Consequently, the demand for coordination at the member-state level is high, although how this is achieved varies (Hocking and Spence 2005; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000; Spence and Bàtora 2015).

In the US context, the needs of enhanced centralized control over foreign policy and the ability to respond to a proliferation of crisis situations have increased the significance of the National Security Council. Created in 1947 with a small number of advisers to the White House, it grew steadily under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to 400 at its height. According to one observer, "[T]his growth has been a direct result of the President relying more on the National Security Council to devise and implement his foreign policy than on the Department of State" (Schaefer 2016: 5). Susan E. Rice, Obama's last national security adviser, attributed the growth to the merging of the NSC with the Homeland Security Council following the 2001 terrorist attacks and emerging security challenges in areas such as health and cybersecurity. Arguing the benefits of a 'mean and lean NSC, she noted that the overall size of the NSC had been reduced by 15% under her leadership (De Young 2017).

The MFA's Functions

Despite variations in their precise locations and significance in an increasingly complex NDS, MFAs share broad generic functions:

- A key node in a diplomatic communications system through which information from the international environment is gathered, analyzed, and disseminated.
- A policy advice function, providing expertise to politicians, other parts of the bureaucracy, and non-governmental actors with interests in international policy.
- A memory bank, gathering and storing information.
- A policy transfer function through which the channels of diplomatic communication are used to exchange information and ideas on a range of issues between countries.
- Service functions directed at the overseas needs of specific domestic constituencies, such as trade promotion (or commercial diplomacy) and consular services.
- Administrative functions relating to the management of the overseas diplomatic network, relationships with the resident *corps diplomatique*, and associated diplomatic protocol matters.

The first two of these functions are most commonly regarded as being challenged. As a communications system, the rapid dispersal of information through the electronic media and the use of digital tools such as **social media** are frequently viewed as rendering the diplomatic network redundant (see Kurbalija, chapter 8 in this volume). Similarly, the emergence of rival sources of policy advice and expertise, both in other government departments and outside them, in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example, is seen as threatening the value of the MFA in an environment where specialist rather than generalist diplomatic expertise is valued. On the other hand, the memory bank function rarely, if ever, features in this debate, suggesting that observers either do not value it, are unaware of its existence, or accept that it is insulated from the pressures of exogenous change. The development of the policy transfer role, which similarly tends to be downplayed in discussions of the functions of contemporary diplomacy, can be interpreted as indicative of decline or adaptation to changing circumstances.

Attempting to analyze the impact of the changing policy environment on the MFA suggests a need for greater definitional clarity as to the impact of environmental factors on these various functions. The general point is that understanding the position of the contemporary MFA is helped by disaggregating and analyzing its functions rather than by generalizing in broad terms about its decline.

KEY POINTS

- Historically, the emergence of the modern MFA is associated with the increased separation of domestic and international aspects of public policy.
- While MFAs vary in their precise form and function, they display a high degree of similarity.
- During the twentieth century, the management structures of international policy witnessed two linked trends: fragmentation and concentration.
- While it is not universally true that the MFA has been the sole, or even dominant, actor in the management of international policy, its role has been increasingly challenged by the changing demands faced by governments in managing international policy and, consequently, the shape and composition of the NDS.

THE MFA AND THE NDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The discussion so far has moved away from familiar arguments regarding the relative decline of the MFA in favor of examining the shifting character and composition of the NDS and the place of the MFA within it. As suggested earlier, there are two linked dimensions here: the response of the MFA as an organization seeking to ensure its survival against threats from its environment, and its adaptation as a component of the NDS. Different countries illustrate various facets of this more nuanced view of the status and role of the MFA.

Thus, the MFAs in the United States (Department of State) and India (Ministry of External Affairs) have been criticized for failing to respond adequately to the changing global environment and the needs that this imposes on the NDS. The MFA is portrayed as lacking key skills and training strategies appropriate to the changing international environment, failing to develop linkages with other parts of the bureaucracy and with the private sector critical to the management of international policy, having inadequate policy capacity, and not appreciating the importance of access to overseas domestic constituencies (Cassidy 2015; Markey 2009; Metzl 2001; Schaefer 2016). On a similar theme, the 2016 “Future FCO Report” in the United Kingdom argues that the FCO is bad at utilizing expertise outside the organization. The report estimates that only 90 UK-based FCO staff are working in other government departments and the European External Action Service, with only three people seconded into the FCO from organizations outside the government bureaucracy (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2016). But these are part of a broader set of issues conditioning the operation of MFAs that we need to consider.

A key theme in the 2016 "Future FCO Report" is the need to reconfigure the NDS, and for the MFA to build relations with other government departments, thereby enhancing the overall capabilities of national governments (hence the emphasis on the need for what is frequently termed a **whole-of-government** approach to international policy). This focuses attention on the respective roles of the MFA and other government departments with clear international responsibilities, and on the dangers of a country speaking with multiple voices on international issues. In this context, bureaucratic turf battles are familiar and, in some countries, have grown as domestic agendas become internationalized.

In China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confronts strong rivalry from key bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Commerce, the People's Bank of China, and the Ministry of Finance (see Zhang, chapter 16 in this volume). The consequences can be important—and not just for the country itself. Thus, the highly significant position of China in the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen has been explained in terms of bureaucratic conflict over China's stance on fixed targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Development and Reform Commission (Z. Chen 2016; Jakobson and Knox 2010).

How these tensions play out depends on a range of domestic factors, and the situation is by no means clear-cut. Generally, for example, the UK and Australian picture is painted as more collegial than conflictual in terms of the management of international policy than is suggested by the **bureaucratic politics** model based on US experience. On the other hand, Japan, like China, has experienced significant tensions between its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments. The desire to overcome differences in Japanese policy on free trade agreements has resulted in the creation of a bureau to centralize policy making in the MFA, preventing other ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, from exercising an effective veto on policy in the area (Rathus 2010).

Beyond intrabureaucratic relations, the changing global environment poses issues for the structure and functions of the MFA. To a greater or lesser extent, all MFAs have adopted a two-pronged structure based on geographic and functional sections. Although there are clear variations in precise form, the tendency has been to favor the latter in response to an environment in which issues and areas are ever more closely linked. In 2010, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that its structure "will no longer hinge on geographic areas but on macro-sector themes: the three pillars of security, European integration and the outward reach of the Country System" (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark has moved from a vertical pillar structure focusing on geographic divisions to a thematic and horizontal structure based on eleven centers, as this better reflects a more complex international order and enhances policy coordination. But the balance between functional capacity and geographic expertise remains a contentious issue. On the one hand, the "Future FCO Report" argues that the value of specialists is not adequately appreciated, and that they "must be more systematically involved in policy making at all levels" (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2016: 23). On the other, in the US Department of State, it has been suggested that the expansion of non-regional bureaus has "produced an exceedingly complex organizational structure. Developing a distinct 'State' point of view is now extremely difficult and [. . .] has reduced the department's ability to exercise any leadership" (Schaefer 2016: 11).

The generalist-specialist debate links to a second concern: the need to strengthen MFA policy capacity in order to cope with change. One of the most obvious ways to provide this is through a policy planning unit or department. Strengthening policy capacity, however, is increasingly seen as also requiring the development of stronger linkages within the overall bureaucratic structure as well as with stakeholders outside the MFA. Establishing "knowledge networks" embracing not only other government departments but also business and key groups in civil society, particularly NGOs, is considered essential to underpinning the role of the contemporary MFA. In a similar vein, bringing in outside expertise is linked to recruitment policy and advocacy of lateral recruitment, something that analysts argue the Indian Ministry of External Affairs needs to undertake (Markey 2009: 78–79; Rana 2007a: 47–76).

These organizational issues are central not only to the skill sets seen as necessary among modern diplomats but also to how these can best be developed. The debate about diplomats as "generalists" and "specialists" is obviously related to the organizational question of the balance between geographic and functional structures noted above. While a strong case can be made for the continuing importance and necessity of generalist diplomatic skills, the trend during the twentieth century was toward an emphasis on specialist skills, reflecting the nature of the changing international agenda. This has posed two issues for the MFA: first, how to acquire and deploy such specialist skills, and second, how to respond to the claims of specialists in functional departments to "act internationally" on behalf of their governments.

One response to this problem has been to redefine training needs beyond the more traditional agendas common to foreign service institutes and diplomatic academies. Alongside this, MFAs have had to respond to major social and demographic change over the last fifty years, not least in terms of their gender policies (see Aggestam and Towns, chapter 13 in this volume). In Europe, the Nordic countries lead the way in terms of the number of women diplomats in post. Norway has the highest number of women ambassadors, up from 8.5 percent in 1997 to 30 percent in 2010 (Embassy Barometer n.d.). Recalling that the British FCO only started to employ women in the diplomatic service in 1946, it is indicative of the distance traveled since then that, in 2008, the first instance of a (husband and wife) job-sharing ambassadorial post occurred in the British High Commission (embassy) in Zambia (Maitland 2010).

Changing Patterns of Communication: Public Diplomacy and Digital Diplomacy

As reflected throughout this book, communication is the essence of diplomacy. A major challenge for diplomats and the structures within which they function is to respond to the rapidly moving changes in the communications environment that have occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Two issues have assumed a key place on the MFA agenda: whom to communicate with and how to do it. The two intersect in the centrality assumed by public diplomacy and the use of digital tools such as social media.

The MFA and Public Diplomacy

In one sense, public diplomacy (see Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume) is a well-established facet of national diplomacy; in another, it is undergoing fundamental change. The end of the Cold War altered the role of public diplomacy from that of accessing closed systems to one of developing strategies for operating in an open system containing a multitude of voices utilizing new communications and information technologies. Fundamentally, this is altering the modalities of influence in world politics, placing increased importance on access to complex webs of transnational linkages and networks alongside traditional intergovernmental channels of diplomatic action (A. Evans and Steven 2008).

The result has been twofold. In terms of diplomatic strategies, public diplomacy is becoming integrated into international policy processes rather than being regarded as a supplementary tool outside mainstream diplomatic activity. This was a key argument in the 2005 Carter Review of UK public diplomacy, leading to the creation of the FCO Public Diplomacy Board (Hocking 2008). Second, at an organizational level, public diplomacy is being "mainstreamed" into MFA structures and human resource strategies. This goal has been a central theme in the extensive discussion of US public diplomacy requirements over the last decade. Here, the need to integrate the public diplomacy function overseen by the US Information Agency with Department of State geographic bureaus, where policy is effectively formulated, is seen as critical to integrating policy and public diplomacy (Graffy 2009).

Enhancing and redefining public diplomacy capacity is also reflected throughout the diplomatic service. It is now taken as a basic rule that diplomats in the field need to engage with a wide range of actors and interests in host countries and integrate centrally determined public diplomacy strategies into their activities. This is not always easy, however. In the case of the United States, for example, a major issue for the Department of State has been the rules regarding diplomats' engagement with the media in the countries where they were serving. The need for prior clearance from the State Department helped to generate a culture of caution and disengagement rather than one of engagement with local media and, therefore, shaping perceptions and attitudes. These rules were changed as Karen Hughes, who held the post of undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in the George W. Bush administration, encouraged engagement and introduced structural changes that could underpin it (see box 7-3).

The MFA and Digital Diplomacy

Not surprisingly, public diplomacy is closely linked to the emergence of "digital diplomacy" (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Hocking and Melissen 2015; Fletcher, 2016; see Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume). The development of **Web 2.0** interactive websites and the growing—if uncertain—usage of social media by MFAs adds a significant new layer to a communications environment in which publics have become "content producers" rather than participants in government-controlled communications (Zaharna 2015).

This is an area where technological change conditions both MFA activity and its status within the NDS. Web 2.0 offers scope for developing interactive websites, and recognition of the growing significance of social networking sites is being exploited

BOX 7-3

Diplomacy in Practice: Changing the Public Diplomacy Culture in US Diplomatic Missions

As Colleen Graffy was the first deputy assistant secretary of state for public diplomacy to be appointed (in 2005) to the US Department of State and served in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. As she describes:

> Despite establishing the "Rules of the Road" clearance procedures, there was no pressure to make media engagement a priority. All that changed with the development of "media hubs" in Brussels, Dubai and London, which helped to generate and facilitate media appearances by senior US government officials. The European and Eurasian Bureau (EUR), under the wise counsel of the first Senior Advisor for the Media Hubs, Adam (now Ambassador) Ereli, created a "Media Matrix" which tracked who was going out on television, where and on what topic. This single-handedly changed the off-the-record default position: When the monthly chart came out showing, for example, that the consul general in Florence was doing more media than the ambassador to Spain, or that the ambassador to the Court of St. James's (UK) was more engaged than the ambassador to Italy, suddenly television interviews began to be put on the schedule.

Source: Graffy (2009).

by many MFAs as they develop strategies and infrastructure to utilize digital tools. The FCO, for example, runs 255 websites, which include the FCO's corporate site, country sites in multiple languages, special subject sites, and campaign sites, as well as some 120 Twitter channels and 120 Facebook pages together with a number of local or regional digital channels (for example, Sina Weibo in China). Six Foreign Office ministers are currently on Twitter, while over twenty ambassadors tweet personally. The FCO website received more than 10 million page views in 2012–13, while around 100,000 people follow the foreign secretary on Twitter. In 2008, the FCO became the first UK central government department to open its blogging platform to all staff who could establish a legitimate case for using it (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2010). While former British foreign secretary David Miliband, a committed blogger himself, welcomed these developments as opening up the "secret garden of diplomacy" (Borger 2008), the use of social networking media such as Twitter has inevitably raised issues regarding its value and compatibility with the patterns of behavior associated with the diplomatic profession.

The advent of digitalization, however, is not restricted to the public diplomacy sphere. Improving knowledge management is seen as a key objective, as is the use of digital tools in the MFA (Hanson 2012). Additionally, MFAs are making increasing use of digitalization in consular and crisis management work. The short-term consular solution is to develop a good website, offer automated services for travelling citizens, and make use of social networking sites in emergencies and crisis situations. In Australia, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has developed its Smartraveller website, on which it posts travel updates and revisions to travel advisories for 169 overseas destinations. In Finland, the MFA has created "The World Surprises" map service, which enables travelers to share travel experiences and to access MFA information on travel destinations. These developments aim to sensitize the travelling public to possible dangers, but also to establish reasonable expectations regarding consular support overseas. In both the United Kingdom and Australia, this message has been reinforced through television documentaries ("The Embassy" on the Nine Network in Australia) focusing on consular work in embassies.

Digitalization also poses numerous organizational issues for MFAs. Not the least of these is the importance of supportive internal structures (such as the US Department of State's Office of eDiplomacy) and the presence of "digital champions." In the United States, the importance of Hillary Clinton, when secretary of state, in promoting digitalization has been noted, as has the support given by Carl Bildt, when Swedish foreign minister, and Indian Prime Minister Modi (Hocking and Melissen 2015: 49–50). Support for the use of digital tools is equally important in the ranks of diplomats themselves. Active users of digital tools, such as former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul (rated amongst the 2013 "Twitterati 100" for using social media to engage in a "Twitter war" with the Russian MFA), Andreas Sandre of the Italian diplomatic service, and former UK ambassador to Lebanon Tom Fletcher, are seen as role models in the promotion of digital diplomacy.

Opening up the "secret garden of diplomacy" challenges one of the principles most closely associated with the development of diplomacy—that of secrecy. The expansion and redefinition of the NDS, combined with the logic of public diplomacy and the adoption of digital tools, places a growing emphasis on the demands of transparency. But the release of US Department of State diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks starting in November 2010 posed fundamental questions concerning the norms and functions of diplomacy, as well as practical questions regarding the maintenance of secure communications in an information-rich environment. Additionally, the problems of **cybersecurity** have been underscored by reports in early 2011 that China had penetrated the FCO's internal communications systems and that a pirate Internet site, replicating the official French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, was circulating bogus "official" announcements. Similarly, in 2015, the Danish Foreign Ministry was cyberattacked through the installation of a remotely operated, malicious program into a computer at a Danish embassy. This was believed to have been supported by a government in the Middle East.

Adapting the Diplomatic Network

The utility of maintaining a network of overseas posts has been consistently questioned in light of the current enhanced patterns of communication and the alternative, instantaneous sources of information available to policy makers (Oliver 2016). Nevertheless, despite the cost, governments maintain extensive diplomatic networks (see table 7.2), and even small states maintain a network reflecting their core areas of interest. Having said that, most of the developments discussed so far have impacted on overseas diplomatic networks.

Underpinning much of the discussion is the relationship between two core issues in the history of **diplomatic representation**: those of *access* and of *presence* in the

Table 7.2 Diplomatic Representation

Based on Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Group of 20 (G20) member states

COUNTRY	POSTS	COUNTRY	POSTS
1. United States	270	11. Italy	202
2. France	267	12. India	172
3. China	258	14. Mexico	157
4. Russian Federation	243	16. Switzerland	148
5. United Kingdom	236	17. Netherlands	141
6. Turkey	225	18. Poland	131
7. Brazil	222	19. Czech Republic	114
8. Germany	218	20. Australia	113
9. Japan	214	40. Estonia	40
10. Spain	212	42. Iceland	22

Source: Lowy Institute for International Policy (2016).

international system. Historically, establishing access to key centers of policy activity came to be associated with permanent presence, notably in the creation of networks or **resident ambassadors** in **bilateral missions** and **multilateral missions**. These tended to replace an older model of managing access—namely, the use of **mission diplomacy** for specific purposes.

This linkage is changing as the functions of diplomatic networks and their sheer cost have come under close scrutiny. Increasingly, alternative forms of diplomatic presence are proposed, as small, flexible, and quickly deployable posts are coming to be seen as better attuned to contemporary needs than the traditional embassy.

At the level of diplomatic practice as opposed to popular debate, which is strongly influenced by the image of diplomats as a privileged clique, enjoying an extravagant lifestyle subsidized by hard-pressed taxpayers, significant changes are occurring at three interrelated levels:

- a redefinition of functions.
- a rebalancing of the structure of overseas posts reflecting changes in the NDS outlined earlier.
- a continuing review of the size and distribution of networks.

There is continuing debate as to the precise functions to be served by these networks and how they should respond to the broad environmental changes noted earlier (see box 7-4). A consistent theme here is the reduced importance of traditional **diplomatic reporting** as opposed to well-focused policy advice enabled by the creation of secure email systems. In some MFAs, this has brought diplomatic posts more directly into central policy formulation, compensating for the reduced geographic expertise that a more functionally oriented structure might create (Rana 2007b). One of the most consistent demands in both developed and developing states is that their diplomats respond to the demands of a competitive global

BOX 7-4

What Diplomats Do: Functions of the Diplomatic Network

According to the German Federal Foreign Office website, the essential tasks of the German missions broad include:

- collecting information
- reporting on issues that are of relevance to the various authorities of the federation and the Länder
- helping German citizens in emergencies, carrying out crisis protection measures, and assisting Germans living abroad with regard to certificates and legal documents
- issuing visas for travel to Germany
- assisting German companies with their activities in the host country and generally enhancing mutual trade
- promoting cultural exchange
- educating the host country's public about our foreign policy and also about Germany and its society and culture in general
- preparing and escorting high-level visits from Germany

SOURCE: German Federal Foreign Office (n.d.)

economy by assuming a more active role in **commercial diplomacy** (see Woolcock, chapter 12 in this volume). This is nothing new. It runs as a leitmotif in reform proposals for the British diplomatic service over the last sixty years, reemerging as a key theme of the British coalition government elected in May 2010, which proposed to appoint businesspeople as ambassadors (Barker 2010). Research by the Lowy Institute for its "Global Diplomacy Index" reveals that while the UK FCO closed around 30 diplomatic missions between 2009 and 2015, its network for promoting science and innovation policies expanded from 24 to 28 countries (Oliver 2016).

Another functional theme, affecting the work of both the MFA and the diplomatic service, has been the enhanced significance of consular work (see Leira and Neumann, chapter 9 in this volume). This reflects the intersection of the commercial demands on foreign services, the demands from ever more mobile populations, and the expectations that the NDS (since this involves a range of domestic departments) should actively respond to the needs of their citizens caught up in sudden natural and man-made international crises. Thus, the establishment and expansion of crisis management units at home has become a key issue. The decision by the FCO, following the pressures created by the 2011 Arab Spring, to launch a new Crisis Centre was intended to enable it to handle two large crisis situations simultaneously through a centralized command structure linking departments across government. A similar logic of cross-government cooperation can be seen in the Quai d'Orsay's Emergency Operations Centre (see box 7-5). Enhancing crisis "surge capacity" at headquarters

BOX 7-5

Diplomats and Crises

Times of Crisis
28 July 2014

Marc Fonbaustier

Head of the Emergency Operations Center, Quai d'Orsay Paris

- "Working at the EOC has convinced me of the importance of 'short-term diplomacy.'"
- "I have learnt the importance of inter-ministerial work, building relations based on confidence and daily contact with the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Health."
- "There can be no . . . planning or crisis management without this essential cooperation."

Source: Fonbaustier (2014).

is balanced by enhanced capacity in the field, often by means of regional "crisis hubs" linking missions in specific geographic regions.

These developments are closely related to the second dimension of change—namely, the changing structure of **diplomatic posts**, reflecting the reconfiguration of the NDS. The trend for many embassies to be staffed by members of a range of departments other than the MFA has been established for many years, but some larger posts have reached the point where professional diplomats are a minority. This has created a somewhat paradoxical claim on the part of MFAs, which, on the one hand, acknowledge that overseas missions are increasingly a platform for the entire government apparatus while, on the other, frequently assert that diplomatic missions constitute a key element of the "value added" afforded by the MFA in the management of international policy. However this might be viewed, a diffusion of bureaucratic interests at missions abroad poses issues of communication with the central government and of conventions determining the "tasking" of posts and, ultimately, policy coordination.

The third facet, but by no means the least significant, facet of change is the issue of the resources available for the maintenance of the diplomatic network and how these are deployed. Around the world, diplomatic services are being rationalized. Denmark, for example, announced the closure of five missions in 2010. But clearly, national needs differ. The size of the Indian foreign service is regarded as inadequate for a rising economic power, with 669 diplomats distributed between the ministry in New Delhi and 119 missions and 49 consulates around the world, and is being expanded (Markey 2009). A quite different situation exists in the EU, where the creation of the European External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty poses interesting questions regarding its impact on member-state diplomatic services (see Bátora, chapter 17 in this volume). One feature of the EU diplomatic landscape is a growing trend among member states to reduce the resources devoted to intra-EU diplomatic representation (Bátora and Hocking 2009).

Doing more with less has encouraged experiments with a range of structural reforms, such as economies of scale through greater use of **multiple accreditation** of diplomats to two or more countries and assigning specific functions to regional geographic hubs. In the EU, there have been limited experiments with **colocation** of EU missions in third countries that amount to a sharing of premises. Switzerland now shares premises with the Netherlands in Oman, and Canada and Australia have a reciprocal agreement relating to consular assistance (Oliver 2016).

Additionally, outside the EU, greater use is being made of **non-resident ambassadors**. While by no means restricted to smaller states, these have obvious attractions for a country such as Singapore, which has 46 non-resident high commissioners/ambassadors supplementing its 50 overseas missions. In the United States, a changing global environment combined with pressures on resources have resulted in a number of experiments, including small-scale American "presence posts," first deployed in France and often staffed by one foreign service officer; **mobile diplomats** (circuit riders) operating from a mission and regularly visiting cities or regions; and "virtual presence posts," in the form of websites targeted at a geographic area and maintained from an embassy (Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn 2007).

Of more general significance, however, is the recognition that the distribution of scarce diplomatic resources needs to reflect the redistribution of global power in the twenty-first century. In turn, this theme was central to the "Transformational Diplomacy" initiative announced by secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in 2006, in which a major shift in the distribution of US diplomatic posts away from Europe and toward the emerging economies was proposed (Rice 2006). Similar patterns of "representational refocusing" have emerged around the world in the subsequent decade.

Digitalization also interacts with changing patterns of diplomatic representation. In the world of digital diplomacy, information flows within an NDS and between MFAs become more complex. Embassies embed themselves through social media in networks linking embassies, their own MFAs and other parts of their government, as well as host MFAs. Ilan Manor (2014) has examined this phenomenon in the context of the "social network" of embassies in Israel. Noting that this network is surprisingly limited, with only eleven of the eighty-two embassies accredited to Israel with active Twitter accounts and a presence on Facebook, it nevertheless demonstrates the possibilities of social media to reinforce the central role of the MFA in information networks. Not only do embassies follow their own MFAs, they can create a social network of foreign embassies in a host country and follow its MFA. Manor (2014) notes the opportunities that such a network can offer:

> If the ministry is followed by other embassies it is able to effectively disseminate foreign policy messages to other countries. Moreover, if it follows foreign embassies' digital diplomacy channels, the local MFA can gather information regarding foreign policy initiatives of other countries. In the case of Israel, the Israeli MFA is located at the very heart of the local diplomatic social network.

The Domestic Environment

International pressures are balanced, and in some cases intensified, by domestic pressures affecting the ways in which MFAs operate. One determinant of this has already been noted in terms of the need to build relationships not only with other government departments but also with a range of non-governmental stakeholders as the NDS reshapes itself to deal with changing agendas and more complex patterns of policy making. Growing linkages and working relationships with **non-state actors** of various descriptions are a feature of the contemporary diplomatic environment and are therefore shaping the working environment of MFAs and their foreign services (see Pigman, chapter 4, and Badie, chapter 5, in this volume).

Related to these growing linkages and relationships is the recognition that aspects of diplomacy have become a "consumer commodity," whereby MFAs are confronted by an expanded customer base. Pressures to provide commercial services and, more recently, the public attention given to the performance of a foreign ministry in serving the needs of a more mobile traveling public through its consular functions are not only central to its work but also create standards by which it is judged. Manifestations of this are apparent from MFA websites that offer the public (as with the British FCO's LOCATE facility) the ability to register travel plans so that their location is known in case of emergency.

The other major aspect of the MFA's domestic environment relates to the impact of public sector governance demands that developed in the 1990s. Rather than being regarded as a distinctive component of government administration, the MFA has found itself increasingly subject to the demands placed on domestic departments. Generally, this stresses the establishment of targets and the measurement of performance in quantifiable terms. The adoption of strategic plans and the publication of mission statements together with a range of documents explaining the goals of the ministry and how these are to be achieved are manifestations of this development (Christensen and Petersen 2005).

KEY POINTS

- The relevant issue for understanding the contemporary MFA is not whether it is a dominant agent of international policy or in terminal decline but how it is responding to a changing place in the NDS and what functions it performs.
- The MFA's organizational environment comprises international and domestic components.
- Although public diplomacy has emerged as a major task for the MFA, it now assumes a more central significance, demanding that it be integrated into the shaping and delivery of policy objectives.
- Increasingly, digitalization is presenting both challenges and opportunities to foreign ministries and their diplomatic networks.
- The network of overseas posts is a key element of the NDS and not the property of the MFA. But as with the MFA and other government departments operating internationally, it is adapting to domestic and international change.
- Increasingly, the MFA finds itself subjected to working practices originally applied to domestic bureaucratic departments. This is part of its "deforeignization."

CONCLUSION

Examining the nature and evolution of the MFA offers significant insights into both the theory and the practice of diplomacy. While statist approaches to diplomacy tend to privilege these institutions and regard them as immutable aspects of the diplomatic order, alternative views have modified this image. In much of the early globalization literature, traditional forms of diplomacy came to be regarded as an obstacle rather than a solution to the management of global problems. Consequently, the institutional structures associated with diplomacy, such as the MFA, were deemed no longer fit for the purpose.

More recent interpretations of globalization cast a different light on these issues. Rather than being locked into a condition of terminal decline, the state has come to be seen as adapting to the pressures that globalization imposes. The adaptation of the "globalized state" is considered critical to the management of pressing global issues. In terms of diplomacy, this suggests the principles of state-based diplomacy are adapting to the demands of a multiactor environment in which the construction of flexible and issue-oriented networks is critical.

The chapter has argued several points: that we can better understand these developments by recognizing that the MFA is a subsystem within a broader NDS; that the MFA as an organization is determined by its location at the point of interface between the NDS and the global diplomatic system; that the MFA, despite growing resource constraints, has at its disposal an influential and articulate transnational elite able to argue a case for the organizational status quo or, more subtly, to ensure survival through redefining and re-presenting itself; and finally, that MFAs are likely to survive in some recognizable form because of the combined effect of inertia and uncertainty as to the value of alternative structures that seek to accommodate the complexities and interdependencies of international policy processes.

QUESTIONS

1. How do differing approaches to the study of diplomacy impact on interpretations of the status and functions of the contemporary MFA?
2. What functions do MFAs perform?
3. How are the functions of MFAs affected by globalization and regionalization?
4. What is meant by the term "national diplomatic system"? How do MFAs relate to this system?
5. What changes are occurring in the structure and functions of overseas networks of diplomatic posts?
6. How helpful and relevant is the concept of the "decline" of MFAs to an understanding of their contemporary role?
7. What insights into the nature of contemporary structures and processes of diplomacy can we gain from studying the MFA?
8. What are the implications of digital diplomacy for the functioning of MFAs and their diplomatic networks?
9. What are the implications in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

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CHAPTER 8

The Impact of the Internet on Diplomacy

Jovan Kurbalija

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Changing the environment for diplomacy
- New topics on diplomatic agendas
- New tools for diplomatic activities
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

"My God, this is the end of diplomacy." Such was the reported reaction of Lord Palmerston, British prime minister, on receiving the first telegraph message in the 1860s. "The term digital diplomacy is almost redundant—it is just diplomacy, period" was the comment of John Kerry, US secretary of state, on the impact of the Internet on diplomacy (Kerry 2013). Most reactions from academics and diplomats about the impact of communication technologies on diplomacy fall between these two extremes: Palmerston's pessimism about the future of diplomacy in the age of the telegraph, and Kerry's optimism about the continuity of diplomacy in the digital age. Throughout history, the telegraph, telephone, radio, and other technological inventions have always prompted discussion about continuity and change in diplomacy. With the introduction of cell phones and computers, and of the Internet in particular, academics, diplomats, journalists, and the general public are again analyzing how these more recent technologies, many of them the foundations of globalization, are changing diplomacy. This chapter contributes to this analysis by examining the interplay between the Internet and diplomacy in three areas: the impact of the Internet on the environment in which diplomacy is conducted, the emergence of new Internet-driven topics on diplomatic agendas, and the use of Internet-driven tools that affect the practice of diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet and, more generally, information and communication technology (ICT) have revolutionized the way we communicate and manage information. In a matter of twenty years, our means of communication have shifted from telegraphs and faxes to cell phones and Internet services, such as Skype and WhatsApp. With five billion cellphone users and two billion Internet users, simple and affordable communication is now available for most of the world's population. Facebook and other social networks have announced a new phase in the communication revolution, and most human knowledge, previously preserved in printed books, has been digitalized. Of course, this rapid digital growth has an impact on the political, social, and economic fabric of modern society.

This chapter examines the Internet's impact on diplomacy in three main areas: the changing diplomatic environment, focusing on such factors as the Internet's influence on geopolitics, geoeconomics, **sovereignty**, and global interdependence; new topics on the diplomatic agenda, including Internet governance, **cybersecurity**, and privacy; and new tools for diplomatic activities, such as, email, social media, and big data. This approach to digital diplomacy goes beyond the narrow focus on social media and public diplomacy found in much of the contemporary literature on digital diplomacy and covers the overall interplay between the Internet and diplomacy (Kurbalija forthcoming). From this examination, the chapter argues that the impact of the Internet on diplomacy is significant, and that the future of diplomacy will be shaped by the interplay between these technology-driven changes and the continuity of the core functions of diplomacy.

CHANGING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy does not exist within a vacuum. It is both shaped by and shapes the broader societal context. Historically speaking, each epoch has its defining technology that determines economic, social, and political success. Control over and mastery of the defining technology is a source of power. The defining technology of our era is digital technology—more specifically, the Internet—with knowledge being of central importance.

Digital Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

As the defining technology of the modern era, the Internet influences both traditional geopolitics, centered on the question of national security, and, increasingly, geoeconomics, defined as the promotion of national interests through economic means. Global geopolitical and geoeconomic relationships depend heavily on access to the main Internet cables carrying digital traffic between countries and continents. Presently, more than ninety percent of all global Internet traffic flows through submarine cables, which mostly follow the old geographic routes used by telegraph cables in the nineteenth century (see figure 8.1). Submarine Internet cables reach land via a few Internet traffic hubs. Most Latin American cables reach land in Miami. In Asia, the key Internet traffic hubs are Singapore and Hong Kong. Other key points for Internet traffic include Amsterdam, New York, and San Francisco. The bandwidth


Anchorage
Seattle
UNITED STATES
New York
Los Angeles
Miami
Panama
Caracas
Cayenne
Rio de janeiro
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Dublin
Brussels
Marseille
Lisbon
Algiers
Gibraltar
Odessa
Athens
AFRICA
Dakar
Accra
Porto Novo
Abidjan
Libreville
Luanda
Djibouti
Mogadishu
Dar es salaam
Maputo
Cape Town
Kuwait
Doha
Abu dhabi
Muscat
Arabian sea
INDIA
Mumbai
Chennai
Colombo
CHINA
Shanghai
Hong Kong
Taiwan
JAPAN
Busan
Manila
Guam
Singapore
Jakarta
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
Port Hedland
Perth
Sydney
Noumea
Suva
Auckland
NEW ZEALAND

Alexandria, 2008
A ship's anchor accidentally cuts two cables, seaMewe4 and FLAG Europe-Asia, reducing internet capacity in Asia by 75%

Taiwan, 2006
Site of the previous biggest cable disaster, when under-ocean landslide cut nine cables between Taiwan and the Philippines, disabling net access for weeks

ASIA
Asia has an enormous number of internet users: 501 millon of the world's 1.3 billion users. And it's growing by 8.82% per year

Figure 8.1 The world's undersea Internet cables
SOURCE: Thumbnail from *Guardian* (2009).

capacity of submarine cables differs from region to region, with the trans-Atlantic cable having the highest bandwidth usage (see Table 8.1)

Today, access to these cables is subject to change in a least two ways. First, the routes have increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic significance, because many traverse tense strategic "hotpoints," such as the Straits of Luzon, Hormuz, and Malacca, as well as the Suez Canal. The strategic importance of Internet hotpoints was shown in 2008, when two major Internet cables near Alexandria, Egypt, were damaged, causing major disruption to Internet access in the Gulf states, India, Bangladesh, and some other countries (BBC News 2008).

Second, reliance on access to traditional submarine Internet cables is changing with the development of new terrestrial routes. The Chinese "One Belt–One Road" project plans to strengthen digital connections across Eurasia. Digital fiber-optic cables will be laid along railroads and energy pipelines, which will be built across the two continents. On the one hand, terrestrial cables could, for the first time since telegraph submarine cables were laid in the nineteenth century, challenge the dominant electronic communication system that follows the maritime rim around the Eurasian land mass (Gibraltar–Suez–Aden–Bombay–Singapore). This could have uncertain, even negative, geopolitical and geoeconomic implications, given that control over global communications systems is a source of power. On the other hand, alternative Internet routes could have positive implications, such as reducing the concentration of Internet traffic points in such places as Egypt, which currently carries ninety percent of traffic between Asia and Europe, and increasing the connectivity and development of landlocked countries in Central Asia. Overall, geopolitical and geoeconomic relations, as in the past, affect the context in which diplomacy operates, and in turn, practices of diplomacy will affect that context.

Sovereignty in the Digital Era

The Internet is also challenging state sovereignty (Krasner 1999). This naturally has implications for diplomats, whose work includes safeguarding the sovereignty of the state.

Table 8.1 Survey of the Data Capacity of Submarine Internet Cables Globally

REGION	CAPACITY (TERABYTES PER SECOND)
Trans-Atlantic	23
Trans-Pacific	20
Pan-East Asian	17
South Asia & the Middle East	12
North & South America	9
Australia & New Zealand	5
Sub-Saharan	2
Total	**88**

SOURCE: Terabit Consulting (2014).

The fast-and-easy flow of Internet traffic across national borders challenges the state's exclusive right to regulate its internal sovereignty over domestic public affairs, national laws, and protection of its citizens' rights. With regard to the latter, nation-states lack effective mechanisms to protect the citizens' data stored by social network companies, such as Facebook and Twitter.

States have a limited capacity to influence Internet activities in their territory. The intangible nature of Internet services makes it difficult for states, among other functions, to coordinate economic policy, collect taxes, or impose customs controls. For example, Google has taken over a considerable part of the advertising economy from local newspapers and TV stations worldwide. Uber's challenge to the taxi industry has not only provided new transportation services but also opened the question of taxation for, among other public services, financing the maintenance of roads used by Uber cars. Airbnb challenges the traditional hotel industry. Internet platforms in other fields (for example, food distribution, health, and education) also introduce new economic dynamics and pose challenges to the way nation-states manage economic life in their territory.

One of the paradoxes that diplomats now confront is that of protecting a state's internal and external sovereignty while, at the same time, promoting the state's participation in the processes of global and regional integration and global governance. As Builder (1993: 160) points out: "For nations to be economically competitive, they must allow individual citizens access to information networks and computer technology. In doing so, they cede significant control over economic, cultural, and eventually political events in their countries." Overall, changes to how sovereignty is practiced, both domestically and internationally, have implications for diplomatic practice.

Interdependence in the Digital World

Another change to the context in which diplomacy operates is the increased degree of global **interdependence**. The Internet has considerably influenced the capacity of actors in world politics to interact with each other by providing physical technologies (easier exchange of information) and social technologies (development of a common communication space with shared rules and procedures). Email, social media, and other services have empowered individuals and societies to communicate globally. This high-intensity communication, bringing more contacts and greater interdependence between actors, has implications for diplomatic practice.

More interdependence most often leads to more frequent use of diplomacy as a tool for managing international relations and solving potential conflict. High levels of economic and social interdependence can limit the use of **hard power** and increase the importance of **soft power** and diplomatic persuasion as ways of solving international conflicts. Nye (2011) provides a detailed analysis of the Internet's in developing interdependence and projecting soft power.

Furthermore, in many instances, growing interdependence blurs the traditional division between national and international communication spaces. As Keohane and Nye (2002) demonstrated, growing interdependence is leading to an increasing number of traditionally domestic issues affecting foreign policy.

In 2011, the video showing the burning of the Qur'an by a Christian fundamentalist in the United States triggered protests in Muslim countries, which resulted in a foreign policy issue for US diplomacy. The blocking in 2015-16 of WhatsApp in Brazil, following a court order, affected the accessibility of the platform in neighboring countries, such as Argentina and Chile, since the infrastructure that carries Internet content does not necessarily conform with state borders (Caputo 2015).

KEY POINTS

- The defining technology of our time is digital technology—specifically, the Internet.
- Access to the Internet influences geopolitics and geoeconomics; the Internet alters the concept of sovereignty by challenging the control that governments have over territorial space.
- As the Internet increases interdependence, the more relevant diplomacy becomes for solving conflicts.
- Growing communication interdependence blurs the distinction between national and international communication spaces and requires diplomats to target both audiences.
- The Internet supports a range of new actors who influence society and whose technical skills and knowledge are based on diplomatic persuasion rather than on political coercion.

NEW TOPICS ON DIPLOMATIC AGENDAS

The Internet is increasing the type and number of issues that diplomats and other diplomatic actors have to negotiate. This broadening effect of communication technologies on the diplomatic agenda was already evident in the last century. As Newsom (1989: 29) points out: "For most of the twentieth century, the international diplomatic agenda has consisted of questions of political and economic relations between nation-states—the traditional subjects of diplomacy. After the Second World War new diplomatic issues arose, spurred by the technical advances in [. . .] electronics." In the twenty-first century the communications technologies, including the Internet, continue to be an important topic in diplomatic negotiations (Zartman 2016). Along with climate change, migration, and food security Internet governance is one of the topics that is expanding the diplomatic agenda.

This section starts by examining current attempts to negotiate mechanisms for the governance of the Internet itself. It then canvasses some of the numerous other policy issues that have become digitalized and that are subjects of diplomatic negotiation. Among these issues are cybersecurity; copyright and intellectual property; development, including economic frameworks; content policy and censorship; protection of citizens' data, and big data. These topics comprise another type of internet governance.

Internet governance is the subject of intense diplomatic negotiation. The issue was put on the global diplomatic agenda during the World Summit on the Information Society, the first meeting of which was held in Geneva in 2003. Internet governance covers a wide set of issues, which can be divided into the following seven areas: infrastructure and standardization, security, human rights, legal, development, economic, and sociocultural (Kurbalija 2016). Central to these ongoing negotiations is reaching agreement among the multiple stakeholders on the future development of the Internet. There is no global decision-making body for the Internet, in contrast to trade, which has the World Trade Organization (WTO), and to health, which has the World Health Organization, as the respective global decision-making bodies. It is difficult to gather all Internet-related topics under one organizational roof because of the very multidisciplinary nature of the Internet governance field. The main global body where Internet governance is addressed in its full complexity is the annual International Global Forum (IGF), which involves the main stakeholders in digital policy: governments, the business sector, civil society, and the technical and academic communities. It provides space for discussion, but it does not make policy decisions. Instead, policy decisions are made in the relevant bodies concerned with specific IG issues such as intellectual property (WIPO), digital commerce (WTO), privacy protection (UN Human Rights Council) (see box 8-1).

The global regulation of the Internet occurs in three layers: the telecommunications infrastructure layer; the Internet technical layer encompassing, for example, standards, Internet protocol (IP) numbers, and domain names; and the content layer. For many years, one of the most controversial issues in debates about global Internet governance has been related to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—a non-profit legal entity incorporated in California—and its link to the US government (until September 30, 2016). ICANN manages the Domain Name System (DNS), an Internet address book that translates Internet domain names (like google.com) into IP numeric addresses used by computers and other devices to identify a certain Internet resource. From its creation in 1998 until 2016, ICANN handled this important function on the basis of a contract with the US government. In the framework of this contract, the US government used to approve every major change within the DNS (for example, when ICANN decided to create a new generic top-level domain, such as .bank, the implementation of this decision needed formal validation from the US government). On October 1, 2016, however, at the expiration of the contract, the stewardship role of the US government was passed to the overall Internet community, which will exercise this new role through a series of mechanisms involving the participation of Internet users, governments, the private sector, and the technical community. Although the new arrangement cut the umbilical cord between ICANN and the US government, ICANN remains a US legal entity, under the jurisdiction of US courts. This creates the risk of potential court cases involving top-level domains managed by foreign governments and other entities. In fact, this has happened in the case of .africa, whose allocation to an entity supported by the African Union was challenged in a Los Angeles court by a competing applicant, DotConnectAfrica Trust. The question of jurisdiction will remain the main open issue in debates over the international status of ICANN.

BOX 8-1

A Summary of the Main Internet Governance Topics

- **Cybersecurity** is high on the agenda of major international meetings, including the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20). In June 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared cyberspace as a fourth military operational domain, in addition to land, water, and air. This creates new diplomatic and policy dynamics in dealing with cybersecurity at a global level. The United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts declared that existing international law applies to the use of ICTs by states. The main challenge is to identify a common understanding of how concepts such as state responsibility and the right to self-defense are applicable in the digital space.
- *Copyright and other intellectual property rights* are becoming relevant in new ways with the advent of the Internet, both in terms of what can potentially be protected (for example, domain names) and how intellectual property rights are being enforced (for example, through blocking, domain name seizures, and automatic mechanisms for Digital Rights Management). Intellectual property provisions have recently been included in several multilateral trade agreements, and they were a part of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
- Internet governance has important *development* aspects. Closing the **digital divide** requires complex development interventions combining technological, economic, and regulatory measures, among others. Furthermore, digital tools are considered to be of great importance in achieving progress toward sustainable development goals (Internet Governance Forum 2015).
- The major global economic arrangements and bodies stress that the Internet has a key role in expanding the frontier of *economic production*. The 2016 G20 Leaders' Summit Communiqué emphasized that "we are living in an age of Internet economy" (Paltiel 2016). The World Bank's 2016 Development Report, *Digital Dividends*, provides a framework for addressing policy issues, such as regulation and education, that are essential for obtaining the benefits, or dividends, from digital technologies (World Bank 2016). Ecommerce is the focus of negotiations at the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and many regional economic organizations.
- *Content policy* on the Internet is shaped by political reasons as well as by different regional and cultural approaches to issues such as pornography, hate speech, and religious beliefs. The difference between censorship and justifiable content policy is at the focus of debate, especially within the human rights community. During the 2016 US presidential elections, the question of "fake news" came into the focus of content policy discussions, with requests to Facebook to remove "fake" news items. Facebook and other Internet companies try to limit their responsibility over the content they host and avoid the risk of acting as censors over the Internet.
- *Citizens' privacy* is increasingly affected by the Internet. Cloud computing shifts data from hard disks and traditional storage media to the major servers (for example,. Gmail, Hotmail, wikis), or so-called "clouds." Governments

are concerned about the protection of their citizens' data, but also about the shift of national digital assets to facilities managed by private companies and located in other countries. Privacy and data protection are regulated in the policy triangle among users, state, and business. In the field of privacy and data protection, the European Union (EU) is the main player trying to set higher levels of protection of privacy at the international level. Protection of privacy is also discussed in the UN Human Rights Council.

- *The Internet of Things (IoT)* refers mainly to devices connected to the Internet, such as cars, home appliances, clothes, city infrastructure, and medical and health care devices. IoT devices are often connected in wide systems, typically described as "smart houses" or "smart cities." IoT generate massive amounts of data, usually described as "big data." IoT and big data give rise to many policy challenges, such as standardization and concerns related to privacy and data protection.
- *Developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI)* have led to AI algorithms being used in devices and equipment such as smart vehicles, smart buildings, and medical robots. AI opens a wide range of policy issues, from protection of data to ethics. The question of how and/or whether to guide and regulate the future growth of AI is being addressed by governments, the private sector, and civil society worldwide.

KEY POINTS

- Internet governance covers a wide set of topics—from governance *of* the Internet (for example, technical functionality) to governance *on* the Internet (for example, ecommerce, **cybercrime**, and intellectual property).
- Given the multidisciplinary nature of the Internet, Internet governance requires active participation of governments, business, the technical community, and civil society actors.
- The Internet governance agenda is expanding to cover digital aspects of traditional policy issues dealing with security, economy, development, culture, and human rights.

NEW TOOLS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

The Internet is an everyday working tool for diplomats. They communicate via email. They use search engines to find information, social media to interact with the public, and teleconferencing to negotiate. These technologies, among others, impact how modern diplomacy performs its main functions, as outlined in Article 3 of the **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (UN 2005b): representation, protection of nationals and consular assistance, negotiations, information gathering, and promotion of friendly relations, including public diplomacy. This section surveys the impact of the Internet on core diplomatic functions as well as on the organization and professional culture of diplomatic services worldwide.

Diplomatic Representation and Digitalization

Representation, one of the oldest diplomatic functions, has not been substantively challenged by the Internet. Countries are still mainly represented through resident diplomatic missions or, in some cases, non-resident ambassadors. In the digital realm, the main forms of representation are the websites of the ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs). Currently, MFAs in 170 countries out of 193 members of the UN have official websites, the main function of which is to provide information (this is further discussed in the public diplomacy section below).

The reduction in the number of physical embassies due to budgetary cuts and/or security risks has triggered a search for alternative forms of diplomatic representation via digital means. The United States uses websites—Virtual Presence Posts—in order to improve engagement "with specific communities where the US has no physical diplomatic facilities" (US Department of State n.d.). Currently, the United States operates 40 Virtual Presence Posts, including a virtual embassy in Iran. Israel has established the virtual Israeli Embassy to members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the form of a Twitter account (@israelintheGCC), aimed at "promoting dialogue with the people of the GCC region" (Gulf News Report 2013). Twitter was used by US State Department and the Cuban Foreign Ministry to help reestablish diplomatic ties in the digital space (Twiplomacy 2016).

In 2007, the Maldives government created the first virtual embassy on the online platform Second Life), which was followed by the virtual embassies of Sweden, Estonia, the Philippines, Macedonia, and Columbia. As an early experiment in virtual reality, Second Life had limited usability for the wider Internet audience, and this resulted in the relatively limited use of virtual embassies by Israel and most other countries. However, new virtual reality platforms, such as those developed by the gaming industry, have the potential to offer MFAs new possibilities for establishing virtual embassies by—for example—developing interactive experiences that merge the phisical and the digital.

Digital Tools in Negotiations

Digital tools impact all aspects of the typical diplomatic negotiation cycle, starting from preparatory activities, via the actual negotiations, to postnegotiations implementation. The level of digitalization depends on the type of negotiations. Digitalization is most advanced in major multilateral conferences, such as the 2016 Paris Climate Change negotiations, where digital tools can help manage a complex process with many participants as well as allow the inclusive participation of civil society and a wider strata of the public. Digital tools are less frequently used in bilateral negotiations, and very rarely used in delicate state-to-state, security crisis management negotiations. Face-to-face meetings are increasingly supplemented by teleconferencing on a wide range of platforms, from dedicated teleconference rooms to low-cost and even free online interaction platforms, such as Adobe Connect, WebEx, and Google Hangouts. Saving on travel costs is one of the main reasons for the increasing use of teleconferencing tools. In addition, such platforms can be used during moments of major travel disruption, as was the case in Europe during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption.

Another major impact of the Internet on negotiations came with the availability of **wireless technology (WiFi)** in conference rooms. WiFi access has made diplomatic negotiations and meetings more inclusive and open by facilitating the participation of an increased number of non-governmental actors, including those who cannot, for financial or other reasons, physically participate in the meetings. Eparticipation is most fruitfully used in policy processes such as human rights, climate change, and Internet governance.

The use of new etools for negotiations should be approached carefully and within appropriate contexts. One of the main concerns is that online negotiations develop less rapport, trust, and cooperation than face-to-face negotiations do (Purdy, Nye, and Balakrishnan 2000). In addition, diplomacy is a profession that often requires discretion. While openness is the guiding principle of good governance, many successful diplomatic deals have been made far removed from the public eye. For example, the most recent diplomatic breakthroughs achieved through *in situ* negotiations, with very little use of technology, include the Myanmar transition, the Kosovo arrangement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the US-Cuba normalization of relations.

In sum, the use of digital tools should be influenced by the context in which negotiations are being organized. For most negotiations, digital tools should facilitate higher transparency and the involvement of the wider public. There will be always negotiations that require discretion, however, and no use of social media in the conference rooms.

Consular Diplomacy

There are three main realms of digitalization in consular diplomacy: automation of consular activities, interaction with diaspora, and crisis management. The procedural nature of many consular activities makes them suitable for digital automatization. For example, digitalization is extensively used in visa-issuing processes. Visa management includes many procedural steps, from application to rejection or issuance, that can be made much more efficient by using digital tools. Twenty-four countries have introduced some level of digitalization to the visa process (DiploFoundation 2016). Evisa services are offered by Bahrain, Cambodia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Turkey, among other countries. For internal management of the visa process, the United States uses the Consular Lookout and Support System, which contains information about foreigners involved in terrorist and criminal activities that makes them ineligible to obtain a US visa. The EU's Schengen visa system is managed digitally through the Visa Information System.

Digital tools also help consulates to deliver services to their diaspora and nationals, which can be very time and resource intensive. Consulates can automate a few steps in issuing passports, certificates, and other documents. Facebook has been a particularly effective platform for providing continuous contact with diaspora and nationals, and ensuring assistance in the case of emergency.

Major natural disasters (for example, 2010 earthquake in Chile and 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan) as well as conflicts and security crises (for example, the Libyan conflict and terrorist attacks) have involved the widespread use of digital tools for assisting nationals, coordinating relief operations, and providing humanitarian assistance. For example, India used social media to reach out to nationals scattered all over Libya during the 2011 evacuation (Thakur 2012).

Social media tools have proven to be particularly important in the first hours after a natural disaster, when there is a lack of information from traditional media and a lack of coordination from official organizations. Twitter and other text-based platforms are particularly robust in the crisis situation, since they can be operated from mobile phones requiring little processing power.

Data, Information, and Knowledge Management in Diplomacy

Data, information, and knowledge are the lifeblood of diplomacy. They inform and guide diplomatic activities. They are central to how diplomatic services are organized. And they impact the effectiveness of diplomacy. Managing data, information, and knowledge is described in Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as "ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State" (UN 2005b). Typically, this activity is performed through three phases: information gathering; diplomatic reporting and analysis; and organizing data, information, and knowledge.

Data, information, and knowledge are interrelated concepts and are often used interchangeably. However, there are important differences between them. The term "data" refers to raw and unprocessed facts, such as Country A did not sign the Cybercrime Convention. When we add additional context to data, we get "information." For example, we could create information from the fact that Country A did not sign the Cybercrime Convention by determining which other countries did, and did not, sign the Convention. "Knowledge" emerges when we get further insights, such as by looking at the reasons why countries have not signed the Cybercrime Convention. Knowledge can emerge through the interplay of using data mining and policy analysis. Data mining can help us to identify patterns and correlations from, for example, Interpol data sets on cybercrime and other crimes (revealing the relevance of cybercrime in the context of other crimes for Country A), World Bank and International Telecommunications Union data sets on Internet users (revealing the level of dependence on the Internet), and ecommerce data (revealing the importance of the stability of the Internet and cross-border exchange for the economic well-being of Country A). Experts can combine identified patterns and correlations with policy and diplomatic analyses. The outcome of the process would be to create new knowledge and insights to support diplomatic actions.[1]

Information Gathering

The first step in dealing with data, information, and knowledge is information gathering. Over the last decade, information gathering has gradually shifted from relying primarily on internal resources to information available outside of diplomatic services, mainly on the Internet. Google and other search engines help users to locate information among an estimated 60 trillion pages that exist on the Internet. In addition to Google, local search engines, such as Baidu in China and Yandex in Russia, could provide more focused access to local content.

Wikipedia is used by diplomats for both retrieving background information and obtaining just-in-time coverage of main diplomatic events and crisis situations. On Wikipedia, first hand reflections and commentaries from contributors on the spot are particularly valuable. Only a few large diplomatic services can provide information coverage of international events comparable to Wikipedia.

Blogs are another highly relevant source of information and knowledge available for diplomats. The most important blogs, written by respected and authoritative authors, can influence policy, frame discussions, and shape agendas in international negotiations. Blogs are particularly influential in specialized policy fields, such as climate change, migration, and food security. Traditional textual blogs have been evolving into "vlogs" (video logs), which provide commentaries on diplomatic developments by ministers and ambassadors. Vlogs are distributed via YouTube channels.

Social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, are important sources of diplomatic information. Social media platforms push the information to end users without the need to visit particular pages to check for new links or shared updates. On Facebook and Twitter, diplomats can retrieve a just-in-time coverage of major events. They are particularly useful in times of crisis when official information is lacking. Facebook and Twitter are also used for sharing links on professional readings.

In addition to gathering information individually by diplomats, the US Department of State established a more institutional approach by conducting real-time monitoring of social media through its Bureau of Public Affairs' Rapid Response Unit. This unit employs a team that reacts to social media developments that could affect US national interests (Hanson 2012).

Diplomatic Reporting and Analysis

After gathering information and data, the next step for diplomats is their analysis and diplomatic reporting. At this point, diplomats generate knowledge by placing information into a policy context. Typically, their analyses take the form of a diplomatic report. In the late 1990s, a shift occurred with the so-called CNN effect—real-time coverage of world events twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, all through the year.

The next change in diplomatic reporting came with the emergence of Wikipedia and social media, which further shifted the focus of diplomatic reporting from mainly providing information to the capital to providing a context for information. While most data and information are publicly available, their contextualization remains diplomats' specific function.

Data mining is used for identifying patterns and trends of relevance for diplomacy by processing data sets. As noted above, it is often labeled as big data. A recent report by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2016) recommends the establishment of a position of a Data Director and data-mining of both that office's internal data and open data available online.

Textual data are highly relevant for diplomacy. Diplomats often have to deal with a wide range of unstructured data. Text mining offers new possibilities in identifying trends and patterns from a vast amount of unstructured textual data contained in international treaties, diplomatic correspondence, reports, and media articles, among other sources.

Organizing Data, Information, and Knowledge

After gathering information, analyzing, and diplomatic reporting, the next challenge for diplomatic services is to preserve, organize, and make accessible vast amounts of data, information, and knowledge. Digitization of diplomatic archives began in the 1990s with the introduction of databases and document management systems. The next major shift happened in the 2000s, when diplomatic services started using social media and open-source platforms for internal information management solutions. For example, inspired by Wikipedia, the US Department of State established Diplopedia, which has become a valuable resource for sharing knowledge and information within the department.

Public Diplomacy and the Internet

The Internet, and especially social media tools, have influenced communication between diplomatic services and the public both at home and abroad. MFA websites are the workhorse of digital public diplomacy. These sites have evolved from an innovative feature in the 1990s to a mainstream tool of public diplomacy used by 170 MFAs and 3,000 diplomatic and consular missions worldwide.

On most MFA websites, it is possible to find basic foreign policy instruments, press releases, and a "who's who" in the MFA. More advanced websites have frequently updated travel information for nationals and information for foreigners visiting the country. Further sophistication is provided by more interactive communication through integration with social media tools such as blogs, Twitter, and Facebook.

The social media wave, which started in the mid-2000s, triggered major developments in the relationship between the Internet and public diplomacy by providing access to a wider audience and enabling more efficient content creation and richer interaction with the public. The informative power of social media is illustrated by a Pew Research Center (2016) study showing that forty-four percent of US adults get news on the American presidential election via social media. A survey of digital diplomacy by the DiploFoundation (2016) identifies eight main channels that are used in public diplomacy: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Flickr, Instagram, Google+, and blogs. Table 8.2 contains the results of this survey on the use of social media channels by MFAs.

Twitter is the most popular social media platform for public diplomacy, being used by114 MFAs. It has a wide range of uses in public diplomacy, starting from

Table 8.2 Survey of the Use of Social Media Platforms by MFAs

SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM	NUMBER OF MFAs
Twitter	114
Facebook	89
YouTube	75
Flickr	47
LinkedIn	44
Instagram	15
Blogs	9
Google+	8

Source: DiploFoundation (2016).

introducing policy positions to sounding the opinions of the community. The United Kingdom leads the "twiplomacy" list, with 305 diplomatic missions and heads of missions on Twitter, followed by Canada with 227 accounts and the United States with 213 accounts. Russia's mission to NATO and the US Embassy in China have the highest number of Twitter followers (660,000 and 500,000, respectively).

Facebook has evolved from a platform to connect with friends and share personal info (photos, music, and readings) toward a platform that is increasingly used for professional communication. With over 1.6 billion monthly active users, Facebook is one of the key emediums for public diplomacy. In addition to its central use by 89 MFAs, Facebook has been a particularly successful channel for embassies and consulates. For example, the US Embassy in Pakistan has more than 2.7 million followers.

The use of social media in diplomacy reflects technological developments. The United Kingdom and the United States are using all eight main social media platforms for public diplomacy (see table 8.3). On the other side of the spectrum are the MFAs of 102 countries that do not use any social media platform for public diplomacy. This digital diplomacy divide should be addressed in order to ensure a more inclusive global policy space. Some countries, like Kazakhstan and Ukraine, managed to leapfrog into digital diplomacy. Small and developing countries, with the help of the international community, should look for technical and organizational solutions to accelerate development of their digital diplomacy capacities.

Organizational Support and Professional Culture

Digital diplomacy requires solid organizational and financial support. Most social media have a low entry point: In less than one day, an average Internet user can set up an account and learn how to use the platform. Yet social media has a high functional point: The effective use of social media for public diplomacy takes resources and, more importantly, diplomats' time.

A 2011 report by the US Department of State on the use of social media drew a number of conclusions, including the following: social media was useful but labor intensive; those who assigned time to social media succeeded in building up a large and interactive audience, primarily of young people, who were the target group; officers needed more training in the use of social media; all sections of the missions should be more involved; and more content should be in local languages (US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 2011). The report recommended the provision of further guidance for staff, an essential element of any foreign ministry's social media strategy.

The Internet is also an agent for organizational change (Hocking 2016). In particular, the success of digital diplomacy projects is affected by four elements of the diplomatic organizational and professional culture: hierarchy, secrecy, and risk-averseness.

Hierarchy is a core principle within diplomatic services. Most ICT/Internet tools that have been introduced into diplomatic services—for example, sharing of information and automation of work processes—faced hierarchy as an important limitation. This challenge became even more apparent with the emergence of social media (blogs, wikis, Twitter, Facebook, and other tools), which introduce the

Table 8.3 **Top 8 diplomatic services: Use of social media channels**

	FACEBOOK	TWITTER	YOUTUBE	LINKEDIN	FLICKR	INSTAGRAM	GOOGLE+	BLOGS	TOTAL
United States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	8
United Kingdom	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	8
Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	7
Austria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	6
France	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	6
Israel	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	6
Kazakhstan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	6
Ukraine	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	6

Source: DiploFoundation (2016).

networked organization and further flatten the hierarchical distribution of information. Diplomatic services, however, have started to adjust their emphasis on hierarchy. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2016) report proposes several measures in this direction: reducing the number of hierarchical layers from eleven to four, introducing campaign- and project-based structures, and strengthening the role of heads of missions in relation to headquarters.

Secrecy has always been one of the core characteristics of diplomacy (Murray 2016), and it was particularly important during the Cold War. Diplomats were on the front line of battle between the United States and the Soviet Union and their satellites. Secrecy influenced the way diplomacy was conducted and the way diplomatic services were organized. The need-to-know principle was the basis of information management. According to this principle, diplomats had access only to information of direct relevance and concern for them. Other information was not shared within the diplomatic service. This approach is exactly the opposite to the principle of sharing information facilitated by the introduction of the Internet and ICT.

The lower pressure on secrecy after the end of the Cold War, combined with the growth of the Internet, created more relaxed access to information in diplomatic services worldwide. In the United States, the previously restrictive need-to-know principle was replaced by the need-to-share principle, which allowed access to specific information to a wider group of professionals. After the WikiLeaks release of diplomatic cables, however, the pendulum started swinging back toward more secrecy in the handling of diplomatic documents and communication. Immediate reaction of some diplomatic services was to regulate or even block the use of some Internet services such as Twitter, Facebook and Skype.

Hillary Clinton's use of her private email for official purposes, when she was President Obama's secretary of state, vividly illustrates the challenge that confronts many diplomatic services. In addition to security risks, this incident opens the question of the dual use of digital tools as private and official means of communication, in particular when these two realms interplay, as is often the case in diplomacy. Use of email and Facebook poses the main challenge in striking the right balance between private and official communication. For example, diplomats have to adjust to the evolution of Facebook from initially a space mainly for private exchange into a platform for official communication, with the presence of governments and international organizations.

The risk-averse diplomatic culture was indicated as a key digital diplomacy limitation by the report of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2014). Technology often brings risks. Diplomats tend to be among the late adopters of new technology partly because of to their risk-averse professional culture.

KEY POINTS

- The use of the Internet and computers in conference rooms significantly influences how international meetings are conducted.
- The Internet has significantly influenced four organizational principles for diplomatic services: hierarchy, secrecy, and a risk-averse culture.
- The Internet has changed the management of data, information, and knowledge in diplomatic services. From relying predominantly on internal

information gathered by diplomats, diplomatic services now increasingly rely on external information available on the Internet (for example, Wikipedia and blogs). Data mining and AI open up new possibilities for analysis and decision making in diplomatic services.

- The Internet has replaced traditional one-way public diplomacy communication—from diplomats to publics—to an apparent greater two-way interaction—between diplomatic services and publics.

CONCLUSION

Change and continuity are two key elements that characterize the impact of the Internet on diplomacy. Change has been triggered by the way that the Internet has influenced information and communication, the two cornerstones of diplomacy. The Internet has changed the environment in which diplomacy operates, and it has affected both the nature of power (increasing the relevance of soft power) and the distribution of power (creating new centers of power such as Silicon Valley, where new industries reside). The diplomatic agenda has been expanded to include new topics, such as Internet governance, cybersecurity, and the application of human rights to the Internet, among others. Lastly, the Internet has introduced new diplomatic tools, which so far have been used mainly in consular affairs and public diplomacy.

The Internet has also changed the way that diplomacy is organized and conducted. It empowers a range of new actors who can influence diplomacy, is changing how information and knowledge are managed in diplomatic services, and is altering how diplomatic services communicate with both domestic and foreign publics. Intriguingly, however, the core diplomatic functions remain largely the same despite technological changes. Diplomacy continues to be the main method for solving conflicts peacefully. The challenge of reaching a compromise remains as relevant as ever. The Internet has not affected the relevance of empathy, engagement, and the need for discretion in certain diplomatic negotiations.

The demand for diplomacy as a method of solving conflicts through negotiations and compromise is likely to increase due to the growing Internet-driven economic and political interdependence of the modern world. In this context, diplomacy has proven to be a more effective means to solve conflicts than, for example, the use of military power. The future of diplomacy will be shaped by the interplay between technology-driven changes and the continuity of the core functions of diplomacy.

QUESTIONS

1. What is a “defining technology”?
2. How did the telegraph influence the role of diplomats?
3. Why does the Internet substantially influence diplomacy?
4. How is sovereignty and governmental control limited (and/or strengthened) through new digital technology and the Internet?
5. What is the main paradox for diplomats with regard to state sovereignty?

6. How does the Internet affect societies, and how does it shape interdependence between states?
7. What are the main Internet governance issues featured on diplomatic agendas?
8. What are the main Internet tools used in international meetings and negotiations?
9. How does the use of computers and the Internet influence the hierarchical organization of diplomatic services?
10. What are the main uses of social media tools in public diplomacy?
11. What are the implications in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understanding of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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NOTE

1. Another example that highlights the differences between data, information, and knowledge is the following: The UN General Assembly Voting Record contains a lot of raw and unconnected data, such as number of resolution and country name. Information appears when data are put together in the form that can have semantic meaning—for example, that Country X voted for UN Resolution Y. Information evolves into knowledge when voting patterns are identified. Voting patterns can indicate country groupings as well as emerging or disappearing alliances, and diplomats can analyze these patterns and correlations. The outcome of the process would be to create new knowledge and insights to support their diplomatic actions.

CHAPTER 9

Consular Diplomacy

Halvard Leira and Iver B. Neumann

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Definitional issues
- Emergence and development of consular tasks and offices
- The consul and the diplomat
- The consul today
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

Consul-like offices have emerged in different countries and at different times in world history as a response to the challenges presented, by long-distance travel and trade, to citizens of one locality traveling and trading elsewhere. Although consuls, or the persons who serve in these offices, carry out important functions in the international system—primarily protecting one's nationals and commercial interests in foreign lands—they are poorly understood and often relegated to subordinate status in the diplomatic hierarchy. First, this chapter argues that we should focus on consular offices and tasks as they have actually existed, rather than looking at them through a diplomacy lens. The diplomat handles overall differences between groups. The consul, however, handles the practical measures that facilitate commercial and social interactions between strangers. Second, the chapter argues that this functional interaction does not depend on the existence of sovereign states or an international state system but, rather, on the existence of economic activities that involve members of more than one particular group or polity. This difference between the consul and the diplomat is likely to increase in a globalizing world.

INTRODUCTION

Consuls and their equivalents have handled issues of trade, law, and politics for millennia, but in a more routine and less spectacular manner than diplomats, who have generally dealt in "high politics"—treaties, intrigues, war, and peace. The consul has not depended on the existence of a network of polities with reciprocal relations among themselves; on the contrary, consuls have often emerged where diplomatic relations for some reason or other have been impossible or simply unthinkable. Diplomats are always sent from one **polity** and received in another; they follow and are accredited to the sovereign or government of a receiving polity and, thus, are to be found in recognized capital cities or with governments in exile. Consuls, on the other hand, follow trade and people and, in principle, can be found anywhere. And historically, they have often existed without an explicit sending polity.

Intellectual interest in consuls has peaked when their tasks have been in flux and the room for innovation is greatest. The growing interest in consular tasks and affairs among practitioners and academics alike in recent decades must necessarily be understood in light of the challenges that **globalization** presents to principles of state sovereignty, in response to which consuls seem to be more favorably positioned than many diplomats. Still, it is hard to conceptualize consuls outside of the framework of diplomacy, and even our attempt at giving them their due is colored by the inevitable comparisons. In this chapter, we begin with a detailed historical presentation, including the **Vienna Convention on Consular Relations** (1963). We then contrast consuls and diplomats, and we conclude with an overview of the increasingly lively current debate about consular work.

KEY POINTS

- The consul is commonly understood as a sideshow to the diplomat, but as an institution, the consul has performed a host of different tasks and has had a varied history. Consular tasks are not the same as diplomacy.
- Interest in consular tasks tends to peak during periods of perceived change in the international system.
- Being more adaptable and less tied to the sovereignty principle than diplomats, consuls might be better positioned to handle future challenges.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

The logic of state **sovereignty**, and in particular the gradual application of territorial law from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries, changed the workings of consuls in ways that make it hard to grasp pre-sovereign consular activities. The fusing of the consular services with diplomatic services and ministries of foreign affairs over the last 100 years has, in the eyes of most, subordinated the consul to the diplomat. This is an understandable but ahistorical reading.

As late as 1957, when doing preparatory work for the codification of consular relations in international law, the special rapporteur of the International Law Commission, Jaroslav Zourek (1957: 81), lamented that a "complete lack of uniformity is to be noted in the generic appellations of consular representatives abroad." And even after the establishment of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963 (discussed in detail later), no less an authority on diplomacy than Satow's *A guide to diplomatic practice* (1979: 211) flatly stated that "there can be no precise and at the same time universally acceptable definition of the term." On the one hand, people with the title of consul have dealt with a staggeringly wide variety of tasks; on the other, people without such a title have engaged in activities that would be easily recognizable as consular. We have chosen to look beyond the strictly technical meaning of the term, so as to enable a discussion of instances outside the historical and geographic core of consular activity, an investigation that will in turn cast light on the consul itself. At a minimum, the historically amorphous group under study here (consuls) represents the interests of persons in one way or another foreign to those of the receiving country, or polity, and their functions are in some way related to commerce. As we discuss in the conclusion, even this definition might prove too narrow in the near future, as consular functions are again in the process of changing. (Note that our definition requires a receiving, or host, polity, but that a sending polity is not necessary.)

KEY POINTS

- It is virtually impossible to provide a comprehensive and precise definition of consuls and consular offices.
- A workable definition must at minimum include functions related to commerce.

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSULAR TASKS AND OFFICES

The very first examples of consul-like offices can be found in the first millennium BC. At that time, there were "special judges for foreigners among some of the peoples of India" (Zourek 1957: 73). Several Greek institutions warrant attention. **Proxenia** (see box 9-1) marked an extension of the guest-friendships (*xenia*) of individuals to communities or their representatives. The *proxenos* was a citizen of the host (or receiving) polity who was most often appointed by the polity that he represented. Given the lack of a legal framework for non-citizens, the *proxenos* acted as legal representative of the foreigners he represented, as well as serving as a commercial agent. He could also be used as a messenger and as a gatherer of intelligence. *Prostatai* acted as intermediaries between the *polis* and foreigners living in it and were chosen by the foreigners themselves (see box 9-1).

The Roman *praetor peregrinus* was a state official who was in charge of settling cases between citizens and *peregrines* (foreigners or pilgrims), as well as between *peregrines*, by adjudicating according to the appropriate law. The *prostatai* and the *praetor peregrinus* are often considered precursors to later instances of **extraterritorial jurisdiction** associated with consuls. It should be noted, however, that the very concept of extraterritoriality would have made little sense at the time, as no clear concept of territorial sovereignty existed then. Rather, the principle of the **personality of laws** applied (see box 9-1). What law applied to a case was determined by the status of the subject(s) in question, not by the territory on which they happened to reside (S. S. Liu 1925). This principle is essential for understanding the development of the consul well into the modern age, as the judicial competencies of the consuls rested on it.

The title of consul—itself a relic of republican Rome, where the consul was the highest elected office—was first applied to a number of different trade-related activities in the western Mediterranean (J. Ulbert 2006). Gradually, the two meanings of leader and trader merged, and consul became the title applied to the leader and magistrate of a colony of compatriots in a foreign polity. According to Jörg Ulbert (2006: 12), the first such usage of the term hails from the year 1117.

BOX 9-1

Some Terms Associated with Consular Diplomacy

Alderman: A consul-like head of the establishments of the Hanseatic League.
Career consul: A consul who is part of a foreign service and is a citizen of the sending state.
Consular corps: The body of consular officers resident in one city.
Consular immunity: Immunity related to the consular office, covering the physical office, consular correspondence, and acts committed as a consular officer.
Consulate: A diplomatic office, subordinate to an embassy, established in an important city, usually other than the capital city, of another state. A consulate's primary purpose is to provide services to its citizens traveling or residing there and to promote bilateral trade between the two states. It is headed by a **consul**. A **consulate-general** is the term used in a larger city, such as New York City, Shanghai, or Sao Paulo. A consulate-general is headed by a **consul general**.
Diplomatic corps: The body of all diplomats resident in one capital or accredited to an international organization.
Honorary consul: A consul who resides permanently in the receiving state; can be of any nationality.
Personality of laws: The principle that law follows the person, according to place of birth or tie of allegiance, rather than the territory of residence.
Praetor peregrinus: Ancient Roman office in charge of adjudication between citizens and non-citizens.
Prostatai: Ancient Greek office that acted as the intermediary between the polity and groups of non-citizens living within it.
Proxenia: Ancient Greek office, with clear similarities to current consular offices, concerned with enabling trade between polities.
Shabandar: Consul-like office in Malacca during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Telonarii: Judges in Germanic Spain who settled cases according to the law of the sea.
Territorial law: The principle that jurisdiction follows territory; closely tied to the principle of sovereignty.
Wakil al-tujjar: Arabic office closely resembling the early consuls from the eleventh and twelfth centuries onward.

Practice predated theory. The colonies of foreigners in Constantinople had their own special magistrates from at least the ninth and tenth centuries. Of more lasting importance, Italian port cities made treaties with both the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim rulers of the eastern Mediterranean. From the twelfth century onward, these magistrates were known as consuls, the title being imported from the western Mediterranean. The sending polities usually elected the first consuls, but as the colonies of expatriates grew, they would tend to elect their own consuls.

The European consuls of the eastern Mediterranean were gradually granted both criminal and civil jurisdiction over their compatriots and, ultimately, jurisdiction also in cases where compatriots were involved in regular civil and criminal cases in the receiving polity. In the final centuries of the Ottoman Empire, consuls became virtually independent of local authorities. The practice of granting internal jurisdiction to groups of foreign merchants can be found in Asian sources at least from the eighth century onward. In addition, in the Muslim world, the office of *wakil al-tujjar*, in existence since at least the twelfth century (see box 9-1), was quite similar to the consular office as it developed in the western Mediterranean. To the Muslim polities, the early consuls were useful in keeping the peace and settling disputes inside the trading communities. From a Muslim perspective, the privileges were granted unilaterally, however, and could be revoked at any time (see box 9-2).

BOX 9-2

Capitulations (Ottoman-European, Seventeenth Century)

The Ottoman Turks considered the sending of envoys to be a mark of submission. Consequently, they followed the Islamic practice vis-à-vis tribute entities called *amān* when establishing peaceful relations not only with Islamic polities like Persia but also with European states. Translated roughly as “safety” or “security,” *amān* meant that you were under somebody’s protection. If the initial contacts went well, the next step for the Porte, as the Ottomans were often referred to, was to grant an *ahdname* (from the Arabic *ahd*, “treaty,” and the Persian *name*, “writ”). Translated into English as “capitulations” (from the Latin *Capitula*, “chapter heading”) or “covenant-letters,” *ahdname* were granted to merchants for a year at a time by the sultans, who saw them as acts of condescension , and gave merchants the right to trade without having to pay taxes. These concessions were seen by European trading states as treaties but by the Muslim rulers as edicts. Muslim sovereigns in North Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and elsewhere granted these capitulations to facilitate trade. Note that rights could also be granted, as when, in the 1660s, the head of the Ottoman Turks, the Sublime Porte, issued an order that stated “the consul could not be arrested for interrogation, imprisoned, or dismissed from office; his house could not be searched or sealed up; his clothing, victuals, and other domestic supplies could be imported free of duties; lawsuits in which he was involved had to go straight to the supreme court” (S. P. Anderson 1989: 95). Capitulations were often rescinded in times of war, which made for complications: Western powers tended to understand this as persecution of consuls, whereas to the Muslim rulers, it was simply a question of taking back privileges that had been unilaterally granted.

Extensive long-distance trade requires mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and information deficits, and consular offices provide just that. We find relatively similar institutions also outside of the Mediterranean, like the shabandar in Malacca in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries or the **aldermen** of the Hanseatic League in northern Europe from the thirteenth century onward (see box 9-1).

The autonomy of the consul, acting as the *primus inter pares* (first among equals) and judicial head of a community of merchants, came under pressure from both sending and receiving polities as states grew stronger in the seventeenth century. With a growing interest in their populations more generally in the sending states, consuls were given an increased responsibility for, and control over, compatriots in foreign ports and clearer responsibilities for the general interest of the polity. Consuls were also increasingly tasked with gathering all sorts of political and mercantile intelligence. Finally, consular positions were attractive as positions of patronage as well.

The consul's emerging role as servant of the sovereign state became clearer with the publication of the first actual consular regulations, issued by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, France's secretary of state of the navy, in 1681. These regulations were soon followed by the first official instructions to French consuls in 1690. The networks of consuls also grew, fueled mainly by war and the expansion of long-distance and bulk trade. New markets were opened, and **mercantilist** states were increasingly willing to support the promotion and expansion of their own citizens' trade. In states where there had been no tradition of consuls, consular and diplomatic representation was intermingled in the early years. And even where the consular and diplomatic functions were formally separated, as in Sweden, there often was no corresponding separation in representation until the middle of the eighteenth century (Müller 2004). As the rule of law was expanded to include consuls in foreign ports, a distinction was established between what anachronistically could be called "career consuls" (citizens of the sending polity dispatched by and from that polity) and "honorary consuls" (citizens of any polity but usually of the receiving one). In the latter case, consular offices tended to become semi-hereditary and markers of status in the ports of the receiving polity.

Sending states tried to increase control over their subjects abroad through codifying the judicial powers of the consuls. Receiving states correspondingly tried to rein in that very same power to ensure their territorial sovereignty. Accordingly, during the seventeenth century, consuls lost many of the **immunities and privileges** they had enjoyed until then, and opinion against them generally grew more hostile. Nevertheless, in many instances, they retained legal power over their own compatriots in the receiving state well into the nineteenth century. The move from the principle of the personality of the law (where the law followed the person, regardless of territory) to **territorial law** (associated with the sovereign state) was gradual and uneven (see box 9-1).

As the consul's judicial functions declined in importance during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, consuls were, in principle, supposed to take care of the commercial interests of the sending state and its merchants. Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule were relatively common. The most systematic exception can be found in the "Barbary States" (roughly present-day Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), where the consuls were considered to be more similar to diplomats than the run-of-the-mill consul elsewhere. These consuls were dealing not only with political issues but also with the aid and attempted buy-back of many enslaved Europeans. These representatives could not be given the title of ambassador, given that the Barbary States were formally **vassals** of the Ottoman Empire and, therefore, not authorized to appoint or receive diplomats. That was the prerogative of courts considered to be fully sovereign. A roughly parallel situation could be found in the many nineteenth-century European capitals of **suzerain** political entities, like Belgrade, Bucharest, and Christiania. Similarly, when the expanding colonial empires desired to bestow some title on the explorers who were expanding colonial possessions, a consular one was often applied. In short, where diplomatic representation could not be established, consular representation was given political content.

These exceptions aside, the nineteenth century also saw the first establishment of actual "consular services," dedicated to the promotion of trade and the protection of the interests of compatriots abroad (Platt 1971). In many areas of the world, these compatriots were first and foremost the sailors of merchant navies, but with increasing mass migration to the Americas and Australia, consuls were also involved with a number of other compatriots. Dealing with sailors typically included adjudicating conflicts between crew and captains and helping shipwrecked crews, but at least one Norwegian consul in Hamburg also saw it as his task to send a high proportion of sailors' salaries home to wives before he released them to the temptations of the city. Migration, on the other hand, had one major consequence—never-ending cases of inheritance.

The actual level and form of organization differed greatly both between the states and related to where the consuls would be placed. The consuls to China and North Africa, for example, generally held higher status and received a higher salary than consuls to less remote places. Paradoxically, in a century when many diplomatic services and ministries of foreign affairs were contracting in size, the consular services were growing very rapidly. This was largely a result of the increasing mobility of people and goods, but the liberal ideology of the time also mattered. To many liberals in the American revolutionary tradition, and to the Manchester liberals of England, diplomacy equaled nobility equaled war, whereas consuls equaled merchants equaled peace. When states such as the United States and Norway gained independence, both with substantial trade and shipping, strong liberal traditions, but no prior experience of having their own diplomacy, consular services were the preferred tools for interaction with the world.

For the consul, the twentieth century was marked by greater standardization, in particular through the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Like its more well-known twin, the **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (1961), it was the result of deliberations initiated within the United Nations. The work on diplomatic intercourse could draw on earlier codifications of diplomacy at the congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle (in 1815 and 1818, respectively). The work on consular intercourse, on the other hand, also included a substantial discussion about its history and the varied sources of law associated with it. For example, British consuls in 1825, roughly the time when diplomatic procedures were first being codified, were still seen as no more than "a group of individual state servants overseas, whose only common denominator was the name of consul" (Platt 1971: 13), and the International Law Commission thus had to establish a baseline of common understanding before any legal articles could be drafted.

As was to be expected given the relative status of diplomats and consuls, much of the work on the consular convention, particularly regarding nomenclature, was derived from the Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The rights it ascribes to consuls and honorary consuls shadow diplomatic rights, but they are not as extensive. The receiving state does not have the right to enter a **consulate** (or **consulate general)** or to interfere with its communications to and from the sending state. Consuls have "consular immunity," which means that, unlike diplomats, they are immune only against those acts they have executed as part of their job as consuls. They may be tried in court cases and called as witnesses in other cases. Furthermore, unlike **diplomatic immunity**, consular immunity does not extend to family members. If the receiving state considers a consul to have misbehaved, he or she may be declared unwanted (*persona non grata*) and expelled from the country. The convention's seventy-nine articles give a comprehensive overview of what consular work entails today (for the full text, see United Nations 2005a).

In addition to the standardization provided by the Convention on Consular Relations, the subordination of consular activities to diplomacy was formalized still further through the fusion of consular services, diplomatic services, and ministries of foreign affairs into unitary foreign services. The drivers in this process seem to have been a desire for coherence abroad, with commercial affairs and citizen protection being incorporated more fully in the foreign policy portfolio. Thus, the distinctiveness of professional consular services was lost, as the consulates that were staffed from home became filled with trained diplomats. Although many foreign services underwent reforms aimed at increasing the consular component of diplomacy, consular posts would tend to be viewed with disdain by career-minded diplomats. The functions of consuls were also gradually changing. The reduction of manpower needed onboard most ships reduced the need for consuls in the ports of the world. And improvements in global communications made the consuls less important as information gatherers but increased their judicial workload, for example, where matters of custody are concerned.

KEY POINTS

- Consuls, under that name, emerged in the Mediterranean in the first centuries of the second millennium.
- Consul-like offices have emerged in connection with long-distance trade in a number of places.
- Consuls have helped reduce transaction costs and information deficits.
- Until the establishment of territorial jurisdiction from the seventeenth century onward, a key consular function was meting out justice within a community of merchants.
- With the gradual expansion and adoption of the sovereignty principle, consuls increasingly dealt with issues of trade but, overall, had a very varied set of functions.

- Unlike diplomacy, there was no common, preestablished understanding of what consuls were when consular relations were to be codified.
- In the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, consuls are given rights akin to those of diplomats but tied to the office, not the holder and his or her family.

THE CONSUL AND THE DIPLOMAT

Being in many ways less spectacular than diplomats, there have never been any guides for action written specifically for consuls, like the works of François de Callières or Ernest Satow. This is not to say that consular activities have passed unnoticed, but writers have had a hard time figuring out the character of the consuls and their activities. In his work on the functions of ambassadors published in 1681, Abraham de Wicquefort, a diplomat himself and writer of one of the most influential manuals for diplomats, treated the consuls as "but merchants" and denied them extraterritorial rights, although they were still allowed to adjudicate between their compatriots. Cornelius van Bynkershoek, an eighteenth-century legal theorist best known for his work on the law of the seas and public law, followed Wicquefort, and their statements had a major influence on later court decisions. The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were a low tide for consular status, in international law treatises as well as in the known instances of case law. A change, however, followed with Emerich de Vattel, one of the key eighteenth-century theorists of international law, who argued that since the consuls were appointed by a sovereign and accepted in that capacity by another sovereign, they were to some extent protected by international law. Over the course of the next two centuries, this position became codified in case law as well as in treaties and conventions and, finally, in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Even if the juridical status of consuls was gradually established, writers still had difficulty pinning down their function and tended to view consuls through a diplomacy lens. Works on diplomacy treat consuls in one of three ways. The first is not to mention them at all—M. S. Anderson's (1993) celebrated account is a key example of this. The second way is to see them as precursors of diplomacy. Garrett Mattingly's (1955) standard account of early modern diplomacy is an example of this view: He mentions the Italian consuls in the Levant as one of the main precursors of resident embassies and, thus, of diplomacy as such. A third approach is to see the diplomat and the consul as evolving in close parallel, but with the consul clearly subordinate. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne (2011) exemplify this approach. Given their perceived status as the diplomats' sidekick, consuls are also largely omitted from national histories of foreign affairs. When mentioned, attention is paid to one's national consuls overseas, not to foreign consuls residing on the polity's own soil.

While reading the history backward creates a picture of the consul as the diplomat's neglected subordinate, who is gradually integrated into a diplomacy-oriented national foreign service, reading the history of the consul forward creates a more nuanced picture. Our argument is that logically, consul-like offices are not necessarily dependent on the existence of sovereign states or on an international state system. The precondition for their emergence is not any particular form of polity but simply the existence of economic activities that involve members of more than one particular group or polity. Thus, the history of the consul, narrowly conceived, should be interpreted separately from the history of the diplomat, the exception being modern career consuls, who are usually diplomats who happen to spend time at a consular post.

Whereas the diplomat handles overall differences between groups through their representatives, the consul handles the practical measures that facilitate commercial and social interactions between strangers (cf. Sharp 2009: 10). Diplomats interact over time and build up an entire **diplomatic culture**. Consuls, whose interaction is more intermittent, do not. When certain consuls in certain places at certain times have, indeed, been engaged in mediating cases of **estrangement,** or alienation, as were the Western consuls to the Barbary States, this happened in an ad hoc manner, and it did not lead to the same degree of institutionalization as in the case of the **diplomatic corps**—that is, the body of all diplomats resident at one court and, later, also in one international organization. **Consular corps** exist as well, but their history is newer and their interaction not so dense (see box 9-1). When cultural differences were great, one can assume that consuls were key negotiators in making foreign practices intelligible for the sending polity. Still, when local merchants became consul for a foreign state with which they traded extensively, they usually retained their own culture, albeit with special knowledge of a different culture. Merchants who settled permanently in foreign countries, or career consuls who spent their entire career in one post, may be said to have become "bicultural." In either case, these cultural skills did not include mastery of an extensive and generalized set of models for how things ought to be done that added up to a specific way of "being-in-the-world" that would be instantly recognizable by other consuls. To date, no such thing as a consular culture exists, unlike, as just mentioned, a diplomatic culture, as identified by several writers (for example, Bull 2002; Der Derian 1996; Neumann 2010; Wiseman 2005). Consuls do not mediate in cases of estrangement beyond what is needed to be done in order to clinch the deal at hand; they have not been engaged in overcoming systemic alienation. Estrangement, however, has rarely prevented trade. And when considering the wide variety of tasks in which consuls have been engaged, their overall approach could better be summarized as the mediation of distance, particularly geographic distance, but also social and cultural distance as well as that created by practical complications. Whereas diplomatic activity tends to be more important for the messages it sends than for what it actually does, what consuls do is often an end in itself.

Although consuls may arguably have a longer history than diplomats—the functions described elsewhere in this book (see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume) pertaining to Amarna and ancient Greek interactions thousands of years ago are more reminiscent of consular than of diplomatic functions—consuls have, indeed, been seen as the poor cousins of ambassadors and ministers. Small wonder that one of the key works on consuls, D. C. M. Platt's (1971) study of the British consuls, carries the title *The Cinderella Service*. Nevertheless, consuls in many ways transcend diplomacy. Consular offices were established well before diplomatic services, and so their history cannot be reduced to the history of the diplomat. The multifaceted, ever-changing, and multiple functions of consuls—incorporating at various times extraterritorial jurisdiction, political intrigue in autonomous provinces, and support services for privateering—undermine the once prevalent understanding of a distinct separation between domestic and foreign policy that allegedly stemmed from the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. It is this quality of being both inside and outside, but not dependent on sovereignty, that has led to renewed scholarly interest in consuls over the last decades

KEY POINTS

- Consuls have been poorly understood in the literature on international law and diplomacy.
- Consuls, unlike diplomats, are not dependent on sovereign states and a state system.
- There is no consular culture; the activities of consuls are functional rather than cultural.

THE CONSUL TODAY

Overall, consular activities have long been in a process of change from being mainly focused on commerce to being mainly concerned with citizen's services, although consuls are still engaged in the promotion of trade and the provision of commercially relevant information. As new centers of manufacture and trade emerge, states, particular small and medium-sized ones, continue to use consuls as a cost-efficient way of promoting trade and investment, while larger states rely more on trade attachés, delegations, and direct bilateral contacts. All states nevertheless rely on consuls in emerging regional hubs that are far from the capitals where embassies are located (Stringer 2011).

Increasingly, however, consuls have also been charged with tasks of a more legal or juridical nature, as the demand for citizen services has exploded. Several trends have contributed to this, chief among them being the increased mobility of people and the continuing belief (at least in the Western world) that the state has a responsibility for its citizens abroad (see Hocking, chapter 7 in this volume). Ever-increasing mass tourism and travel implies that regular consular assistance (like providing safe-travel advisories and reissuing passports) takes more and more time. The growth is not only in number of tourists, however but also in number of countries sending tourists, and in many of the "newer" sending-countries, providing adequate consular service has become a source of legitimacy. In addition to tourists, permanent or semi-permanent migration also fuels the need for consular services. This is so not only for diasporas, leading, for instance, to the opening of some 50 Mexican consulates in the United States (Hernández Joseph 2012), but also for the many expatriate communities of retirees from northern climates settling in countries such as Spain and Thailand.

More and more, ministries of foreign affairs have to guide and aid their own citizens before travel, such as through issuing travel advice, urging travelers to register their trips, and encouraging realistic expectations. During travel, lost passports, petty crime, and accidents might require attention, and even after travelers have returned home, they might still need help with getting matters sorted out. Apart from these relatively mundane chores, the consular services also have to prepare for the very real possibility of mass evacuations following natural disasters, political turmoil, or war (see box 9-3). Consular stations and honorary consuls are also often the most visible "face" of a country abroad, handling visa applications, educational and cultural exchanges, promotion of tourism, and a number of other **public diplomacy** issues. Consulates of popular destination-countries can receive hundreds, if not thousands, of visa application every day. Serious crimes, also lead to the growing need for consular assistance. Child abduction, forced marriages, sex tourism, and human trafficking are examples of this, as is the steadily growing number of foreigners in the world's prisons. When criminal cases involving countrymen in foreign states gain media attention, consular officers can end up spending months, or even years, dealing with them. These trends, combined with ever-increasing media attention, have led to a partial breakdown of the boundary between consular and diplomatic tasks (Okano-Heijmans 2011a). This boundary is also blurred by the persistence of consulates carrying out activities that come close to traditional diplomacy, for instance, in capitals of autonomous regions; these tasks can range from the opening of art exhibitions to cooperation with local authorities on combatting discrimination.

BOX 9-3

The Floodlight of Modern Consular Problems

The earliest meaning of the word "nation" is a group of people hailing from the same place but living somewhere else. It could be a group of students, or it could be a group of merchants.

Among the consular functions, taking care of compatriots has always loomed large, but it has taken different forms, depending, among other things, on who those compatriots were. In the nineteenth century, they were usually merchants, sailors, and travelers of independent means. With the explosion in the number of travelers and the introduction of the passport in the late nineteenth century, taking care of stranded emigrants and travelers took up more time. With the introduction of mass tourism in the 1960s, followed by the phenomenon of globalization, the number of people to take care of increased exponentially. Annual international tourist arrivals alone have grown from around 25 million in 1950 to around almost 1.2 billion in 2015. And to this phenomenon must be added that of a growing awareness about rights, which means that people who are out traveling and have a problem increasingly demand that consuls should help them. There are expatriates, and even locals, who phone the British consular service to have the recipe for Christmas pudding, but then there are those in serious trouble: people who have had spouses crossing borders with their common offspring, people who have been arrested and do not understand either the legal situation they have landed in or the language in which it is being conducted, journalists who are being abducted by armed groups. Such cases invariably lead to media attention; the premise of a countryman in trouble abroad can fuel nationalism—and certainly sell newspapers.

A number of northern European services were awakened to the enormity of this task during Christmas 2004, when tsunamis hit areas of mass tourism in, among other places, Thailand and Indonesia. The ensuing deaths and chaos quickly proved consular capacity inadequate. More than 2,000 tourists perished, with Sweden and Germany losing more than 500 each. More important, a much higher number of people were initially reported missing, and even higher numbers were left completely stranded. The Scandinavian countries alone had an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 tourists in the affected area. As the crisis subsided, various public inquiries asked the question of what it meant to run a consular service under conditions of globalization. What may a traveler reasonably expect in terms of services, and what should be left to other social institutions, such as insurance companies, travel operators, and police forces? Such debates are about to transform the face of the world's consul services yet again.

The changes in functions are mirrored by a change in personnel. A century ago, the honorary consul would typically be a merchant or a shipowner, someone with a special knowledge of the commercial world. Today, lawyers seem to be as common as businesspeople. This change may be read as an indication of the growing importance of law in postmodern society, but also of the maturity and complexity of the global economy. In earlier times, one primarily needed consuls who knew how to have goods physically moved from one place to another, whereas the current economy primarily rewards people who know the legalities of transfer. This change also reflects the shifting patterns of interaction described earlier, where the focus has moved from the mobility of goods to the mobility of people. Although both sending and receiving states have only approximate numbers and data, the number of honorary consuls seems to be on the increase (cf. Stringer 2011).

A focus on the challenges of dealing with ordinary citizens traveling abroad and providing them with assistance has the potential to increase the domestic standing of diplomats and consuls alike (see box 9-4). However, as expectations have been rising, foreign services are also vulnerable to the charge of not doing enough to help compatriots abroad. Ministries of foreign affairs thus find themselves in the unenviable position of having to engage in a careful balancing act of public affairs, educating the public about the dangers of going abroad and the limits to the assistance that can be expected, while not insulting foreign governments or giving citizens the impression that they are on their own (cf. Maley 2011). Furthermore, the sheer amount of consular work presents a serious drain on the resources of foreign services. One solution, clearly visible in the consular affairs of countries of the European Union, is to cooperate on consular tasks (Fernández 2011; Wesseling and Boniface 2011).

Another partial solution can be found in cooperation with non-governmental organizations or private-sector actors, through outsourcing. Several countries have already outsourced all or part of their visa-related activities in foreign countries. While the case can certainly be made for outsourcing both visa work and travel advice (cf. Maley 2011), it should also be noted that honorary consuls represent a long-standing form of outsourcing—and a cheap one at that.

In addition to international cooperation and outsourcing, many states rely increasingly on advances in mobile and networked technology to deliver consular services, from travel advice via registration and visa issues to emergency response and coordination. There have also been attempts at establishing international regimes or legal codification on consular issues such as child abduction and health protection,

BOX 9-4

The View of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

As quoted by J. Dickie, the "Foresight Report" of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office states:

> *Consular work is our principal* shop-front to the British public. The media care far more about a British citizen overseas than about diplomatic relations and treaties.

Source: Dickie (2008: xi).

and some states have attempted to integrate diasporas more closely with consular work. The overarching challenge remains, however, that the demand for consular services is virtually insatiable, while the supply is quite clearly restricted.

KEY POINTS

- With increasing global mobility, emphasis in consular work is shifting from the mercantile to the legal.
- Consequently, more and more consuls have some legal expertise.
- Taking care of citizens abroad increases the domestic standing not only of a state's consular service but of its diplomats, too.
- The increased workload is beginning to lead to outsourcing, a trend that could eventually sever the consular service from the diplomatic one.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that what are today called consular functions stretch at least as far back as 4,000 years ago, when we find institutionalized attempts to promote and protect trade. The modern consular office began to evolve in the eastern Mediterranean during the High Middle Ages. Subsequently, beginning in the middle to late seventeenth century and culminating in the early nineteenth century, the principle of sovereignty associated with the territorial state system changed consular offices from focusing mainly on order within a community of merchants to focusing on representing the merchant's state of origin to the receiving state. This consular extraterritorial jurisdiction over compatriots could still be found in parts of Europe well into the nineteenth century, however, and consuls could still carry out political and diplomatic tasks. Even so, because diplomats increasingly carried out these latter tasks, the consul became subordinate to the diplomat. Then, in the early twentieth century, states began to merge the two services—the diplomatic service and the consular service—with the home-based ministry of foreign affairs in a united foreign service.

Consuls may yet have their historical revenge on diplomats, who, as we argued, have for so long regarded consuls as the poor cousins of the diplomatic world. Consuls or consul-like persons have conducted, and will continue to conduct, diplomatic tasks, in times of crisis and war, and outside of state capitals. In a world where a growing number of people are involved in transnational movement, diplomats, who specialize in representing polities, are worried about their role and relevance. Consuls, on the other hand, can rest assured that there will always be a need for people who can manage the practical tasks associated with movements that span more than one political unit. No matter how small a country's diplomatic representation abroad, a consul is almost always present.

QUESTIONS

1. Why have consul-like offices emerged?
2. What are the key differences between consuls and diplomats?
3. Why are consular tasks so debated now, when previously academics largely ignored the subject and practitioners avoided consular postings abroad?

4. What are the implications of changes in consular affairs for the practical concept of consular diplomacy?
5. What are the roles of consuls in the contemporary era compared with those in the past?
6. What was, and is, the status of the consul in international law?
7. Why is the scope of foreign ministries' responsibilities to nationals abroad expanding at a time when sovereignty is said to be in decline?
8. Do recent trends suggest that foreign ministries are acquiring a domestic constituency within civil society?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

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CHAPTER 10

Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomatic Practices

Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Diplomacy as practice
- The Practice of bilateral diplomacy
- The Practice of multilateral diplomacy
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter explores bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through the lens of practice theory. A "theory-methods package," practice theory provides a unit of analysis for empirical inquiry—"practices," defined as socially meaningful and organized patterns of activities—and it helps explain how macro phenomena such as war and cooperation come about in world politics. As historically and culturally diverse as they may be, diplomatic practices are analytically alike in claiming to represent a given polity to the outside world. As the case of bilateral diplomatic reporting during the 2011 revolt in Egypt reveals, everyday practices in the embassy impact foreign policy-making and crisis management. Similarly, the ways in which permanent representatives to international organizations perform multilateral diplomacy help explain the sources of informal hierarchy on the world stage.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, during the Arab Spring uprising, Western diplomats posted in Cairo, Egypt, had the heavy responsibility of **reporting** back to their capital in order to describe the situation on the ground and advise their government on the best course of action to take in response. To that purpose, **ambassadors** and their team met with various interlocutors from the Egyptian government, other **foreign embassies**, and selected activists—in interactions that were both personal and digital—and developed their assessments and policy advice in tandem with their prior understanding of the host society in the form of confidential diplomatic cables. As anecdotal as they may seem, these peculiar diplomatic practices go a long way in explaining the half-baked response by Western capitals to the political revolution in Egypt and beyond.

Similarly, state delegates posted at **permanent representations** to **international organizations (IOs)** such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interact and negotiate with their foreign counterparts on a daily basis. As they set out to influence the language of a particular treaty clause, to run for a committee chairmanship, or to frame their instructions to their peers or civil servants, multilateral diplomats produce, reproduce, and sometimes challenge an informal hierarchy of influence that they casually dub the "international pecking order." The principle of **sovereignty** aside, not all ambassadors weigh the same at the multilateral table—a hard-nosed reality that the distribution of country resources can only partly account for.

Both of these examples illustrate the value that is added by studying diplomacy through the lens of practice theory (Pouliot and Cornut 2015). For one thing, this analytical approach helps make sense of the various things that ambassadors and other state delegates actually do. Diplomatic practices are as rich as they are diverse, and we need a minimally granular approach in order to capture this social complexity. For another thing, the patterned ways in which diplomats perform their trade is neither epiphenomenal—that is, an unimportant string of anecdotes of little scholarly value—nor redundant with "deeper" structural forces, such as the distribution of material capabilities. On the contrary, diplomatic practices *do* things; that is, they produce effects on political **crisis management** in bilateral settings and on **international hierarchy** in multilateral contexts.

In many ways, diplomatic studies and practice theory are birds of a feather. To put it succinctly, both approaches feature: 1) a focus on concrete enactments of human performance; 2) a relational or interactionist perspective on international politics; 3) a commitment to interdisciplinarity, in particular political science, history, anthropology, geography, and sociology; 4) an ecumenical approach to theoretical paradigms; and 5) a desire to build bridges between scholarship and actual practice. In a way, students of diplomacy were precursors to the recent surge of interest in international practices (see, for example, Cohen 1987; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995). The most famous classics on diplomacy, from Callières to Nicolson through Satow, are in fact handbooks—that is, practical guides to action that describe the experience-near activities on which practice theory also focuses. In fact, a piece about diplomacy by Neumann (2002) is what formally introduced the "practice turn" vocabulary to the academic discipline of international relations (IR). It should come as no surprise, then, that "practice-based theorizing" is drawing increasing attention from scholars of diplomacy (Wiseman 2011a).

DIPLOMACY AS PRACTICE

The variety of diplomatic activities is quite amazing, especially over time and space (see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume). Practices commonly studied by scholars in diplomatic studies include, to name but a few, speech writing, conference negotiations, information gathering, visa delivery, multilateral debate, cultural exchange, treaty signing, and Twitter messaging. We propose to capture this diversity under the umbrella concept of practice.

To do so, we conceive of diplomacy as a category of analysis—that is, as a conceptual building block of a theoretical system. In order to reach that level, we must climb the so-called "ladder of abstraction" and strip the concept of its deeply contextual elements. As historically and culturally situated as specific diplomatic practices may be, there still exists an analytical core that we can extract from this diversity. As a category of analysis, the concept of diplomacy boils down to three key components: "first, diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction); second, it is relational (it operates at the interface between one's polity and others); and third, it is political (involving both representation and governing)" (Sending et al. 2015: 5). We propose to conceive of these very concrete social patterns as the contingent enactments of a much broader and many-sided "claim to represent a given polity to the outside world" (Sending et al. 2015: 5). As such, practice theory helps capture both the specific instantiations (concrete examples) and the analytically general dimension of diplomacy in a theoretically self-aware yet empirically exacting fashion.

Practice theory is not a singular framework. Rather, it encompasses a wide variety of approaches, ranging from Foucauldian poststructuralism to Goffman-style symbolic interactionism, through Latour's actor-network theory and Bourdieu's field analysis—to name but a few. As Nicolini (2012: 1) puts it, "[A] unified theory of practice does not exist. Practice theories constitute, in fact, a rather broad family of theoretical approaches connected by a web of historical and conceptual similarities." Currently, there is much debate about what practices are, what they do, where they come from, and how best to study them (see, for example, Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bueger and Gadinger 2015; Cornut 2015a).

We define practices as socially meaningful and organized patterns of activities; in lay parlance, they are ways of doing things. Practices are distinct from both behavior and action (Adler and Pouliot 2011). The notion of *behavior* captures the material aspect of doing; the concept of *action* adds on a layer of meaningfulness, at both the subjective (intentions and beliefs) and the intersubjective (norms and identities) levels. *Practices*, however, are not only behavioral and meaningful but also organized and patterned. And because they are regular forms of action within a given social context, practices tend to become mutually recognizable for their communities of practitioners. In the end, anything that people do in a contextually typical way counts as a practice.

Practice is a processual and relational concept. It expresses movement and action: The doing, in a socially structured and recognizable way, of X. Practice invokes the gerund form, the flow or movement of something being done—that is, *X*-ing. Practices are ways of doing things. Seen through these lenses, diplomacy, as a bundle of practices, is a fundamentally dynamic process. It is not an outcome but an activity.

Analytically, practice theory provides two major benefits to social scientists. First, the approach suggests a useful methodological starting point for empirical inquiry: practices! In that sense, the practice lens forms what Nicolini (2012: 8) calls a "theory-methods package"—that is, a theoretical framework with direct methodological implications. Essentially, practice theory defines the unit of analysis: the ways of doing things that are prevalent in a given social domain. The amount of fine-grained, detailed work that this methodology entails is certainly no shortcut. As Bueger and Gadinger (2015: 13) put it, practice approaches inevitably "upscale empirical and descriptive work." In a way reminiscent of "grounded theory," this methodology gives pride of place to induction and the bottom-up reconstruction of micro-processes—the everyday, the mundane, the seemingly anecdotal—out of which the social emerges.

Many practice scholars emphasize the interpretive nature of practice methodology. Ways of doing things are socially meaningful, a trait that requires paying attention to sense making. As Mattern (2011: 82) nicely puts it, investigating practices "demands a method that reads the social world through real human beings, interpreting their doings not in reference to abstract criteria, but in reference to the local criteria of the social environment in which they are positioned." As such, practice methodology is very far from the kind of brute empiricism that behavioralism entails. To use Geertz's metaphor, scholars should be recording not any and all eyelid movements, but winks as opposed to twitches. This requires a hermeneutical, or interpretive, approach.

Yet practice methodology entails much more than reconstructing the practitioners' point of view and everyday whereabouts. Subjective experiences form the starting point of the analysis and not its final destination. In Nicolini's (2012: 13) words: "The mere 'a-theoretical' cataloguing of what practitioners do [. . .] sheds little light on the meaning of the work that goes into it, what makes it possible, why it is the what it is, and how it contributes to, or interferes with, the production of organizational life." Practice theories are just that—*theories*. As such, they mobilize concepts and analytical categories in order to make sense of key facets of world politics, including diplomacy.

This point connects with the second payoff of the approach, in making sense of the constitutive effects of practices. Our starting point here is that practices are socially productive—that is, they are a generative force in and of themselves. This line of reasoning yields a distinctive insight: social realities, including international politics and diplomacy, are constituted by human beings acting in and on the world. Their ways of doing things delineate practices that enact and give meaning to the world. As Andersen and Neumann (2012: 468) explain, "[O]ne can look at states, organizations, wars, social movements, class or even personhood as practices." The socially organized and patterned ways in which world politics is performed are not merely outcomes in need of an explanation. They are also dynamic processes that produce effects in their wake, explaining the socially emergent nature of the world. As such, practices are a necessary part of any account of the so-called big picture. To ignore them is to cut oneself off from a key set of explanatory factors in world politics. The social world is emergent, and practice is the key process involved in bringing the many facets of global life into being. When seen through these lenses, the concerns of other IR approaches—war, peace, negotiations, states, IOs, and so on—are bundles of individual and collective practices woven together to form the infrastructure of social action on the global stage.

In the field of international security, for example, the practice of nuclear deterrence is premised on a limited number of repeated and scripted gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that make minimal—if often ambiguous—sense to interlocutors (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Because it aspires to mutual intelligibility, the regular enactment of these deeds within a particular political context of state-to-state relations organizes social interactions along more or less shared lines. The patterned ways of doing deterrence, in other words, are what makes it possible for actors to develop social relations, as they mutually recognize the meaningfulness of their respective actions. The process of practice gives structure to the space and discourse of interaction.

A practice theory of diplomacy thus inquires into the constitutive effects of diplomatic practices, whether on international law (Brunnée and Toope 2011; Hurd 2015) multilateral cooperation (Mitzen 2013a; Pouliot 2010), North-South politics (Barkawi 2015), or humanitarianism (Sending 2015), to take but a few examples. The gist of these various works holds to a relatively simple idea: What diplomats of all stripes do, and the ways in which they perform their trade, is taken to be basis for explaining world politics.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomatic practices are highly variegated across time and space.
- As an analytical category, diplomacy boils down to a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world.
- Practices are socially meaningful and organized patterns of activities; in lay parlance, they are ways of doing things.
- As empirical units of analysis, practices require an inductive and interpretive methodology able to reconstruct the micro-processes of social action.
- Practices are socially productive in that they bring together the various social realities that researchers inquire into, including war, the state, or international cooperation.
- A practice theory of diplomacy makes sense of broad international phenomena in terms of the manifold ways of doing things that make them possible.

THE PRACTICE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY

This section focuses on the practices of bilateral diplomacy that bring together the staff of the embassy in the service of the state. As a bureaucratic organization, the embassy is both hierarchical and "siloed." There is a functional division of labor: Each diplomat has an area of expertise. Political officers exchange information with political officers from other embassies and civil servants within the Foreign Ministry; human rights officers meet with other human rights officers and activists from civil society; security attachés confer with security officers and employees of the Ministry of Defense; cultural attachés promote cultural activities; and economic officers promote trade and investments. Atop these silos, the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission are responsible for all the activities within the embassy. There are some exceptions, though. Security attachés often directly report to the Ministry of Defense rather than to the ambassador. Similarly, the staff of a **consulate** is responsible for consular issues, such as providing emergency assistance to distressed travelers. Even though many consulates are located within embassies, consular tasks are the responsibility of the consul, not the ambassador (although in politically sensitive cases, the ambassador will certainly be consulted by consular officers).

Bilateral diplomats posted abroad are tasked with promoting the interests of their government in a given foreign capital. In the past, ambassadors were "plenipotentiary," because they were given full powers to engage the country and their own governments. Today, this provision is purely symbolic, as they no longer actually use their power to bind their own government without first consulting with headquarters (Fréchette 2013). The **letters of credentials** they present to their host country upon arrival still describe them as plenipotentiary, but if anything, the opposite logic seems true: Modern communication technologies and the ease of transcontinental travel allow decision makers at home to directly interact with their foreign counterparts, effectively sidestepping their ambassadors (Malone 2012). Yet diplomats posted in embassies remain the primary operators of bilateral diplomacy on the ground. Their practices enact and give substance to bilateral relations. In direct contact with the ruling government in the foreign capital, they are the hands and the face of their own government, and they are actively involved in three kinds of practices in particular.

First, diplomats **represent** their government, and also cultivate trust and friendship with the foreign government that hosts them. The quality of their everyday bilateral contacts is expected to embody the larger bilateral relationship. As one diplomat explained in an interview, "[T]he ambassador's work [. . .] is really to try to have the best diplomatic relations with the authorities of the country in which the mission is located. He is judged on that."[1] Bilateral diplomatic practices can ease problems and disagreements, facilitate collaboration and cooperation, as well as make possible high-level visits and beneficial access to foreign decision makers. Beyond bilateral contacts, resident diplomats in a foreign capital form what is called the **diplomatic corps**. Because of the close relationships they often have with each other and their shared interests and practices, they embody the international society as a whole (Sharp and Wiseman 2007b).

Second, diplomats posted in an embassy **report** on the political or economic situation in their host country, trying to go beyond the newswire and other publicly available information. Diplomatic analysis is "the attempt to convey an understanding of how authority and power relations are operating and evolving within and between governments and between government and society" (Smith 2011: 1). It serves as a looking glass to help governments understand the politics of other countries. Decision makers at home take stances and make choices about bilateral relations based in part on these reports. As Rana (2002a: 183) puts it, "[T]he diplomatic report offers insights that are unique—the marshalling of information that is of direct relevance to the home government, plus analysis that takes into account the home government's policy concerns, and forecasting needs." The production of such reports requires insider views and firsthand knowledge. This diplomatic mode of knowledge production provides fascinating insights on the nature of the international order that diplomats both embody and reproduce (Constantinou 2013).

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[1] All quotes and interviews in the chapter have been conducted by the authors in the course of previous research projects on diplomatic practices (see Pouliot 2016; and Cornut 2015a).

Third, diplomats in an embassy practice **public diplomacy**—that is, they engage with foreign publics in pursuit of their country's national interest. It is increasingly common for ambassadors and their team to bypass local governmental counterparts and engage directly with **civil societies** abroad. The progressive adoption of social media as a diplomatic tool has increased the frequency and visibility of these practices. In a bilateral context, public diplomacy is used to justify one's action, a purpose also served in the multilateral framework (Hurd 2015; Faizullaev and Cornut 2016). Engagement with foreign publics is also, however, a way for diplomats to intervene directly and influence foreign countries and partners. When posted in non-democratic countries, Western diplomats often promote liberal democracy (Kinsman and Bassuener 2013). These practices lead bilateral diplomats to play contradictory roles, as managers of the status quo through traditional diplomacy, on the one hand, and as agents of political and social change through public diplomacy, on the other.

The complex interplay between the three key practices of bilateral diplomacy—representing the state, reporting, and engaging with foreign publics—may be illustrated with the work of Western embassies in Cairo, Egypt, during the 2011 uprising. This case shows how foreign policy making can come to rest on the seemingly innocuous ways of doing things inside bilateral embassies (Cornut 2015b).

The revolt in Egypt began on January 25, 2011, when massive demonstrations were organized to coincide with the national Police Day, and it lasted until on February 11, 2011, when President Hosni Mubarak resigned. The ways in which foreign diplomats reacted to these events help us understand how Western capitals (mis) handled the crisis. In the first few days, life in the embassies continued pretty much as usual. Then, on January 28th, when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets, foreign delegations began switching to crisis mode, as embassies closed for normal business and families and non-essential personnel began to evacuate. Massive departures from Cairo got underway, while some capitals dispatched experts in crisis management to the Egyptian capital.

Political uprisings such as Egypt's have critical consequences for bilateral relations, regional stability, and even global order. Due to these high stakes, governments have a clear incentive to understand the ins-and-outs of the unfolding situation as quickly as possible. Under such circumstances, embassies are under heavy pressure to transmit high quantities of accurate information about what is happening on the ground. As one interviewee explained: "Through a spokesman, [our] Minister [at home] would react daily to what was happening. So to be able to react and establish a public language, he must know what is happening and have information from the field. He needs to have an update on the situation." Bilateral diplomats are expected to provide just that.

By the end of the first week, crisis teams assembled in the foreign ministries of many countries, with daily meetings of top-level political officials and civil servants.

Contact between missions and headquarters was constant, and emails and reports were sent several times a day. Heads of state as well as government and foreign ministers could speak to their Cairo ambassador on a daily basis. This intensive work and contact with the highest levels probably explains why, as a deputy chief of mission put it in an interview, "[D]iplomats spend their entire career hoping that they would be at a post when a revolution takes place."

In their public declarations about the situation in Egypt, Western presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, and ambassadors oscillated between their desire to support the peoples' protests and political reform in Egypt and their inclination to respect the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a friendly government. They moved from tepid criticism against the Mubarak regime to requesting that he leave office. These prudent political stances mirrored changes on the ground and corresponded to assessments of whether Mubarak would be able to stay in power. As one embassy's human rights officer explained, "Clearly, you want to support the protest and the legitimate aspirations of the people but, you know, without being too critical of the regime that you expect will still be there at the end of the day as a partner." He continued, "As the response became more and more violent, as it became clear that the people aren't going to be leaving the streets, you could see the kind of rhetoric begin to change." For instance, US government political stances were constantly adapted to an evolving situation:

> [Internal sources characterized the] administration's public stance on the issue as having had to change "every twelve hours" as events in Cairo has developed so rapidly. "First it was 'negotiate with the opposition,' then events overtook that, then it was 'orderly transition,' and events overtook that, then it was 'You and your son can't run,' and events overtook that, and now it's 'the process has to begin now,'" [an] official said. "It's been crawl-walk-run—we had to increase the pace as events required." (Tapper 2011)

To provide the best information possible, diplomats would seek to triangulate media information and to anticipate how the situation might evolve. Diplomats gathered information by monitoring the media, by activating their local networks, or by conducting direct observation on the streets. They tried to anticipate what the most important moves would be next, and where possible, they attended important events or tuned in for live television coverage. Based on the information gathered, they then made sense of it by reporting back to the head of mission and helping write cables back to headquarters.

Reporting during the revolt was particularly difficult: Most diplomats found that their usual contacts within the Egyptian government were no longer answering their calls. Physical security also became a preoccupation. Due to evacuations, even diplomats not usually tasked with consular issues had to dedicate some time to logistical support. Moreover, the political fluidity of the unfolding crisis rendered any piece of information rather uncertain. As R. Smith (2011: 53) puts it, "[T]here are simply too many variables, too many unknowns." By their own accounts, diplomats often lacked an in-depth understanding of the Egyptian society beyond the Mubarak regime. For several days, they held to a conviction that "Egypt is not Tunisia," and that the regime would survive. They had been convinced by previous contacts with

Egyptian official circles that the government would be able to contain demonstrators the way that it always had. For instance, as one diplomat explained in a report sent to his headquarters on the afternoon of January 26th:

> In many ways the problems currently facing Egypt resemble those in Tunisia, namely political oppression, security-force brutality, rising prices, a large income gap and corruption. At the same time, most observers agree that the lower level of education, higher illiteracy, and general apathy and disillusionment of the average Egyptian undercut any serious ongoing threat to the government. It is worth noting that for many Egyptians, fear over who would fill a vacuum left by the Mubarak regime override frustrations with the current leadership.

Despite these failings, a limited number of innovative practices of bilateral diplomacy allowed some Western delegates to be better in touch with the new social and political realities of Egypt. In particular, so-called "expeditionary diplomats" broke "free from the isolation of working behind embassy walls and contacting just a narrow array of host-country officials" (Seib 2012: 7). Fluent in Arabic, these unusual diplomats interacted frequently with common people; met with non-governmental organizations, activists, and members of the opposition parties on a regular basis; went to Tahrir Square; and made use of social media. By departing from established practices, they could provide a better basis for governments to react to the crisis.

KEY POINTS

- Embassies are hierarchical and siloed, with a functional division of labor.
- The main practices of bilateral diplomacy include representing the state, reporting to the capital, and engaging with foreign publics.
- The 2011 uprising in Egypt illustrates how bilateral diplomatic practices may affect crisis management and foreign-policy decision making.
- As a result of prevalent practices, such as the cultivation of privileged contacts with the political establishment, Western diplomats in Cairo often failed to anticipate the collapse of the Mubarak regime.

THE PRACTICE OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Multilateralism, "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct" (Ruggie 1992: 571), has come of age. World trade, international security, environmental governance, and economic coordination are in large parts regulated through multilateral channels. Yet such was not always the case. The multilateralization of world politics is a historical process that began two centuries ago and now seems to be maturing. Multilateral diplomacy developed gradually over time, starting with the **Concert of Europe** at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Mitzen 2013a). Especially in the last few decades, multilateralism has turned into the ordinary process by which international relations are conducted (Pouliot 2011).

Among the different forms that multilateralism takes today, permanent representation to IOs is particularly prevalent. Operating more or less behind the scenes,

permanent representatives conduct ceaseless negotiations on behalf of member states. Cities like New York, Brussels, and Vienna host vast numbers of national delegates attached to the UN, the European Union, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a plethora of other intergovernmental bodies. Contrary to conference or summit diplomacy, which relies quite heavily on government-led teams, permanent representation generally involves career diplomats as part of an everyday, routinized interaction setting.

The contemporary prevalence and significance of permanent representation to IOs can hardly be overstated. Permanent missions to IOs are tasked with conducting multilateral negotiations on behalf of nation-states. Delegates attend various meetings dealing with directives, treaties, resolutions, budgets, and other official documents that form the textual fabric of global governance. In actuality, permanent representatives do much more than simply represent the views of their national governments. According to some, national missions can even become involved in "policy formulation": Directly present on the ground, they "adjust to policy as the negotiating situation develops. Permanent representations also assess or predict the actual (as well as the potential reactions of other member states)." In the end, the mission is "often acting in an independent manner" (Blair 2001: 149).

Thanks to the long-held principle of sovereign equality, diplomacy is explicitly antihierarchical. Much of it is about deploying the fiction of sovereign equality through various rituals that euphemize the power politics looming in the background. Diplomatic rituals premised on sovereign equality also abound in multilateral sites. In fact, permanent representation to IOs has evolved into a rationalized mode of operation in which various procedures serve to formalize sovereign equality—for instance, through formal procedures of alphabetical seating, rotating presidencies, or regulated speaking order.

Sovereign equality may well be the founding myth of diplomacy, but it does not suppress stratification dynamics. Indeed, for those state delegates operating along the corridors of IO headquarters, it is a basic fact of life that diplomacy takes place on a deeply "unleveled" playing field (see Pouliot 2016a, 2016b). In any multilateral setting, some state representatives weigh much more heavily than others. Practitioners often refer to this hard-nosed reality as the international pecking order—a term originally coined by a zoologist to describe the dominance hierarchy of hens. In his ethnographic account of UN Security Council dynamics, Ambrosetti (2012: 68) describes a "daily social division of multilateral labor":

> The precise moment when the delegations were speaking during private consultations and public meetings and the kind of arguments and concerns they broached were not accidental. There was a pervasive form of influence at stake in the course of the interaction and in the achievement of preliminary tasks that were collectively expected.

How is it possible for multilateralism and inequality to coexist in such a way? The null hypothesis here is, quite simply, that pecking orders reflect formal rules. And indeed, a number of procedures operate in certain multilateral settings that create an unleveled playing field. These range from selective membership to voting shares and even vetoes. The best example is certainly the formal privileges that the P5 enjoy at the Security Council. Upon closer scrutiny, though, it becomes clear that formal rules alone cannot explain the complex dynamics of social stratification in multilateral diplomacy. For instance, UN Charter provisions on permanent membership no doubt help produce an unleveled playing ground, but they definitely do not tell the whole story about P5 dominance. As Schia (2013: 149) explains:

> Delegates from permanent member-states often serve longer, which gives them much better opportunities to learn, master, and define the game and the skills needed in the informal processes. The permanent members are in a favorable position not only because of their status with veto powers but also because their knowledge, cultural capital, network, and being permanent players of the game in the informal processes matter. These members have an informal power base not reflected in any formal structures of the Council.

The sources of P5 standing, in other words, are much more complex than what the UN Charter provisions say: Codified procedures are nothing but the beginning of the diplomatic process.

The international pecking order cannot be reduced to the distribution of state capabilities, either. Dominant thinking in IR holds that the uneven resources of countries best explains unequal standing and influence on the world stage. While scholars disagree as to which state capacities ultimately matter—ranging from guns through money to ideas—the basic argument is that the distribution of state assets translates into uneven leverage at the multilateral table. The analytical implication should be clear: When diplomacy actually begins, the playing field is already unleveled. State representatives essentially respond to, and play out, the preexisting distribution of corporate assets. In this view, the diplomatic process itself plays little to no role; it is either redundant or epiphenomenal. To caricature, all diplomats could vanish overnight but the world would continue to go round, with diplomatic outputs essentially mirroring the unequal distribution of state capacities.

From a practice perspective, what makes certain diplomats more highly regarded than others is the social attribution of a practical mastery of the local rules of the game, which takes the shape of an ability to craft compromises, take initiatives, or herd colleagues in ways that resound with others. As they manage everyday multilateral affairs, state representatives compete for influence and standing through the display of practical know-how. As a result, practices generate inequality (from) within the ranks of diplomats. These effects obtain in interaction with the broader structural forces often theorized by IR scholars.

Across the UN, there are dozens of missions that clearly punch above their weight, while others fail to seize the opportunities offered by the multilateral procedure. Alluding to Liechtenstein, one deputy permanent representative explained:

> That Ambassador, he's been here for what, ten years. So he knows everybody, he knows the procedures, he knows how to manage a meeting. It's a technique for diplomats: how to convince or sway the audience in the room. [. . .] You speak in such a natural and convincing manner that those who don't know their interest will follow you. [. . .] With time and experience you learn how to take the room's temperature.

Experience is a key source of competence in UN multilateral diplomacy, said another delegate: “First, know the procedure; second, know the people around the table; and third, master the topic. If you have these three elements, you can control the room at your will.”

What this means is that the ways in which diplomats perform their trade, on a daily basis, generates an informal hierarchy that is largely endogenous to the multilateral organization. Agents vie for positions, compete over resources, and seek to foster clashing interests. This struggle, however, is structured by the established ways of doing things multilaterally.

Evidently, one cannot climb the ranks of the pecking order all by oneself. Recognition by peers must be obtained in and through practice. Taking initiative matters, because as several delegates noted, one’s rank in the pecking order remains dependent on how one makes use of it. Standing must be “asserted”; otherwise, one risks “losing prominence”: “[I]f you don’t use it, you lose it,” said one interviewee. To be recognized as competent, permanent representatives must show political will and resolve—in one delegate’s words, they should “have the guts and spine to stand up.” The cultivation of standing, then, is a never-ending process. As one diplomat from the **Global South** put it: “It’s a matter of priorities: Can you hold your ground?” Clearly, not everyone makes the cut, as another interviewee observed: “Out of the 190 ambassadors here, I think there are about thirty who are players and the rest of them are just golf players. So the thirty who are players, they are easy to identify, they have a presence and you get to know them very fast. Reputations within the UN are made within a week and they are destroyed within a day.”

By contrast, in more tightly knit IOs such as NATO, the pecking order operates in very subtle ways. In fact, it is so self-evident in its everyday operation that one should never have to render it explicit. A good illustration comes from an interview with a representative from a large, new member state. Asked whether he felt his country was part of the leading nations within the Alliance, he gave this considered response: “Well, in diplomacy you have to be very careful what you are saying. Each and every member, even the smallest ones, they have their own voice, dignity. Yeah, I will not say words that can be interpreted as patronizing someone.” The disposition of self-restraint also applies to smaller countries, especially in light of their capacity to veto any and all Alliance decisions. There is a delicate balancing act at work here: “The consensus should be kept basically because for a small country, as [my country] is, we should have some kind [. . .] of guarantee to have our voice heard. But it doesn’t mean that it will be applied anytime. No, no, not at all.” Many other interviewees similarly alluded to “some sort of understanding that those who feel less strongly about an issue might find it in their hearts not to raise whatever trivial or non-trivial objections they have.”

Thus, consensus making at NATO requires restraint, both from heavyweights and from featherweights alike. The Secretary-General is also deeply involved in group dynamics and consensus making. His mediating role is key, as is his unparalleled access to information across member states. This necessitates a cautious approach: Guarding the pecking order requires a delicate balancing act and social stratification should not be made overtly apparent. All in all, international pecking orders remind us that as important as the distribution of country assets may be in multilateral diplomacy, ultimately it is the practices enacted by permanent representatives and their team that underpin inequality and hierarchy on the world stage.

KEY POINTS

- Multilateral diplomacy has become a pervasive feature of contemporary world politics.
- Multilateral diplomacy rests on a fiction of sovereign equality, yet not all permanent representatives weigh the same at the table.
- Contrary to common wisdom, informal hierarchies of standing result from the multilateral process itself, as diplomats struggle for competence in and through practice.
- Diplomatic practices evolve from one IO to the next, with significant consequences for the production of international pecking orders.

CONCLUSION

Many synergies exist between diplomatic studies and practice theory. In recent years, both bodies of literature have made strides in IR. This mutual engagement should continue. As a practice, diplomacy exhibits peculiarities that are likely to help advance practice theorizing. For instance, it combines heavily path-dependent rituals with adaptive responses to technological change (see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume). Reciprocally, as an analytical lens, practice theory is perfectly suited for the study of diplomacy. To cite but one example, it takes seriously the notion that as purposive and strategic as diplomacy may be, it rests on forms of practical knowledge that remain poorly understood in IR theory.

Practice scholars converge on using practices as the main unit of analysis. The ways in which people typically do things is key to understanding both macro-phenomena, such as order, institutions, and norms, as well as micro-processes of rational calculations and meaning making. Diplomats, whether of the bilateral of the multilateral sort, are among the most prominent practitioners on the global stage. Practice theory shows that the established ways of doing things inside embassies and permanent representations to IOs play a crucial role in the making and remaking of world politics.

QUESTIONS

1. Some conceptual issues:
    - What are practices?
    - How are practices different from behavior and action?
    - What are the distinctive features of practice methodology?
    - Why do practices matter?
    - How can diplomacy be defined from the perspective of practice theory?
2. Some empirical issues:
    - Which practices define being a diplomat in an embassy?
    - What are the characteristics of the embassy as a bureaucratic institution?
    - Why was it difficult for diplomats to report during the 2011 revolt in Egypt?
    - How did Western decision makers react to the revolt in Egypt?
    - What is an international pecking order, and how does it come about?

  - How do power dynamics coexist with sovereign equality in multilateral settings?
  - Why does one need to look further than formal inequalities to understand multilateral stratification?
  - What are the specificities of the UN Security Council and NATO in terms of practices of negotiation?
3. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 11

Public Diplomacy

Jan Melissen

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction: the rise of a practice and a field of study
- The epiphenomenal nature of public diplomacy
- Official and non-governmental public diplomacy
- Beyond the new public diplomacy: evolving concepts
- Public diplomacy outside the West
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

Public diplomacy—that is, diplomatic engagement with people—is a multidisciplinary area of scholarship that is now receiving more attention from scholars than any other aspect of diplomacy. The fascination with public diplomacy as an increasingly important and visible aspect of diplomatic practice is by no means limited to the West. Moreover, besides states, many different actors are also involved in public diplomacy, and new technologies empower practitioners, governments, as well as individual members of the public. The academic debate about public diplomacy only emerged after the turn of the twenty-first century, which still leaves important conceptual and theoretical issues to be determined. Public diplomacy has many advocates but is not without its critics, and the concept underlines how diplomatic practice is constantly changing. This chapter discusses public diplomacy both as a concept and as a tool used by states and other actors in contemporary diplomatic practice. It is analyzed here as part of the evolution of contemporary diplomatic practice. This chapter is not a guide explaining how public diplomacy should be undertaken, and it does not go into a systematic discussion of public diplomacy's effectiveness.

INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF A PRACTICE AND A FIELD OF STUDY

The concept and practice of public diplomacy have attracted much attention in academia over the last decade, and a great deal of scholarship is underway. If a review of articles in *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* since 2006 is used as a guide, more academic work is now in progress on public diplomacy than on any other single theme on the diplomatic studies research agenda. The literature on public diplomacy has been flooded with contributions from other disciplines as well, including communication studies, political science and international relations, history, public relations, and marketing. According to Eytan Gilboa (2008: 56), the study of public diplomacy is "probably one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship." Yet despite a cacophony of opinions on what the concept means, little exists in the way of theory building. One study refers to a review of 150 definitional statements of public diplomacy, which can be grouped into six intellectual and practical categories (Fitzpatrick 2010: 89). Many students of diplomacy have a discernible sense of being overwhelmed by these developments. At the same time, most of these scholars want to be involved in the debate about what has become commonly known as the "new public diplomacy" (Melissen 2005). Gregory (2011: 353) deliberately steps aside from discussions about "traditional" and "new" and defines public diplomacy as "an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values."

The remarkable academic vitality in public diplomacy studies reflects the upswing of attention on public diplomacy among practitioners across the world. A sense clearly now exists within many foreign ministries that it is essential to catch up with fast-moving developments in global communications—or risk being left behind in a field crowded with many other agile actors who practice public diplomacy. Few governments are at ease with their country's image or reputation, even though this quality is hard to measure (Pahlavi 2007). The governments of countries with consistently high scores in global popularity rankings, such as the United Kingdom and France, are concerned about their image projection in foreign countries, and with good reason.

Many of the world's leading powers—for example, the United States after the Second World War, Japan from the 1970s onward, and China today—have all in their own way discovered that their rise in power can lead to greater vulnerability in terms of external reputation (Lee and Melissen 2011). These countries have financially invested quite substantial sums in public diplomacy, although, as critics correctly point out, such expenditure is dwarfed by military spending. In the first decade of this century, several US opinion leaders started advocating the importance of combining both **soft power**, of which public diplomacy is an element (see later discussion), and **hard power**, comprising economic power as well as military force. This reflected the US defense establishment's quiet, long-standing, and usually well-financed interest in **strategic communication**, the security community's variant of public diplomacy. According to a leading communications scholar, the late Phil Taylor (2010: 24), the **information operations** conducted by national defense departments and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) act as a support tool "to lubricate the business of military activity, rather like the role of public diplomacy in lubricating foreign policy."

The term "public diplomacy" has American heritage. Coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and founder of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, it took approximately forty years, however, for the term to enter US public discourse, cross the Atlantic, and become a neologism in multiple languages around the world. Today, public diplomacy and related information activities that aim to influence foreign opinion are seen as too important to be left only to diplomats and foreign ministries. In many countries, other executive agencies, such as ministries of economic affairs, development cooperation, culture, and even agriculture, have their own stake in public diplomacy, economic branding, and related practices for promoting their portfolios. Ideally, such activities across government are **joined-up**, or coordinated across the **whole-of-government**. In reality, however, and despite neat governmental organizational charts, bureaucratic life presents obstacles to streamlined activity and overall coherence.

Directly or indirectly, the dramatic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the US and global debates on public diplomacy. It is important to stress, however, that the activities underlying this concept are not new. The practice of international reputation management can be traced back to the pre-Westphalian world, before the rise of the state, and even to the earliest written evidence about diplomacy in the ancient world (see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume). Diplomacy has never been able to neglect public opinion, although the importance of such opinion was minuscule when information was still largely controlled by those in power. And more than 200 years ago, during classical diplomacy's finest hour, the Austrian statesman and diplomat Klemens von Metternich observed that "public opinion is the most important medium of all. Like religion it penetrates into the darkest corners" (Bátora 2010b). The early twentieth century, made conspicuous by sharply rising nationalism and widespread destruction during the First World War, marked the beginning of professional image cultivation. In 1917, US president Woodrow Wilson and the Soviet Union's new political leader, Vladimir Lenin, inaugurated a new era in international politics when they presented the world with sharply contrasting ideological alternatives (Mayer 1959). After 1945, no citizen of the countries involved in the Cold War between East and West could escape from **propaganda**, for lack of a better term. In an increasingly interdependent and integrated Western Europe, practices such as Germany's *politische* Öffentlichkeitsarbeit and France's *politique d'influence*—synonyms for public diplomacy before they were substituted by it—were vital policy tools in managing relationships between former enemies.

Developments in the United States have been important for public diplomacy's evolution. Students of public diplomacy today can learn from historical analyses of US public diplomacy (Cull 2008, 2009; Osgood and Etheridge 2010) and from comparisons of the past with the present. In the United States, the US Information Agency (USIA), a special agency that existed from 1953 to 1999, was responsible for educating various generations of public diplomacy professionals, even though many saw this

BOX 11-1

Edward R. Murrow's Long Shadow in US Public Diplomacy

One of the most emblematic figures in the history of US public diplomacy was Edward R. Murrow, the CBS celebrity journalist who became director of the United States Information Agency in 1961. As he testified to the US Congress, "American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that". The verdict on Murrow is overwhelmingly positive, although some of his former colleagues at Voice of America aired their disappointment. As Nicholas Cull of the Centre for Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, LA, summarized: "It seemed that Murrow cared less about the substance of truth, but rather focused on its appearance."

SOURCES: Cull (2003: 23–24); Public Diplomacy Alumni Association (2017)

"information work," which was done outside the State Department, as a sundry activity at the periphery of diplomacy. The USIA was important in projecting US ideas and images to the public in different parts of the world. Edward R. Murrow, USIA's director during the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, is still known for his commonsense remarks about what works in public diplomacy and what does not (see box 11-1). With hindsight, crucial USIA wisdom and expertise were lost when it was integrated with the State Department in 1999. Arguably, subsequent US public diplomacy at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with its emphasis on "selling Uncle Sam" through product marketing, advertising techniques, and one-way messaging, could have benefited from learning the lessons of past approaches.

KEY POINTS

- Public diplomacy is a young field of study in which a cacophony of opinions still exists on what public diplomacy means, so far with only limited theory building.
- Foreign ministries are aware that they need to catch up with developments in global communications and the pressures of technological change—or risk being left behind in an international arena where many others are practicing public diplomacy and already adept at using state-of-the art digital tools.
- Diplomacy has never been able to neglect public opinion, although its importance was minuscule when information was still largely controlled by those in power. Clearly, this is no longer the case.

THE EPIPHENOMENAL NATURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Because there are so many unanswered questions about public diplomacy, and so many disciplines with different perspectives to offer, the topic attracts a lot of debate. When delving into literature on the subject, a student of diplomacy can feel like a pedestrian crossing a busy junction, with all sorts of traffic approaching from different directions but with little overview. Contributions from disciplines far from the mainstream study of diplomacy, such as marketing, media studies, public opinion research, rhetoric, or psychology, are very valuable but normally do not give priority to assessing public diplomacy from a wider diplomatic perspective.

From a diplomatic studies viewpoint, public diplomacy is not a freestanding activity. Rather, it has an "epiphenomenal" nature—that is, it accompanies wider developments in contemporary diplomatic practice. The most salient transformational development in diplomatic practice today is that a level diplomatic playing field, mainly consisting of state actors, can no longer be taken for granted. Geoffrey Wiseman's (2010) concept of **polylateralism** neatly captures the mutations, or changing nature, of contemporary diplomacy. Although it may now be common wisdom that a variety of non-state actors have joined the fray, a closer look at the societal dimension of diplomacy helps us to understand that a fundamental change is occurring in diplomatic practice and in traditional diplomatic actors' priorities.

To understand the societal nature of contemporary diplomacy (see Sharp, chapter 3; Pigman, chapter 4; and Badie, chapter 5, in this volume), we need to note that in the modern era, states in the international system managed to absorb various forms of diplomatic innovation relatively easily.[1] In the midst of change, there was always the basic comfort—for participants in the diplomatic process, at least—of generally accepted rules of the game, a set of fundamental norms and working practices, and agreed-upon protocol and ceremony. In the world of diplomats, elegantly depicted and admired by Harold Nicolson (1954), there was little sympathy for openness and democracy in diplomatic affairs, or for society to play a meaningful role. By comparison, diplomacy today is becoming societized or, as Kelley (2010: 289) argues, is "becoming enmeshed within the public domain." Issues affecting citizens' daily lives that are far removed from classical diplomacy have moved upward on the agenda of foreign ministries. Many diplomats experience, and express, the feeling that they are living in a citizen-driven world. As practitioners have also come to realize, it no longer makes sense to distinguish between diplomacy and public diplomacy (Gregory 2016). Nonetheless, in this broader contemporary context of diplomacy, public diplomacy has a distinct quality, in that it helps to entice diplomats out of their narrow domain of officially **accredited representatives**, ruling elites, and others orbiting around government. For diplomacy, and for individual official diplomats, this opening of their previously privileged habitat is not a superficial concession to a new era. Rather, it is an important historical development that profoundly affects the working practices inside foreign ministries and their embassies and contributes to important shifts in the relationship between governments and individual citizens. This development is begging for more attention from diplomacy scholars.

Not only is it difficult to distinguish between diplomacy and public diplomacy, but it is becoming clear that older and more recent diplomatic practices are merging into something new. As in the cinema technique of morphing, one image blends into another, and the two are transformed into something else. Foreign ministries are increasingly aware of the transnational dimension of external policies, as well as issues in domestic society. Public diplomacy can therefore no longer be approached as a separate consideration from governmental aspects of policy making and foreign relations. This is most clearly visible in the more integrated parts of the world, with multiple connections between societies of countries in the same international neighborhood. For instance, it is a given in the European Union (EU) that member states take public diplomacy considerations into account on all sorts of issues at different stages of the political debate and policy-making process, and also during international negotiations. It is unimaginable for governments today to live under the illusion that domestic policies and debates on internationally controversial issues stop at the porous borders with other countries, and they should therefore act accordingly. This view differs from the more conventional argument that the "old" and the "new"—that is, traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy—coexist as practices with a different diplomatic logic. It remains convenient and functional to continue to refer to public diplomacy under a separate heading, but it is important to remember that public diplomacy should not be separated from diplomacy at large.

This argument clashes with the traditionalist view of public diplomacy, which does not deny that public diplomacy is now perhaps the most important duty for ambassadors (Berridge 2010: 190) but which considers this development an unfortunate distraction from ambassadors' core diplomatic duties. Traditionalist scholars consider public diplomacy a euphemism for propaganda (Berridge and James 2001), while most classical scholars writing on diplomacy have seen it as either a harmful development (Nicolson 1963) or simply something peripheral to diplomacy (Bull 1977; Watson 1982). Like many old-school practitioners today, traditionalist scholars do not accept that public diplomacy could be anything other than a form of political advertising (Berridge and James 2001: 197). In contrast, the view shared by many scholars is that public diplomacy today is based on the acceptance of pluralism and communication based on dialogue rather than one-way messaging. The public diplomacy practice by many state actors, starting with but not limited to authoritarian governments, does, however, show that the "two-way street" may just be rhetoric. Moreover, actual dialogue with foreign publics is a great challenge for all, in that it breaks with familiar patterns of diplomatic communication.

Traditionalists reject the argument that the rise of public diplomacy is important to academic study. From their point of view, the patterns of interaction between the states that diplomats represent and the societies where they represent their states are of limited interest. The circle they need to square, however, is that the same foreign ministries at the heart of their conception of diplomacy see public diplomacy as a concern affecting more and more of their day-to-day activities.

Despite acknowledging the importance of public diplomacy, foreign ministries find it difficult to dedicate sufficient financial and human resources to their public diplomacy activities. Governments always have pressing policy objectives, vested domestic interests, and important foreign policy agendas. Yet in spite of all these pressures, public diplomacy has moved center stage. The underlying reason is that public diplomacy is symptomatic of the changing balance between traditional diplomatic functions and other foreign ministry tasks that have recently come to the fore (see Hocking, chapter 7 in this volume). It is important for those practicing or studying diplomacy to emphasize this trend, because it is not likely to be noticed by observers whose attention is still focused on classical policy areas and high-politics issues on the international politics agenda. This type of oversight by scholars and practitioners is not unique to public diplomacy. Consular affairs is another area of spectacular growth for ministries of foreign affairs, and—like public diplomacy—is based on connections with society (see Leira and Neumann, chapter 9 in this volume). Both public diplomacy and consular diplomacy should hence be understood as part of the bigger picture, acting as prisms for understanding significant changes in the conduct of international relations in a world where diplomats increasingly meet members of the public in a range of configurations.

KEY POINTS

- Public diplomacy is accompanying wider developments in contemporary diplomatic practice, including the rise of a variety of diplomatic actors involved in it.
- The rise of public diplomacy is symptomatic of the recent changing balance between traditional diplomatic functions and foreign ministry tasks.
- From a conceptual point of view, public diplomacy is part of diplomacy at large, but it is more practical to continue referring to it separately while remembering that it should not be considered in isolation.
- Traditionalist students of diplomacy consider public diplomacy as political advertising or a euphemism for propaganda.
- The changing relationship between diplomats and people, both at home and abroad, deserves more attention from diplomacy scholars.

OFFICIAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

From a historical, theoretical, or empirical point of view, it is hard to sustain the argument that diplomacy as a *practice* is limited to the state or any other particular actor. It follows that the same applies to public diplomacy. According to one scholar-diplomat (see box 11-2), public diplomacy for national governments has become part of the central diplomatic task of projecting one's country into the host nation by means of bridging the gap between the home and the host's government and society (Heine 2008: 279). States, however, are no longer on their own. A variety of intergovernmental organizations, including the World Trade Organization and NATO, as well as regional organizations, such as the EU, keep strengthening their institutional capacity and, as a result, have become more interested in nurturing their international reputation. Even international bodies where the constituent members' national interests loom particularly large, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), worry about their collective image. The standoff between Russia and the West in recent years shows the information challenge has become a political priority for states and international organizations, with opponents on both sides making use of sophisticated social media strategies. NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, for instance, has extensive (and controversial) information programs aimed at out-of-area civil-military theaters, while it is simultaneously engaged in outreach activities in NATO's twenty-eight member states. Similarly, one aim of the EU's new diplomatic body, the European External Action Service, is to project a positive image of a large and diverse group of member states. With a Union deeply affected by the aftermath of economic crisis, the influx of refugees from the European periphery, migration between member states, plus the defection of the United Kingdom ("Brexit"), public diplomacy in relations with EU strategic partners outside Europe is seen as an existential necessity. It is hard to generalize about the public diplomacy of such a large and heterogeneous group of international organizations, but it is important to note that their public diplomacy, including its purposes and messages, is distinct from that of the nation-states that they comprise. It is also worth remembering that many international organizations are relatively new to the business of public diplomacy, and that their activities in this field are usually more about straightforward communication and information efforts than about engaging with people.

Below, or in parallel to, the state level, the public diplomacy of substate regions is more visibly self-interested. Regions with legal muscle in foreign affairs, such as Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia in Spain, or Québec in Canada, employ public diplomacy both to raise international awareness of their distinct identity and interests and as an instrument of domestic nation-building. With their sometimes long-standing experience and activist dedication to their cause, such actors occasionally outsmart the states of which they are constitutionally a component. For example, Catalonia came late to public diplomacy but has given it high priority in its external relations. In comparison with federal governments' more complex narrative, assertive regions generally have a more straightforward story to tell.

Next, global cities also have public diplomacy strategies that easily match those of many national governments, as becomes particularly clear in the years running up to and during mega-events such as the Olympic Games or world football championships. And embassies in capital cities can also take advantage of local issues and debates, as was demonstrated by Dutch public diplomacy during the London Cycling Campaign (see box 11-3). In a more general sense, the public diplomacy of and in big cities deserves more analysis in the context of their wider contribution to international relations in a state-based international society (Khanna 2011).

BOX 11-2

Scholar-Diplomats and the Study of Diplomacy

A great deal of the literature mentioned throughout this book refers to the writings of scholar-diplomats, who make an interesting contribution to the study of diplomacy. Their academic reflections on their own professional activity benefit from their personal, practical experience, including a familiarity with the diplomatic customs that offers more to their writings than a mere "reality check." The list of such authors includes distinguished names like Harold Nicolson, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Adam Watson. There are, however, many lesser-known contemporary authors who have written books (Daryl Copeland, Tom Fletcher, Paul Webster Hare, Kishan Rana, Shaun Riordan) or small gems of articles with critical reflections and reminiscences of great value to diplomatic studies.

BOX 11-3

What Diplomats Do: Embassy Public Diplomacy and the London Cycling Campaign

Cycling has become an issue in London's local politics. The London Cycling Campaign (LCC), the world's biggest regional cycling interest group, lobbies fiercely for transforming the city into a safer and healthier living environment. In 2012, all candidates in the mayoral elections embraced the idea of making the streets of London safer for cycling. LCC used cycling conditions in Holland as an example for the United Kingdom, and the Embassy of the Netherlands was quick to take advantage of the "Love London Go Dutch" campaign.

Piggybacking on a high-profile *Times* newspaper call for action, the Embassy joined the LCC's campaign by funding and organizing events that offered the knowledge and expertise of Dutch government and businesses to position them as authorities on cycling and transportation infrastructure. Significantly, the Embassy's approach centered on the principle of mutual interest, working through or at the request of third parties, and always coorganizing events with UK partners. In this particular case, Dutch diplomats benefited from the momentum of a lively debate on cycling in the capital and in other UK cities.

Dutch public diplomacy used and fostered the general image of the Netherlands as an innovative cycling nation to achieve specific policy objectives with measurable returns on investment: to build and leverage a sustainable network at the levels of local and national government, and to generate commercial opportunities for Dutch business. Two years of active campaigning, which influenced the London cycling strategy, were followed by a four-year economic diplomacy stage that helped position Dutch businesses in successful bids for contracts. Last, but not least, as cycling in London became an issue that touched the day-to-day lives of most Londoners, the "Love London Go Dutch" project helped public diplomacy efforts in truly connecting with the general public.

As opposed to official state-based public diplomacy, which is structurally constrained by governmental red tape and a professional culture that inclines toward risk avoidance, the campaign-oriented activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are usually quick-moving and supple. NGOs include actors of all sizes, from large organizations to individuals. Global celebrities such as Bono, Bob Geldof, or Angelina Jolie (A. F. Cooper 2008a, 2008b; Dieter and Kumar 2008; Thrall et al. 2008) and bloggers seem to have emerged from nowhere. The public diplomacy activism of influential NGOs such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch is focused on timely activism, long-term relationship building, and immediate political results. In their global operations, these NGOs see public diplomacy as a tool to mobilize individual public support and forge coalitions with a variety of actors, including states exploiting the idea of a normative **niche diplomacy**. One of the earliest examples of such coordination was the 1990s campaigns resulting in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, better known as the Ottawa or Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (Williams, Goose, and Wareham 2008).

Some smaller NGOs dealing with issues such as dialogue across civilizations and religions see public diplomacy as an opportunity to strengthen their role as facilitating transnational relations among social actors—for instance, in supporting improved relations between the Islamic world and the West. However, although some NGOs declare their autonomy from state-based officialdom, they are often connected to governments in various ways, such as in an advisory role or as bodies running politically sensitive, government-funded projects. The question of autonomy can become an issue for so-called arm's length public diplomacy and government-funded cultural relations bodies, as the British Council found in 2008 when the Russian government closed the council's offices in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg and accused it of having violated Russian law. Quasi-NGOS ("quangos")—or non-departmental public bodies to which government has devolved powers—are an example of structural connections between NGOs and governments. In other words, NGOs come in many shapes and sizes, are not always as independent as they appear, and are not free from criticism. To make things even more complex, a non-state actor such as Islamic State (IS), or Daesh, is doing propaganda but also engaging with foreign publics in a dialogic mode. As far as NGOs are concerned, their role in diplomacy and international negotiations is undisputed, and their modus operandi appears to fit public diplomacy's current networking milieu better than the practices of states and international organizations do (Kelley 2014).

Official public diplomacy can also learn from the corporate sector, which is spending ever-larger sums of money on its international reputation. Consumer-oriented disciplines, such as marketing and public relations, have a lot of useful practical knowledge to offer states. Best practices in the commercial sector can teach government officials a great deal. Multinational corporations such as Microsoft and British Petroleum (BP) take their corporate understanding of public diplomacy very seriously. BP's catastrophic 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is an example of corporate public diplomacy aimed at protecting commercial interests and cultivating BP's corporate social profile. Even before the current debates about public diplomacy, consultancy firms were advising governments on their communication strategy (Manheim 1994). Small states as well as great and emerging powers (including Kosovo, China, and Brazil) attempt to boost their image by hiring Western companies to conduct multimedia offensive. In a more general sense, international companies confronted with the consequences of a volatile geopolitical environment increasingly see the need of developing their diplomatic capacity, with public diplomacy thus becoming part of a wider diplomatic skill set (Riordan 2014).

Processes adopted by the commercial sector have also given birth to the largely quasi-academic study of **nation branding** (Fitzpatrick 2010: 129–51), an approach that focuses on nation-states and other territorially defined actors in terms of their competition with each other. The nation-branding approach is considered to be dated, if not "old-fashioned," in much of the Western world, although ministries of economic affairs and the tourist sector are generally wedded to developing their nation's economic brand (Murphy 2008: 10). Writings on nation branding have consequently been able to profit from the conceptual and semantic confusion surrounding public diplomacy. At the same time, we see in more theoretically informed discussions how status and identity are being taken very seriously, not least by a number of the world's big authoritarian powers, such as Russia and China (Paul, Larson and Wohlforth 2014).

Foreign ministries will have to get used to the fact that building networks through public diplomacy is a continuous activity, and that this requires collaborative diplomacy and working with an increasing number of partners outside government (Hanson 2011). Nowadays, they do, for instance, increasingly look for coalitions with businesses—so-called public-private partnerships (Pigman 2010: 124–29)—to promote themselves and to underpin their economic and commercial diplomacy. The 2008 global economic crisis increased this type of activity. Even though it may seem far-fetched, from an academic point of view, private sector initiatives can be categorized under the broad heading of **citizen diplomacy**, a concept that, in the words of one American practitioner, is based on the idea that "in a vibrant democracy, the individual citizen has the right—even the responsibility—to shape foreign relations" (S. L. Mueller 2009: 47). The important underlying premise here is that governments and citizens are, broadly speaking, in agreement about their country's direction, but that greater formal coordination between the two sectors is required.

This description of activities conducted by different public diplomacy actors can often be understood collectively as overlapping networks. Those who aim to enhance their power through public diplomacy have to take advantage of complex networks, make a good assessment of their own position in such networks, and interact effectively with other actors (Fisher 2010). This chapter's representation of public diplomacy's evolution is linked to international actors and their relationships. A contrasting view is offered by Castells (2008: 91), who regards public diplomacy as the **diplomacy of the public**. He argues that the "project behind the idea of public diplomacy is not to assert the power of a state or of a social actor in the form of 'soft power.' It is, instead, to harness the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures in the hope of sharing meaning and understanding." A growing number of governments are, indeed, showing awareness that they require a nimble public diplomacy, and not merely for narrow national interest, and are embracing normative themes such as global justice, human security, and issues related to the new international security agenda. The argument is that a more broad-minded public diplomacy, ultimately in states' own interests, should focus less on exclusively national goals but deliver more on common and global problems (Murphy 2008).

In sum, public diplomacy clearly is no longer the preserve of states, and states can actually learn a great deal from those who feel equally or even more at ease in a transnational network environment. This is particularly true with the use of new technologies that facilitate social networking (see Kurbalija, chapter 8 in this volume) and new, more experimental ways of working in diplomacy. One example is the growing popularity of experimentation with so-called DiploHacks—workshop-like sessions in which diplomats and other participants look for technological solutions to international policy challenges, such as in the field of development assistance. Social media are increasingly utilized not only by individual government ministers and practitioners on sites like Facebook and Twitter (as one would expect, @DiploHack can be found on Twitter) but also as strategic organizing tools that create communities of interest and offer opportunities for joint problem solving, such as by means of **crowdsourcing**. Strategists realize that public diplomacy should go where people are found, where debates that matter are taking place, and should arrive before such debates reach conventional media outlets. Social media are not miracle cures, but they empower both people and governments. And as we have seen in recent years, they have enormous potential for public diplomacy. Today's digital tools enable a single public diplomacy officer at an embassy to reach hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of people. Nevertheless, diplomatic establishments are adapting slowly. Most embassies around the world still have static websites, with no appeal to users of modern electronic media. Still, the number of diplomatic missions with fingers on the pulse of the times is growing, and we have only seen the beginning of how the technological revolution is affecting public diplomacy and other dimensions of diplomatic practice (Hocking and Melissen 2016)

KEY POINTS

- The public diplomacy of the heterogeneous group of intergovernmental organizations is characterized by procedures, purposes, and messages that are different from those of individual states.
- NGOs often collaborate with governments, but their modus operandi fit the international networking environment better than states' public diplomacy does.
- The corporate sector spends large sums of money on international reputation management and has much useful knowledge to offer governments.
- Governments increasingly require a public diplomacy that takes into account transnational and global problems.
- Fast-moving technological developments and the rise of everything digital are the new frontier of public diplomacy. This calls for a better conceptual understanding of diplomacy by practitioners in the digital age and by scholars in empirical studies.

BEYOND THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: EVOLVING CONCEPTS

During the last decade, many books and articles have attempted to define and update the concept of public diplomacy—for example, when new insights emerged or best practices were rediscovered from Cold War experience (Cull 2008; Gilboa 2008; Gregory 2008a; Melissen 2005; Potter 2009; Snow and Taylor 2009). During this process, many propositions about public diplomacy were found to be "old," such as the idea that public diplomacy is limited to foreign ministries' one-way communication *to* foreign publics. New propositions about public diplomacy aimed to make it a better fit for our time. For example, the dialogical or two-way-street exchange of listening and receiving was stressed. And more emphasis was placed on long-term relationship building (instead of largely defensive and policy-driven initiatives) and on collaborative activities with social actors, who were seen as being more credible interpreters and receivers than state representatives (Melissen 2005). Apart from the focus on relationship-based public diplomacy, recent research has also explored the cross-cultural dimension in greater depth (Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). Between 2005 and 2010, the academic debate—involving many the contributions of new arrivals—showed that the learning process from earlier discussions of public diplomacy had been somewhat fragmented and incoherent. As Fitzpatrick (2010: 88) rightly concludes, "To some degree, discussions of 'old' and 'new' public diplomacy have interfered with efforts to bring conceptual clarity." Critical discussion in the more recent public diplomacy literature has also rightly raised the question as to whether, or to what extent, empirical research confirms earlier normative writings on public diplomacy as a two-way street or interactive dialogue.

Recent discussions on public diplomacy reflect a growing consciousness inside foreign ministries that such diplomacy is often conditional upon the cultivation of extragovernmental networks and satisfactory collaboration with sub-national and domestic civil society actors (see Box 11-4). In the latter case, the assumption is that this "hidden-hand" approach to public diplomacy is not handicapped by the lack of legitimacy that is often associated with official representatives. On politically or culturally sensitive issues, as well as on matters involving religion, non-diplomats, or unofficial diplomats, often have more credibility to the eyes of individuals in foreign societies than the foreign government's accredited representatives, and their views are therefore more easily accepted as "right." Conceptual and theoretical issues, which have been insufficiently explored, remain with this approach, however, and two of these deserve mention here.

First, and briefly, most literature has failed to consider the engagement of domestic publics in the concept of public diplomacy (Bátora 2006; Huijgh 2010, 2016; Potter 2009). An interesting analogy can be made here. Just as generations of diplomacy students have largely overlooked consular affairs and, indeed, public diplomacy as important elements of overall diplomacy, many scholars today regard public diplomacy's domestic dimension as alien territory, or even an oxymoron. Scholars generally examine state-level practices directed toward foreign publics but resist analyzing the role of domestic publics in foreign policy formation—for instance, in foreign policy dialogues or policy ediscussions. Arguments for including domestic publics in conceptualizing public diplomacy have to be understood within broader changes in global society. The democratization of foreign policy making emphasizes the need for participation by domestic constituencies, because globalization and worldwide communications blur the boundaries between domestic and international publics and policy environments. Interestingly, the idea that the two variants of public diplomacy are two sides of the same coin has, from the start, received a particularly favorable reception in Asia (see Zhang, chapter 16 in this volume). Like the concept of citizen diplomacy, the domestic dimension of public diplomacy nevertheless remains a teaser for many academics wondering where the analytical boundaries lie between diplomacy and cross-cultural internationalism, or between diplomatic practice and domestic affairs (Gregory 2016).

BOX 11-4

Networked Public Diplomacy Going Dutch

From its inception in early 2012, "The Hague Peace and Justice Public Diplomacy Project" has been an example of a networked public diplomacy project initiated by a national actor and a local actor. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the municipality of The Hague joined forces in strengthening the Netherlands overall and The Hague specifically as a center of expertise in "peace and justice." The project capitalizes on an opportunity: Many decision makers, practitioners, and scholars in the field of peace and justice visit the Netherlands. Together with its stakeholders, the Project officers' approach is based on a shared purpose and the sharing of goals and instruments. Importantly, local network members include international organizations in the peace, justice, and security domains, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court; knowledge institutions; NGOs; and the media.

From the outset, building long-term societal relationships was at the heart of the project. Aligned stakeholder interests and shared aims are prerequisites for collaborative public diplomacy, but they do not suffice for success. Building a sense of urgency for action is needed. The Hague Project built this urgency by focusing on international conferences, dialogues at universities, encounters with journalists and bloggers, and on-the-ground discussions with representatives of affected communities. The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, attended by many world leaders, also offered momentum. The highest officials from the international courts and tribunals, Europol, EuroJust, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, focused on what they called "The Hague thinking".

Public diplomacy is not just for embassies. Initiatives like this one in the domestic environment can make a real difference, and they involve sustained project management. One key aspect of this particular project was that it was run by an "embedded professional" with access to the ministry of foreign affairs network of diplomatic posts, but moving freely and independently between stakeholders and participants.

FURTHER READING: de Beer and van Buitenen (2016).

A second issue that deserves further scrutiny is the concept of soft power, or **attractive power**, and the way in which soft power works and how it relates to public diplomacy. The term "soft power" has entered popular discourse, especially in North America, Europe, and Asia, and has been directly translated into several languages. Politicians often refer to its importance. Sometimes, however, the exchanges between scholars of international relations and students of public diplomacy appear like a dialogue of the deaf. Theorizing about soft power takes place mainly among international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts, who often turn a blind eye to diplomacy and, consequently, to public diplomacy (for literature on China's soft power, see Gill and Huang 2006; Kurlantzick 2007; Suzuki 2009). Public diplomacy scholars, meanwhile, have been inclined to use the notion rather loosely (Melissen 2005). The concept of soft power was developed by a practitioner-scholar, Joseph S. Nye (1990: 32), who referred to the importance of "intangible power resources, such as culture, ideology and institutions." Nye (2008b: 94) later defined soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment." What Nye (2004) did not sufficiently emphasize in his work in the 1990s and the early 2000s, however, is that states and other international actors, such as non-governmental and international organizations and regions, use public diplomacy to enhance their soft power. Nye's concept nevertheless has the potential to bring thinking on the nature of power in international relations closer to diplomacy, and the soft power concept has an intellectual pedigree that is, inter alia, based on accumulated wisdom in diplomatic practice. Nye built on the insights of such diverse predecessors as French statesman and diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, who stressed the importance of a nation's *réputation*, and the passionate realist theorist Edward Hallett Carr (1939), whose book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* pays substantial attention to "power over opinion."

Of particular interest to students of diplomacy is the criticism that Nye and his followers have paid too little attention to how soft power actually works through processes of transnational socialization, in spite of their early appreciation of societal and cultural factors of power (Nye 2002: 9). Nye recently met some of the critics of his soft power concept halfway, by placing more emphasis on the fact that soft power cannot simply be wielded by an actor possessing and projecting it but, rather, that "the subjects matter as much as the agents" and that attraction is "codetermined and persuasion is socially constructed" (Nye 2008a: x; see also Nye 2010: 219–21). After two decades, Nye (2011) synthesized his thinking on soft power, various other dimensions of power, and public diplomacy. Theoretical critiques, however, point out that the way soft power works may not always be clear in diffuse processes of social relations, and that an agent-focused approach risks neglecting the crucial socialization process that connects soft power and the mechanism of persuasion (Y. W. Lee 2011). Recognition that power is encapsulated in a complex pattern of reciprocal relationships may result in a more expanded power concept with roots in the discipline of sociology (B. Barnes 1988).

In the international sphere, the idea of **social power** presents itself as a challenger of soft power. It builds on a more contextual understanding of power, and it examines "the capacity to establish norms and rules around which actors' actions converge" (van Ham 2010: 8). The concepts of soft power and social power encapsulate the practice of public diplomacy. Diplomacy students' engagement in this scholarly debate may therefore encourage understanding of the relationship between public diplomacy and power, as well as strengthen the link between their academic field and the study of international relations within political science.

KEY POINTS

- Official public diplomacy often depends upon collaboration with civil society actors, who possess greater credibility and whose views are more easily accepted as "right."
- Paradoxically, domestic outreach expands a country's engagement with foreign publics, as well as challenging conventional wisdom about what public diplomacy is and what it is not.
- Debate about the concepts of soft power and social power, which incorporate public diplomacy, potentially strengthens dialogue between the study of diplomacy and international relations.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OUTSIDE THE WEST

In comparison with other aspects of diplomacy, exchange of research findings and best practices on public diplomacy exists among think tanks, academia, and government (Wilton Park 2010). Much recent learning about public diplomacy has taken place within the confines of the West. However, public diplomacy is not a solely occidental affair. The non-Western world's experiences are evidence that **culture** helps to shape and define public diplomacy, and that one can learn a great deal from public diplomacy as it unfolds in different settings—for instance, in East Asia (Melissen and Sohn 2015).

Several states outside North America and Europe have developed the idea of public diplomacy, but soft power and public diplomacy have become particularly fashionable in East Asia. In comparison with the West, the larger role of the state is a striking feature of the Asian flavor of public diplomacy, as is the case in other areas of international politics, and hence the smaller potential of civil society to play a meaningful role in public diplomacy. Important drivers behind East Asian governments' soft-power strategies are concerns about their perceived national identity and long-standing, unstable regional relationships. The most obvious challenge for China, Japan, and South Korea—the region's three leading economic powers—is that their soft power has a tendency not to keep pace with economic growth. Many people admire China's economic rise over the past decades, but that admiration has not made China a more attractive country in the eyes of foreign publics (Page and Xie 2011). And to their dismay, both Tokyo and Beijing have experienced that global public opinion can be confusingly fickle and inconstant, as the Chinese government famously found out in the glare of media attention during the 2008 Olympic Games (see box 11-5). Eight years later, in 2016, meticulous and, as many observers noted, disproportionate preparation to make the Hangzhou G20 summit hosted by China a success serves as a reminder that, albeit "with Chinese

BOX 11-5

China's Olympic Games

The 2008 Olympic Games provided China an opportunity to display itself as a great power on the rise. There was no public diplomacy master plan for Beijing's communication with the world, though, and the slogan "People's Olympics" in a sense showed that most official attention was on China's own population. Officials hoped that the games would help the world to "better understand China." However, foreign publics took a critical interest in what was going on within China's borders, in regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, and in issues such as human rights and the rule of law. As a result, the Chinese government learned several lessons from the 2008 games: that international cultural barriers can distort what is heard by those with another worldview, that the positive effect of sporting events on a country's image overseas is overrated, and that a patriotic overreaction to foreign criticism is likely to be counterproductive.

SOURCES: Brownell (2009); Manzenreiter (2010); J. Wang (2009).

characteristics," the Beijing leadership, is still prepared to go an extraordinarily long way in enhancing its global soft power.

Asians have learned from the accumulated public diplomacy experience in the United States and Europe, but the West can learn from Asian experiences, too. The importance of culture in public diplomacy has often been underestimated by the United States and European countries. Widely reported flaws in recent US public diplomacy are that it is too often crisis-driven and policy-oriented, suffers from a short-term perspective, is prone to one-way messaging, and is patronizing in relations with other parts of the world (Seib 2009). For years, the dominant US approach boiled down to exerting soft power in the hope of attracting others, instead of trying to cultivate long-term relationships and understand how foreign publics actually perceived the United States.

As well as taking notice of culture, Western public diplomacy should take account of relations across civilizations and religious divides. For a variety of reasons, Western public diplomacy in the Middle East—one of the world's least democratic and impenetrable regions—is simply more difficult than anywhere else. Recent turbulence there and in North Africa has not made things easier for Western public diplomacy strategists. Against the backdrop of a history of Western intervention and with today's terrorist threat permanently shadowing relations, public diplomacy aimed at the Middle East has produced few successes. Under President George W. Bush, the office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, created by his predecessor, Bill Clinton, in 1999, focused heavily on the region but failed miserably. Western military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with US and European policies toward Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have contributed to turning the Middle East into the real testing ground for public diplomacy. The appearance on the international scene of so-called IS, or Daesh, as an actor with an unexpected following from within Western societies, as well as the empowerment of more mainstream non-state actors by the use of social media, have confronted Western governments with a whole new set of challenges. It is important to bear in mind that most early twenty-first century academic thinking on public diplomacy antedates recent experiences with social media and the rise of an actor like IS that rejects diplomacy as an institution of the society of states.

Public diplomacy failures and successes in this complex theater have shed light on the requirements for effective strategies under adverse circumstances. State-of-the-art Western public diplomacy in the Middle East may even give a glimpse of future conditions for success. In terms of policy learning, and following insights from academia, it has led to explicit differentiation between government-initiated public diplomacy and non-state actor public diplomacy. The latter activity is continuing in multiple transnational networks; civil society organizations and people from the Arab and Islamic world are active public diplomacy participants at the center of events (van Doeveren 2011). Nimble governments recognize their lack of legitimacy in such transnational networks, in which an actor's power is increasingly defined by "who is connected to whom and for what purposes" (Slaughter 2009: 112). In the early twenty-first century, most governments, however, have been struggling to adapt to such new realities.

KEY POINTS

- The experiences of the non-Western world demonstrate that one can learn a great deal from public diplomacy as it unfolds in different settings.
- In East Asian public diplomacy, the role of the state is larger, and civil society's potential to have an effect on public diplomacy is smaller, than in the West.
- Recent experience has led to differentiation between government-initiated and non-state actor public diplomacy in transnational networks.

CONCLUSION

A variety of complex public diplomacy puzzles reveals what some countries have learned the hard way: public diplomacy offers no easy answers or quick solutions. It is hard to establish the kind of causal links that would demonstrate the effectiveness of specific public diplomacy policy actions. And public diplomacy literature rarely questions public diplomacy's effectiveness in the way that diplomats do, looking at things from a purely practical viewpoint and confronted with public diplomacy's limitations on a daily basis. Whether or not public diplomacy "works" is a question that is also at the forefront of the minds of people who make decisions about allocating resources, but another fundamental reason underscores the case for public diplomacy. Only governments that would settle for the unimaginable—that is, mastering the art of diplomacy as it was practiced yesterday—could theoretically opt out of the game. Conversely, public diplomacy can only be properly understood if it is analyzed in the context of change in diplomacy at large. One consequence of this evolutionary process is that it will be more difficult to distinguish between diplomacy and public diplomacy, as the two practices are in the process of morphing into a more inclusive mode of diplomacy.

Future public diplomacy is likely to be more culturally sensitive. It will build to a greater extent on the legitimacy of non-governmental actors as well as the efficacy of extragovernmental networks and partnerships, and there is no doubt whatsoever that it will be more high-tech. Yet the future of public diplomacy is not free from paradoxes. Governments are adjusting to public diplomacy's "newness," and probably will aim to develop a more forward-looking public diplomacy in the wider context of overall foreign policy strategy. Simultaneously, however, the credibility of official public diplomacy, looking for clear deliverables, depends on the involvement of sometimes fickle civil society actors that are reluctant to give up their autonomy.

Furthermore, the required coherence of public diplomacy narratives will compel states, and other official actors, to reflect on identity issues and their specific aspirations in unfolding global controversies. The flip side is that such debates will take the same actors out of their comfort zone of relative control and into a democratic arena, where issues are being politicized and argued. On the one hand, authoritarian states are confronted with the limits of state influence and the challenge of moving the needle of foreign perceptions in a world that is progressively transnational and empowers individuals more than ever before. On the other hand, at the opening of the digital age, the technological savviness of non-democratic governments and non-state actors challenging states, or even the international order itself, should not be underestimated. Influencing foreign publics has not become any easier.

QUESTIONS

1. How is public diplomacy part of broader changes in diplomatic practice?
2. What are the obstacles in measuring public diplomacy's effectiveness?
3. What can be learned from comparing best practices and failures in public diplomacy?
4. What are the constraints and possibilities for public diplomacy in the new global communications environment?
5. What are the arguments for and against a conceptual distinction and separate approach for "foreign" and "domestic" activities in public diplomacy?
6. Compare and contrast the public diplomacy of substate actors with the same activity by nation-states.
7. How are the concepts of public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy related?
8. Does the West provide a model of public diplomacy that can be usefully emulated by non-Western countries?
9. How can Western states' public diplomacy with the Arab and Islamic world serve their national interest without compromising their legitimacy?
10. Are China's lack of democracy and human rights record obstacles to the development of a successful public diplomacy?
11. Do you agree that public diplomacy's importance is overstated by governments, international organizations, and scholars?
12. How has the process of digitization changed the playing field for global public diplomacy?
13. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

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NOTE

1. The modern period stretches from the establishment of the resident embassy in Renaissance Italy to the rise of summitry after the Second World War and diplomacy's multilateralization in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 12

Economic Diplomacy

Stephen Woolcock

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- What is economic diplomacy?
- What makes economic diplomacy important?
- Is economic diplomacy distinctive?
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter suggests we should adopt a definition of economic diplomacy that is selectively broad and takes account of how process shapes outcomes. We should understand economic diplomacy as a process of decision making and negotiation in international economic relations focused on core issues such as trade, investment, and finance. Economic diplomacy applies in particular to the negotiation of the framework within which international economic relations exist—in other words, rules, regimes, and norms as reflected in binding or voluntary agreements—as well as to discrete negotiations that affect the creation and distribution of international economic activity. From this perspective, we can argue that economic diplomacy in a globalizing world is becoming increasingly important, and, interestingly, may well differ from general diplomacy or traditional understandings of contemporary diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses what we should understand by the term "economic diplomacy." It first defines the term, stressing that economic diplomacy should be understood as decision making and negotiation in core issues of international economic relations (see Zartman, chapter 6 in this volume). Then, it sets out reasons why economic diplomacy has become more important. The chapter argues that increased **interdependence** of national economies has necessitated more active negotiation of the **open, rules-based international economic order** of the world today. Economic diplomacy is therefore central to the creation and maintenance of such an order. This is possibly uncontentious within the field of international political economy, but a more challenging question is whether there is something distinctive about economic diplomacy as opposed to general diplomacy—that is, the traditional understanding of diplomacy as an institution centered on the ministry of foreign affairs and professional diplomats who, inter alia, negotiate and implement states' political and security foreign policies. This is an important claim in the context of the current volume on diplomacy; therefore, the chapter also considers ways in which economic diplomacy could be seen to differ from general diplomacy. As in the treatment of the topic of economic diplomacy as a whole, the focus is more on the process of decision making and negotiation than on the relative importance of economics in international relations. Rather than presenting only a definition of what economic diplomacy is, the chapter seeks to illustrate the main arguments with reference to examples.

The chapter argues that economic diplomacy, as defined here, has become more important for a number of reasons. First, in the prevailing open, rules-based international economic order, domestic economic objectives now rely more than ever on international cooperation. Second, this cooperation can no longer be achieved through the exercise of economic hegemony, or thanks to the leadership or combined normative power of the "Western capitalist" economies grouped in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) "club model" that shaped much of international economic relations until the turn of the twenty-first century. The international (or global) economy today is multipolar, and more so than the international system. The cooperation required to sustain a stable, open, international economic system therefore requires a more active economic diplomacy to negotiate outcomes among states with rather more varied interests and normative views or to form more fluid coalitions of states than was the case in the OECD-dominated order. Finally, the chapter suggests that what distinguishes economic from general diplomacy is the greater variety and number of actors involved, that markets are endogenous to decision making, and that the rules-based system means binding **regimes** are relatively more important.

KEY POINTS

- Economic diplomacy should be understood as decision making and negotiation in core issues of international economic relations.
- As defined here, it has become more important as a means of creating and maintaining the open, rules-based international economic order on which economic globalization is founded.
- Economic diplomacy as a process differs from general diplomacy.

even say grand—strategy. Third, the definition suggested here would not include "commercial diplomacy," which best describes the actions of governments in promoting investment or seeking contracts or orders for companies based in the home state. In other words, it is the use of foreign service capability to support commercial interests. Economic diplomacy facilitates trade and investment by negotiating market access, rules, or agreed-upon norms and standards but does not extend to "looking for business," which continues to be undertaken by many countries, such as through trade delegations led by a head of state or minister.

The definition used here also relates to the process of decision making and negotiation in international economic relations rather than the substance, which would fall under trade or financial policy (Okano-Heijmans 2011b: 15) and is perhaps more accurately defined by the term "foreign economic policy." An analysis of economic diplomacy therefore implies a study of how the process shapes the outcomes. Typically, research would compare negotiations in which the structure of power and interests are essentially the same but the outcomes are different. One example would be a comparison of the Cancún World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in September 2003, which collapsed, and the negotiations on the so-called Framework for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations in Geneva in July 2004 (see box 12-1). Another example of where process has been central to outcomes is climate change negotiations. In 2009, the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP) on the Climate Change Convention ended in a failure, but in 2016, there was a (qualified) success in Paris. The way the negotiations were conducted, along with some substantive changes in preferences, played an important role in this difference. The rationale for such an economic diplomacy approach is that process matters, and a case can clearly be made that process issues, rather than the structure of interests, are factors in shaping international economic relations. Again, trade negotiations can be used as an example here (see box 12-1). This definition of economic diplomacy clearly locates it in the nexus of international political economy and international institutions.

BOX 12-1

Process Shapes International Economic Relations

The current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of the WTO offers welfare gains for all participants, so a rationalist economic analysis would suggest all parties should have an interest in achieving an agreement. The nature of the negotiation—a largely conventional market-access negotiation covering nonagricultural market access, agriculture, and perhaps services—was more straightforward than the previous Uruguay Round. But it has not been possible to conclude the DDA, whereas the Uruguay Round was successfully concluded. While there are many factors at work here, the way in which the parties have gone about the negotiation and how the parties responded to domestic pressures have clearly been one fairly important factor in the DDA outcome.

KEY POINTS

- Economic diplomacy is made up of subfields, such as trade, financial, and environmental diplomacy, and both decision making and negotiation differ between them.
- It is important to note what is *not* included in economic diplomacy.
- An analysis of economic diplomacy implies a study of how the process shapes outcomes and in-depth comparison of negotiations in which the structure of power and interests are essentially the same but the outcomes differ.

WHAT MAKES ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IMPORTANT?

There are several reasons for arguing that economic diplomacy has become more important and, therefore, deserving of some distinctive treatment. This section summarizes a number of these reasons.

The Need to Reconcile Domestic and International Policy

All international relations, and therefore all diplomacy, require international policy to be reconciled with domestic policies. In the case of economic diplomacy, the need is arguably greater, because with the progression in international economic interdependence toward globalization, the ability to deliver in key areas of domestic policy has become dependent on international policies. Economic growth, jobs, investment, financial stability, and environmental aims depend on cooperation and, thus, on the outcome of economic diplomacy. This tends to make the interface more immediate. In foreign policy, a country's negotiating position or policy may be constrained by domestic policy considerations, and at the extreme, governments may stand or fall as a result of a foreign policy. But with globalization, the achievement of a range of domestic policy objectives has come to depend more and more on economic diplomacy.

Solutions to Challenges Facing National Governments Require International Cooperation

A related point to the one above is that it is no longer possible to find responses to challenges purely through domestic policy. Financial stability and global warming provide the most obvious examples of this, but they are by no means the only ones. Given the degree of interdependence of financial markets, no country, neither the United States nor even the European Union (EU) alone, was in a position to reestablish stability in financial markets following the 2007–8 financial crisis. Nor was it possible to deal with the effects of this crisis on the real economy without international cooperation. Future financial crises will also only avoided, or their impact at least diminished, only through cooperation in establishing regulatory standards for the financial sector.

The environment provides another example of how domestic policies are no longer an adequate response to challenges such as global warming. Reductions of carbon and other emissions in the EU, even if substantial, will have no impact on global warming if other countries fail to act. Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, is that the maintenance of a stable and open international trade and investment regime is now arguably a prerequisite for wealth creation and jobs. Although all states can theoretically withdraw from international markets, this is only possible at considerable cost. Even the largest economies, including the United States, China, and the EU as a single market, now depend on companies engaged in global supply chains for their growth and employment.

Increased Need for Negotiated Solutions

Economic diplomacy is now relatively more important because of the greater need for negotiated solutions to the challenges of international economic relations. In the multipolar international economy of the twenty-first century, coercion, or even dominance, by a group of key economies, such as the OECD, is no longer a viable approach. In the past, a hegemon could ensure provision of the international **public goods** required to maintain a stable international economy. And while the pros and cons of **hegemonic stability theory** or leadership can be discussed, there seems little doubt that the United States largely shaped the Western capitalist international economic order in the immediate postwar years. As US hegemony waned, it was replaced by the US-led club model, as exemplified by the OECD, the **Quad**, and the **Group of Seven (G7)**. Although of somewhat different compositions, these clubs or coalitions of relatively like-minded countries were then able to shape international economic relations (see box 12-2).

In the field of financial diplomacy, the G7 constituted the club model approach to cooperation (albeit not always sufficient) to manage the world economy after the floating of exchange rates from 1973. There has been a strong trans-Atlantic bias in trade, investment, and financial diplomacy, with policy cooperation between the United States and European members of GATT, the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and G7 tending to dominate. Japan was of course a member of the club but generally not proactive in seeking to shape the norms. This

BOX 12-2

The OECD in International Economic Relations

The OECD developed (largely voluntary) norms and standards for cooperation that were subsequently applied in more binding international rules. The OECD's work in the 1970s on technical barriers to trade and government procurement was transferred to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Tokyo Round. The OECD work on agriculture, services, and investment in the 1980s shaped GATT negotiations during the Uruguay Round. In terms of investment norms developed in the OECD during the 1960s, the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad was used as the basis for bilateral investment agreements negotiated by the European states in the following decades. Later work in the OECD formed the basis for the approach to investment provisions in a range of comprehensive preferential trade and investment agreements that have shaped investment rules despite the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).

trans-Atlantic–based system continued well into the 1990s in trade, with the United States and the EU in particular shaping the Uruguay Round. In financial diplomacy, it endured even longer, until the financial crisis of 2007–8, when it became clear that solutions could not be found without wider participation. Although in the case of financial market regulation, it could be argued that there was still a dominant trans-Atlantic dimension even in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Since the turn of the century, however, the trans-Atlantic system has become progressively less viable. In the case of trade, the emergence of China and India and the activism of Brazil have meant that agreement in international trade now requires the support of these countries and, most probably, other bloc coalitions, such as the Africa Group. For India and Brazil, the desire to have a greater role is not new. They have always sought more influence, but until their economic growth enhanced their market power, they had little impact. Today, the **Group of Twenty (G20)**, established in mid-2003, now has both the market power and the will to challenge the prevailing OECD hegemony.[2]

The result of these structural changes in international economic relations is that outcomes now need to be negotiated. It is no longer possible for a hegemon to shape through leadership, or to coerce other parties to cooperate. Nor is it possible for the OECD club to shape the norms for others to follow. Outcomes now need to be negotiated, because solutions are no longer possible without the "buy-in" from other major emerging or developing countries. There was of course negotiation in the OECD club. Indeed, OECD codes or norms often only emerged after many years of dialogue and debate among the members. But the OECD/Western club consisted of more or less like-minded countries. In the international economy of today, one cannot assume that all the major players have like minds. Negotiations therefore have also become more complex.

Shaping the Nature of the International Economic Order

Economic diplomacy is also important, because it has an impact on the shape and nature of the international economic order, whether liberal or **mercantilist**, rules-based or power-based, cooperative or anarchic. The general trends in the international economic order, such as from the **embedded liberalism** of the immediate post–Second World War systems to the liberal paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, are clearly shaped by many factors captured by international political economy. But insofar as the process of negotiations shapes outcomes, so, too, does economic diplomacy.

With the development of a dense network of regimes, economic diplomacy also determines the interaction between these in a form of multifora diplomacy. For example, the response to the 2007-8 financial crisis took the form of commitments in the G20 summits that were acted upon in the IMF, the Financial Stability Board, and the various specialist regulatory bodies dealing with banking, securities, and accounting standards. In the fields of trade and investment, the international rules and norms are shaped in a number of different fora, from the multilateral WTO through **plurilateral negotiations** such as the Trade in Services Agreement to regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements. There are spillovers from one forum to another that shape and are shaped by the strategies of some of the major states and actors.

The End of High and Low Politics

After 1990, economic diplomacy has also become more important with the end of the distinction between "high politics" and "low politics" that prevailed during the Cold War. During much of the 1950s and especially, the 1960s, when the Cold War was at its deepest, policy makers and analysts distinguished between the high politics of national security and foreign policy and the low politics of international economic relations.

The end of the Cold War finally brought an end to this distinction. New security threats were identified, such as international crime, terrorism, and more recently, global warming. And there has been a "securitization of international economic relations," meaning that aspects of international economic relations are defined in terms of their impact on security. For example, the stability of the international financial system—or, rather, the lack of it—is seen as a threat to the security of the Western capitalist system and, thus, to **nation-states** that rely on this system for their wealth and prosperity. The concept of "collective security" has been used in the context of the effects of economic underdevelopment as well. For example, economic underdevelopment is seen as one cause of political instability in developing or middle-income countries that can, in turn, lead to destabilizing outward migration or terrorism, as has become all too apparent in recent years.

Such securitization of international economic relations and development, however, can distort the debate. By definition, such a securitization is concerned with a treatment of economic relations that is near the security end of the spectrum. Economic diplomacy as defined in this chapter is more concerned with wealth creation and its distribution, which requires proper consideration of economic means and objectives and should therefore be placed in the center of the spectrum. A simpler way of putting it is to say that international economic relations have become relatively more important since the end of the Cold War and the deepening of economic interdependence and globalization. The fact that populist pressures are now leading some governments to reassess their policies makes economic diplomacy, or how states respond to such pressures, more rather than less important.

KEY POINTS

- Economic diplomacy is increasing in importance for several reasons.
- With globalization, the achievement of domestic policies has come to depend more and more on economic diplomacy.
- It is no longer possible to find responses to challenges purely through domestic policy.
- There is a greater need for negotiated solutions to the challenges of international economic relations.
- Economic diplomacy has an important impact on the shape and nature of the international economic order.
- Since the end of the Cold War and the deepening of economic interdependence or globalization, international economic relations have become high politics.

IS ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY DISTINCTIVE?

Can economic diplomacy be seen as distinctive, as a separate field of analysis or study, or is it simply part and parcel of diplomacy? In many respects, the differences between economic diplomacy and general diplomacy have been addressed earlier in this chapter. Diplomacy tends to be associated with general political relations, with the more or less formal relations between states, and with reconciliation of the political aims and objectives of nation-states. Economic diplomacy is concerned with reconciling domestic and international economic policies. A more difficult question is, then, whether there is a distinction between economic diplomacy and "foreign economic policy." While there appears to be no clear definition of the latter term, it is generally concerned with the content of policy rather than with the process of decision making and negotiation. It has also tended to be used in the context of the foreign policies of specific states, and so tends to cover similar ground to that of economic statecraft and appears to be more toward the security/foreign policy end of the spectrum discussed earlier (Bergsten 2004; M. Smith 2004). Where foreign economic policy focuses on how decisions are taken or the factors shaping such policy, there would be little difference between it and what we have called economic diplomacy.

While a distinction can be made between the more substantive nature of foreign economic policy or foreign policy, on the one hand, and the more process nature of economic diplomacy, on the other, similar approaches are used to analyze the two. For example, it is normal to use rationalist, realist, domestic/institutional, **constructivist,** or **two-level game** approaches for both. The study of economic diplomacy may also use **regime theory** or international institutions theory to assess how these shape, and are shaped by, economic negotiations (Bayne and Woolcock 2016; Woolcock 2011;). But these various analytical approaches have been adapted and applied to look at the process of negotiation (Odell 2000; Sebenius 1983). Negotiation analysis has also been used to some effect in analyzing economic diplomacy. First developed for business negotiations, there is now a growing literature on the application of negotiation analysis to international economic negotiations (Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins 2006). More recently, there has also been work in Europe on the issue of the EU (Dür and Elsig 2011; Woolcock 2012).

More Actors Involved

Economic diplomacy is distinctive in the sense that it tends to involve more actors than general diplomacy does. There is of course a trend toward a greater number of actors in all forms of diplomacy, but it could be argued that this is especially true for economic diplomacy. In general diplomacy, the ministry of foreign affairs is still central to any analysis. This is not the case for economic diplomacy. Foreign ministries are seldom in control of economic diplomacy and often struggle to retain a role, or even an overview, of what is going on.

This is not to say that ministries of foreign affairs are not involved at all. For example, in **economic summitry,** ministries of foreign affairs often fulfill important coordinating functions, such as through the political **sous-sherpas** of the **Group of Eight (G8)** or in the G20 summits. Note, however, that even here, overall coordination is generally undertaken by the main sherpas, who in many cases are located in the offices of the head of state or government, such as in the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom, the White House in the United States, or the Kanzleramt in Germany. When economic issues are discussed alongside broader foreign policy issues, such as in the G8, ministries of foreign affairs have a greater coordinating role. The G7 and G8 process has quite often linked economic and political or foreign policy issues, although the agenda has passed through various cycles. Originally, the G7 was about economic relations. During the 1980s, there was more emphasis on foreign and security policy issues, as the United States under President Ronald Reagan and the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stressed that the main way of addressing international economic challenges was to put one's own house in order. The end of the Cold War brought economic issues back with support for countries undergoing transition. The 2000s saw a shift toward concern about those countries that had not benefited from globalization. These were mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, hence the various initiatives aimed at supporting African development. With the response to the 2007–8 financial crisis, the cycle has come back to international finance in the G20 (Bayne 2011).

It is also important to recognize that in the normal course of events, political-level negotiations follow more technical work. Typically, negotiations start with a technical working group to explore the scope of future negotiations and the prospects of a mutually beneficial agreement. This stage in any negotiation is important, as this is when the issues are framed and the agenda is influenced. But the work is generally carried out by technical experts. When negotiations proper begin, they are often broken into various negotiating groups, with officials taking the lead. Only at a later stage, when there is a need to strike deals or make trade-offs between different issues, will ministers become more involved in the detail of negotiations.

It is also helpful to consider the differences between countries. Some have significant institutional or administrative capacity, and some, such as the least developed countries, have very little. In the smaller developing or even least developed countries, a lot of the heavy lifting in terms of economic negotiations may well be done by the foreign service, either because of limited international expertise in other ministries or because of limited resources for officials to participate in international negotiations. Thus, **ambassadors** from developing or least developed countries are often involved in WTO negotiations in Geneva. As ambassadors tend to be generalist or experts in general diplomacy, they will not be the best placed to deal with technical issues and will find themselves sitting across from expert officials sent by the larger or more developed countries. This raises important questions for the economic diplomacy of developing countries, such as how to make best use of limited capacity or how to adapt "classical" forms of the foreign service to deal with technical, specialist economic negotiations. Given that "the devil is in the details" in much economic diplomacy, failure to address this issue can put the least developed countries at a disadvantage.

General diplomatic skills are not enough when it comes to negotiating detailed provisions in trade or other agreements. Often, the more mundane issues, such as rules of origin in trade agreements, can have a major impact on trade. A lack of technical background or limited knowledge of the costs and benefits of any economic negotiation can also influence the negotiating positions adopted by agents. All negotiators must operate under conditions of "bounded rationality,"—that is, limited, or at least incomplete, knowledge of the economic implications of any agreement. But this will tend to be more the case for developing country negotiators with a classical diplomatic training and little, if any, research capacity to draw on. When unsure about the costs and benefits of any agreement, the prudent negotiator will adopt defensive positions, prefer to defer or block new initiatives, and keep the debate on more political or ideological issues that require less technical expertise. Such defensive positions then put a break on negotiations (for two different standpoints, see Rana 2017; Soobramanien 2017).

Leaving aside these qualifications, the main point here is that economic diplomacy is distinctive, in that it generally involves and is often led by ministries other than the ministry of foreign affairs. These economic diplomacy negotiations are undertaken directly with their opposite numbers in other countries or in **multilateral**, regional, or bilateral negotiations with the aim of reconciling domestic and international policy objectives and, therefore, constitute diplomacy, although not general diplomacy.

The picture varies from policy area to policy area, as intimated earlier. In the case of trade, negotiations are led either by a specialist trade ministry or, for some cases that have recognized the growing importance of economic issues, by a merged ministry of foreign affairs and trade. This is more often the case among smaller countries, but not always. Canada and New Zealand, for example, have long had a combined ministry of trade and foreign affairs. There appears to be something of a trend toward such mergers, with more developing countries moving to merge trade or external economic relations and foreign policy. Kenya with its new constitution is an example. In the ministries that lead on trade, there will also be a distinction between technical- and political-level negotiations. As noted earlier, the real substance of trade diplomacy generally concerns detailed issues, such as schedules on market access or rules on how to discipline national regulatory policies. Negotiations of this type are, for the most part, conducted by specialist officials. Only in the critical stages of trade negotiations, when cross-issue bargains need to be struck, will ministers engage in detailed negotiations. For example, substantive negotiations for the current twenty-eight member states of the EU (expected soon to be twenty-seven) are frequently conducted by officials at the level of heads of units, which is three levels down from the political level of European Commissioner.[3]

Ministries of finance have, if anything, more autonomy in conducting financial diplomacy than is the case in trade diplomacy. The shift to the G20 as the principle forum for financial diplomacy has tended to consolidate the role of ministries of finance, in the sense that they have been leading on G20 issues since the original G20 finance ministers forum was established in 1999. The G20 summits, which also include the central banks of the countries concerned, work on the basis of detailed economic analysis, for which ministries of foreign affairs have no competence.

International environmental diplomacy is also conducted, for the most part, by specialist ministries. Again, as for the case of trade, much of negotiation concerns detailed technical issues and is conducted by expert officials. On issues such as climate change, it is the technical specialists in the ministries of environment (or specialist climate change departments) who have the institutional memory and negotiating capacity. Much of the early or preparatory negotiation on issues such as climate change is conducted in technical working groups that can last for weeks at a time. Ministers will get involved in political-level negotiations in which consolidated texts or agreements are produced. Given the high political salience of some issues, heads of state and government may then get involved, as in the case of the Paris COP on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 2016. This can create coordination problems between the three levels (technical, ministerial, and heads of government) that can lead to difficulties, such as during the 2009 COP in Copenhagen (Christiansen 2011).

In the case of economic diplomacy, therefore, the institutional memory and negotiating capacity are dispersed throughout government. This need not mean decentralized decision making, and there would generally be interministerial or departmental coordination to ensure that the views of all the relevant ministries are fed into the negotiations. But it does mean that economic diplomacy requires a greater degree of such coordination than in the case of foreign policy diplomacy.

In addition to negotiations being led and conducted by various ministries within government, agents outside of government also engage in economic diplomacy. These can take the form of public—or quasi-public—agencies or private, nongovernmental actors. An example of the former would be independent central banks or financial regulators. Central banks are engaged in economic diplomacy in a more or less structured form, have engaged in financial diplomacy for decades in the Bank for International Settlements, and play a key role alongside ministries of finance in bodies such as the Financial Stability Board, which has the task of coordinating financial market regulation in the wake of the 2007–8 financial crisis. Independent regulatory agencies are also actively engaged in economic diplomacy in the field of international finance through organizations such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. These bodies are key, both developing and implementing regulatory standards for financial markets. When it comes to international accounting standards, it is a private organization, the International Accounting Standards Board, that plays a leading role in economic diplomacy. Adjustments to accounting standards were one of the important responses to the 2007–8 financial crisis: Because the accounting standards used at the time of the crisis measured the value of assets on the market, the financial crisis resulted in a lower valuation of bank assets, which had a pro-cyclical effect. In other words, as the market value of assets fell during the crisis, the financial institutions had to either sell assets or retain existing capital in order to maintain a sufficient level of capital adequacy. This in turn exacerbated the credit crunch for the financial institutions. Another example of purely private, market operators playing an important role in policy can be found in the credit rating agencies; although it would be a stretch to say that these engage in economic diplomacy, their decisions can have profound implications on financial markets.

In other sectors of the economy, quasi-public bodies such as standards bodies are negotiating international standards in organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical

Commission. These standards influence national regulatory policies on safety and environmental standards that facilitate production operations in different countries by providing, for example, common quality standards. Similarly, standards developed in the Codex Alimentarius Commission of the World Health Organization are important in setting standards for food and animal health and provide a vital input into policy debates on issues such as the use of genetically modified crops, national sanitary and phytosanitary controls, and the uses of biotechnology.

The private sector and civil society NGOs are, of course, also engaged as actors in economic diplomacy (see box 12-3). In most cases, this is through lobbying or seeking to influence governments or international organizations. But in some cases, there is coordination and policy making within the private sector, as in the case of international accounting standards mentioned earlier.

Markets Endogenous to Policy

Another distinctive feature of economic diplomacy is that markets are endogenous. In other words, economic diplomacy is shaped by, and shapes, developments in markets to such a degree that markets themselves become "actors" in the policy process. In a predominantly liberal order of global markets, this impact of markets has become arguably more pronounced.

Again, the financial sector provides a very clear illustration of how markets are endogenous to international financial diplomacy. The response to the 2007–8 and other financial crises shows how decision making and negotiation are geared to influence markets but, at the same time, are driven by markets. On occasions, financial diplomacy has had to be conducted over the weekend, before financial markets open on the following Monday, in an effort to stabilize markets and minimize the risks of bank failures or, in the case of sovereign debt negotiations, the ultimate costs to the taxpayer in terms of bailing out troubled financial institutions or states.

Markets play a similar role in trade and investment diplomacy, but with somewhat longer-term effects. As nation-states compete less in exporting products and more in attracting foreign investment and, thus, for economic activity and jobs, investment negotiations can have an important impact. Although the effect of investment agreements has probably been overstated in much of the policy debate, governments have been motivated to negotiate bilateral investment agreements, or to include investment in preferential trade agreements, at least in part by a desire to attract inward investment. The real or perceived threat of companies moving elsewhere

BOX 12-3

The Kimberley Process

The Kimberley process—which involved the regulation and control of the trade in diamonds in order to ensure that "blood diamonds" produced to fund insurgencies in various sub-Saharan African countries did not find their way onto international markets—was essentially negotiated by the participating states, the main diamond trading companies, and some leading civil society NGOs.

is also a factor in a wide range of regulatory policies, from social and environmental policies to the protection of intellectual property rights. The financial services sector is yet again a recent example of this effect. Efforts to strengthen the regulation of financial markets and reduce the risk of a further international financial crisis have led governments to seek tighter regulation of the financial sector. But tighter regulation in one market can be perceived, or presented, as driving market activity to other financial centers that have lower regulatory standards or enforce regulation less rigorously. Governments then, because of market pressure, seek international cooperation to ensure that the regulatory standards are more or less equivalent in all the major markets. In other words, there is a desire to ensure that international financial market regulation is compatible with domestic policies. Here is a clear example of the need in economic diplomacy to reconcile domestic and international policy.

The endogenous nature of markets in economic diplomacy can also be illustrated in the field of environmental diplomacy, through the effects of what is termed "carbon leakage." This occurs when investment, and thus production, in carbon-intensive processes move from a jurisdiction in which greenhouse gases are relatively tightly regulated or taxed to a location of less control or lower taxation. In this case, markets are endogenous to decision making and negotiation of international environmental policies, because in the absence of a comprehensive international agreement on climate change, market forces will result in increased costs for countries introducing policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, it is the economic costs of environmental policy that justify including environmental diplomacy under the general heading of economic diplomacy.

More Focus on Value Creation?

Another possible distinguishing feature of economic diplomacy is that it tends to be more concerned with value creation than with value claiming. This feature is less clear-cut, since economic diplomacy can also be driven by **mercantilist** objectives concerned with relative gains and the trend in some countries during recent years points to a revival of more **mercantilist relative gains** rhetoric. But in a predominantly **liberal international economic order**, wealth creation through increased trade and investment is a central motivating factor in international negotiations. The growth of national economies in an interdependent or global economy depends on international efforts to cooperate. Economic growth, through increased trade and investment, requires cooperation in international trade or investment policies that increase mutually beneficial trade and are therefore value creating.

Economic diplomacy always, however, involves elements of value claiming as well as value creating. For example, virtually all international economic negotiations have **reciprocity** as an explicit or implicit objective. Trade negotiations are based on reciprocal market openings, even if the position of developing countries is recognized by expecting less-than-full reciprocity from them. Climate change negotiations are based on common, but differentiated, commitments from all countries. In negotiations on how to reduce macroeconomic imbalances in the world economy, there is an expectation that both surplus and deficit countries will contribute. But the pursuit of excessive value claiming would not be compatible with a predominantly liberal economic order. Therefore, any distinction between a predominantly value-creating economic diplomacy and a more value-claiming diplomacy clearly is only relative and depends on the continuation of a predominant liberal economic order, compared with a more realist, balance-of-power based view of foreign and security policy.

Regimes Play a Bigger Role

Another distinguishing feature of economic diplomacy is that it is more concerned with negotiating rules. As discussed earlier, in some fields of economic diplomacy, rules or regimes have become more binding on national governments. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, for example, resulted in trade rules that were both binding on national governments and enforceable through the equally binding WTO dispute settlement procedures. Subsequently, there has been a significant increase in preferential or free trade agreements that are equally binding on national governments and clearly impose real limits on national policy autonomy. In investment, bilateral investment treaties or provisions in some of the major preferential trade and investment agreements have resulted in a rules-based system for investment that is enforceable by international arbitration panels. Failure to provide adequate protection for foreign investors can result in states being required to pay substantial financial compensation to the companies concerned.

In the field of finance, regimes have been less binding, although again, in the wake of the 2007–8 and other financial crises, there have been efforts to strengthen the various codes or standards. In environmental policy, the picture is mixed, with a trend toward binding agreements in some fields, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its recent extension to cover hydroflourocarbons, but less in other areas of climate change, as illustrated by the non-binding Paris COP targets for reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Compared with international relations in general, however, international economics appears to have a denser network of relatively binding regimes. In foreign policy, nation-states have been much more reluctant to commit to binding regimes.

Where binding international regimes have been negotiated, this creates a clear obligation to bring domestic policy and legislation in line with international obligations. Thus, economic diplomacy implies a more immediate link between domestic and international policies. Foreign policy or diplomacy is clearly also related to domestic politics (for example, domestic support for a particular policy or action), but the domestic pressures concerned are more often political (but no less important to a government) and less based on legislation.

KEY POINTS

- Economic diplomacy is distinctive from general or traditional diplomacy for a number of reasons.
- It involves more actors than general diplomacy and is often led by ministries other than the ministry of foreign affairs.
- Negotiations are often conducted by specialist officials.
- Because many actors are involved, it requires greater coordination than foreign policy diplomacy; many agents outside of governments involved in economic diplomacy.

- It is shaped by, and shapes, markets, and is more concerned with value creation than with value claiming.
- It is more focused on negotiating regimes than foreign policy negotiations are, and it makes greater use of multilateral or plurilateral negotiations compared with the greater use of bilateralism in political and security foreign policy diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

Economic diplomacy is concerned with decision making and negotiation of core issues in international economic relations. Such a definition enables us to focus on the activities of governments and other actors that seek to promote stable, sustainable economic growth in a predominantly liberal global economy. In such a global economy, national economic objectives cannot be achieved without international cooperation, hence the focus of economic diplomacy on reconciling domestic policies and international policies and obligations. Given the inevitable linkages between economic and political relations, it is helpful to focus on the use of economic instruments for economic ends and to exclude the use of economic instruments or leverage for immediate political or foreign policy objectives. Political or foreign policy considerations will still be a factor in all economic diplomacy, however, such as when the promotion of stronger economic relations is seen as a means of promoting stability in a country or region or of consolidating political relations with a strategic partner. Equally, it is suggested that the business end of the spectrum, what has been referred to here as commercial diplomacy, be excluded from the definition.

Economic diplomacy has become more important as a result of globalization, because domestic economic objectives now more than ever rely on international cooperation, thus requiring governments to reconcile the two. Economic diplomacy is also more important when it comes to defending the open, rules-based liberal economic order on which globalization is based. If the growing populist backlash against globalization is to be contained, it will also require effective economic diplomacy that can manage the pressures of economic nationalism and retain support for the maintenance of international public goods. It has also been argued that economic diplomacy has become more important because of the emergence of a multipolar international economic order, in which negotiation has had to replace hegemonic leadership, or the OECD-club model. With a more heterogeneous economic order, there is a need for more negotiation between states that are less like-minded than those of the OECD. Alternatively, more active economic diplomacy is needed to form coalitions of states that can shape outcomes.

It is harder to identify factors that distinguish economic diplomacy from other forms of diplomacy. This chapter has been suggested that there tend to be more actors engaged in economic diplomacy, that markets are of such immediate importance they are endogenous to decision making, and that the negotiation of binding international regimes is relatively more important in economic diplomacy than in general diplomacy.

QUESTIONS

1. Compare and contrast the definitions of economic diplomacy in this chapter with those in Bayne and Woolcock (2016) and Okano-Heijmans (2011b).
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the definition offered in this chapter?
3. How would you distinguish between process and structure? Why is it important to analyze process when explaining the nature of economic diplomacy?
4. Discuss the examples of process given in this chapter, research other examples, and then explain why the focus on process informs explanations of the outcomes.
5. Do you agree that economic diplomacy is increasing in importance?
6. What is the understanding of diplomacy that substantiates the claim that economic diplomacy has distinctive features?
7. Which actors have influence in economic diplomacy? What does this imply for the role of foreign ministries?
8. What are the disadvantages that least developed states confront in conducting economic diplomacy? How might such problems be addressed?
9. How have trade, financial, investment, and environmental diplomacy evolved over the last decade?
10. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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NOTES

1. Maaike Okano-Heijmans refers to a spectrum reaching from the more political/strategic elements of economic diplomacy, such as sanctions, through core issues in economic relations, as discussed here, to the business end of the spectrum, in the shape of commercial diplomacy. Okano-Heijmanns also distinguishes between

commercial diplomacy, trade and financial diplomacy, and inducements (all three of which would be seen as economic diplomacy here) and sanctions. Generally speaking, she has an understanding of economic diplomacy similar to that of the author, with the exception of appearing to exclude the negotiation of international rules governing economic relations. For a further discussion of definitions, see Okano-Heijmans (2011b: 20).

2. This is the trade G20 consisting of Brazil, China, India, and other developing and emerging countries and should not be confused with the G20 meeting of finance ministers that from 2008 has been extended to include the heads of state and government of systemically important economies.
3. In the EU, the Foreign Affairs Council signs off on trade agreements, but it does so in most cases after the substance of any agreement has been approved at the level of senior trade officials in the Trade Policy Committee.

CHAPTER 13

Diplomacy: A Gendered Institution

Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction: what does gender have to do with diplomacy?
- A brief history of women in diplomacy
- The diplomatic wife: a fixture of diplomacy?
- Change and continuity in the contemporary foreign service
- Women at the negotiating table
- Gendered practices of negotiation?
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter examines change in and continuity of women's participation in diplomacy and elaborates to what extent diplomatic norms, institutions, and practices are gendered. Major changes have taken place during the last century that have altered the contents and practice of diplomacy. One of them is that women have become an integral part of diplomatic services. Yet, there are still relatively few women appointed to senior diplomatic and negotiation positions. This chapter provides a historical background, which highlights how women historically have fulfilled a variety of important roles in diplomacy. From the nineteenth century onward, however, women were increasingly excluded, and their roles were reduced to that of the "diplomatic wife." In contemporary diplomacy, men are still in the majority, but this is changing rapidly, which raises a number of questions regarding diplomatic practices. For instance, are there gendered practices and styles of negotiation? The United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 provides a significant milestone in the quest for gender equality and durable peace. Today, numerous global and regional declarations state the need to include more women into diplomatic negotiations.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES GENDER HAVE TO DO WITH DIPLOMACY?

The origin of diplomacy as an institution is unclear and debatable. Historically, women have performed a variety of roles and tasks in diplomacy. In more recent times, diplomacy came to be viewed as an art based on tradition and historical precedents, which were practiced by an exclusive group of male diplomats with a "trained intuition" (Berridge 2010). In the last century, however, major changes have taken place, which have caused significant alterations to the norms and practices of diplomacy. One of these transformations is that women now officially have (re) entered the diplomatic sphere. In some countries, such as Australia, Norway, the United States, Colombia, and Sweden, women constitute a significant part of the diplomatic service. Yet the overall number of female diplomats, negotiators, and mediators is still low.

What happens to the male-dominated and **gendered diplomacy** when female diplomats and negotiators are entering this institution? This problematic has received surprisingly scant attention in academia (Aggestam and Towns 2017; Babcok and Laschever 2003; Florea et al. 2003; McCarthy 2014; Paffenholz et al. 2016), in contrast to the recent deliberations among policy makers and practitioners, where gender and inclusion is now a central theme (Anderlini 2007). The landmark **United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325** from 2000 provides a significant milestone in the quest for inclusive representation and participation. The resolution pushed for a new threshold of action on gender equality and mainstreaming in international politics, and it catapulted issues of women, peace, and security (WPS) onto the global agenda. The resolution also underlines the important role that women play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, and wider peace support operations. Some countries, such as Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have even made the WPS agenda one of the core pillars of their foreign policies (True 2017).

Still, despite these important initiatives and changes, gender in diplomacy has, as mentioned above, received little scholarly interest. Hence, this chapter analyzes the continuity of and change in women's participation in diplomacy and elaborates on how diplomatic norms, institutional cultures, and practices are gendered. Furthermore, the chapter examines to what extent diplomacy has changed over time, with a broader and more diverse representation. For sure, the entry of women as diplomats in larger numbers, particularly above the threshold of tokenism, has brought changes to diplomacy as an institution. But how different are diplomatic activities associated with masculinity and femininity? The discussion below is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and femininity (see also Bjarnegård 2009).

As reflected in the other chapters of this volume, diplomacy covers a broad range of issues and areas. This chapter focuses primarily on women in the Foreign Service and diplomatic peace negotiations. These negotiations tend to have specific institutional characteristics, as gender roles in times of conflict become polarized (Aharoni 2011: 411). And these dynamics tend to legitimize a diplomatic hierarchy as well as a relational and gendered division of labor, with men assigned to stereotypically "male" tasks and positions and women to "female" assignments.

As a theoretical point of departure for this chapter, research on **gendered institutions** is used to highlight how gender tends to influence institutional processes and practice. Hence, institutions themselves, not just the people working as diplomats, are viewed as bearers of gender. Thus, gender helps shape the expectations and practices of individuals into relatively stable and predictable patterns (Acker 1990, 1992; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; McGlen and Sarkees 1993). The concept of institution is used here in two different ways. First, an institution is viewed as an established, formal organization, with clear aims and rules, that specifies chains of command and work roles with responsibilities, authorities, and tasks. For instance, the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) is an institution in this formal organizational sense. Second, an institution can also refer to a less formalized but nonetheless sustained set of practices, relationships, or behavioral patterns (Jönsson and Hall 2005; Sharp 2009; see also March and Olsen 1989). Diplomatic negotiations can be seen as an institution in this sense, as negotiations consist of somewhat predictable sets of practices, relationships, and behavioral patterns, even if these are not formalized into an organization (see also Adler and Pouliot 2011).

KEY POINTS

- Major changes in diplomacy have taken place during the last century, of which one is that women now officially participate in the diplomatic spheres on a global scale. However, this problematic has received scant attention in academia.
- The UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which was endorsed in 2000, provides a significant milestone in the quest for women's participation and gender equality in diplomacy.
- The notion of "gendered institutions" underlines how gender influences formal as well as less formal institutional processes and practices.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN IN DIPLOMACY

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, exceptionally few women served as Foreign Service Officers or occupied other formal diplomatic roles. Official diplomacy was a sphere almost exclusively for men. Women's absence from the formal positions of diplomacy does not mean women have not been important for the functioning of diplomacy, however. For one, prior to the nineteenth century, women carried out official diplomatic duties that were later to be reserved exclusively for men. Second, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as women were shut out of formal diplomatic roles, the **diplomatic wife** came to be central to diplomacy. In this section, we will briefly describe the historically changing roles of women and men in diplomacy up to the twentieth century.

It is clear from many historical studies that women have served important roles in diplomacy for a very long time. For instance, women were both pawns of and active agents in Roman-barbarian diplomacy during the fifth century (Becker-Piriou 2008). Modern diplomacy, with resident embassies and career diplomats, first began emerging in Renaissance Italy in the middle of the fifteenth century. Interactions among aristocratic actors and those close to the royal courts remained central for diplomacy, and proximity to royal power was pivotal for diplomatic credentials. Political interactions among nobility and elites took place in networks of both men and women, and there was no strict separation between the public and the private realm. Intimate relationships with royalty and the powerful could thus be more important for influencing diplomatic outcomes than holding official office.

In this context, women of the high European nobility could—and did—carry out diplomatic tasks and exercised diplomatic influence. Sluga and James (2016) show that dynastic brides were expected to perform diplomatic duties in Renaissance Italy. At that time, literacy was rare, and particularly so among women. Female nobility who were to enter politically arranged marriages were trained to write letters in chancery style, used for official documents, and to give speeches to foreign officials, all in order to serve in official diplomatic networks and to engage in diplomatic correspondence. Throughout the centuries to come, the large social networks of noble women close to the courts were relied upon for diplomatic purposes. Queens and countesses had legitimate access to courtly politics and, thus, to foreign affairs, but companions (ladies-in-the-waiting) of female rulers, wives of ambassadors, and other women who had personal relations with those involved in foreign relations also served important diplomatic functions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Bastian 2016: 114). These women often functioned as diplomatic newsgatherers and political intermediaries. At times, they were even appointed to ambassador posts. For instance, in 1645, the French aristocrat Renée du Bec-Crespin, Countess of Guébriant, was formally appointed female ambassador to Poland (Tischer 2001).

In general, official ambassadors tended to be male. Well-placed women with dynastic connections had more flexible functions in foreign affairs, as their tasks were neither as clearly defined nor as constrained by ceremonial rules. As such, they could be quite influential in and central for diplomatic relations. For instance, French aristocrat Anne-Marie de La Trémoille (1642–1722), the Princess of Ursins, represented and managed French interests at the Spanish court in Madrid for 13 years. She was well educated, knew the rules of aristocratic society, spoke five languages, and being an avid traveler, had an extensive network of powerful friends and acquaintances around Europe. Indeed, she was so important to the French king that each French ambassador to Spain—there were six during her time in Madrid—had to establish close ties with her in order to be diplomatically effective (Bastian 2016).

During the nineteenth century, the character of European states changed. Power over politics and foreign affairs shifted away from royal courts and toward executive and legislative political institutions. The public sphere of politics was separated from the private sphere, and the public world of politics came to be seen as male—and for men only. Women were expected to care for the home and the family, not to engage in politics or state affairs. As diplomacy was professionalized and shifted more firmly to MFAs at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, women lost much of their former influence on diplomacy. Foreign Service careers were only open to men, with women barred from even taking the Foreign Service exams. Although not allowed to serve as diplomats through much of the twentieth century, women were nonetheless expected to carry out central, but unrecognized and unpaid, duties as diplomatic wives.

KEY POINTS

- Historically, prior to the nineteenth century, women were active in diplomacy, mostly in informal roles.
- In contexts where proximity to royal courts was central for diplomatic influence, women of the high European nobility could and did carry out diplomatic tasks.
- By the end of the nineteenth century, women lost much of their former influence in diplomacy.

THE DIPLOMATIC WIFE: A FIXTURE OF DIPLOMACY?

At the beginning of the twentieth century, entry exams and formal diplomatic training systems became increasingly common to select Foreign Service officers. For instance, in the United States, the first formal examination system for prospective diplomats was created in 1905. In 1924, a Foreign Service personnel board was created to oversee appointments and promotions of diplomats. One of its tasks was to assess each diplomat's marital status, and whether "members of his family contribute favorably to his standing in the community" (Inspection Record on Foreign Service Posts 1906–39, as cited in Wood 2007: 509). This emphasis on a heterosexual marriage and the contribution of the family—particularly the wife—to the diplomat's work was indeed a cornerstone of twentieth-century diplomacy. Being married to a woman was believed to keep male diplomats from seeking out illicit liaisons with local women (or men), thus providing a means to avoid diplomatic embarrassment. Also, being married was thought to ensure that male diplomats were not homosexual and, therefore, vulnerable to blackmail.

More importantly, however, the social and hosting activities of unmarried diplomats were thought to be lacking and beyond their skill set. By the end of the nineteenth century, diplomacy and hosting had become closely related. The division between home and office, private and public, was thus not as clear in diplomacy as in other areas, and much important diplomatic work was carried out in diplomats' homes. Hosting dinners, receptions, and parties had now become seen as "women's work," however, and the home, whether that of lower-ranking diplomats or the ambassador's residence, was now seen as a woman's realm. It thus fell on Foreign Service wives to move with their diplomat husbands to their foreign postings and then carry out a range of duties, such as giving luncheons and dinners and hosting other official events. Prior to the twentieth century, women had only occasionally joined their husbands in foreign embassies. Now, not only were they expected to do so, but they were *required* to undertake the public role and official labor as a diplomatic wife without pay. As Cynthia Enloe (1990: 97) explains, this unpaid labor has been absolutely central for diplomacy:

> Diplomacy runs smoothly when there is trust and confidence between officials representing government which usually have different, if not conflicting interests. That trust and confidence has to be created in a congenial environment; it doesn't sprout naturally. Most men find that congenial environment outside their offices. The home—the ambassador's official residence, or the homes of lower-ranking

> diplomats—is seen as the place where this trust between men can be cultivated. The home is the domain of the wife. The domestic duties of foreign-service wives include creating an atmosphere where men from different states can get to know one another "man to man."

A cultivated, charming, and beautiful wife was also seen as a symbol of a state's status, an indicator of the cultural and economic standing of the country she represented. Echoing earlier roles of women in diplomacy, many wives furthermore developed extensive social networks to gather useful information, often by venturing into local arenas that were more closed to public officials (Wood 2007: 522).

Many diplomatic wives have been discontented with the lack of recognition and pay for the diplomatic work they are expected to carry out. In a number of Foreign Service organizations, they have thus voiced demands for change and even created associations to help bring about change. Along with many changes during the 1970s on recruitment of women as US diplomats, diplomatic wives were declared "private persons" in 1972, no longer to be evaluated as a part of their husband's career performance. A decade earlier, in 1960, the US Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide had been created to serve as an advocate for spouses and family members of American Foreign Service employees. One of its main accomplishments was the establishment of a Family Liaison Office in 1978 to support families during the moves to foreign countries, such as by finding international schools, identifying employment options for the spouse, and more. Many other Foreign Service organizations have now created similar offices.

Beginning in the 1920s and accelerating after World War II, the legal bans on women serving as diplomats were lifted around the world. However, the vast majority of diplomats continue to be men, and women still serve a supportive function as diplomatic wives. The conditions under which they do so vary from state to state, but conventional heterosexual marriage and wifely duty continue to matter in diplomatic affairs.

KEY POINTS

- Through much of the twentieth century, the diplomat was assumed to be male.
- A heterosexual marriage and the support of a diplomatic wife were cornerstones of twentieth-century diplomacy.
- Until the 1970s, diplomatic wives were expected to carry out a range of duties without pay, such as giving luncheons and dinners and hosting other official events.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN SERVICE

During the twentieth century, facing large and international women's movements demanding change, states increasingly opened up to having women serve in various political functions and hold offices previously reserved for men. Laws permitting women to vote, to stand for elections, to serve as political appointees, and to work as civil servants spread throughout the world during that time. Diplomacy, however, has been relatively resistant to the entry of women. With some pioneers in the 1920s, most states seem to have begun allowing women to enter the diplomatic career before and after the Second World War. As illustration, the United States (1922) and France (1929) allowed female career diplomats in the 1920s, with Denmark (1934), Norway (1938), Canada (1947), Brazil (1954), and most other states following in the decades to come. However, many states instituted a special marriage rule for women that forced them to choose between marriage and their diplomatic career: If they married, they had to leave their job as a diplomat. This rule was not lifted until the 1970s, during the so-called "second wave" of feminism.

Today, the majority of diplomats are still male, with eight-five percent of ambassadors around the world being men (Towns and Niklasson 2016). However, this is quickly changing, and more so in some states than in others. In the past two decades, an accelerating number of women have entered diplomacy. In a number of countries, more women than men succeed in the diplomatic entry exams. Looking at the top level, women now make up from twenty-five to forty percent of the ambassadors of countries such as Sweden, Norway, Australia, and the United States, and they constitute an even larger share of the lower-level diplomats (Towns and Niklasson 2016). In the Swedish MFA, fifty-four percent of the employees are women. MFAs are furthermore increasingly headed by female foreign ministers. Since the 1990s, some states have even primarily appointed women to that post. All four Swedish foreign ministers between 1991 and 2006 were women, for instance, and the picture in the United States is similar, where three of the four secretaries of state prior to the Trump administration were female (Madeleine Albright, 1997–2001; Condoleezza Rice, 2005–9; and Hilary Rodham Clinton, 2009–13). Although diplomacy is still largely an arena inhabited by men, if these trends continue, there may be gender parity in the decades to come.

Even if there were gender parity in diplomacy, this would not necessarily mean that gender would cease to matter. We have to ask where men and women end up in in the diplomatic profession, if their careers develop on equal terms, what posts they are appointed to, and whether women and men face different barriers. Despite several decades of women embarking on diplomatic careers, there are still disproportionately few women in high-ranking positions in most Foreign Service organizations. Women tend to end up in less prestigious consular positions and in less prestigious sections and postings. Looking at gender patterns in ambassador appointments, Towns and Niklasson (2016) have shown that female ambassadors are less likely than male ones to be appointed to states with the highest military or economic status. Simply adding more women does not ensure equality within the Foreign Service. Many MFAs recognize this, however, and have put in place antidiscrimination policies in order to create a fair work environment.

Many academic studies have pointed out that several factors continue to negatively affect women's ability to advance in diplomacy (see, for example, Conley Tyler et al. 2014; Jeffreys-Jones 1995; McGlen and Sarkees 1991, 1993, 2001; Rahman 2011). Stereotypes about men and women tend to guide career paths and recruitment, leading to unequal outcomes. Interviews with diplomats suggest that some men continue to take female diplomats less seriously, as they are seen as less assertive and authoritative (see, for example, Rahman 2011). Women are sometimes overlooked for diplomatic postings to countries where politics are male dominated, as it is assumed they will be ignored and belittled—and thus less effective—in such masculinized environments. Some MFAs even suffer from rampant sexism and overt discrimination against women.

Even though the marriage ban has been lifted, reconciling work and family remains one of the main difficulties facing women diplomats. This can be problematic for men as well, but the fact remains that parenthood and heterosexual marriage still generally rely on conventional gender roles and divisions of labor, in which the mother and wife shoulders most family responsibilities. A diplomatic career includes long foreign postings and much travel, which presumes accommodating spouses with either flexible careers or no personal professional aspirations. Evening and weekend obligations—for example, receptions and protocol events—often have to take precedence over important family occasions. Also, while wives often accompany male ambassadors on their foreign postings, husbands do not do so to the same degree, as they are less willing to give up their own career to become a diplomatic husband. Many women (and some men) thus continue to have to choose between a diplomatic career and family life, as the two are more difficult to reconcile here than in other careers.

A number of MFAs have tried to find ways to provide more flexible working opportunities in order to suit family circumstances. Parental leave and the provision of child care to diplomats near the ministry or embassy greatly facilitate the needs of women diplomats. According to Rahman (2011), the German MFA provides more than 100 types of part-time schemes, including an option to work between fifteen and thirty-four hours a week. Such infrastructural support is necessary in order for women to plan a family while maintaining a demanding career that developed around the male diplomat/diplomatic wife model.

KEY POINTS

- Bans on women from serving as diplomats were lifted around the Second World War, and bans on married women were lifted in the 1970s.
- The majority of diplomats are still men, but this is changing rapidly around the world. In a number of MFAs, the majority of employees are now women.
- Even if diplomacy reaches gender parity, gender inequalities may still remain.
- Gender stereotypes and discrimination continue to adversely affect primarily women.
- One of the primary career obstacles for women diplomats is the difficulty reconciling family obligations and work in diplomacy.

WOMEN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

Even though diplomatic negotiations involve a broad range of issues, areas, and actors, there is a striking consistency in the global pattern of underrepresentation of women in senior negotiation positions. The European Union stands out by having appointed a woman, Federica Mogherini, as High Representative of the European External Action Service, but all nine Special Representatives are still men.[1] The UN appointed its first-ever Special Peace Envoy, Mary Robinson, to the Great Lakes of Africa in 2013. At the same time, Karin Landgren (2015), a senior UN diplomat, warns that the push towards gender parity in the UN may be lost, since ninety-two percent of all senior UN positions during 2015 were appointed to men.

Particularly in times of violent conflict, gender roles and norms become salient, which tends to express a "masculine hegemony" in peace negotiations (Cohn 2013). In a report conducted by UN WOMEN (2012) this pattern was statistically confirmed. Based on thirty-one peace agreements between 1992 and 2011, the results show that women constitute a mere nine percent of all negotiators, two-and-a-half percent of all mediators, and four percent as signatures of peace accords.

Box 13-1. indicates that the overall negotiation environment is gendered and poses a major obstacle to the broader participation of women as negotiators. The pattern shows that men tend to end up in more prestigious positions and assignments, whereas women cluster in less prestigious ones. This explains why so few women are in senior negotiation positions. By way of illustration, Sarai Aharoni (2011), in a revealing account of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, shows how rigid gender roles were present during most of the Middle East peace process in the 1990s.

Homo-sociality is often expressed unconsciously in preferences and choices of men over women for leadership position. Men may not consciously or overtly exclude women but tend to favor and reproduce a homo-social environment of networks, making it difficult for women to be included (Kronsell 2009: 252).[2] Again, this may be one reason why there are still so few women who are appointed to senior

BOX 13-1

Who Are the Women that Mediate and Where?

In a pilot study on women and international mediation, Karin Aggestam and Isak Svensson (2012) identify thirty-six cases between 1992 and 2012 in which women have been mediators, which is approximately eight percent of all international mediation efforts. After the adoption of UN Resolution 1325, there was a slight increase of women as mediators. The pattern of where women mediate (mostly in Africa, followed by the Middle East and Europe) or the type of conflict (over government/territory) reflects the overall conflict trends. What stands out is the overrepresentation of Nordic mediators (twenty-five percent), which may be explained by the presence of more senior female diplomats in these countries as well as by the Nordic countries' long-term engagement and commitment to the UN and global peace. African mediators, acting mostly on behalf of the African Union, have intervened in twenty-five percent of all cases, whereas the United States intervened in seventeen percent. This can be explained by the fact that many contemporary conflicts have taken place in Africa, and that the three recent secretaries of state have been Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton, who on many occasions during their tenures intervened as mediators in the Middle East peace process.

SOURCE: Aggestam and Svensson (2012)

positions within the UN, as well as within other regional organizations. Men and women are hierarchically ordered, which is a pattern that Sylvia Bashevkin (1993) describes as "the higher, the fewer." Dame Margaret Joan Anstee served in the UN for over four decades, rose to the rank of Under-Secretary General in 1987, and has extensive mediation experience. She was astounded that women continue to face hurdles in achieving top UN positions despite the fact that there are so many highly qualified women (Tinde 2009: 148). Also, the Finnish peacemaker and Nobel Peace Laureate Martti Ahtisaari underlines the need to change perceptions and "get used" to seeing women in senior negotiation positions (Porter 2007: 15). At the same time, we know little about the roles and perspectives of low-level female negotiators and specialists. Hence, there may be a discrepancy in public images of peacemaking and the invisible peace work done by women in actual negotiations. The incorporation of women into peace negotiations is most often consistent with traditional definitions of gender roles and stereotypes (Aharoni 2011: 411-13).

At the same time, we can see a remarkable international mobilization and efforts to include more women in peace negotiations today. Peace agreements have long-term repercussions for postconflict societies, and peace negotiations are framed as a "window of opportunity" to redefine relationships and empower groups toward peaceful democratic societies (Anderson 2016). Hence, numerous global and regional declarations now state the need to include more women in peace negotiations. **Diplomatic mediation** in particular is seen as the "weapon of inclusion" (Wallström 2016) as it concerns the ability, authority, and leadership to access and use power to redesign peace processes. Box 13-2. suggests some venues where women can be empowered during the negotiation process. The UN has also launched several initiatives, such as a High-level Seminar series on Gender and Inclusive

BOX 13-2

Making Women's Participation Count in Negotiations

A recent study on inclusive peace negotiations found that direct inclusion of women does not in itself increase the chances that more peace agreements will be reached and implemented. What makes a difference is the power that women exercise during that process. This is why the study authors draw the strong conclusion that "making women's participation count is more important than merely counting the number of women included." As part of that effort, they suggest seven modalities of broadening women's participation in peace processes:

- Direct representation at the negotiation table
- Observer status
- Consultations
- Inclusive commissions
- Problem-solving workshops
- Public decision making
- Mass action

SOURCE: Paffenholz et al. (2016).

Mediation. Since 2012, all UN mediation support teams have included women. Most recently, at the end of 2015, the Swedish government announced its plan to create a network of women peace mediators to be deployed in conflicts around the world. The Nordic governments simultaneously formed a **Nordic Women's Mediators' Network**. These changes and initiatives are particularly noteworthy in light of how resistant the field of foreign policy has been to the inclusion of women.

As part of these international efforts to promote gender equality and inclusion in global diplomacy, two dominant policy discourses may be delineated. The first draws upon a rights- and justice-based approach, which argues that women are entitled to participate in diplomacy and negotiations since they constitute fifty percent of the population. Negotiators are centrally positioned to exercise power and influence; thus, this should be reflected more fairly in diplomatic appointments between women and men, and certainly in matters related to peace and security (Charlesworth 2008; El-Bushra 2007). The second, and more prevalent, discourse relies on instrumental reasoning, which is seen as more effective when it comes to persuasion. For example, Hillary Clinton (2011), during her tenure as US Secretary of State, said on numerous occasions that including women is **smart diplomacy**. Moreover, such a discourse argues that the presence of women at the negotiation table brings added value to diplomacy. By way of illustration, Federica Mogherini stated after the successful conclusion of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in 2015, that "[h]aving many women at the table in key positions [. . .] helped us to be concrete and pragmatic the whole way" (Kianpour 2015). Peace is also intimately linked with equality between men and women. Consequently, claims are made that there is a positive correlation between women's participation and durable negotiated outcomes.[3] For example, the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, who is taking the lead in launching a feminist foreign policy, underlines that women's participation increases the likelihood of sustainable peace (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond 2016).

KEY POINTS

- There is a consistent global pattern of underrepresentation of women in senior negotiation positions. UN WOMAN reports that in 2012, eight percent of negotiators, two-and-a-half percent of mediators and four percent of signatories to peace agreements were women.
- Women and men tend to be hierarchically ordered. Men tend to end up in more prestigious positions, whereas women cluster in less prestigious ones.
- Today, numerous global and regional declarations state the need to include more women into peace negotiations.

GENDERED PRACTICES OF NEGOTIATION?

What does academic scholarship say about these underlying assumptions regarding sex, gender, performativity and outcomes? Again, research in this area is sparse, but some studies indicate a correlation between inclusive representation in negotiation and sustainable peace (Nilsson 2012). Also, the visibility of gender issues and gender-specific languages in peace agreements are correlated with durable peace (Bell 2015). Still, these findings are tentative, and much more research is needed.

As Jacqui True (2017) notes, it is not all that clear what the relationship is between descriptive representation of women and substantive representation, which reflects women's political interests in policy making.[4]

Likewise, systematic empirical research about masculine and feminine negotiation styles is limited. Some studies on gender roles in this area have been published, and these have found differences in the way that men and women approach negotiations in a broad sense. Kolb (2009) argues that women tend to have a more relational view of others in negotiations, and that they prefer more problem-solving dialogue than men. Likewise, Florea et al (2003: 230), using simulations and experiments, stipulate that women bring a personalized component of empathy, which is frequently undervalued in male-dominated settings, to negotiations (see also Boyer et al. 2009). Hence, such a negotiation style poses a "double-edged sword" for women, being valuable at the negotiation table while at the same time possibly keeping women from getting to the negotiation table because of current gendered constructs of negotiation (Florea et al. 2003: 232).

Masculine traits are frequently associated with competitive **transactional negotiation behavior**, whereas feminine characteristics are linked to cooperative **transformational problem solving**. Masculine characteristics typically include self-affirmation, competition, and dominance, while feminine characteristics entail cooperation and inclusion (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Barron 2003; Florea et al. 2003). These propositions also resemble a classical distinction in negotiation theory between distributive and integrative negotiations (R. Fisher and Ury 1981; Naurin 2010) and in mediation theory between power and pure mediation (Aggestam 2002).

Boyer et al. (2009) reach a similar conclusion but underline an important aspect: The distinctive negotiating approach of women is only detected in negotiations where women constitute a critical mass. Hence, a token female mediator or negotiator in an otherwise overwhelmingly male-dominated environment does not change the dynamics of negotiation but, rather, adjusts to a male-structured context (Boyer et al. 2009: 27). By way of illustration, the United States has had several female mediators, such as Condoleezza Rice and Madeleine Albright, but they have not distinguished themselves with a distinctly feminine style of mediation. So under what conditions is a problem-solving approach favored? This points to the need for exploring in more depth the contexts, institutional settings, and enabling and restraining conditions of women participating in international negotiations. For instance, Weingarten and Douvan (1985: 354) conclude from their study that the more structured and institutionalized the role of negotiation is, the less likely gender and personal characteristics influence the process. This deeper exploration helps to avoid essentializing how women practice mediation and negotiation. Problem solving may be associated with feminine characteristics, but in practice, this is an approach that several men are also promoting and exercising (R. J. Fisher 2009).

KEY POINTS

- Some studies have found differences in the way that men and women approach negotiations. The results are tentative, however, and much more research is needed.

- Masculine traits are frequently associated with competitive transactional negotiation, whereas feminine characteristics are linked to cooperative transformational negotiation.
- When negotiations are institutionalized, gender and personal characteristics tend to have less influence on the process.

CONCLUSION

The overarching ambition with this chapter has been to fill a void in the study of diplomacy by addressing the gendered nature of diplomacy. We have chosen to analyse the gender conundrum by stressing three dimensions of diplomacy: institution, continuity and change, and practice. First, we argue that it is important to analyze gender and diplomacy through the prism of institution. Such an analysis makes it possible to move beyond the sex of the diplomat. An institutional analysis illuminates how formal and less formal institutions are ingrained with gender norms, which come to guide both policy formulation and diplomatic processes and practices. Second, we stress the importance of understanding the continuity and change in diplomacy. In this chapter, we highlight how women historically have made important contributions to, and have been an integral part of, the evolution of diplomacy. Surprisingly, in the nineteenth century, women then became increasingly excluded from the official diplomatic spheres. Hence, the "return" of women in the late twentieth century to the center stage underlines the necessity of a historical perspective in the study of gender and diplomacy. Third, the diversity of diplomatic practices in many ways constitutes the "essence" of diplomacy, often clustered in the four strands of communication, representation, information gathering, and negotiation. In this chapter, we zoom in on diplomatic negotiations in particular as a way to illuminate the contemporary international mobilization on gender equality and mainstreaming in international institutions, which have been spurred by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. We also explore various gender styles and to what extent they may correlate with negotiated settlements. By way of conclusion, we note that despite significant breakthroughs of women in diplomacy during the last century, women's appointments to senior diplomatic positions, and particularly in peace negotiations, are still lagging. Hence, the quest for a gender-just diplomacy is still in its initial stages.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways does gender shape diplomacy?
2. How has the role of women in diplomacy changed over time?
3. Can gender parity in diplomacy be equated with gender equality in diplomacy? Why, or why not?
4. What changes are necessary to bring about more gender equality in diplomacy?
5. What are the major arguments in contemporary global politics for including more women in diplomatic negotiations?
6. Is it possible to generalize about masculine and feminine styles of negotiation? If so, how, and under what conditions?

7. In what ways do gendered hierarchies hinder women's broader participation in negotiations?
8. In what ways does UN Security Council Resolution 1325 impact on diplomatic practices?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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NOTES

1. European External Action Service recently installed a senior gender advisor after Denmark, Finland, and Sweden pushed and successfully secured such position as a way to enforce the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.
2. A homo-social environment is one that involves preferred social relationships between persons of the same sex, and especially between men.
3. Some of these arguments reflect an idealized version of "femininity," in which women are assumed to be efficient diplomats and negotiators, particularly in the "soft" humanitarian spheres of foreign policy (Anderlini 2007). Some policy makers seem to be well aware of the risks of making women's participation contingent upon positive outcomes. Yet they argue that such instrumental reasoning is the most effective way to push forward toward a broader representation of women on the global diplomatic scene (Hudson 2012: 46).
4. Descriptive representation focuses on variations in the number of women participating in diplomacy. Substantive representation focuses on the effects of women's participation.

CHAPTER 14

Diplomacy and the Use of Force

Michael L'Estrange

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Changing contexts of the use of force
- Diplomacy's responses to the threat or use of force
- Diplomacy, the use of force, and national decision making: an Australian structural approach
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

One of the great challenges in analyzing the interaction of diplomacy and the threat or use of force centers on the question of whether force and coercion are alternatives to diplomacy or whether they are part of a continuum and elements that can coalesce as part of a coherent strategy. This chapter focuses on this question by assessing the diversifying contexts in which force can be used or threatened and the ways in which diplomacy has responded, both in the past and at the present time. It addresses the contemporary contrast between the broadening range of international contexts in which force can be threatened or used with the reality that the incidence of major armed conflicts and the relative scale of civilian and military casualties inflicted as a result of that use of force are less than in previous historical periods. The chapter also explores how diplomacy has adapted to the changing contexts in which force can be used, in particular through an analysis of the role of diplomacy in seeking to preempt the use of violence and force, establishing internationally accepted norms to limit and contain the use of force, coercing actions where necessary in support of those norms, and negotiating outcomes to end violence and the use of force when they have occurred. Finally, the chapter looks at the practical decision-making challenges at a government level that the interaction between diplomacy and the use of force can present. In that context, it examines the holistic approach adopted in Australia in terms of the structure of national security policy making at the highest levels of national governance.

INTRODUCTION

The interaction between the processes of diplomacy and the use or threat of military force is nuanced, complex, and evolving. It is neither one dimensional nor zero sum. The interaction that is calibrated differently in different circumstances, and its contours continue to be reshaped by changes in relations among states and non-state actors that are redefining the parameters of the use of force and the modalities of diplomacy.

In some contexts, the resort to violence and the outbreak of conflict can legitimately be seen as constituting a failure of diplomacy. These are often situations in which parties (usually sovereign states) perceive a clear choice to be made in a dispute between, on the one hand, engaging in and abiding by the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations and, on the other, seeking potential gains through the use or threat of force and the rejection or abandonment of diplomatic processes when it suits their purposes to do so.

The interaction between diplomacy and the use of force, however, is often less binary and less clearly demarcated. In some contexts, military force or the threat of such force can be used as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the role of diplomacy. In these circumstances, if military force is used or threatened, it constitutes less a failure of diplomacy than the outcome of a deliberate strategy in which the use or threat of such force is combined with ongoing diplomatic engagement to secure national advantages or regional stability. An emphasis on one dimension of such a strategy does not necessarily entail the comprehensive failure or permanent abandonment of the other dimensions.

The different contextual circumstances that are shaping different kinds of interaction between diplomacy and the use of force can usefully be analyzed at two levels. The first is the identification of the changing contexts in which the military force of sovereign states and the capacity for violence on the part of non-state actors are being used or threatened. The second is to relate these contexts to the changing purposes of twenty-first century diplomacy, exploring the different layers of diplomatic activity that can be pursued in the different contexts in which force and violence are used or threatened.

CHANGING CONTEXTS OF THE USE OF FORCE

The history of war and violence highlights important patterns of continuity and change in relation to motives, materiel, strategies, tactics, and outcomes (Lebow 2010). In recent times, however, there has been a particular emerging contrast that characterizes the use of force. In one sense, the context in which force is used or threatened is broadening and diversifying. The broadening and diversification of the modern use of force and violence is apparent in relation to sovereign states as well as non-state actors (Hurrell 2005: 26–27). Yet the incidence of major armed conflicts and the relative scale of civilian and military casualties as a result of the use of force are less than in previous historical periods (Jervis 2011; Pinker 2011; A. Roberts 2012).

The violence and conflict that occur among and within states can encompass, directly or indirectly, the major powers as well as other states in their own right.

The growth of defense budgets, the acquisition of new weapons technologies, and new coalitions of security interests are diversifying the ways in which states can threaten or use force in different circumstances. The driving forces underpinning this diversity of state-based capacity to use force include border security concerns, geopolitical ambitions, the actual or threatened acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by other states, economic advantage, religious intolerance, ethnic disputes, competing ideologies, and perceived domestic political advantages on the part of particular regimes. Force is also applied in civil conflicts within states irrespective of their power and influence in the international system.

Among **sovereign states**, national security concerns underpin the acquisition of military capabilities and shape considerations relating to their use. In this context, the conceptual framework and policy priorities of many states in relation to national security policy making are broadening. Traditional national security priorities of territorial integrity and the primacy of preserving independent sovereign decision making uncoerced by others is being supplemented at a number of levels. One dimension involves new forms of old geopolitical priorities, including assertions of spheres of influence; new interpretations of maritime jurisdictions; access to the **global commons** in the air, at sea, and in space; promotion of national interests in areas neighboring states or in their "near abroad"; as well as the pursuit of policy linkages and associations of interests with others in relation to preserving or fundamentally changing the geopolitical status quo. At another level, the concept of national security is broadening for many states beyond the traditional parameters of state security and geopolitical ambitions to encompass a diversity of **human security** issues focused on economic disadvantage, ethnic disputes, impacts of climate change, international criminal networks, terrorism, the irregular movement of people across national borders, and other forces of societal change.

The national security interests of states can be challenged not only by the assertiveness and military power of other states but also by failures of state authority and unresolved contests for power and influence in particular countries. This latter concern becomes particularly relevant in the contemporary international system, in which the number of failed, failing, vulnerable, and rogue states is increasing. In such states, the inability to assert domestic authority, constrain violent conduct, address its root causes, or engage in constructive international citizenship can lead to even greater internal instability and wider regional tensions.

These evolving perceptions among states of what constitutes their "national security" (in state security and human security contexts), and of how that security can be threatened, are important elements shaping the role of diplomacy and the use and threat of force in the international system. But other important realities are also influencing the ways in which force is being used or threatened.

Violence and conflict extend well beyond the boundaries and motives of sovereign states. Violence can be perpetrated and conflicts exacerbated by non-state actors not only in relation to states and their citizens but also in relation to rivalry among themselves. The motivations for such non-state violence range from terrorist intimidation to religious fundamentalism and from international criminal activity to non-state lawlessness both within and projected from failed, failing, and rogue states.

In this diversifying state and non-state context, the use of force can be exerted in a variety of ways and for widely differing purposes. It can be aggressive or defensive. It can be seen as discretionary or non-discretionary. It can be pursued in support of state security or human security interests. It can be a response to events and provocations, or it can be preemptive, preventative, or anticipatory. It can be exercised unilaterally, plurilaterally, or involving "coalitions of the willing." Wars can be fought as a result of rivalry or inequality (Cashman 2007: 124–59). They can be viewed in traditional realist terms or in the context of a transforming global socioeconomic order (Ikenberry 2014). Force can be directly exercised by states or through the use of proxies (R. Smith 2005: 267–305). And it can be conducted in defiance of international law or to defend established international legal norms and principles.

In addition to its varying purposes, the use of force also has important gradations, ranging from intimidation and direct threats to random and irregular acts of violence to the limited use of violence and force to low-level conflict through to full-scale war. Furthermore, military force can be used, threatened, or deployed in situations other than war—in counterterrorism and antipiracy operations, in border security activities involving irregular migration, in civil disorder, in **peacekeeping** or **peacemaking** operations, or in a range of other emergency contingencies.

The broadening purposes and dimensions involved in the deployment of military capabilities and the contemporary use and threat of force contrast with the fact that far fewer major conflicts have occurred over recent decades than in the past. Moreover, as a proportion of the global population, there are fewer civilian and military casualties when conflicts do occur than in previous eras (A. Roberts 2012: 177–78), and there has been a significant reduction in the occurrence of civil wars since the end of the Cold War (Human Security Report Project 2013: 3-4). The extent of and reasons for the decline in global violence, and in particular the number of fatalities caused by warfare, have been and remain a focus of considerable contestability.

The "declinist" school of thought in relation to the prevalence and impact of global violence has extensive and well-established foundations (Gaddis 1987; Gat 2013; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Goldstein 2011; Gurr 2000; Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; J. Mueller 1989, 2009; Spagat et al 2009). It was, however, Steven Pinker's research (2011) that galvanized the debate in a particular way. Pinker focused his propositions on the historical evolution of the decline of violence over a long sweep of history, supporting his claims with extensive statistical evidence and incorporating detailed explanations for the reduced incidence over time of warfare (and of homicides generally).

Pinker's research elicited both enthusiastic support and vigorous dissent. A growing consensus developed on the significant decline in the number and lethality (in terms of lives lost) of wars among states since the Second World War and the clear reduction in the occurrence of civil wars since the end of the Cold War (Human Security Report Project 2013: 3–4). However, there remains contestability over the extent of violence in earlier periods of human history, and in particular over the scale of deadly violence in the twentieth century when compared to those periods (Gray 2011; Mitzen 2013b). There is also ongoing contestability in relation to the most appropriate metrics of intensity, duration, and scale that should be used in making such comparisons (Kolbert 2011). And there are further critiques of "declinist" perspectives generally—and of Pinker's contentions in particular—focused on the lack of appropriate consideration of "realist" influences (Levy and Thompson 2013; Thayer 2013), the impact of "structural" violence caused by the inequalities in global socioeconomic systems (Herman and Peterson 2012), and the scope of regional conflicts over recent times, including those in Rwanda, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Darfur, and Syria. And yet, for all these particular dimensions of contestability, the scope of consensus—focused on the contemporary relative decline in the incidence of war among the major powers, as well as in the scale and impact of violence and the use of military force generally, when compared with past eras in history—is significant.

There are many reasons for this decline. Some relate to the impact of the experience and memory of war, particularly in the context of the two World Wars of the twentieth century. Linked to such experience and memory is the realization of the potential enhanced devastation that future wars could inflict as a result of the applications of new technologies, the increasing adoption of remote-controlled mechanisms to project higher levels of force and violence on targets at long distances, the ongoing reality of nuclear weapons, and the broadening access to various weapons of mass destruction. These influences have changed many aspects of the cost-benefit calculations associated with contemporary judgments about the utility of war and the use of force and violence, with the risks of escalation in particular altering perceptions of the net gains that are likely to be derived.

Other factors have also contributed to the decline in the incidence and impact of contemporary conflicts and the use of force. These include the expansion of democratic forms of government among states in the international system; the shifting balance of national economic and security interests as a result of the competitive pressures and cooperative potential of economic globalization; the enhanced capacity of states to address grievances and otherwise deter violence; the influence of international norms and the role of international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and others; and the contribution of diplomatic and other initiatives to international peace support operations, including peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. These factors, each in their own way, have had an ameliorating influence on the modern incidence of armed conflicts and the scale of casualties. However, their quantifiable impact is often difficult—if not impossible—to measure with precision, and their relevance in particular contexts is variable and can often be indirect at best.

The contemporary trend of a declining incidence of armed conflict and, in relative terms, a diminishing human cost is neither linear nor inevitably permanent. A number of reasons underpinning the current trend could be reversed. Alienation engendered by perceptions of "winners" and "losers" from economic globalization could greatly diminish its impact as a force for promoting shared interests and reducing interstate conflict. Increased competition among nations for guaranteed access to resources such as food, water, and energy could engender new rivalries and potentially conflict, especially in circumstances where the impact of climate change focuses this resource competition in a sharp-edged way. New technologies with lethal applications for weapons development could change calculations about the balance of advantage in the use of particular instruments of force (Hirst 2002: 330–33). New scope for irregular uses of force could accentuate the attractions of asymmetric warfare waged by weaker states or violent non-state actors. New forms of nationalism, underpinned by old animosities and revived by a modern sense of alienation and ambition, may well bring new scope for violent assertiveness and confrontation (Jervis 2011: 414). Conflicts in volatile regions such as the Middle East are increasingly unconstrained by sovereign borders, with the risk for "spillovers" of violence and force escalating as a result, as tragically evidenced in the Syrian conflict. The "privatization of violence" among non-state actors such as terrorists, religious fundamentalists, and criminal networks is also significantly accentuating the potential for wider conflict (Hurrell 2005: 26). In the context of such developments, the role of diplomacy, and the effectiveness of international institutions, will be tested in new and exacting ways.

KEY POINTS

- The contexts in which force is being used are broader, while the incidence of armed conflicts and the relative scale of casualties are reduced, compared to previous eras. However, this trend is not inevitably ongoing, and the potential for its reversal is significant.
- The military capabilities of states are diversifying, and the driving forces of non-state violence are multiplying to include terrorist intimidation, religious fundamentalism, and international criminal activities.
- The sophistication of weapons development and the changing balance of security and economic considerations in an era of **globalization** are shifting the cost-benefit calculations in relation to the use of force.

DIPLOMACY'S RESPONSES TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

Given the diversifying contemporary contexts in which force is being used or threatened by states and non-state actors, it is unsurprising that diplomacy is also becoming more layered and multidimensional in adapting to such change. There are many aspects of this evolution of diplomacy in responding to the changing uses of force, but four are critically important. None is mutually exclusive, and there is often osmosis between them. However, each has distinctive purposes and objectives.

Diplomacy Aimed at Avoiding the Use of Force

Diplomacy can be focused on avoiding or limiting the use of force by addressing the underlying causes of confrontation and conflict. This focus takes diplomacy into its traditional territory of facilitating dialogue, providing frameworks of international law, promoting economic development, enabling capacity building, engaging in conflict resolution, and contributing to diplomatic initiatives (**track-two** and **track-three**) that engage not only professional diplomats but also academic and other experts, the business community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society representatives.

With this focus, diplomacy seeks to reconcile, in creative and constructive ways, the self-interest of particular states with the broader interests of their region and the wider international community in peace and stability. Such diplomacy has sought to achieve this goal without parties resorting to the use of force as a means of advancing their own perceived self-interest.

Over time, this particular focus of diplomacy has been pursued in different ways. After the First World War, a range of diplomatic initiatives focused on facilitating peaceful international progress through "outlawing" war. They included the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the negotiation under the leadership of US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Bjola 2005: 270; Slocombe 2003: 117; 118). Neither of these initiatives fulfilled its core purpose, which was focused on the avoidance of international conflict. The League of Nations was inhibited from the outset by its limited membership, and it ultimately failed as a result of its incapacity to constrain the rearmament programs, geopolitical assertiveness, and violations of international law in the 1930s. Similarly, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was signed by 62 countries, including the United States, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, Australia, and others, saw its objectives eroded and its provisions circumvented by states pursuing conflict without declaring war, such as Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, as well as the Soviet invasion of Finland and Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939.

Following these failed global initiatives to "outlaw" war in the period between the two World Wars, diplomacy subsequently focused priority on addressing the underlying causes of conflict in more specific and targeted ways. These included developing new security architectures, offering stabilizing options in crisis situations, providing frameworks for development assistance and poverty reduction programs, opening up trade and investment opportunities, building stronger people-to-people connections across borders, negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements, strengthening confidence-building measures among states, promoting interfaith dialogues, addressing the root causes of bitter ethnic divisions, and seeking common ground to reduce tensions over competing geopolitical rivalries.

Some of these initiatives have been pursued in relatively open ways, while others have required levels of confidentiality and secrecy. Some have been focused on immediate challenges to peace and stability, while others have addressed priorities over the longer term. Some have been conducted bilaterally and others multilaterally. Some continue to use the traditional channels of government-to-government communication and negotiation in order to address the core causes of tension and conflict, while others seek to achieve progress directly with the citizens of others countries through utilization of twenty-first century connection technologies, particularly digital mobile platforms, social media, and various forms of "e-diplomacy" (see Kurbalija, chapter 8 in this volume).

Norms-Based Diplomacy

Diplomacy also has a vital role to play in establishing internationally accepted norms, rules, and conventions to limit and constrain, rather than to eliminate, the use of force. Examples of such diplomacy reach back to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and to the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. In more recent times, they include the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the International Criminal Court and the wide range of arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements, especially those relating to the use of nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical warfare.

An enduring product of this kind of diplomacy aimed at limiting and governing the legitimate use of force is the 1945 UN Charter, the resolutions of UN deliberative bodies over the subsequent seven decades, and the mechanisms that the UN can use to uphold its determinations. The UN Charter contains a general prohibition in relation to the use of force. Article 2 states, in particular, that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The UN Charter, however, also provides explicitly for the legitimate use of force, either unilaterally or collectively. The unilateral use of force by a state or states in the event of the use of armed force against them is set out in Article 51 of the Charter. This Article provides for "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations," and it allows a state not only to defend itself but to join others, such as its partners in security alliances, in collectively repelling an armed attack launched by another state as means of last resort until the **collective security** arrangements of the UN are applied. These collective security powers of the UN are set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, whereby the UN Security Council may authorize force in response to an act of aggression, a breach of the peace, or a threat to international security (also see Wiseman and Basu, chapter 18 in this volume).

There is significant ambiguity, however, in these and related provisions of the UN Charter. One area relates to the scope of application of the self-defense and collective security principles that the Charter specifies. Another relates to the application of those principles to the protection by a state of its nationals abroad, or to the actions of non-state actors, or to humanitarian interventions (Bjola 2005: 273–76). Ambiguity also surrounds the application of requirements for necessity and proportionality in the exercise of self-defense and collective security principles under the UN Charter. And there is still further ambiguity in relation to "preemptive actions" taken by states and the doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense," especially as applied against terrorists or against states acquiring, or suspected of acquiring, weapons of mass destruction. (For different perspectives on these issues, see Slocombe, 2003; Weiner, 2006.) This particular ambiguity was highlighted in the period after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, when the Administration of President George W. Bush asserted in relation to terrorism that "to defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal" and that "as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed" (National Security Strategy 2002: Foreword). The Bush administration further maintained that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" (National Security Strategy 2002: 15).

In addition to the conceptual ambiguities inherent in the provisions of the UN Charter relating to the legitimate use of force, there are particular practical realities that create additional complexity. One such reality is the veto power able to be exercised by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China) in relation to the non-procedural decisions of the Council, including those relating to the use of force by the UN, its individual member states, or particular non-state groups.

These ambiguities and shortfalls in the practical implementation of the legal provisions of the UN Charter with respect to the use of force have encouraged a search for ways and means of addressing them. One school of thought has proposed a pathway to complement the international legal context in relation to the use of force with other constructs, such as the concept of "deliberative legitimacy" (Bjola 2005: 276–81). This concept focuses on a non-coerced commitment of an actor or actors to abide by norms and rules agreed upon through a process of "communicative action" that involves truthfulness, participation by all affected parties, and a willingness to be persuaded.

In this concept of "deliberative legitimacy," there is a vital, but inherently difficult, role for diplomacy. The scale of this difficulty lies in the fact that the "communicative action" on which the concept is based assumes that actors are prepared to adjust their practices and change their views; that inequalities in political, economic, and military capacities are put aside; and that those in dispute share a commitment to some important norms and undertakings in relation to their competing claims and disputes. These are very demanding prerequisites for any effective practical application of the idea of "deliberative legitimacy" in relation to the use of force based on communicative action. In many contexts, they are likely to make the pursuit of such legitimacy an elusive one. But the concept does suggest an emerging potential niche role for diplomacy in relation to the use of force that may have a constructive effect in some situations, particularly those that are unreceptive to traditional forms of diplomacy.

Coercive Diplomacy

The interaction between diplomacy and the use of force is also reflected in the notion of **coercive diplomacy** that has evolved over recent decades (George 1991; Levy 2008). Such diplomacy involves the application of pressure, through threats as well as promises and inducements, to persuade a rival or opponent to cease aggression or to otherwise change behavior. The threats could relate to the use of limited or more intensive force, the application of economic sanctions, the specification of a deadline for compliance, or a range of other actions designed to demonstrate resilience and opposition and aimed at foreshadowing other, stronger measures if no change in behavior occurs (Jakobsen 1998: 139–46). The promises are invariably linked directly with the threats, however, and the inducements are not made without necessary concessions.

Coercive diplomacy has been applied in many instances over recent decades, and its outcomes—in crises involving Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Kuwait, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere—have been studied intensively (Art and Cronin 2003: 21–156; George and Simons 1994: 111–229;

Jakobsen 1998: 50–129; Jentleson 2006: 4–6, 10–11). These and other studies show that the effective application of coercive diplomacy requires a set of parameters that include an appropriate and ongoing calibration, the alignment of mutual understandings, and the realistic viability of the coercive actions taken, threats made, or inducements offered.

The prospects for the successful exercise of coercive diplomacy are enhanced if the objectives being pursuing are appropriately calibrated to the measures being threatened or applied. Calibration involves the pursuit of clearly specified goals that the coercer believes can be achieved successfully within a practical timeframe and at an acceptable cost. In that context, calibration of coercive diplomacy aimed at regime change, rather than policy change, would need to encompass the likely prospects of high cost and long-term engagements.

Effective coercive diplomacy also requires a basic alignment of mutual understandings. The coercing state needs to have a realistic expectation that a cessation of violent conduct or changes in other provocative behavior by the party being coerced will be a consequence of the coercive measures being implemented. And the state or non-state actor being coerced needs to be convinced that the balance of threats and inducements being made is a tolerable one to accept—and that future, intolerable coercive demands will not be forthcoming if the immediate, tolerable ones are met.

The realistic viability required for coercive diplomacy to be effective involves a range of factors. It entails the political will and practical capabilities required to sustain the application of coercive pressures, if necessary, over a considerable period of time. The credibility of coercive diplomacy is also a factor of the support that a coercing state can gain within its own domestic constituency as well as the international support it can generate for its actions. Furthermore, the viability of an exercise of coercive diplomacy is enhanced by the clarity and coherence of the objectives being pursued and by the effectiveness of a coercing state's public and private communications strategies

Ultimately, the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy centers on how the coerced entity sees its own evolving balance of advantage. It may see that advantage as best served by changing the behavior that is the focus of coercive action or by continuing, and even accentuating, that behavior. This cost-benefit calculus is very much a product of the calibration, alignment, and viability of the coercive diplomacy being exercised against it.

The record of coercive diplomacy over recent decades highlights more instances of failure than success (Jervis 2013: 105–6), and even where success can be identified over time (as in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s), the price paid was often far higher than anticipated. This outcome is unsurprising, because the successful application of coercive diplomacy requires a delicate and changeable balance of prerequisites tailored to the specific historical, geographic, societal, religious, and economic contexts in which particular crises evolve. Among those prerequisites are an appropriate balance of threats, assurances, and inducements (often made contemporaneously); access to accurate intelligence; a capacity for responsiveness to unanticipated countermeasures, misperceptions, and miscalculations on the part of both the coercing and coerced parties; an ability to build confidence among parties whose record of interaction has demonstrated little of it and where the potential of inducements to achieve compromise may be very limited; and the identification of productive pathways to verify compliance with the actions required by coercive diplomacy, to manage the complications of such diplomacy when exercised by a group of states together, and to address the difficulties of coercing more than one rival or adversary where they have interests that are not fully aligned (Jakobsen 1998: 2–4, 17–20, 139–42).

Yet for all these formidable prerequisites, there are instances where diplomacy, combined with the use or threat of force and/or sanctions, has proven effective. These include the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Haiti in 1994, Libya's disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in 2003, and in a qualified way, in the Balkans and in Kosovo during the early and the late 1990s, respectively.

These and other examples highlight that the use or threat of force, the deployment of military assets (including in situations other than war), and the pursuit of diplomacy are not always demarcated or exclusive options. There are contexts in which the use or threat of limited force, or the deployment of military assets as part of a broader diplomatic strategy, can preempt a resort to more intensive applications of force—or even all-out war. In such contexts, opponents have options opened up by coercive diplomacy rather than being limited to a choice between only two alternatives—namely, intensifying their use of force or agreeing to a humiliating backdown.

Diplomacy to End or Contain Conflict

Diplomacy has a critical role to play in the cessation of hostilities and the ending of conflicts. This can be achieved by overseeing the terms of surrender by one or more parties and providing a framework for subsequent arrangements, by brokering an immediate cessation of hostilities without preconditions, by facilitating mutually agreed-upon international dispute resolution processes, or by reconciling the competing objectives of victorious parties in a post-conflict situation.

Diplomacy can pursue very different priorities in postconflict situations. For example, the diplomatic bargaining that led to the Treaty of Versailles after the end of the First World War was driven overwhelmingly by revenge against those who had been defeated. This approach contrasted dramatically with the diplomatic maneuvering at the end of the Second World War, with its focus on economic reconstruction and the creation of new forms of global and regional security architecture that included, rather than further alienated, the defeated nations.

Diplomacy aimed at ending conflicts can often be incomplete or temporary. The diplomatic negotiations that led to a ceasefire in the Korean War in 1953 has never been complemented by a peace treaty between the parties involved in the conflict. And the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, which enabled the withdrawal of US forces from the Vietnam War, were followed only two years later by North Vietnam's successful military campaign against the South.

Diplomacy to end conflicts can often be associated with peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. Examples from recent decades include El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Timor Leste, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Over recent years, one aspect of diplomacy to end violence and conflict has been focused on collective international action coalescing around the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative designed to end particular incidences of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity (Bellamy 2013; G. Evans 2008a; Glanville 2013). In the specific context of the crimes against humanity committed in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, Srebrenica and Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999, international action to uphold the R2P concept was accepted at the 2005 UN World Summit, unanimously endorsed later that year at the UN General Assembly, and reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in 2006. Interventions under the auspices of the R2P were made in Kenya in 2007–8, the Côte d'Ivoire in 2010–11, Libya in 2011, and the Central African Republic in 2012.

The implementation of R2P has encountered significant obstacles. Some nations, particularly smaller and less powerful ones, perceive that R2P runs counter to the norms of non-intervention and self-determination, that it is applied only to them rather than to larger and more powerful states, and that it has connotations of neocolonial intervention. At one level, there has been a concern that R2P may be invoked too intrusively and widely, or as a pretext for regime change. At another level, there has been a quite different concern that the criteria for the use of international military forces in R2P contexts—namely, that it be as a last resort, be proportionate and for a defined purpose, and be more likely to achieve good rather than harm (G. Evans 2008a: 292)—may be too subjective and inhibit the prospects for reaching international consensus on the application of these principle in particular situations. There has also been the limitation imposed by the lack of physical availability of international forces to deploy on the ground in situations where R2P circumstances warrant it.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy has pursued various pathways in seeking to prevent, constrain, and end armed conflicts and violence. Those pathways continue to evolve in the modern global system.
- Preventative measures have ranged from initiatives to "outlaw" war to contemporary initiatives focused on ameliorating the underlying causes of conflict.
- Diplomacy continues in its priority of establishing norms, rules, and conventions to limit both the ways in which force is used and its purposes. The UN plays a critical role in this context, but there are unresolved ambiguities in its provisions on the legitimate use of force.
- Coercive diplomacy faces many challenges to its effective application, and its record has more failures than successes. But the lessons to be learned from its successes are instructive in terms of maximizing its potential for limiting particular uses of force in the future.
- Diplomacy has a vital role to play in ending conflicts and the use of violence. One important dimension of this relates to application of the R2P doctrine to protect individuals from crimes against humanity and resolution of the practical challenges it faces.

DIPLOMACY, THE USE OF FORCE, AND NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: AN AUSTRALIAN STRUCTURAL APPROACH

The interaction of diplomacy, the deployment of defense assets, and the threat or use of force is an important area of focus for theoretical and academic study. It is also at the cutting-edge of practical policy making for national governments and international bodies.

National governments, in particular, have their own distinctive decision-making mechanisms for considering the appropriate exercises of **hard power** and **soft power**, the use of military and police forces in particular circumstances, and the pursuit of diplomatic outcomes. Some governments address the policy-making choices involved in a segmented and demarcated way. Others view these choices more seamlessly, as part of a connected range of policy options rather than as an inevitably exclusive choice among them.

The structures of national security decision making in Australia highlight a "policy osmosis" approach, which addresses diplomatic, security, and other policy options in a holistic way (see box 14-1). The focus of such decision making is the

BOX 14-1

Australia's National Security Committee of Cabinet: Roles and Responsibilities of the Prime Minister/Ministers and Senior Officials/Defence Force Officers

Prime Minister And Ministers

- Define objectives.
- Set priorities.
- Make decisions/choose among options.
- Develop/endorse strategic planning.
- Oversee implementation plans and allocate resources as necessary.
- Monitor progress.
- Change policy guidance if necessary.

Senior Officials/Defence Force Officers

- Inform decision making by Ministers with situational reports, diplomatic context, intelligence assessments, and advice on military considerations.
- Propose options to achieve objectives specified by Ministers.
- Outline the consequences of proposed actions as well as inaction.
- Clarify what is known and unknown in relation to issues of focus.
- Develop implementation planning in relation to Ministerial decisions.
- Advise Ministers of new developments and progress in relation to Ministerial decisions previously made.

National Security Committee (NSC) of the Cabinet. The NSC was established in 1996 and (with some adaptations of membership) has subsequently been continued by governments of different political persuasions.

The NSC has become a unique policy-making operation within the Australian Government. It is a Committee of the Cabinet but, unlike other such Committees, is not required to refer its outcomes for consideration by the full Cabinet, although it may choose on occasion to do so. NSC decisions are taken by its Ministerial members, who include the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-General, as well as (currently) the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Cabinet Secretary. Importantly, NSC meetings are also attended by the Secretaries of the civil service departments of the relevant Ministers as well as by the Chief of the Defence Force and the Heads of intelligence agencies. Other Ministers and senior civil service, Defence Force, and Federal Police officers can be seconded to the NSC as required for the consideration of particular issues.

Ministers make and are responsible for NSC decisions. However, non-Ministerial participants in NSC deliberations provide an important contextual framework for such decision making through their direct input of the most up-to-date information and informed perspectives on Australian capabilities, interests, and policy options.

The NSC meets regularly and addresses the key foreign policy, defense, and intelligence-related issues facing the Australian Government. It has been the peak decision-making body within the Government on all the major national security issues since 1996, including the 1998–99 East Timor crisis, the response to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the Australian military and police deployment to the Solomon Islands in 2003, responses to terrorist attacks on Australians overseas, border protection issues, and major geopolitical and economic developments affecting Australia's international interests.

KEY POINTS

- The interaction of diplomacy, the deployment of defense assets, and the threat or use of force is an important area of focus for theoretical and academic study.
- The holistic structure and operation of high-level national security policy making in Australia, with the National Security Committee of Cabinet at its apex, epitomises an approach that reflects the need for an integrated process of policy decision making that reflects the synergies and interconnections existing in relation to the purposes and practice of diplomacy, the deployment of Australian defense and police assets, and the threat or use of military force in particular circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Perspectives on the interaction between diplomacy and the use of force were once framed by the differing outlooks of national security realists and liberal internationalists. That interaction now needs to accommodate a less demarcated approach that encompasses not only the changing contexts in which force and violence can be used by states and non-state actors but also the impact of both traditional and newer forms of diplomacy, including state-to-state, state-to-citizen, and citizen-to-citizen variations.

This chapter has explored the interaction between diplomacy and force in terms of the binary and non-binary choices it poses in different contexts. It is an interaction that keeps evolving in terms of the relevance of international norms in relation to the use of force, the applicability of coercive forms of diplomacy, the constraints on or prohibition of specific applications of force, and the pursuit of new diplomatic pathways to address the underlying causes of violence and conflict. Ongoing research in these and related areas will continue to be an important priority as new forms of diplomacy evolve and new contexts of force and conflict emerge.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the main diplomatic structures and processes focused on the avoidance and limitation of the use of force?
2. Are these structures and processes becoming more relevant or less so?
3. What shapes binary and non-binary choices between the pursuit of diplomatic outcomes and the use of force?
4. What influence does the broadening concept of "national security," encompassing priorities in state security and human security, have on the prospects for the use of force?
5. Is the current trend of a relative declining incidence in the use of force compared to previous eras likely to continue?
6. Are norms-based approaches to limiting or preventing the use of force most effectively negotiated and implemented on a comprehensive, global basis, or are tailored approaches based on regional agreements becoming more viable?
7. Is coercive diplomacy a contradiction in terms or an increasingly relevant way to limit, prevent, or end the use of force?
8. Do the processes of "deliberative legitimacy" and "communicative action" offer a useful and practical way forward to address the shortfalls of international law in relation to the use of force?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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PART IV

National, Regional, and International Diplomatic Practices

This part explores contemporary diplomatic practice from the perspective of three different levels of analysis—the national, the regional, and the international.

Our *first* aim is for you to consider how, in increasingly complex international and domestic contexts, a selection of key players at these three levels practice contemporary diplomacy. Chapters cover the world's two major state actors, the United States and China; several major regional institutions, such as the European Union and the African Union; and the most important international organization, the United Nations. A consensus view is that since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States had provided the foundations for a liberal international order. Whether the Trump administration will reinforce that consensus understanding of world order or promote a nationalist, "America First" alternative is very much an open question. In addition, China is now challenging that liberal order, producing a robust debate as to whether "China's rise" will be peaceful or belligerent. The European Union, even though it faces economic and refugee/migration challenges as well as accommodating the British public's vote to exit the Union, remains something of a "model" for other regional institutions experimenting with new diplomatic practices. And the United Nations not only retains its status as the key organization of global governance but also—for our purposes—mirrors to some extent diplomacy's three evolving distinct, yet linked, forms (bilateral, multilateral, and polylateral).

Our *second* aim is for you not only to understand these national, regional, and international practices as important subjects in their own right but also, more challengingly, to think about them and about the extent to which they are interconnected elements of an overarching, universal diplomatic culture. Thus, we urge you to consider the idea that while individual European Union countries have a particular national diplomatic style that differentiates one from another, individual national styles are modified to some extent when member states act together diplomatically—for example, when they agree on joint initiatives, share diplomatic facilities under the Union banner, and take joint positions at the United Nations. The increasing complexity of the overarching diplomatic culture further demonstrates that diplomacy is hyperconnected, adaptive, and diverse.

CHAPTER 15

United States Contemporary Diplomacy: Implementing a Foreign Policy of "Engagement"

Alan K. Henrikson

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction: foreign policy as diplomatic process
- Containment: negotiating (only) from a position of strength
- Transformation: putting (others') domestic affairs at the center of foreign policy
- Engagement: talking with enemies as well as (just) with friends
- Conclusion: diplomacy now the primary means, but not the end, of policy

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter traces and assesses the conceptual foundations and progression of American diplomacy from the Cold War period to the present day through the lenses of three major US policy ideas—containment, transformation, and engagement. It suggests that there has been a substantive shift in the way US foreign policy is originated, not just in the way it is implemented. US diplomats in the field increasingly "engage with" others—with adversaries as well as with allies and friends—in two-way, interactive relationships. The chapter questions the adequacy of dynamic "engagement"—essentially a process, rather than a program or a purpose—as foreign policy itself.

INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN POLICY AS DIPLOMATIC PROCESS

Diplomacy has become a central theme of American foreign policy. Indeed, it is becoming almost a policy itself—that of "engagement." During the Cold War, military, economic, and political "containment" was the main strategic concept of the United States. Today, however, the dominant motif of US foreign policy is the need to establish and maintain firm contact, efficient communication, and if possible, friendly relationships with the leadership elites, wider political structures, and even populations of all countries, especially those that are or might become adversarial or could otherwise, through maladministration or impotence, pose threats to world order. "Engagement" is the term used, both officially and popularly, to describe the new emphasis on diplomatic outreach in American foreign policy.

The transition from containment to engagement—as both the superpower nuclear rivalry and the ideological battle between communist East and democratic West diminished—required reflection and intellectual adjustment. There needed to be accommodation of foreign policy, and also of diplomatic procedure, to the new global context. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a "post–Cold War" conceptual void. The new globalizing economy further exposed the lack of compelling purpose in US policy.

The al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, filled this void with anger. Like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the events of 9/11 marked a fundamental change in American political orientation. After launching a war on terror abroad and securing the country with the Patriot Act at home, the US government under President George W. Bush during his second administration embarked upon a new nominal course in diplomacy called "transformational diplomacy." Elevating the operational struggle against terrorism, it espoused a new, higher purpose—to "end tyranny" in the world. It also entailed a major shift of diplomatic resources and focus: away from the stable and, presumably, safe capitals of Europe to the dynamic new economic centers and other regions of the developing world, where future challenges and opportunities for the United States might arise.

With Barack Obama's election as US president in November 2008, an "engagement" policy concept took hold. While the term had been used earlier (see box 15-1), it was now given new status and formal recognition as well as complexity, meaning, and comprehensiveness. Without an overarching ideological view comparable to the Cold War or the global war on terror, American foreign policy became, expressly, more diplomatic. Indeed, diplomacy—the engagement process—became virtually policy itself, as distinct from being a policy precursor or the instrument of policy. Implicitly, to "engage" was to be present, active, and committed. But it does not say exactly how, where, or why—to what larger end.

The engagement idea is often presented as an alternative, and an antidote, to "isolationism." It also has been offered, however, in contrast to the other extreme: "interventionism," particularly military intervention. American diplomacy sometimes denies, but it also rests on, power. The term "engagement" itself has a strong military resonance. It conjures up an older image of opposing armies, not merely arrayed against each other but engaged in combat. The contemporary term's policy origin may also in fact be military—an intragovernmental transposition from

BOX 15-1

US Engagement with India

On May 11, 1998, Strobe Talbott, the US deputy secretary of state, received word that India had exploded a nuclear device. What follows, he writes, is the story of the "negotiation—or, as we agreed to call it, the dialogue"—that he had with "the Indian statesman Jaswant Singh" (Talbott 2004: 3). Over the next two-and-a-half years, they met fourteen times at ten locations in seven countries on three continents. Talbott also held parallel meetings with various Pakistani officials. As Talbott describes:

> Those encounters added up to the most intense and prolonged set of exchanges ever between American and Indian officials at a level higher than ambassadors. [. . .] In a successful dialogue, the two parties do more than just talk to each other. Each makes an effort to understand what the other has said and to incorporate that understanding into a reply. A dialogue does not, however, necessarily mean that the participants change each other's minds. Hence the other term that figured prominently in the way Jaswant Singh and I defined our task: engagement. That word can connote eye-to-eye contact, a firm handshake, a pledge, or a long-term commitment. But engagement can also mean the crossing of swords, a clash of armies or warships or wills. Both elements, conciliation and contest, were present in what went on between Jaswant Singh and me.

SOURCE: Talbott (2004: 4).

US Army handbooks and Department of Defense thinking. The influence of the military on US diplomacy is profound. The significance of this point is that "engagement" has a coercive connotation. The threat of coercion can be explicit, as when "consequences" are hinted at if cooperation is not forthcoming. Engagement, as actually being implemented, is well described by *New York Times* reporter David Sanger (2010) as "a complicated mixture of openness to negotiation, constantly escalating pressure and a series of deadlines, some explicit, some vague." For the "engaged" party, such a forward-pressing approach can appear to be "interference," and if it penetrates deeply into the recipient country's domestic affairs, it is seen as a violation of its sovereignty, as recognized by the United Nations Charter and the terms of the **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations** (1961).

While premised on physical strength and a forward military presence, the essential meaning of engagement today is nonetheless *diplomatic*. There remain basic commonalities, however. Diplomatic contact, like military engagement, gives the involved parties an awareness of the other side's capabilities and intentions. To *test* the other party's intentions can be a major purpose of engagement, military or diplomatic. Like wrestlers, those in direct contact can better anticipate the other's moves and maybe even the direction, if not the exact degree, of the other's possible thrusts. Engagement is inherently interactive and, optimally, also intercommunicative.

The engagement concept today encompasses not only "traditional diplomacy"—that is, representation by resident ambassadors at foreign capitals—but also the assignment of "special representatives" and "special envoys" to manage particular problems and pursue thematic issues. Moreover, it implies multifaceted involvement with other countries' non-governmental elites and populations. Engagement diplomacy thus is not only, although it still is mainly, a state-to-state relationship. It is also a state-to-society mode of interaction. It can even embrace, as some theorists of "**citizen diplomacy**" suggest, a society-to-society interchange, especially if the flow of influence is politically intended as well as morally purposeful (see Badie, chapter 5, and Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume).

At all levels, the engagement idea suggests a deliberate meshing of gears with, and within, the country that is engaged. Such contact occurs on different planes: at summit meetings or during diplomats' visits to foreign ministries in national capitals, but also during official encounters at the provincial or district level and even at the city, town, or village level. The methods of engagement diplomacy are widening. Its practitioners use not only traditional diplomatic methods, such as formal delivery of **démarches** in person, but also nontraditional means of messaging, such as through the devices of information and communication technology (ICT). Engagement diplomacy has many points of potential contact, real as well as virtual. And its geography is extensive, ranging from chancelleries to conference centers, where informal talks by negotiators can occur, to Internet "chat rooms."

The United States, which emerged as a global power following the Second World War and exerts a planetary influence, now is diplomatically "engaged" almost everywhere. How does it exert this influence? How does the US government implement "engagement," a process-as-policy? Can diplomatic process substitute for foreign policy—for actual strategy aimed at well-targeted objectives? Or must the goals of policy be well identified for engagement diplomacy to succeed? The latter would be a logical presumption. Engagement per se, however, might create political opportunities and, through its exercise, increase capacities to think and act strategically, thereby contributing to the maintenance of US "leadership."

KEY POINTS

- The Cold War's end left a conceptual void in American foreign policy, as the "containment" of Russia and communism no longer seemed necessary and globalization made foreign policy itself appear less relevant.
- The September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks redirected US foreign policy, which, through "transformational diplomacy" as well as a proclaimed military and political war on terror, sought to "end tyranny."
- "Engagement," both military and diplomatic, emerged as a middle course between isolationism and interventionism.
- Engagement diplomacy, conducted through a variety of methods and at different levels, and sometimes alongside US military operations, mixes coercion with outreach in a complex and shifting pattern of intended persuasiveness.

CONTAINMENT: NEGOTIATING (ONLY) FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH

A strategic basis for engagement was laid in the early Cold War period by the American diplomat and policy planner George F. Kennan—recognized as the father of "containment" in his famous July 1947 article written under the pseudonym "X" in *Foreign Affairs*.

In the article Kennan (X 1947: 576) argued that "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world [was] something that [could] be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Such pressure could not, however, be "charmed or talked out of existence" (576). His idea of counterpressure thus was not an active diplomatic strategy (Gaddis 2005: 24–52). Nor did the US government then, during the realism-minded administration of President Harry S. Truman, favor negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Kennan, who served briefly as US ambassador to the Soviet Union (1951–52), did not consider the Russian dictator Joseph Stalin a trustworthy or otherwise suitable partner for the United States. However, following Stalin's death on March 1953, Kennan came to believe that a negotiated East-West understanding might be achievable. In his 1957 BBC Reith Lectures, he proposed the mutual "disengagement" of military forces—those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as the Warsaw Pact—from a zone in central Europe, to include the Federal Republic of Germany (Kennan 1958).

The prevailing view, however, was that of former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who advocated "negotiation from strength" (Bell 1963). Western superiority, arguably, had been established with the formation of NATO, which the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had joined in 1955. The demonstration of Soviet prowess with the October 1957 launch of the orbital satellite *Sputnik*, however, suggested that the United States and the Western powers had lost the scientific and technological high ground. From this perspective, Kennan's idea of negotiating with the Soviet Union to achieve military disengagement was an "illusion," as Acheson (1958) declared it. Nonetheless, others, such as the influential columnist Walter Lippmann, considered Kennan's approach to be "the only alternative which has some promise of leading to the reunification of Germany and to the national independence of the East European states." Nonetheless, even he believed that it was "too soon" to adopt a program of action, for "the re-orientation of our thinking" had still further to go (Lippmann 1958: 33-37).

John F. Kennedy's election as US president advanced that thinking to a serious consideration of breaking the East-West impasse through diplomacy. In his January 1961 inaugural address, Kennedy said: "We dare not tempt them with weakness," referring to those nations that would make themselves America's adversary. "For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed." Yet the mounting costs and the steady spread of atomic weaponry, with two great groups of nations "racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war," offered less and less comfort. "So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof." He then memorably declared: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate" (J. F. Kennedy 1962: 2).

The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis and its resolution, through the cautious exercise of power and brilliant diplomatic improvisation in bilateral contacts with Soviet diplomats and others as well as at the United Nations, demonstrated the need for a better connection to Moscow (R. F. Kennedy 1971; May and Zelikow 1997). Crisis management had worked, and it established a new paradigm for decision making and diplomacy (Allison and Zelikow 1999). But it was ad hoc and unreliable. Following the crisis, a **hotline** was set up between Moscow and Washington, and the

Partial Test Ban Treaty was negotiated, thereby establishing direct and continuous contact between the Kremlin and White House and beginning a systemic process of arms control. Tension between the Soviet Union and the United States thereby was considerably reduced, even though both sides continued their military programs.

President Richard M. Nixon proclaimed **détente** as US policy and sought to move from an "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation." Hoping to gain negotiating space for ending the Vietnam War by exploiting Sino-Soviet rivalry, national security adviser Henry Kissinger and President Nixon traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Kissinger 1979: 684–787, 1049–96; MacMillan 2007). The opening to China was followed by a less spectacular, but a more substantive, meeting in Moscow in 1972. The results of these initiatives included the Shanghai Communiqué with the PRC and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger demonstrated geopolitical awareness, "triangular" strategizing, and a skillful "linkage" of unrelated issues—trade and arms control concessions in tacit exchange for cooperation in reducing conflict in Indochina and elsewhere.

President Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, and President Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter, also engaged in summit meetings with the Soviet leadership, although without significant results. President Ronald Reagan, initially reluctant to deal with the leaders of what he viewed as an "evil empire," and convinced that only "peace through strength" worked, was at the same time unwilling to accept the logic of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). In September 1983 he therefore dramatically proposed an alternative to strategic deterrence, the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars." He even offered the Soviet Union coparticipation in the project, which implied a major American technological advance. Although considered a failure at the time, a meeting in Reykjavík, Iceland, in August 1986 between President Reagan and the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, began a process of nuclear arms reduction and military withdrawal (Adelman 2014). This process ultimately resulted in a free Europe and the Cold War's end during the George H. W. Bush administration. "Containment worked," said President Bush (2009: 34). It had to be supplemented, however, by diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- "Containment," introduced by George F. Kennan, posited that the way to respond to Soviet expansionism under Stalin was through the vigilant, patient, and proportionate application of "counterforce" of various unspecified kinds.
- Containment was premised on the balance of power that for those such as Secretary of State Acheson (aware of the US military disadvantage in central Europe) meant no negotiation with the Soviet Union except from a position of clearly superior allied strength.
- President Kennedy, although also concerned about the Soviet-American military balance, argued famously for direct negotiations.
- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, including the possibility of a mutually devastating nuclear conflict, caused US presidential administrations, most notably those of Nixon and Reagan, to enter serious negotiations with Moscow for joint management of nuclear weaponry, although still premising US policy on "peace through strength."

TRANSFORMATION: PUTTING (OTHERS') DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AT THE CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY

A new approach to diplomacy occurred with the administration of President Bill Clinton in the context of a rapidly globalizing world economy. Born after the Second World War and having no military experience, Clinton viewed foreign affairs as inseparable from domestic affairs, and also as equally amenable to presidential mediation. His handling of relations with Russia under Gorbachev's successor, President Boris Yeltsin, was adroit (Talbott 2002). It was also more institutionalized—a key factor in implementing a foreign policy of engagement. A commission cochaired by Vice President Al Gore, Jr., and Soviet prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was established following a Canadian-arranged, Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in Vancouver in April 1993 (B. Clinton 2004: 505–8). No less skillful was Clinton's personal intercession between the contending parties in Northern Ireland and, if without ultimately achieving any result, in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

More consequential was President Clinton's and his administration's involvement in economic negotiations, which resulted in the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement, formation of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping that included the PRC, and transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the World Trade Organization. The US Department of State under Warren Christopher set up an "America Desk" to strengthen the nexus of foreign and domestic affairs. Its purpose was to support US businesses and other American private interests that might be having difficulty overseas, partly in the hope of creating a stronger domestic constituency for American foreign policy and for the Department of State itself.

The September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon violently brought foreign policy "home" to Americans, and also drew attention to the relevance of the internal conditions of other societies, notably Afghanistan, which Osama bin Laden had used as a sanctuary. President George W. Bush characterized the al-Qaeda hijacking of airplanes as an attack on the United States of America and its values of freedom and democracy. He projected his administration's response: "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while" (G. W. Bush 2003b: 1116). In an address to Congress, he stated: "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated" (G. W. Bush 2003a: 1141). Official American diplomacy adhered to this stern message, although some diplomats dissented and a few even resigned (Kiesling 2006).

The reaction abroad to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, following a failed effort by Secretary of State Colin Powell to secure a United Nations resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force, was almost universally negative. It demonstrated the need to engage foreign publics as well as governments. US **public diplomacy** was severely challenged not only among Muslims but also among the populations of America's closest friends and allies. The appointment of an accomplished Madison Avenue advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, to the position of under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, was unsuccessful. Her media campaign to win the hearts and minds of people in the Arab street by showing how well Muslims in the United States itself were doing did not work. In fact, it only deepened resentment. The difficulties encountered by Department of State personnel, and the much larger numbers of Department of Defense and military personnel, in the Middle East following the invasion of Afghanistan and ensuing de facto occupation of Iraq produced a partial change of outlook within the Bush administration itself.

Organizationally, significant steps were taken. Secretary of State Powell, a former soldier who had become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saw major deficiencies in the Department of State's structures and systems. He sought to build its capacity, including, notably, modernization of its outdated ICT facilities. He also launched a Diplomatic Readiness Initiative to strengthen the State Department's human resources—numbers of personnel as well as their managerial and other skills. The **Foreign Service** was expanded and better supported. Believing that career **Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)** had been underappreciated and underused, Powell abolished many of the existing special envoy positions. He preferred to work cooperatively within the international community, not only with NATO but also with the United Nations. This put him at odds with unilateralist-minded members of the Bush administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney. Powell's resignation after one term of service was accepted.

President Bush chose his close friend and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice to succeed General Powell as secretary of state. Appearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations preparatory to her Senate confirmation in January 2005, she declared: "The time for diplomacy is now" (Kessler 2005: A01). A year later, she outlined her concept of transformational diplomacy at odds with the geopolitical realism of her past mentors, including former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Her concept blended ideologically with President Bush's declared objective in his second inaugural address of "ending tyranny in our world." Focusing on the internal governance of states rather than on their external behavior, she theorized: "The fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power." The peoples of other countries, on whom even authoritarian regimes ultimately depended for support, therefore appeared to be potential instruments of change and international stabilization. The US government, accordingly, would "use America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures." For that purpose, it would be necessary to "transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes" (Rice 2006). By implication, this could include regime change, not just induced policy change.

Among the administrative adjustments Secretary Rice sought was "shifting existing resources"—the FSOs themselves—out of the larger, comfortable US embassies in Europe and to those in major developing countries, such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Officers would even be assigned to run one-person "American Presence Posts" in non-capital cities. The "diplomatic posture" of the United States thus would be not only localized but also regionalized and made more thematically responsive. For example, "small, agile transnational networks" of diplomats in rapid response teams would be formed to address the problem of disease—the better to combat "the spread of pandemics across entire continents," she explained (Rice 2006). A broader transregional approach also would be taken in public diplomacy, the better to counter the influence of Al Jazeera throughout the wider Middle East (Seib 2008).

The "newest and most cost effective way" of reaching people, Secretary Rice proposed, was the "Virtual Presence Post"—an Internet site managed by computer-adept younger officers, based mostly in Washington, DC, that would be focused on "key population centers" elsewhere. She had high hopes for its appeal: "This digital meeting room enables foreign citizens, young people most of all, to engage online with American diplomats who could be hundreds of miles away." Such communities could be affiliated by interest and identity rather than by situation or statehood—new "network" communities.

Secretary Rice acknowledged that some officers would be sent to "hardship posts" in highly dangerous places. She foresaw that American diplomats would "serve in different kinds of conditions, like reconstruction and stabilization missions, where they must partner more directly with the military"—as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Steps already had been taken to achieve better "jointness" between American soldiers and civilians, including those from the Department of State. Increased field activity required greater local knowledge. Moreover, she said, "record numbers of people" must be trained "to master difficult languages," such as Arabic and Chinese. Regarding the Foreign Service's own composition, Rice (2006) advocated a diverse diplomatic service to match the world's diversity.

Within the US Foreign Service itself, the changes proposed by Rice met with resistance. The new concerns compounded old grievances about inadequate resources and excessive political appointees. There had been little consultation within the Department of State before the secretary announced the changes, and many FSOs felt they would be assigned involuntarily to perilous duties without preparation or protection. "By demanding that FSOs take on the unprecedented, open-ended, and fundamentally impossible challenge of nation building under fire without adequate training or funding," wrote Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, who was president of the American Foreign Service Association, "the White House was continuing a myopic tradition of shortchanging the civilian institutions of foreign policy while lavishing resources on the military. Furthermore," he added, "the Bush administration's general efforts to stifle dissent and to reward those serving in Iraq with promotions and choice assignments has led to the unmistakable politicization of the Foreign Service" (J. A. Holmes 2009: 148–49). American professional diplomacy awaited a new day, hoping it would be different.

KEY POINTS

- The Clinton administration concentrated on negotiating agreements to expand trade and promote American business involvement in the formerly closed economies of Russia and China.
- The 2001 al-Qaeda attacks, directed by a terrorist organization based in Afghanistan, brought "home" to Americans the problem of weak and failing states, and the danger posed by conditions inside them that could be exploited by violent extremist groups hostile to the United States.

- To meet the new challenge, President George W. Bush launched a "crusade," vowing to defeat global terrorism; pursued Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; and ultimately, overthrew Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
- Recognizing the high costs of forcible "regime change"—and also the impossibility of winning the hearts and minds of local populations, especially in Muslim countries, by military means alone—the Bush administration learned the value of field-oriented diplomatic action and introduced "transformational diplomacy."

ENGAGEMENT: TALKING WITH ENEMIES AS WELL AS (JUST) WITH FRIENDS

Since the final years of the George W. Bush administration, and especially during the presidency of Barack Obama, the American emphasis on "engaging with" others has continued, although with less ideological emphasis and adversarial political tone. It has also been less unilateralist, and more open to working through international institutions. The term "engagement," although used by his predecessors, became almost the name of the foreign policy of the Obama administration, which differed from that of the Bush administration most distinctively in its seeming proclivity for "talking with enemies"—as some of its critics characterized the new, moderate, and more flexible approach. The Obama administration's emphasis was less on the inherent nature of a government than on its adherence to the principles of international law and order.

A controversy arose during the 2008 presidential election campaign when then-senator Obama indicated his willingness to talk "without preconditions" with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea. In contrast with most European countries, the United States historically has declined to deal formally with adversarial states unless they met certain specified conditions (Wiseman 2015b: 3). At the time, America's major European allies—Britain, France, and Germany, known as the EU3—*were* talking with Iran, and the United States was in effect "outsourcing" its diplomacy, and to the detriment of its international leadership position. The United States under President Bush had refused to have any bilateral contact with the Iranian government, reinforcing a policy of nonrecognition stemming from the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and Iran's refusal fully to report its nuclear activities as legally required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. The Bush administration seemed to prefer instead a loosely coordinated "good cop/bad cop" approach, letting the Europeans entice the Iranians with carrots while the United States, and also Israel, brandished the sticks. There seemed to be no real unity of effort, however.

The Obama administration, abandoning this disjointed procedure as unproductive, had difficulty defending itself against the charge that engagement would be tantamount to "appeasement"—that is, weak, shortsighted, immoral, dangerous, and possibly fatal compromise. Meeting and negotiating with aggressive dictators can, indeed, imply acquiescence, actual approval, and worse, cynical surrender of both principles and interests—including, importantly, the interests of others. The specter of the 1938 sell-out of Czechoslovakia weighed heavily. However, *talking*, as defenders of diplomacy insist, does not necessarily mean *agreeing*. Such encounters, perhaps especially if begun at a low level and conducted by diplomats rather than by political leaders, can generate useful information, supplementing other sources of knowledge and intelligence. Shunning, from this perspective, is simply a form of self-denial. Diplomacy should be continuous and universal, just as Cardinal Richelieu long ago taught. Moreover, "diplomatic sanctions"—that is, diplomatic disengagement—can actually reduce the leveraging effect of **economic sanctions**, which can continue even as adversaries talk (Maller 2010). Diplomacy and sanctions can be coordinated. Furthermore, non-engagement precludes the possibility of exerting influence through rational persuasion, which can be effective even with ostensibly irrational regimes, depending on how they view and calculate their own interests. Their appreciation of their situations can be influenced by direct interchange, especially with representatives of powerful countries and also international organizations with military or other resources to bring to bear.

United States diplomacy during the Obama administration was prominently conducted by President Obama himself—presidential engagement He had frequent encounters with foreign leaders at the summit level. He traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese president Hu Jintao in November 2009 (H. Cooper 2009). He personally led detailed, substantive discussions of major problems, notably the threat of nuclear proliferation. Even more characteristic of Obama's personal engagement with the world was his publicized delivery of thematic addresses on important policy questions—nuclear issues in Prague, relations with Islam and the Muslim world in Cairo, and the future of African democracy in Accra. His eloquence carried over from his campaigning for the presidency into the international realm. The Norwegian Nobel Committee, recognizing the effect of his rhetorical contribution, awarded him the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, observing that "Obama has as President created a new climate in international politics" (Norwegian Nobel Committee 2009). He capitalized as well, in his trips abroad, on his own personal, international background, his mother being American and his father coming from Kenya. There was an implicit strategy behind his overseas travel. Closer involvement, through visits and speeches, with other countries' populations became an intermediate end in itself—a way of directly shaping world public opinion, and an indirect way of influencing leaders at the top to make them more amenable, more likely to engage in productive discussion, and eventually, to cooperate as partners.

In the Obama administration's 2010 "National Security Strategy" (NSS), the term "engagement" is defined generally, and in a positive way, as "the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders." Negatively defined, it was, "quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes." The NSS stated, in an outline of progressive inclusion: "Engagement begins with our closest friends and allies"—that is, those countries with which the United States shares a common history as well as values and commitments to norms. It mentioned the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in particular as "active partners." It next emphasized the deepening of cooperation with "other 21st century centers of influence"—including China, India, and Russia. It proceeded then to espouse diplomacy and a development policy that supports "new and successful partners" from the Americas to Africa, from the Middle East to

South Asia, including emerging-market countries. But with respect to relations with "adversarial governments," the NSS presented "a clear choice: abide by international norms, and achieve the political and economic benefits that come with greater integration with the international community; or refuse to accept this pathway, and bear the consequences of that decision, including greater isolation" ("National Security Strategy" 2010: 11). Here, the NSS implicitly defended the Obama administration's rationale for possibly engaging diplomatically with dictatorial regimes. "Through engagement," the document stated, "we can create opportunities to resolve differences, strengthen the international community's support for our actions, learn about the intentions and nature of closed regimes, and plainly demonstrate to the publics within those nations that their governments are to blame for their isolation" (11). Rather than being a gesture of appeasement, therefore, engagement conceivably could bring about regime opening.

In his pursuit of "comprehensive engagement," President Obama took advantage of his early popularity abroad in an attempt to reknit frayed ties. In the span of three weeks during late 2010, Obama, together with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, participated in five European summits—the NATO Summit, the summit of nations participating in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the NATO-Russia Council Summit, and the US–European Union Summit, all of which were held in Lisbon, and the Astana Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Philip Gordon, the US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, saw this "extraordinary period of summits" as "an unprecedented opportunity for engagement with our partners in Europe and Eurasia." Indeed, some partnerships—notably that with the members of NATO, which endorsed a new Strategic Concept, and the US-EU tandem, which was pulling together in the economic and regulatory fields—were solidified. US-Russia relations were less consensual, and the OSCE summit in Kazakhstan even less so. The American delegation did not consent to an action plan proposed at Astana, because it did not "adequately reflect our long-standing position on unresolved conflicts," including those in Georgia and its two breakaway regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova's Transnistria region, and Nagorno-Karabakh, as Assistant Secretary Gordon explained: "We took a principled stand on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity and host nation consent" (Kellerhals 2010). As this illustrates, diplomatic engagement does not automatically entail political agreement or compromise. It could even sharpen differences. Nonetheless some progress was made in another area. In February 2011, President Obama signed the instrument of ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

At a time of economic uncertainty, and with the high cost of involvement in war and peace building in Afghanistan and Iraq, the resources available for US diplomacy appeared less and less adequate in relation to American ambition "to lead once more," as President Obama hopefully declared ("National Security Strategy" 2010: cover letter). Partly, the problem was one of internal resource allocation. Significantly, the strongest advocate for increasing the US government's international affairs budget in order to strengthen the "civilian" capacity of the United States abroad was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, an experienced holdover from the

Bush administration. Strikingly, Gates contrasted the annual appropriation for the Department of Defense, not counting funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, of nearly $500 billion with the Department of State's budget of just $36 billion. He noted that even with newly hired personnel, the size of the Foreign Service—some 6,600 career diplomats—was "less than the manning for one aircraft carrier strike group" (J. E. Barnes 2007). Others, including the American Foreign Service Association (2007), observed pointedly that the Department of Defense had more people in its military bands than the Department of State had diplomats.

Under the combined influence of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, there was a new emphasis on the coordinated application of all instruments of American power—a "whole-of-government" approach—to influence, optimally without resort to military force, foreign governments and populations. Secretary Clinton envisioned "a global civilian service of the same caliber and flexibility as the US military" (H. R. Clinton 2010: 16). The Department of State would try to lead the way. Following an example of the Department of Defense, in 2009 Secretary Clinton launched the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to create better long-term synergy between the Foreign Service and the US Agency for International Development, both of which were under her supervision. In the name of "civilian power," she would also include personnel of other US government agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Peace Corps. How could "leading through civilian power" be achieved? At the managerial level, heavy reliance would have to be placed on the interagency process. Secretary Clinton emphasized that "the US foreign policy apparatus must reward teamwork, promote collaboration, and support interagency rotations" (H. R. Clinton 2010: 16).

The actual tools of the Obama administration's integrated **smart power** approach were diverse. They included economic development assistance, reconstruction and stabilization support, trade and investment promotion, cultural and educational exchange, and also, in the communications sphere, the use of social media as well as expanded radio and television broadcasting in local languages. Engagement diplomacy, however, meant not just reaching people but also *relating* with them—and relating them to each other. As Judith McHale, who was the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs at the time, explained: "So it's not public diplomacy, it's not messaging, it's not just a marketing message. It's really fostering an environment where you can strengthen relationships between people" (Johnson 2010).

"Military diplomacy," if conducted primarily with other militaries, would foster new relationships, not just operational liaisons but also bonds of effective collaboration and genuine community with host societies where US troops, women as well as men, might be present. Particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, American diplomats working in "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" sought to engender longer-lasting links using an array of methods. Their efforts, sometimes referred to as "expeditionary diplomacy," recall an older, days-of-empire style of interacting with local officials and chieftains. The intention, however, was to be innovative.

"Partnerships" at every level—with leading countries, with international organizations, and even with influential private groups at home and abroad—were being pursued. The development of a stable US relationship with the PRC held particular importance, both because of China's inherent weight and because of the many geographic and functional areas in which its influence could be felt, either positively or negatively. The contradictory strategic thoughts of American officials as to how to deal with the rising China were somewhat contradictory. Commentators have called the resulting policy "congagement"—a hybrid of "containment" and "engagement" (Khalilzad et al. 1999). The term reflects deep wariness, a serious political-ideological strategic concern about China's exercise of power, including its naval deployments, its human rights behavior, and its refusal to let its currency float to reduce its huge trade surplus with the United States. "Engagement," *New York Times* correspondent David Sanger (2010) notes with regard to China in particular, "has its limits. Here in Beijing, a once-promising effort to engage the world's greatest rising power has gone badly off track. Chinese officials welcomed Mr. Obama's outreach in 2009. But increasingly, they are determined to show that they will not be pushed around by a country they view as a fading superpower." Engagement, like containment, required giving an impression of strength, but even more so, perhaps, evidence of dynamism and drive—and of leadership.

The principal framework that the United States uses for engaging the PRC has been the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a bilateral forum that combines the separate dialogues—Strategic Dialogue and Economic Dialogue—inherited from the Bush administration. Another, more specific diplomatic mechanism, focused on a regional security problem, is the Six-Party Talks, which include the Pyongyang regime, concerning the North Korean nuclear weapons program. That was dealt with directly early in the Obama administration through the use of a presidential special representative, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, a veteran US diplomat described by the Department of State as "the senior official handling all aspects of North Korea policy and the senior emissary for engagement with North Korea" (H. R. Clinton 2009).

The US-China environmental relationship has also benefitted from direct diplomacy. President Obama himself, meeting in Beijing with the new PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2014, agreed to a US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. Their bilateral commitment contributed significantly to the adoption by consensus in December 2015 of the Paris Agreement within the multilateral United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A key figure throughout the process of achieving a global agreement was the State Department envoy Todd Stern, who cooperated closely with the Chinese. "I worked very intensively with my counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, over the past seven years," he said (Lidegaard 2016).

Other special representatives or envoys also have tried to manage difficult problems. Richard Holbrooke, a bold and iconic figure in American diplomatic history owing to his management of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was assigned the herculean task of stabilizing the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier (Packer 2009). A no less intractable difficulty—that of moving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process toward completion—was given to former senator George Mitchell, who earlier had helped to achieve peace in Northern Ireland. Critics have noted that handing over these major foreign policy challenges to special emissaries, giving the appearance of "subcontracting," seriously complicates the implementation of policy (Ignatius 2010). It can blur lines of authority, duplicate channels of communication, and confuse areas of responsibility, bewildering US central administrators and host government officials alike.

The 2013 appointment of John Kerry as secretary of state, in succession to Hillary Clinton, marked a distinct change of style: the assertion of a greater secretarial role in negotiations themselves. In an attempt to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Secretary Kerry brought representatives of the two sides to Washington, DC, and subsequently traveled to the area itself numerous times to encourage progress. Ultimately more fruitful were the talks that resulted, in July 2015, in the Iran nuclear deal. Following secret bilateral exploratory discussions in Oman, and a meeting between Secretary Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the United Nations, President Obama telephoned the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, and engaged the United States directly in the search for nuclear peace with Iran. The resulting negotiations included the European Union's high representative as well as the foreign ministers of seven countries—Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, and Germany. Secretary Kerry, while leading the American delegation, relied heavily for resolution of technical issues on Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who dealt personally with the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where Moniz had been a professor. The result was a diplomatic landmark: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (White House 2015b).

A breakthrough occurred as well in relations between the United States and Cuba. Having from the beginning of his administration indicated a willingness to engage with Cuba, President Obama, on the basis of confidential diplomacy facilitated by Pope Francis, was able in December 2014 to announce a new course. He recognized the difficult inheritance of the past, including the hostility of the Cold War. "But I believe that we can do more to support the Cuban people, and promote our values, through engagement," he said. "After all, these fifty years have shown that isolation has not worked. It's time for a new approach." Accordingly, in a series of reciprocal moves with the Castro regime, he proceeded toward the normalization of relations. In March 2015, he and his family traveled to Cuba in his effort "to engage and empower the Cuban people." The US embassy in Havana, which had functioned as the "US Interests Section" under the protecting power of Switzerland, was in August formally reopened by Secretary Kerry. "The restoration of diplomatic ties will also make it easier for our governments to engage," he declared. "Having normal relations makes it easier for us to talk, and talk can deepen understanding even when we know full well we will not see eye to eye on everything" (White House 2015a).

These various examples of engagement suggest that it may now be diplomacy, rather than actual policy, that is the key to American international success. Is that truly the case, however? With regard to the Middle East in particular, it frequently is observed that no amount of diplomacy, whether quiet or public, can compensate for a US policy that is perceived by many in the Arab world as biased in favor of the state of Israel. Can diplomats themselves make policy, even if not formally charged with responsibility for doing so? Does their local knowledge, and reports based on their experience, ever constitute policy itself, serving as its essential source?

The 2010 public revelation by WikiLeaks of a trove of US embassy cables sent by American diplomats posted around the world caused Secretary of State Clinton to deny those documents' significance as indications of policy. "I want to make clear," she emphasized, "that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world" (US Department of State 2010). Her defensive remarks caused consternation among many American diplomats overseas who already felt a "disconnect" with policy making in the capital (Thompson-Jones 2016: 31–32). And while it may be true that the *setting* of policy is done in Washington, by the president and elected officials in Congress along with cabinet officers and other top presidential appointees, American diplomats and other representatives in the field often provide much of the actual substance of the US policy as it is *implemented* (Stearns 1996: xiii). Especially in remote places and in turbulent situations, they are the ones who know best what the conditions are and what policy responses are needed to address them. Furthermore, as Secretary Clinton herself noted, it is not only "our statements," made in Washington, that reflect US policy. It is also "our actions around the world" that do so. First and foremost, professional diplomats are the ones who take those actions.

"The United States of America is more engaged in more places with greater impact today than at any time in American history," stated Secretary Kerry at an Aspen Ideas Festival to general applause. "And that is simply documentable and undeniable" (Friedersdorf 2016). He himself traveled more frequently than any previous secretary of state, trying to hold things together—in Afghanistan, divided by tribal contestation; in Iraq, shaken by the inroads of Islamic State (IS); in strife-torn Syria and other parts of the Middle East; and even in Europe, struggling with the influx of refugees, Eurozone issues, and the "Brexit" referendum vote. The first challenge that Kerry believed the United States itself had to confront was "countering non-state violent actors." The US government had helped to contain IS, had assembled a coalition against the movement, and was "moving methodically and authoritatively to destroy them"—that is, by military force, with arms, training, and drones. "We are also diligently working to destroy the narrative that they are successful," he said (Friedersdorf 2016). That, however, required a different kind of engagement.

Traditional diplomacy—that is, government-to-government diplomacy—clearly would not suffice. Neither would conventional public diplomacy as it had been practiced by the US Information Agency (1953–99), with its emphasis on radio broadcasting, cultural programs, and educational exchanges. New channels and methods had to be found. The digital revolution offered a possibility of engaging persons individually, if only virtually, and the State Department's effort at "engagement" was multifaceted. The Office of Digital Engagement (ODE) maintains the Department's official blog, DipNote, as well as its presence on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and most other new media platforms. ODE manages ten foreign language Twitter feeds—in Arabic, Farsi, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Russian, Hindi, Urdu, Chinese, and Turkish. More narrowly focused, and more strategic in purpose, is the Global Engagement Center, an interagency effort housed in the State Department that is intended to coordinate the US government's "messaging to foreign audiences that undermines the disinformation espoused by extremist groups." In order to expose the "true nature" of IS and al-Qaeda, the Center would implement its strategy by building the capacity of "a global network of positive messengers" and, by the use of data analytics systems, "guide and inform our messaging efforts" in collaborative, thematic campaigns. Significantly, the Department seemed to be acknowledging that America's own message was not getting through with persuasive appeal. "Our direct engagement with violent extremists has been reduced in favor of partner-driven messaging and enhancing the content capabilities of our partners" (US Department of State 2016).

KEY POINTS

- "Engagement," although a very broad term covering military interaction as well as active civilian involvement abroad, has primarily a diplomatic meaning, specifically implying a willingness to talk directly with those with whom it may not be possible, or even desirable, to agree.
- The Obama administration initially made its willingness to "engage with" others—those that may be considered to be enemies as well as allies and friends—and to do so "without preconditions" (if, nevertheless, with careful preparation) a hallmark of its approach to diplomacy, and even of its bureaucratic nomenclature
- To shun relations with adversaries, such as the leaders or other representatives of Iran with regard to its nuclear program, can lead to the "outsourcing" of American diplomacy.
- President Obama himself engaged actively in international relations, not only at the popular level, by giving highly publicized speeches abroad, but also at the summit level with his political counterparts, in efforts at shared leadership. Secretaries Clinton and Gates sought to coordinate all instruments of American power—a "whole-of-government" approach, sometimes referred to as "smart power"—to maximize America's influence abroad.
- The United States' engagement diplomacy has its limits, especially in dealing with large, powerful, and distinctly un-like-minded states. Even with Russia and China, specific agreements, however, were achieved: New START with Russia, and the Joint Announcement on Climate Change with the PRC. The diplomatic breakthroughs with Iran and Cuba, though more dramatic, have yet to prove broad-based in effect.
- The (non-military) challenge posed by violent extremist groups has increasingly been met by digital diplomacy and by the empowerment of US partners to respond to the extremist threat themselves.

CONCLUSION: DIPLOMACY NOW THE PRIMARY MEANS, BUT NOT THE END OF POLICY

The overarching idea in the preceding analysis of the cumulative progression of concepts—from containment through transformation to engagement—is the increasing need for, and the increasing actual centrality of, *diplomacy* in US foreign policy, which now consists of official responses to a wide variety of regional and functional "problems" that cannot be subsumed under broad, declaratory statements of *policy* set in Washington. Diplomacy, for that reason, turns out to be perhaps more important than foreign policy as such. This is in marked contrast with the Cold War era. It is also very different from the more recent "global war on terror" period. While there are basic principles, values, and interests that must govern American official action abroad, that action itself often is, sometimes of necessity, taken in response to reports and advice from diplomatic missions around the world. Too often, the counsel of field officers—those who are actually engaged—is ignored. Their experience-based wisdom may be just assumed by those in charge in Washington, feeling engaged, as they too are, in policy deliberations, executive-legislative contention, and the bureaucratic process.

The term "engagement," as suggested earlier, has become almost a policy in itself. This is true not only for the United States but also for its allies, whose rhetoric is profoundly affected by—and sometimes emulates and reinforces—American diplomatic terminology. Thus, for example, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2008) commissioned the report *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World*. And the Group of Experts chaired by former secretary of state Madeleine Albright that advised NATO in revising its strategic concept proposed, under the heading "Engaging with Russia," that "NATO should pursue a policy of engagement with Russia while reassuring all Allies that their security and interests will be defended" (NATO 2010b). The new NATO strategic concept that was adopted by the NATO heads of state and government in Lisbon in November 2010 is titled "Active Engagement, Modern Defense." The document, among its other provisions, "offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping NATO-led operations to which they contribute" (NATO 2010a).

While *almost* a policy itself, "engagement" is essentially only a process, no matter how formally structured. It cannot be a substitute for policy. Principles, values, and interests must be included. These need to be structured in coherent form and united by strategic purpose. President Obama has said of the US government's efforts to "build new and deeper partnerships in every region, and strengthen international standards and institutions" that "[t]his engagement is no end in itself." Its purpose is to achieve an "international order" that "can resolve challenges of our times" ("National Security Strategy" 2010: cover letter).

The high internationalism of US foreign policy during the early Obama years became tempered by realism, including growing concern about the consequences of climate change as well as the menace posed by authoritarian regimes and violent extremist groups. Caution regarding military intervention became a watchword for President Obama, who tried to keep a distinction between the important and the urgent, even as advisers, including Secretary Kerry, periodically sought approval for military measures to reinforce American diplomacy. Former secretary of state and again presidential aspirant Hillary Clinton observed, to the great annoyance of her one-time boss, that "great nations need organizing principles, and 'Don't do stupid stuff' is not an organizing principle" (Goldberg 2016). She herself, when serving in the State Department, had been more an implementer than a strategist, if generally more inclined to combine diplomacy with military force than President Obama was (Landler 2016b).

Contemporary American diplomacy does need more overall strategic design as well as specific, intermediate-level guidance so that influence can be brought to bear in the right amounts in the right places at the right times. When commenting on the WikiLeaks revelations, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former US Department of State director of policy planning, observed that President Obama's team seemed to understand from the start that "engagement isn't an on-off switch, it's a rheostat, and they knew how to turn it up quickly." However, he noted that "what the cables don't tell you is how far he's willing to keep turning it up, especially in hard cases like Iran" (quoted in Sanger 2010). That calibration did turn out favorably, with the reaching of the Iran nuclear deal, whatever the longer-term consequences of that agreement might be.

The engagement of American power should be governed by the regulation of conscious policy. Yet events like the waves of protests during the 2011 Arab Spring uprising and its widespread aftermath demonstrate a continuing need for pure diplomatic reaction—differentiated, definite, and decisive. The implementation of American diplomacy depends not only on the instrument—the Department of State, its administrative officials, its diplomats abroad, and its communications technology—but also on its shared sense of purpose and control, its higher ideological and political direction. Diplomacy is ultimately a means rather than an end. Yet it is often the primary means today, one less of coercion than of persuasion, through which the United States achieves its international goals.

That the United States will continue to rely on diplomacy of a professional kind, rather than on military force or economic power, has been called into question by the surprising 2016 election of the businessman Donald J. Trump to its presidency. His campaign fulminations against "radical Islamic terrorism," his disruptive sending of Twitter messages, and especially, his executive order temporarily banning entry into the United States of citizens from seven Middle Eastern, Muslim-majority countries caused more than a thousand FSOs and other State Department employees to register their strong dissent. The ban seemed more likely to increase than to decrease the terrorist danger. President Trump's "only America first" decree, voiced in his inaugural address, suggested, at least at the rhetorical level, a retreat from the decades-long internationalist leadership role of his predecessors, and perhaps even a return to isolationism.

Nevertheless, the entrepreneur Trump's record of securing profitable "deals," negotiated with bluster and sharp bargaining, indicated the possibility of a new kind of US engagement: transactional diplomacy. Even treaty-based commitments such as NATO's solemn Article 5 collective-defense pledge could be made dependent upon allies' meeting their obligations, including fulfillment of the common two percent of gross domestic product defense-spending goal. Alliances thus might become conditional, even though expressly affirmed—as by General James Mattis, who was appointed Secretary of Defense. Essentially bilateral rather than multilateral, the Trump administration's style of engagement appears to be heavily premised on direct personal contacts, including presidential telephone calls and visits by foreign leaders—British Prime Minister Theresa May, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—who rushed to Washington to get to know the inexperienced, unconventional, and somewhat unpredictable new American president. "Reverse engagement," this method of gaining reassurance from the United States might be called.

And it can be an effective method, a diplomatic one. Not merely tactical, such direct, high-level interaction could contribute, even strategically, to the larger international balance, including a reengaged America, upon which the world's peace and prosperity might depend.

QUESTIONS

1. Can we practically distinguish between large foreign policy concepts like "containment," "transformation," and "engagement" and the diplomacy that is conducted in accordance with them?
2. Should diplomatic engagement be regarded as an end in itself or as a basis for achieving other ends?
3. At what point does diplomatic "engagement" turn into unacceptable, perhaps even illegal, "interference" in another country's domestic affairs?
4. Should diplomatic negotiation always be from a "position of strength"?
5. Is "transformation" of other societies an appropriate—and realistic—goal for American diplomats?
6. Can good diplomacy and skillful diplomats ever compensate for faulty, unwise, or indeed, even immoral policy? What are the limits of professional obedience? Is dissent by diplomats realistic?
7. Is the word "power," as in the expression "smart power," an appropriate term to use in diplomacy, or does the terminology of power have no place in formal diplomatic discourse?
8. Do American diplomats today share in the "making" of policy, or is it "set" entirely in Washington?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

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CHAPTER 16

China’s Contemporary Diplomacy

Zhang Qingmin

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Changing diplomatic goals and evolving diplomatic strategies
- Proactive multilateral diplomacy
- An omnidirectional diplomatic structure
- The broadening of diplomatic arenas
- Pluralization of diplomatic actors and demand for diplomatic cooperation
- Conclusion

READER’S GUIDE

This chapter discusses some of the important trends and evolving features in China’s diplomacy since the country opened up in 1978, and in particular those occurring after the end of the Cold War. Among the major changes in China’s diplomacy are: the use of diplomatic processes to support the goal of domestic economic construction, which remains one of China’s core national interests; the implementation of proactive multilateral diplomacy and engagement with international society; the establishment of an omnidirectional Chinese diplomatic structure; the adoption of a broad range of diplomatic practices; and the formation of diplomatic institutions for addressing the expanded channels of external diplomatic involvement. These changes have not only made China an important player on the world stage but also shaped China’s strategic thinking and diplomatic practice. These trends will continue as China rises.

INTRODUCTION

In his speech at the founding ceremony of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on November 8, 1949, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (1990: 1) said, “We have accumulated some experiences in external struggle in the past more than ten years since the war against aggression, but the work to sort out and make them a scientific and systematic discipline has not started yet [. . .] [W]e should sinify diplomacy science, but we are unable to do it now." China's diplomatic isolation from 1949 to 1979 made Zhou's desire difficult to fulfil. After Deng Xiaoping's opening-up and reform policies in 1978, China became increasingly integrated with the international community. Likewise, Chinese diplomacy became more active and sophisticated in nature. More recently, in 2014, China's current leader, President Xi Jinping, called for "a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role as a major country [. . .] conducting diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision" (*People's Daily* 2014a).

This chapter traces the development of China's diplomacy after the end of the Cold War to examine if the late premier's desire to investigate and theorize the particular features of China's diplomacy has been successfully realized. The chapter analyzes the major developments in China's contemporary diplomacy in the post–Cold War era, including its diplomatic goals and strategies, its attitudes toward the **international system** and **norms**, its restructured omnidirectional bilateral relations, its expanded diplomatic arenas, and new developments in the institutions involved in China's diplomacy following the pluralization of diplomatic actors. The conclusion briefly reflects on the implications of these new developments for China's future diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Upon the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China's leaders called for *sinification* of China's diplomatic theory.
- China's leaders today call for diplomacy with Chinese features.

CHANGING DIPLOMATIC GOALS AND EVOLVING DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES

Diplomacy, according to Sir Ernest Satow (1979: 1), "is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of relations between the governments of independent states." Diplomacy is not static but a very dynamic social phenomenon; it is the natural consequence of constant changes in the international environment and rapidly transforming internal social changes. The rapid process of **globalization** after the end of the Cold War, itself a comprehensive and multileveled process, fundamentally changed the context of states' diplomacy. Diplomatic agendas are increasingly pluralized, the actors of diplomacy have expanded, and the means and channels, even the content and concept, of diplomacy are undergoing unprecedented transformation.

Not only has the international context within which contemporary China conducts its diplomacy changed, so, too, has the domestic context. The social and economic changes that have taken place in China since 1979 have created a different country. China has made a historical great leap forward in almost every aspect of social life. The impact that the world has on China—and China's influence on the world—is unprecedented. Chinese diplomacy is becoming ever more dynamic and sophisticated in both its relations with the world and its ideas on these relations.

Diplomacy is a means to implement foreign policy. China's diplomacy changed with the changes in its foreign policy goals. When the Chinese government decided in 1978 to shift the focus of domestic policy to economic construction, the goal of Chinese diplomacy switched toward creating a peaceful international and neighborhood environment for China's domestic economic development. Indeed, securing regional peace for the sake of domestic growth remained a top diplomatic objective after the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) considered the first twenty years of the new century as a strategic opportunity for China's economic construction, which was emphasized as being the focus of all Chinese works. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he used the notion of the "Chinese dream" and great national rejuvenations to refer to this economic goal. This dream was substantiated by two "centenary goals": to build, first, a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and, second, a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and modern socialist country by 2049 (J. Hu 2012).

Economic diplomacy has continued to occupy an important position in China's overall foreign policy work since the country opened up in 1978. Unlike the understanding of economic diplomacy held by some Western scholars (see, for example, Woolcock, chapter 12 of this volume) who define economic diplomacy as a process, Chinese scholars understand economic diplomacy to mean two things: first, using diplomatic means to further its economic goals, and second, using economic means to further its diplomatic goals (Y. Zhou 2004: 11). Great efforts have been made to promote foreign trade, expand international cooperation, and participate in global economic cooperation. One of the most noteworthy efforts was China's fifteen-year endeavour, from 1986 to 2001, to restore its contracting status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO). When the WTO Doha round of negotiations ran into deadlock, China actively engaged in negotiation and, by the end of 2015, had concluded some 14 bilateral free trade agreements. The success of its export-orientated economy is evidence of China's economic diplomacy.

The PRC rarely engaged the term "national interest" during the Cold War era, but this changed in the post–Cold War climate, when China began to emphasize national interest as the basis of its foreign policy. China highlighted the significant role of its core national interests as the bottom line of its diplomacy. Since then, the goal of China's diplomacy has been not only to serve its economic interest of realizing the two "centenary goals" but also to serve its core national interests (see box 16-1). The priority is to enhance the Party's leading role and maintain the regime's security of the socialist system (*People's Daily* 2014b).

When the goals of Chinese diplomacy changed in the early 1980s, the country's diplomatic strategy shifted to that of independence and non-alignment. (The Chinese government continues to iterate this strategy today.) But a reactive and expedient strategy became much more salient following the catalytic changes of the post–Cold War period. This strategy was known as *taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei* ("keeping a low profile and biding our time in order to succeed").

The "keeping a low profile" strategy can be seen as a success: the CCP survived the demise of the Soviet Union and sustained a high economic growth rate, defying predictions that China would follow in the Soviets' footsteps by collapsing or disintegrating. China's success led to replacement of the prediction of China's collapse

BOX 16-1

China's Core National Interests

The White Paper on China's Peaceful Development published by Chinese Government laid out in clear terms that:

> China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.

SOURCE: State Council Information Office of the PRC (2011: 18).

with the prediction that it would emerge as the next threat. To repel such concerns, Hu Jintao's leadership generation (2002–12) proposed a road of "peaceful rise" (J. Hu 2003; Wen 2003; Zheng 2007: 467) or "peaceful development" (Suettinger 2004), a very different path to that proposed by realist thinkers in international relations who predict China would be a threat.

By the second quarter of 2010, China's gross domestic product surpassed that of Japan, making China the second-largest economy in the world. The difference between China and the United States' economic power also narrowed remarkably. Concerns that China and the United States would repeat the "Thucydides trap," in which a rising power runs into conflict with the status quo power, resurfaced. But President Xi Jinping, during his first meeting with US president Barack Obama in 2013, envisioned a different scenario of big-power relations and proposed a new type of major-country relationship with the United States, one featuring no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation (Xinhua 2013).

The development of China's foreign policy and diplomacy, however, revealed that the task of building major-power relations in a new diplomatic era was anything but easy, involving, as it does, a complex network of bilateral relations. Historically, there have never been two countries that are, on the one hand, so interdependent and benefiting from mutual cooperation across various fields and, on the other hand, so confrontational about many other issues. The barriers to the new type of major-country bilateral relations are numerous. First, the US government has not yet embraced the major-country relations concept as proposed by China. Second, the maritime hot spots in East Asia challenge the prospects for the new type of major-country relations. Additionally, the US pivot to Asia, and the reaffirmation of its military **alliance** system across East Asia, creates a counterbalance to China's staunch policy of sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands, as well as to China's overall regional assertiveness over its claims in the South China Sea. And China's response of "non-acceptance, non-participation, non-recognition and non-implementation" (State Council Information Office of the PRC 2016: 48) to the International Permanent Court of Arbitration's rejection of China's claims in the South China Sea based on the nine-dash line has led to the assertive interpretations of Chinese diplomacy.

KEY POINTS

- Changing international and domestic environments have changed the context of states' diplomacy.
- China's diplomatic goals have evolved from facilitating the country's economic development to serving its core national interests.
- China's diplomatic strategy has evolved from non-aligned independence to keeping a low profile to peaceful development to building a new type of major-country relations of win-win cooperation.

PROACTIVE MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

The most important trend of China's contemporary diplomacy has been its change from a passive response to active participation in international society and multilateral diplomacy. This change began around 1978, in the age of increasing globalization and the international community's emphasis on international cooperation, both of which helped give new momentum to the process of China's integration in the international system. Regarding globalization as an objective, as well as an unavoidable trend in world economic development independent of mankind's will, China energetically expanded its multilateral diplomacy and actively sought to integrate itself within the international community. By 2015, China had joined more than 130 intergovernmental organizations; signed or acceded to more than 400 multilateral international treaties, conventions, agreements, and protocols; and signed 12,000 treaties with other countries (Z. Liu 2015) across fields as broad as politics, security, economics, and culture. China claims to be a participant, a benefiter, and a maintainer of the current international order.

Indeed, China not only benefits from such integration but also actively contributes to international organizations and the international order. This is best exemplified by its role in the United Nations (UN). China's share of the UN budget, which was 0.7% in 1995, has increased to 5.15% in 2012 and reached 7.92% in 2016. Since China began to pay its dues to the UN **peacekeeping** operations in 1982, its share has increased to 10.2% in 2016 is now second only to that of the United States. A further example of China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations, beginning in 1988 when it became a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, is its military contribution to these missions. By the end of 2014, China had sent more than 30,000 person-times (includes persons deployed twice) of military personnel and police to 30 UN peacekeeping operations, making it the leading contributor out of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Zhong 2015).

During the process of joining the international community, China has changed from passive and reactive diplomacy to proactive diplomacy, moving away from tedious political propaganda and polemics to effectively employing international law, rules, and practices to advance its policy goals. Before the end of the Cold War, for example, Chinese leaders seldom participated in the annual meetings of the UN General Assembly. Today, however, Chinese presidents and premiers not only have presented and delivered at the UN, they have also participated in international meetings, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea), the Asia-Europe Meeting, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping, and the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. More recently, China began to host multilateral events, which it calls "host diplomacy." The 2008 Olympics, the 2009 Shanghai Expo, the 2014 APEC summit, and the 2016 Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Hangzhou, as well as many other extravagant and ceremonial events in China, are all state-orchestrated efforts to market the China brand and demonstrate China's strong desire to join the international community as an equal and proactive member in the global multilateral diplomatic arena.

What is more important is the change in China's perception of international organizations and its relationship with them. China learned that it could not exert influence on the world unless it first changed itself (B. Zhang 2002). It therefore sought to alter its strategies, from challenging the existing international arrangement to desiring to be a "responsible stakeholder" that seeks "maximum opportunities for its development from within the existing order" (Q. Zhao 1996: 14).

China's rise and integration within the international community has had several consequences, however. Internationally, it has raised both expectations for China to shoulder more responsibility and wider concerns about the "China threat." Domestically, it has inflated nationalism, which calls for a more assertive foreign policy, at a time when the government has reiterated its commitment to the road of peaceful development. While China's diplomacy is regarded as assertive or aggressive outside China, it is simultaneously criticized inside China for being too soft. There are even calls for the Chinese foreign minister to take calcium tablets to strengthen his backbone! ("Spokesperson of MOFA: We have received calcium tablets, indicating we are too 'soft,'" *Beijing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth News]*, Dec. 10, 2014) The Chinese government tries to walk a fine line—to reconcile expectations and concerns abroad while maintaining stability at home—in order to avoid derailing its economic development.

At the same time, as a country with the dual characteristics of both a developing country and a developed country, China tries to accommodate the big powers so as to maintain its involvement in multilateral negotiations, on the one hand, while closely coordinating with developing countries, on the other. Nonetheless, China seems more determined to join the international system and embrace globalization, as its initiatives to develop the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the "One Belt, One Road" initiative demonstrate. Aware that the trend toward globalization is encountering difficulties, Chinese President Xi Jinping, at the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, stressed China's strong opposition to protectionism and called for invigorating globalization and making it more inclusive and more sustainable in order to drive world economic growth (Xi 2017).

KEY POINTS

- China's relations with multilateral organizations have changed from passive acceptance to active participation.
- China's proactive multilateral diplomacy is represented by, but not limited to, its strong support of and active involvement with the UN and the UN Security Council.

- Through its proactive multilateral diplomacy, China's attitude toward international regimes and norms is changing from negative to positive.
- China's proactive multilateral diplomacy has led to positive and negative claims within and outside China, which are often difficult for the Chinese government to balance.

AN OMNIDIRECTIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRUCTURE

Since its founding in 1949, the PRC's diplomatic relations with other countries have evolved. Initially, the PRC faced threats from one or the other great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, China has traditionally directed its struggle against the country that posed the gravest threat. China's strong opposition to the superpowers (initially the United States and later the USSR) made it closely associate with the poorer, Third World nations. Indeed, this relationship became the cornerstone of its overall foreign relations, and it continues to be very important today.

As China's economic power increased, the overall framework of its diplomatic relations also shifted. This change formally occurred in the political report to the Sixteenth CCP Congress in 2002 and remained unchanged in a similar document to the Eighteenth CCP Congress in 2012. The new framework has been widely interpreted as acknowledging four important points: "Relations with the great powers are the key, those with the surrounding countries are priority, and those with the developing countries are the foundation, while multilateral diplomacy is a new arena" (Q. Zhang 2009: 38–39).

This new diplomatic framework demonstrates a change in China's identity from a revolutionary country to a developing country and, later, from an unequivocal developing country to a country with dual characteristics of both developed and developing countries. Prioritizing relations with developed countries reveals the overall pragmatic nature of China's foreign policy strategy, and this supports China's aim of having diplomacy serve the interests of domestic economic development.

China's relations with neighboring countries were, for the first time, given second place in this new ranking, indicating both the significance of relations between China and its surrounding countries as well as China's status and identity as an important regional power. It is an historical fact that China's connection to other developing nations formed the basis of Chinese foreign policy and diplomatic relations during the Cold War era. In terms of China's economic development strategy, however, the role played by developing countries is undeniably in decline.

At a conference on China's diplomatic work with neighboring countries on October 25, 2013 (the second such conference in CCP history), President Xi emphasized that China must strive to have more friendly political relations, closer economic relations, and deeper security cooperation and people-to-people relations. The greater significance given to China's relations with its neighboring countries has led China watchers to wonder whether President Xi is going to prioritize China's neighborhood relations.

With the shift in China's diplomatic framework, the nature of its foreign relations has substantially changed from relation-oriented to function-oriented (J. Wang 2011). This marks a stark change from the Cold War status quo, when friends and enemies were sorted into distinct groupings. Nowadays, it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Indeed, a friend in one domain might emerge as an enemy or competitor in another. For instance, China and the United States are political and strategic competitors while being highly interdependent in the economic field. China and Russia are potential allies, the two leaders enjoyed close personal relations, but economically, their trade volume has never met their expectations. Such trends are revealed in China's diplomatic institution—the functional departments on specific issue areas have surpassed the relational-oriented, geographic departments within the MOFA. This makes the formation of any security, or value, or economic alliance in a traditional sense more difficult. As a result, China is developing new kinds of partnerships—characterized as non-alliance, non-confrontational, and non-targeting of any third party—with major countries in the world.

KEY POINTS

- China has formed an omnidirectional foreign diplomatic structure.
- China's diplomacy with developed countries is the key.
- China's diplomacy with neighboring countries is the priority.
- China's diplomacy with other developing countries forms a foundation for Chinese diplomacy.
- China's diplomacy is changing from a relation-orientation to a functional-orientation.

THE BROADENING OF DIPLOMATIC ARENAS

Globalization has altered contemporary diplomacy worldwide. In addition to economic interdependence, the fast transborder flows of information and people are two remarkable features of globalization. These two trends have led to some remarkable developments in China's public, cultural, consular, and military diplomacy. China has proceeded to conduct multidimensional diplomacy embodying the multifaceted dimensions of these and other types of diplomacy, including economic diplomacy. To cope with such an expanded diplomatic agenda, the Chinese government introduced the concept of *dawaijiao* ("grand diplomacy" or "big diplomacy"), or *zongti waijiao* ("comprehensive diplomacy") (Tang 2004).

Public Diplomacy

Although a relatively new term, "public diplomacy" is not, in fact, an entirely new practice in China. There are many definitions of public diplomacy (see Melissen, Chapter 11 in this volume). The Chinese definition tends to be more state-centric than many others. As former foreign minister Yang Jiechi (2011: 43) stated, China's public diplomacy

> is usually led by the government, which uses various means of publicity and communications to present to foreign audiences its basic national conditions and policies, and to inform its own citizens of its foreign policy and related measures. The purpose is to win the understanding, recognition and support of the public both in the country and abroad.

This is a very reactive and tactical approach, and it is the result of the international and domestic political situation after the end of the Cold War, which had rendered an image of China that was detrimental to its diplomatic goal of creating a long-lasting and favorable international environment. As Yang (2011:43) wrote, "Prejudices, misunderstandings and misgivings about China still exist due to different ideologies and values, hangover from the Cold War or failure to adjust to China's rapid development." China consequently feels it is imperative to engage in public diplomacy in order to encourage more objective and comprehensive views and understandings of contemporary China.

There are two main differences between Chinese public diplomacy and that of many other countries. First, in China, public diplomacy is a new brand name given to old practices. For instance, cultural diplomacy and civil diplomacy (see later discussion), which are two major forms of public diplomacy in other countries, have a long history and are very dynamic in China. In this chapter, these two forms of diplomacy are discussed separately, because they are not conceptually and institutionally subordinate to public diplomacy in China. Rather, they occupy an equal, if not more important, position in China's overall diplomatic strategy.

Second, China's public diplomacy has two fronts: domestic and international. Internationally, the Chinese government has been trying to effectively use the tools of public diplomacy to project a positive image of China to the world. For instance, the CCP has changed the English translation of *Xuan Chuan Bu* from the "Department of Propaganda" to the "Department of Publicity." China has established the State Council Information Office, whose responsibility, according to its website (http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/index.htm), is not to propagandize China but, rather, to explain China to the world. The Information Office holds regular press conferences and invites relevant ministry leaders to brief the public on topics of common concern. As of September 2016, it has published 103 white papers in different languages on topics of global concern.

When Xi Jinping came to power, he reiterated the need to strengthen China's international "dissemination" capabilities in order to increase the power and influence of China's international discourse. Emphasis is given to the persuasiveness of the Chinese media and to its role in creating an "external propaganda flagship media" (*People's Daily* 2016). The Chinese government has developed a remarkable array of public diplomacy measures over the last two-plus decades, including increasing student exchanges; improving the efficiency of Chinese media; making good use of foreign media, the Internet, and foreign-language publications; making use of important events, such as the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo, to showcase Chinese history and culture; as well as occupying advertising space in Times Square, New York, to project a positive image of China to the world.

Public diplomacy on the domestic front is the equivalent of what is known as "public affairs" in other countries. Its main purpose is to shorten the distance between Chinese diplomats and the Chinese citizenry by informing domestic audiences about China's foreign affairs and diplomacy. The Chinese MOFA established the Public Diplomacy Division under the Department of Information in March 2004. It was later elevated to the Office of Public Diplomacy in 2009. This office has been active in organizing conferences and Internet discussions between foreign ministry officials and the general public as well as inviting citizens from all walks of life to visit the MOFA. Such an inward expansion of China's diplomacy has extended diplomacy toward domestic politics.

The ironic issue surrounding this, however, is that other ministries have been active on the international front of public diplomacy while the MOFA's public diplomacy has been mainly concentrated on the domestic front. In addition to the lack of bureaucratic coordination, the inertia of the old propaganda tradition suggests that the efficacy of China's public diplomacy is mixed (d'Hooghe 2007: 35–36). More recently, however, the relative departments and agencies that are actively engaged in public diplomacy have made good use of digital media to promote the efficiency of its public diplomacy. For instance, the MOFA and all its Foreign Service offices abroad have opened Wechat (Chinese Facebook) or Weibo (Chinese Twitter) accounts to provide instant information on foreign affairs and get feedback from the general public on China's diplomacy. And what is clearly evident is that public diplomacy will continue to play a dominant role in China's contemporary diplomacy, as exemplified by the large sum of money the Chinese government has spent—and continues to spend—on it as well as the remarkable array of public diplomacy activities that have taken place over the past two decades, all with endorsement from the top echelons of the Chinese leadership.

Cultural Diplomacy

Around the world, cultural diplomacy is conventionally regarded as a strand of public diplomacy, but the Chinese regard it as being just as important as political and economic diplomacy (Jiang 2000). Institutionally speaking, cultural diplomacy in China is the function and privilege of the Ministry of Culture. Conceptually, cultural diplomacy in an activity conducted in a cultural domain while public diplomacy is diplomacy targeting the general public, and it may have a cultural dimension. As communism loses ground, the CCP has resorted to traditional Chinese culture as the main ideological source of guidelines for China's contemporary cultural diplomatic practices. The "harmonious world" concept is one such example. As an editorial in the *People's Daily* explained, "China's diplomacy must insists on its traditional values" (*People's Daily* 2014c).

The Seventeenth CCP Congress in 2007 introduced the concept of cultural "**soft power**," and the Eighteenth CCP Congress in 2012 further emphasized cultural power and competitiveness as an important indicator of national prosperity and rejuvenation. Culture is often considered to be the most important form of soft power. To enrich the foundation of China's cultural diplomacy, the Chinese government has taken measures to preserve traditional Chinese culture and to promote cultural innovation by absorbing (learning or borrowing) the fine achievements, or the good elements, of other cultures by drawing on their strengths and virtues. Domestic cultural preservation and revitalization have paved the way for the promotion of cultural diplomacy.

In the global arena, cultural diversification is emphasized alongside the democratization of international relations and the diversification of modes of social development. China has made great efforts to help the rest of the world understand it better—namely, by carrying out a series of colorful culturally branded events, such as the activities of "Spring Festival," "National Day," and "Feel the Charms of

Chinese Culture." Most visible among these are the 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius Classrooms the Chinese government funded in 134 countries from 2004 and 2015 (see box 16-2). In addition, China has cooperated with many countries in holding culture weeks, culture tours, and other culture festivals on reciprocal terms, which helps demonstrate the charm of Chinese culture while also facilitating mutual exchange and understanding with other cultures.

Consular Diplomacy

Protecting the lawful interests and rights of its nationals abroad is the responsibility of a country's diplomatic services and is known professionally as consular diplomacy (see Leira and Neumann, chapter 9 in this volume). Indeed, the significance of this particular dimension of Chinese diplomacy is growing, as more and more Chinese citizens travel abroad for holidays, to invest in business, to study, and to work. In 2014, the number of Chinese who made overseas visits had surpassed 100 million. Collectively, the Chinese people have set up more than 20,000 overseas Chinese-funded institutions in more than 160 countries and regions. This transformation in the number of Chinese people going abroad functions as a bridge that helps to strengthen China's linkages with the world.

The complex international security situation and looming non-traditional security threats, however, have put Chinese nationals, and Chinese-funded institutions overseas, under increasing risk. Consequently, it falls to the MOFA and its departments to decide how best to protect Chinese nationals and corporations abroad. As a result new mechanisms and rules have been devised over recent years to enhance the consular protection of Chinese interests. In addition to upgrading the Consular Protection Division of the Department of Consular Affairs to the Consular Protection Center in 2007, China's MOFA departments have also set up cross-sector coordination and emergency response mechanisms. More resources and staff have been put into consular work as well. Among the more than 240 overseas foreign service institutions (embassies and consular offices), 70 or so specialize in consular affairs.

In accordance with the principle of "putting prevention first and giving equal importance to prevention and the management of emergencies," the Chinese MOFA makes use of modern technology to disseminate early warnings aimed at consular

BOX 16-2

Confucius Institutes

Confucius Institutes, which are governmental non-profit organizations, are the flagship of China's cultural diplomacy. Their main goal is to enable the study of Chinese language around the world and to promote understanding of Chinese language and culture by facilitating educational exchange. This helps to improve the friendly relations between China and the world, as well as contributing to the diversification of world culture. The efficacy of the Confucius Institutes came into controversy, however, when several universities, for various reasons, suspended their cooperation with Confucius Institutes in the United States and Europe.

SOURCE: Confucius Institute Online (2014).

protection. Information such as "Consular News" and "Notes on Traveling to Certain Countries and Cities" is updated on the official website of the MOFA to report recent cases of consular protection. Along with issuing documents, such as the "Guide of Proper Behavior for Chinese Citizens in Outbound Travel" and the "Guide of Chinese Overseas Consular Protection and Service," the website has updated travel advice, notes, and tips for traveling to specific countries and regions, including warnings to people who are traveling to some unsafe areas (MOFA PRC 2010). Today, the foreign affairs departments of the Chinese government handle over 30,000 cases of consular protection annually. The evacuation of Chinese from Libya in 2011 is the largest consular case since the founding of the PRC in 1949 (see box 16-3).

Military Diplomacy

Traditionally, it is claimed that diplomacy starts when war ends, indicating that military and diplomatic activities do not occupy the same space (see L'Estrange, chapter 14 in this volume). Zhou Enlai is known to have said in the early 1950s that diplomats are non-uniformed soldiers. He did not use the term "military diplomacy," however, because the military was a tool of confrontation during the Cold War. As tensions wound down after the end of the Cold War, military cooperation tended to increase. The white paper on China's national defense, issued by the Chinese government in 1998, revised the term "foreign military contacts" to "military diplomacy" (State Council Information Office of the PRC 1998). At the 2015 Military Diplomacy and Sixteenth Military Attaché's Conference, President Xi exhorted the military officers in attendance to "start a new phase of military diplomacy." He noted that the CCP had always viewed military diplomacy as an important tool for advancing China's overall diplomatic goals, safeguarding national security, and promoting the construction of China's military (People's Daily, Jan. 30, 2015). China's major military diplomacy includes activities such as the institutionalization of military communications and connections with other countries, developing high-level military exchanges, conducting military cooperation and exchanges in personnel development, establishing mechanisms for different types of

BOX 16-3

What Diplomats Do: Consular Evacuations of Chinese Citizens from Libya

When the 2011 riots and civil war in Libya threatened the lives and property of more than 30,000 Chinese working in that country, the State Council of China established an emergency command center on February 22nd to organize and coordinate their evacuation and ensure their safety and property. The MOFA designed an emergency traveling passport, and the Chinese government sent large numbers of chartered planes and rented foreign vessels, which shuttled back and forth from Libya to neighboring countries, to facilitate their citizens' return to China. Within ten days (by March 2nd), a total of 35,860 Chinese nationals had been evacuated from Libya, averaging 4,000 evacuations per day. At the same time, China helped to evacuate 2,100 citizens of countries from war-torn Libya.

SOURCE: Chu, Chaoxin and Liu, Zening, "35,860 Chinese Citizens have been withdrawn from Libya, 20,745 have returned to China," *Xinjing Bao [New Beijing News]*, 3 March 2011.

cooperative security dialogue, conducting defense consultations and security dialogues, promoting and participating in regional security cooperation measure, holding joint military exercises with other countries, taking full and active participation in international peacekeeping operations, and international relief and rescue activities.

China has established military ties with more than 150 countries and has military attaché offices in 109 countries. Ninety-eight countries have military attaché offices in China. From 2002 to 2013, the People's Liberation Army has held twenty-eight joint exercises and thirty-four joint training sessions with thirty-one countries in accordance with relevant agreements or arrangements (State Council Information Office of the PRC 2013).

KEY POINTS

- Globalization has expanded the types of diplomacy that states conduct.
- The Chinese government introduced the concept of comprehensive diplomacy to foreign affairs and conducts multidimensional diplomacy, such as public, cultural, consular, and military diplomacy.
- Public diplomacy is a new and active form of China's contemporary diplomacy conducted at the international and domestic levels.
- Cultural diplomacy embodies the strongest Chinese characteristics as a means of soft power.
- Consular diplomacy is becoming increasingly prominent as more Chinese travel abroad.
- Military diplomacy is attracting more attention as a diplomatic instrument.

PLURALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC ACTORS AND DEMAND FOR DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION

China's diplomatic activities are not limited to the arenas already discussed in this chapter. Contemporary diplomacy has expanded to all walks of Chinese life, leading to the pluralization of diplomatic actors and multitrack diplomacy in China's external relations. Summit diplomacy, party diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, and civil diplomacy are among the most important channels of China's diplomacy today.

Summit Diplomacy

Summit diplomacy refers to the diplomatic activities conducted by heads of state or government. It involves such activities as visits by heads of state or government, summit meetings, correspondence and phone calls between heads of state or government, dispatching of envoys or personal representatives of leaders abroad, and delivering foreign policy pronouncements in person (Lu et al. 1997: 159–63; Plischke 1990: 17). Summit diplomacy was not always a central component of China's diplomatic history, but today, it has become a popular and active sphere. Hotlines are frequently used for communications between the Chinese heads of government and state with their counterparts, although bilateral and multilateral summit conferences are the predominant forms of China's summit diplomacy.

The enhanced role of summit diplomacy in China's foreign affairs was confirmed in the second session of the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC) in 2002 (the NPC is China's parliament). Article 81 of the Constitution of the PRC was amended to read: "The President of the People's Republic of China *engages in activities of State Affairs* and receives foreign diplomatic representatives on behalf of the People's Republic of China" (emphasis added). The president's engagement in "activities of State Affairs" is therefore a relatively new function that provides the president with a constitutional basis to conduct more active international diplomacy. For example, Jiang Zemin made seventy-five visits abroad (including countries he visited twice), Hu Jintao managed eight-six excursions, while Xi Jinping made nearly fifty overseas trips within the first four years of his leadership. Active summit diplomacy, however, has undermined the function and authority of the foreign affairs bureaucracies, making Chinese MOFA at present the weakest it has been since the PRC was founded in 1949.

Party Diplomacy

Both the PRC Constitution and the CCP Constitution provide the Party's leadership role among all other organizations and in all domains in China. This is especially true in diplomacy, as the Chinese saying "there are no small issues in diplomacy, all rights belong to the Central Committee" indicates. The CCP National Congress decides the general principles and guidelines for China's diplomacy. The Party's Political Bureau and Standing Committee makes major foreign policy decisions, and its Organizational Department appoints all high-level diplomats (although this power is theoretically in the hands of the NPC). China's president is an honorary and symbolic leader, but he is able to engage in summit diplomacy precisely because he is also the Secretary General of the Party—the de facto leader of the country. When Xi Jinping became the Secretary General of the Party, it was emphasized that "China's diplomacy must insist on CCP leadership and Socialism with Chinese characteristics," and this is considered as "most fundamental condition for Chinese diplomacy (*People's Daily* 2014b).

At the same time, the CCP also has its own foreign ministry, the International Liaison Department of the Party. Originally, when the PRC's diplomacy was limited to a few socialist countries during the 1950s, the CCP's diplomacy took precedence over state-to-state relations or state diplomacy. However, the Twelfth CCP Congress in 1982 decided to separate party-to-party relations from those of interstate relations. Thereafter, the CCP began extensive contacts and exchanges with different foreign, including non-socialist, states. Today, the CCP maintains extensive exchanges and cooperation with 600 political parties in 160 countries and other political organizations, including ruling parties, coalition parties, lawful opposition parties, regional organizations of parties, and regional parties. The CCP conducts dozens of exchange visits with its foreign counterparts each year and has become an important strand of China's foreign relations.

Parliamentary Diplomacy

The term "parliamentary diplomacy" was first used in the Standing Committee's political report to the NPC in 1988 (P. Chen 1988). Today. it mainly refers to the diplomacy conducted by the NPC and its Standing Committee with their international counterparts in order to serve China's national diplomatic goal, domestic work, and the purpose of the NPC. It is intended to further China's national interest and to promote China's relations with other countries (Xu 2012: 22).

To a large extent, China's parliamentary diplomacy is similar to that of many other countries. It consists of diplomatic activities conducted by the parliament, including exchanges of visits between the Chinese NPC and its foreign counterparts. For instance, the eleventh NPC Chairman (from 2008 to 2012), Wu Bangguo, made ten foreign visits, and the members of the Chairman's committee made fifty-three foreign visits. Likewise, the NPC received 109 speakers or vice speakers from its counterparts. China's NPC has established exchange mechanisms with the parliaments of major countries and has maintained parliamentary contacts with 178 countries, established 106 bilateral parliamentary friendship group, and is an observer to five multilateral parliamentary organizations ("Report on the Work of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC in the Past Five Years" 2012).

China's parliamentary diplomacy is also different from that of many other countries in the following ways. First, the Chinese NPC is more than just the legislative branch of the state, as it is the most powerful government organ according to the Chinese constitution. Second, the NPC does not simply oversee China's diplomacy but is an integral part of China's comprehensive diplomacy. Third, the diplomatic work of the NPC is run not by its Foreign Affairs Committee but by the NPC Foreign Affairs Bureau. Finally, the NPC has established its own representatives at sixteen Chinese overseas diplomatic missions (L. Wang 2015).

Civil Diplomacy

Civil diplomacy is different from the diplomacy conducted by governments; it is the diplomacy of making friends, which is also referred to as people-to-people diplomacy in the Chinese context. Civil diplomacy focuses on enhancing trust and understanding between peoples and emphasizes the establishment of friendships that go beyond concrete political and economic interests.

China has a special institution of civil diplomacy, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. As of 2013, this association had established forty-six interregional or transnational friendship linkages and was maintaining friendly cooperation with 500 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across 157 countries. By developing non-official exchanges, organizing visits, and initiating and hosting seminars, talks, forums, and other exchange activities, non-official diplomacy has helped to establish communication mechanism, form cooperative platforms, and enhance mutual understanding between China and the world by building trust and developing friendships.A further major form of civil diplomacy has been the activities between international friendship cities. By the end of 2016, the various provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in China (excluding Taiwan Province, Hong Kong, and Macau Special Administrative Regions) have established 2342 sister provinces (state, country, region or circuit) and sister cities with 134 countries around the globe.("International Sister Cities Conference in 2016 concluded successfully in Chongqing," http://www.cifca.org.cn/Web/videoDetails.aspx?id=3480&ztid=74 accessed 1 June 2017). That the guidelines for civil diplomacy coincide with China's government-run diplomacy indicates that civil diplomacy in China is an important supplement to governmental diplomacy.

With the diplomatic arena expanded, the number of actors that participate in diplomatic processes varies according to the issue at hand (see figure 16.1). Overall, the competition among different stakeholders calls for coordination from the top. The central leadership of the CCP appears to have an advantage in coordination due to its leadership of all aspects of Chinese life. One such way of coordination is


Diplomatic actors
Diplomatic domains
President** and premier
Summit diplomacy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Traditional (political) Diplomacy Consular protection
Ministries of Commerce, Finance, NDR Commission, People's Bank, etc.
Economic Diplomacy
Dept. of Publicity, State Council information Office, Ministry of Education, *Hanban* (Chinese Language Office)
Public Diplomacy
CCP Political Bureau & its Standing Committee.* Headed by the Secretary General
Government State Council. Headed by the Premier
Ministry of Culture
Cultural Diplomacy
General Administration of Sport of China
Sports Diplomacy
Chinese Peoples' Association for Friendship
Civil or People to People Diplomacy
National Health and Family Planning Commission
Global Health Diplomacy
Other Ministries and Actors
Diplomacy in other domains
NPC. Headed by the Chairman of NPC
Parliamentary Diplomacy
PLA headed by Chairman of two Central Military Committees***
Military Diplomacy
International Liaison Dept. of the CCP
Party Diplomacy

Figure 16.1 China's diplomacy – actors and domain

* China's foreign affairs and diplomatic work are led by the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee and are coordinated by three "leading small groups": the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (re-established in 1982); the National Security Leading Small Group (established in 2000); the Maritime Affairs Leading Small Group (established in 2012). The three Leading Small Groups are known as the same organization with different titles. The Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee functions as their secretariat. After Xi became Secretary General of the Party, a State (National) Security Commission was established in 2013. The function of the new organization and its relations with the existing three leading small groups is of interest to many scholars.

** Since the end of the Cold War the President of the PRC has been held by the Secretary General of the CCP Central Committee, who concurrently holds the position of the Chairman of the two Central Military Commissions. Engaging in summit diplomacy is a function of the President as the head of the state, a symbolic role in representing the country and enjoying the treatment of being a head of state in diplomatic activities according to modern diplomatic norms. He also retains de-facto decision-making power as the Secretary General of the Party, the leading core of all affairs in China. The combination of the Presidential role with the Party and State enhances the role of summit diplomacy in diplomatic protocol and diplomatic effectiveness. The Secretary General's position as head of the two Central Military Commissions guarantees the Party's leadership to the army.

*** Article 93 of the PRC Constitution states that, "The Central Military Commission of the People s Republic of China directs the armed forces of the country." The CCP Constitution states that, "The Communist Party of China persists in its leadership over the People's Liberation Army and other armed forces of the people . . ." In practice, the two central military commissions do not conflict with each other because their membership is usually identical and the party Secretary and the President are held by the same one person. While the head of state is a symbolic figure, the Secretary General is the de facto leader of the army.

through holding a special conference on special foreign affairs issue. Recent examples include the Central Conference on the Diplomatic Work on Neighboring Countries (October 24 and 25, 2013), the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (November 28–29, 2014), and the Conference on Military Diplomacy (January 29, 2015). At the Central Foreign Policy Work Conference, President Xi said that the central and unified leadership of the Party must be enhanced, and the institutions and mechanisms concerning foreign affairs must be reformed and improved, to ensure that the Party's policy will be implemented to the letter.

Establishing small leading groups is an additional means of coordination for the CCP. After reestablishment of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group in 1982, the CCP Central Committee established the National Security Leading Small Group in 2000. As maritime disputes became salient, a further Maritime Affairs Leading Small Group was established in 2012. The three coordinating committees all work under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee. After Xi became Secretary General of the Party, a State (national) Security Commission was established in 2013 to help better coordinate an extremely fragmented bureaucracy. Such developments resemble what Hocking (see Chapter 7 in this volume) calls the "national diplomatic system." But the central problem for Chinese foreign policy making is changing from the lack of coordination to the burden of too many coordination teams, which themselves also need to be coordinated.

KEY POINTS

- The fracturing of diplomatic actors leads to multichannel or multitrack diplomacy.
- The enhanced role of summit diplomacy involving leaders in China's diplomacy was confirmed by an amendment to China's constitution.
- Party diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, and civil diplomacy are becoming important channels in China's contemporary diplomacy.
- CCP-led coordination among pluralized diplomatic actors has become a new trend in Chinese diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

The changes analyzed in this chapter are only a few of the many new developments in contemporary Chinese diplomacy. China's gradual integration within the international system has made the country's diplomatic practice more similar to, rather than different from, that of other members of the international community. At the same time, however, China's leaders have called for a diplomatic theory or diplomacy with Chinese style or Chinese characteristics. As this chapter reveals, the most remarkable feature of China's diplomacy is the CCP's leadership. China's diplomacy is not the diplomacy of the state but that of the Party, which covers diplomacy in different fields and through different channels. This differs remarkably from the conventional understanding of diplomacy, which is the management of interstate relations. While China is emphasizing the leadership of the CCP, a Marxist party, in its diplomacy, it also insists that traditional Chinese culture and morals, rather than Marxism, serve as the fundamental guidelines for Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. These developments show that China's diplomacy is still in a process of change. In this sense, we do not see that Zhou Enlai's call for a theory that would distinguish China's diplomacy from that of other countries in this contemporary world has been answered, and it remains a task to be realized in the future.

QUESTIONS

1. How did China's contemporary diplomatic goals and strategies change after the end of the Cold War?
2. How has China's attitude toward international society changed? What are the driving forces behind such changes?
3. Critically evaluate China's diplomatic structure.
4. What are the differences between Chinese and Western understandings of public diplomacy (refer to Melissen, chapter 11 in this volume)?
5. Why does China put so much emphasis on cultural diplomacy?
6. How does globalization change China's diplomatic behavior?
7. What are the most remarkable features of Chinese diplomacy?
8. Do you think it is possible to develop a Chinese theory of diplomacy? Why, or why not?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 17

Regional Institutional Diplomacies: Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, and Other Regions

Jozef Bátora

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Diplomacy as an institution and the challenge of regional institutional diplomatic systems
- EU regional institutional diplomacy
- Regional diplomacy in Asia
- Regional diplomacy in Africa
- Regional diplomacy in South America
- Other regional diplomatic systems
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter reviews the diplomatic structures and processes within regional institutions that are emerging around the globe. Anchored in a conceptualization of diplomacy as an institution, the European Union (EU) model of pooling resources toward the creation of a regional diplomatic system, including a set of dedicated institutional structures for performing diplomacy, is analyzed first. The chapter then addresses how similar processes are at work in Asia, Africa, and South America and in a number of other regional integration schemes. The chapter argues that there is a global trend toward increased regional diplomatic institutions and processes, inspired and catalyzed by developments in the EU, while not necessarily completely copying the European "model."

INTRODUCTION

The post–Second World War international environment is characterized by a proliferation of regional integration processes in various world regions, and this has important implications for the formation of regional diplomatic systems. The EU has been at the forefront of these developments. Bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, consular diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and public diplomacy all appear to have changed significantly within the EU. The most profound changes relate to the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in December 2009 and initiated a major evolution of the EU's external affairs administration, including a new High Representative post and the **European External Action Service (EEAS)** (see box 17-1).

Regional integration processes are not unique to the EU, however, so it is important to assess similar change dynamics in other regions of the world. Through this analysis, the chapter assesses the nature of the diplomatic systems within other regional organizations, and it evaluates the extent to which they are similar and different. This assessment will entail looking at the particular diplomatic structures and processes that characterize regional organizations in Asia, Africa, and South America. After presenting the key diplomatic structures and processes of the EU as a comparative baseline, the chapter will use them to examine other regional organizations, concluding with a table to highlight our comparative findings.

BOX 17-1

Main Institutions of the European Union

Council of the European Union: Also known as "Council of Ministers" or "Council," the Council of the European Union is the Union's main decision-making body. It represents member-state interests in the EU. Member-state ministers attend its meetings. The Council meets in ten different sectoral configurations to decide member-state positions and take decisions. Each country of the EU presides over the Council for six months, by rotation.

European Commission: Comprises twenty-eight (soon to be twenty-seven) commissioners and a permanent staff of some 37,000 European civil servants. Its main function is to propose EU legislation to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Also tasked with implementing EU legislation and the EU budget and acting in the general interest of the Union with complete independence from national governments.

European Council: Comprises the heads of state or government of the member states and the president of the European Commission. It elects its president for a two-and-a-half-year period, and it meets at least four times a year. Its primary function is to provide general political impetus and guidelines for the EU.

European External Action Service (EEAS): The diplomatic service of the EU. Established in 2010 based on articles in the Lisbon Treaty and composed of officials formerly attached to the European Commission, Council of the European Union, and EU member states.

The chapter builds on the idea that diplomacy is a key institution of international order. Reinforced by new institutionalist approaches in political science and organization theory, this conceptualization sets the analytical structure for understanding the systemic challenge that the formation of regional institutional diplomacies represents. The chapter concludes that there are significant developments in regional diplomatic systems around the globe, as a number of regions look toward developing regional integration schemes. There are, however, disparities in both the levels of development and the characteristics of regional diplomatic systems.

DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTITUTION AND THE CHALLENGE OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMATIC SYSTEMS

Diplomacy as a process of mediation of relations has existed ever since the first human collectives started to communicate. Various historical periods featured different kinds of more or less sophisticated diplomatic systems (Der Derian 1987; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995; Nicolson 1939; Numelin 1950; Satow 1922; also see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume). The way diplomacy is organized today, as a set of standardized processes regulating relations between states via ministries of foreign affairs and permanent embassies, is a relatively new phenomenon, with its origins in Europe (Bátora 2008). Well into the seventeenth century, European diplomacy was organized around a reasonably open and multifaceted set of structures, processes, and actors (Mattingly 1955; Queller 1967). It was only with the rise of **sovereign** states and their increasing dominance as a key paradigm of political organization that the conduct of diplomacy gradually came to be associated exclusively with sovereign states (M. S. Anderson 1993). In the "Westphalian state order," diplomacy, then, emerged as one of the key institutions (Bátora 2005; Bull 1977; Watson 1982; Wight 1979; also see the editors' Introduction in this volume). Diplomats from different sovereign states share a set of norms, principles, unwritten codes, and rules to which they all adhere. Building upon the definition of institutions by James March and Johan Olsen (1989), diplomacy as an "institution" can be defined as a set of rules and routines that define appropriate actions of states in the international environment (Bátora 2005: 48). In this sense, diplomacy may be considered an expression of a particular **logic of appropriateness**, informing appropriate actions and interactions of states, providing meanings to situations and actions, and indicating who might be deemed legitimate actors and what might be deemed legitimate situations (see box 17-2)

Explaining the maintenance and endurance of this interstate social structure in an international environment without any overarching hierarchy is a conceptual challenge. If international relations theory is less useful here, organization theory provides a pertinent conceptual toolbox (for an elaboration, see Bátora and Hynek 2014). Thus, diplomacy may be seen as a global **organizational field** (see box 17-2) in which the standards of diplomatic organization, including ministries of foreign affairs and embassies, are maintained through peer pressure and mutual adaptation. Legitimate entry and operation within the global organizational diplomacy field are conditioned by subscribing to particular standards and expectations of how a diplomatic apparatus is to be organized, what it is to do, and how it is to do it. When new

BOX 17-2

Some Terms Associated with Regional Institutional Diplomacy

Logic of appropriateness: Conceptualizes habitual behavior and institutionalized action where actors fulfill obligations and expectations related to a specific role in a specific situation. It constitutes an alternative to the **logic of consequences**—that is, instrumentally, rational action–driven strategic calculations and expectations of specific outcomes (March and Olsen 1989, 2006).

Organizational field: May be defined as a collection of organizations "that in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services and products" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 64–65).

Interstitial organizations: Organizations emerging in functional spaces between established organizational fields. They tap into into legal, physical, financial, personnel, and legitimacy resources of various organizations embedded in different organizational fields and recombine, transpose, and innovate practices across these fields (Bátora 2013).

Regional integration: Generally refers to the process of proliferation of linkages and joint policy making across state borders in a given region and the development of regional supranational governance—that is, the capacity to make binding rules in given policy areas (see Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 1). The classic writings of regional integration theory by Karl Deutsch (1957) and Ernest Haas (1958) and their followers provide varying interpretations of what characterizes regional integration processes (for an analytical review of different approaches, see Caporaso 1998).

states are founded, ministries of foreign affairs are among the first governmental agencies to be created, which is done by copying structures and processes of established foreign ministries. This is not necessarily due to the presumed organizational efficiency of this kind of a governmental agency—as numerous reorganization efforts in foreign ministries around the globe indicate, more often than not these agencies are highly inefficient (Hocking 1999b). Yet foreign ministries are extremely important both as symbols of sovereignty and statehood and as expressions of social existence in the interstate order.

The systemic challenge brought about by **regional integration** (see box 17-2) and by the formation of regional diplomatic systems around the world is twofold. First, these processes challenge the primacy of the state as the dominant diplomatic actor—regional integrationist entities such as the EU are not states, but they do establish diplomatic structures similar to states, including central foreign affairs administrations, embassies, and foreign services. As I elaborate later, the EU may have gone furthest, but the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat based in Jakarta has also done its share (Reiterer 2006). Second, these processes also challenge the unity and homogeneity of the standards and expectations established within the global organizational diplomacy field. As regional integration progresses at different speeds and with different effects in various world regions, there is increasing pressure toward fragmentation of the globally shared set of rules, routines, and norms that represent diplomacy as an institution of the interstate order. The solution may be either to limit the depth and breadth in the formation of regional institutional diplomatic systems or to adapt the global diplomatic order gradually, so as to allow non-state regional diplomatic systems a seat at the diplomatic table.

The EU has been a leader in the formation of a regionally integrated institutional diplomatic system. This leadership has had implications for the foreign affairs administrations of its member states and for the patterns of interaction with "third countries" (that is, countries outside the EU) and other regionally integrated entities.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy is an institution of the modern state order; that is, it provides a framework of norms and rules regularizing interactions among sovereign states as key actors in world politics.
- Regional integration processes and the formation of regional diplomacies challenge established standards of diplomacy as an institution.

EU REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY

The origins and the political evolution of what is the EU today are sufficiently well known. What is important is that two underlying processes have driven the structural development of the EU's regional institutional diplomacy. The first was the creation of the single market accompanied by standardization and mutual technical-functional adjustments in the "low politics" (socioeconomic) realm, producing "spillover" effects that led to further integration in other areas and to strengthening of **supranational** institutions (Haas 1958). The second process, in the field of "high politics" (foreign affairs and diplomacy), has been framed and defined by **intergovernmental** frameworks centered on the **Council of the European Union** (also known as the **Council of Ministers**) (see box 17-1). It is around these two processes of integration (supranational and intergovernmental) that the structures of regional institutional diplomacy have been developed in the EU.

The *supranational structures* for managing the external affairs of the European Communities (EC), as the EU's predecessor was once known, grew out of technical aid programs to the countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific in the 1960s. Because the EC was not a sovereign state, the diplomatic status of officials representing the EC was ambiguous in the early years. Gradually, the EC **delegations** and their staff gained formal recognition as diplomatic agents from the authorities of host countries. This kind of recognition was stretching established concepts of whom, or what, is to be considered a standard diplomatic actor (Bátora and Hynek 2014; Bruter 1999). As Véronique Dimier and Mike McGeever (2006: 496) observe, the "argument was that the EC was a 'partial' state. The Japanese were first to accept that somewhat revolutionary thesis." As of the mid-1980s, the EC had a well-functioning network of diplomatic representation, featuring delegation offices around the world, a dedicated External Service, and an external affairs administration in Brussels built around several Directorates General in the sphere of trade, aid, and later, external relations and enlargement. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, European Communities delegations (EC delegations) have been conducting more standard diplomatic functions, including political and security-related reporting. Training has been aimed at introducing standard elements of diplomatic service culture. Training has also been strengthened by exchange schemes for officers from member states' diplomatic services. On the ground in third countries, the heads of EC delegations have been charged with coordinating the activities of member states' embassies aiming for coherent EU action (see Maastricht Treaty 1992: Article 20). Also, the EC delegations have been charged with managing the financial portfolios from the EU's aid budget, which means they have been responsible for some key instruments in the EU's foreign policy (Spence 2004). Nevertheless, the diplomatic status of the heads of EC delegations as ambassadors on par with ambassadors of sovereign states has been somewhat ambiguous, as they represented a non-state entity with no head of state (Bruter 1999).[1]

If the **European Commission** (see box 17-1), responsible for the external service and the network of worldwide EC delegations, has been a foreign policy actor "by stealth" (see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 84), EU foreign policy making has been centered on the intergovernmental framework of the Council of the European Union. It is here that foreign policy actions of the EU are negotiated and decided by **consensus** by the foreign ministers of member states. Coordination is performed by the permanent EU presidency and the EEAS, and negotiation is performed primarily in the Committee of Permanent Representatives as well as in the Political and Security Committee. Since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EU has been represented externally by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council of the European Union negotiations and the work of the High Representative are supported by the General Secretariat of the Council (known as the Council Secretariat). The origins of the latter go back to the loose foreign policy coordination mechanism known as "European Political Cooperation," initiated in 1970. While the Council Secretariat was created in the 1970s as a bureaucratic support body, in the first decade of the twenty-first century it was playing the role of an embryonic "foreign ministry" of the EU.

As crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo unfolded in the 1990s, numerous coordination problems among the EU actors were exposed. In particular, coordinating the political decisions made in the Council of the European Union with the flows of financial and technical assistance controlled by the European Commission and managed by heads of EC delegations in countries outside the EU often proved to be a severe challenge, undermining the EU's effectiveness in its foreign policy efforts (Bátora et al. 2017; Knaus and Martin 2003,). A series of similar problems along with the multiplicity of diplomatic representation of the EU were among the key motivations behind the change proposals contained in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Spence 2012).

The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of innovations in terms of institutional structures, legal status of diplomatic representatives, and leading principles of the EU's external action. The key institutional innovations include the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS—the "diplomatic service" of the EU. The current High Representative, Federica Mogherini, is in charge of coordinating the EU's external action and representing the EU to the outside. She is also vice president of the European Commission responsible for coordinating the commission's external relations portfolio. With the Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, an element of hierarchy was introduced in the so-called **College of Commissioners**, where the High Representative coordinates the work of the commissioners responsible for enlargement, trade, and developmental aid.

Established in 2010, the EEAS is neither a supranational nor an intergovernmental institution, but a separate body in the institutional architecture of the EU. The idea behind its creation was to achieve better coordination in Brussels and in third countries, linking political decisions with financial aid and other foreign policy instruments at the disposal of the European Commission. Based on stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty, it is organizationally based on selected units and staff from the European Commission's external affairs directorates, from the Council Secretariat, and from the EU member states. It combines and spans the functional areas and institutional domains of foreign ministries, defense ministries, development aid agencies, and intelligence services and could hence be conceptualized as an **interstitial organization** (Bátora 2013) (see box 17-2). This interstitial status increases heterogeneity in the established global organizational field of diplomacy constituted by foreign ministries as standardized organizational carriers of states' diplomatic actorness. This shows, for instance, in how the multinational diplomatic staff of the EEAS enjoys **immunities and privileges** on a par with diplomatic services of states, but this often depends on the resources of EU member states (for example, as the EU is not a state, the EEAS cannot issue diplomatic passports, and its staff carry such passports only if their respective national governments allow them to use these when serving in the EEAS).

Among the key legal changes introduced with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was that the EC delegations abroad changed their status to EU delegations. This has raised the issue of who, and in what situations, represents member states in those third countries where member states have their own national embassies. Development of EU-level diplomatic capacity and strategic actorness has been challenging entrenched organized diplomatic capacities on the national level in EU member states (Mälksoo 2016). In some cases, this has generated lasting symbolic power struggles for status recognition between the EEAS and the EU member states' diplomatic services (Adler-Nissen 2014b).

A further challenge concerns the question of ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EEAS (Bátora 2010a). This relates to the fact that the EEAS is a new element in the architecture of the EU, separate from both the **European Commission** and the **European Council** (see box 17-1), which means that specific procedures need to be set up to ensure political control and democratic accountability. This is particularly pertinent in that the EEAS now manages the considerable budget for supporting the EU's external relations portfolio. In addition, it can also set the parameters and agenda for the EU's political decisions via the High Representative's role in presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union, which is where the foreign ministers of all the member states meet to discuss and decide upon the EU's actions in the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced a transformative agenda concerning the content of the EU's external relations—for example, when it states that the EU is to spread the principles it is built upon to other parts of the world (Lisbon Treaty 2009). This implies, among other things, supporting regional integration processes in other world regions. What remains to be seen are the implications of the United Kingdom's ongoing reordering of its relations with the EU following the June 2016 Brexit vote and the potential exit of British officials from the EU's external affairs bodies.

In sum, multiple features characterize the EU model of regional institutional diplomacy. First, it is a combination of supranational and intergovernmental institutional structures forming the EEAS as an interstitial organization. This enables integrating processes of political decision making with financial aid, technical and legal expertise, and other instruments of the EU's external affairs toolbox. Second, it is a multinational diplomatic service. In this, the EU has departed from the standard model of national foreign services, restricted to one's own nationals. Third, the structural development of EU diplomacy continues in parallel with the maintenance and adaptation of member states' national diplomacy structures. Most of the governments of the EU maintain their embassies around the world, even though some have decided to shift personnel and resources to areas with a high priority while relying upon the EU delegations in places of lower importance for them. Fourth, the combination of the rise and strengthening of diplomatic structures at the EU level with the maintenance and adaptation of structures at the member-state level means that the EU now has a multilayered network of diplomatic representation, with multiple channels and decision-making centers (for an overview. see Spence and Bátora 2015).

KEY POINTS

- European integration has led to the formation of both intergovernmental and supranational decision-making capacities at the EU level.
- External relations in the intergovernmental pillar of the EU (Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defense Policy) have been centered on the Council of the European Union.
- External relations in the supranational pillar of the EU (single market, external trade, aid policies, and enlargement) have been centered on the European Commission.
- The Lisbon Treaty includes the following arrangements for conducting EU diplomacy: an integrated set of supranational tools and intergovernmental decision-making structures for foreign policy decision making, a multinational diplomatic service, parallel structures of diplomatic representation with member states, and a legal personality.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY IN ASIA

Regional integration in Asia has followed a very different path than that taken by the EU. There are a number of regional entities in Asia (see figure 17.1). This section will concentrate on the two main ones: ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).


ECO
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Iran
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Pakistan
Tajikistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
27 Members incl. from Asia: Cambodia, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam
APEC
21 Members incl. from Asia:
China
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Russian Federation
Uzbekistan
Afghanistan
China
Japan
Nepal
India
South Korea
Myanmar
Vietnam
Thailand
Philippines
Singapore
Maldives
Indonesia
SCO
China
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
SAARC
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
ASEAN
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

Figure 17.1 Overlapping membership in Asian regional integration.

ASEAN has a population of about 600 million people and is the largest and most important Asian regional integration initiative. It was established in 1967 between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and although its initial objectives were concerned with regional peace and harmony, it has focused more recently on political and economic integration in order to compete more effectively in an increasingly globalized world. Integration has progressed according to the "ASEAN way," a diplomatic code of conduct built on consensual and flexible decision making, limited institutionalization, informality, and mutual non-interference. This incremental approach to integration is characterized by high levels of head of government/state networking and decision taking combined with a reluctance to use binding institutions or legal instruments. Through this approach, which is substantially different than the EU supranational approach (Rüland 2001), ASEAN achieved its aim of becoming a full ASEAN Community in 2015. This community is based on a Security Community, an Economic Community, and a Socio-Cultural Community.

The ASEAN way—a state-centric approach—pervades the institutions, processes, and procedures of regional integration as well as regional diplomacy. The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta coordinates and implements projects and activities, but it is not—and does not aspire to become—supranational with binding powers like the EU model. Instead, the ASEAN Secretariat's vision is to become the "nerve center," which means a central organizing and information function. The ASEAN institutional structure contains dispute settlement mechanisms, a development fund, and arrangements for a high level of cooperation with the business sector. Two further important structural elements of ASEAN are the rotating chairmanship and the Jakarta-based Committee of Permanent Representatives, alongside the Secretariat, to help merge national positions into ASEAN positions. The ability to coordinate ASEAN diplomacy is based on a willingness to merge national positions and to vote and act as a region—a major challenge in the creation of any regional diplomacy. ASEAN very rarely votes as a group in multilateral forums, although it consistently votes, as a group, against United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Burma. While the formal diplomatic rules and codes of conduct underpinning ASEAN cooperation have not departed from their state-centric principles of mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, the actual practices of regional diplomatic cooperation have evolved (Davies 2016). In recent years, it has been increasingly common to comment on each others' internal affairs in the maintenance of human rights and in other areas. This reveals important patterns of horizontal coordination and standardization across country borders within the ASEAN region.

ASEAN has extensive external relations, notably in the security and economic fields. It has free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries such as Australia, India, Japan, and New Zealand and an important FTA with China that came into effect in January 2010. External negotiations and relations are always conducted, or endorsed, on an intergovernmental basis, usually by the foreign ministers under the ASEAN umbrella, as the foreign ministers did for the ASEAN-China FTA. In addition to these external trade relations, ASEAN has had a diplomatic relationship with the United States for more than thirty years.

Arguably, the ASEAN way is even more important as a diplomatic code of conduct that guides external negotiations and discussions. It is based on respect for sovereignty, a non-confrontational and low-key style that is different from Western diplomacy, which is more comfortable with sanctions, threats, and warnings. This emergent regional diplomatic culture has also spread to other regional arrangements—for example, the **ASEAN Regional Forum**. Interestingly, there is a debate about the limits of the ASEAN way and the extent to which ASEAN actually follows it (Yuzawa 2006).

While ASEAN clearly does not replicate the regional integration or, by extension, the diplomatic structures and processes of the EU, developments in the region indicate some elements of "learning" from the EU experience, or at least some similarities with the path the EU has taken. ASEAN now has third countries accredited to its Secretariat, in recognition of the nerve-center role that it aspires to play. ASEAN also currently has twenty-one committees abroad, all staffed by local member-state ambassadors under rotating chairmanships, such as in Geneva, Beijing, Washington, Paris, Brussels, and New York. The role of these committees is to help coordinate the external activities of ASEAN in their respective locations.

The second major regional initiative in Asia, SAARC, was created in 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. SAARC applies a diplomatic code of conduct similar but not identical to the ASEAN way to its decision-making methods and its integration philosophy. It is therefore also a summit-driven process, with the Council of Ministers as a second level of institutional architecture—again supported by a non-supranational Secretariat. SAARC is much less active on the international scene than ASEAN and has shown a smaller appetite for a regional diplomatic presence. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC does not have third-country representations to its Secretariat, or nascent committees to coordinate and cooperate abroad, which is a reflection of its limited integration objectives.

The extent to which these two regional vehicles—ASEAN and SAARC—display regional diplomatic tendencies differs quite markedly. While neither has the explicit objectives of creating a centralized diplomatic machinery, harmonized positions, and a joint outlook, ASEAN is clearly developing institutions and techniques that reveal a nascent regional diplomacy that is a logical consequence of its regional integration process. ASEAN is an increasingly active player on the regional and global stage, and its activities require structures and processes to find positions and negotiate mandates. And in spite of the ASEAN way, the countries of ASEAN appear to be replicating a number of structural elements of EU regional diplomacy. For example, ASEAN seeks to develop and engage in both low and high politics, and the Secretariat is developing into a key actor assisted by a committee of permanent representatives and by third-country representations. The objectives of these structures are to harmonize national positions and allow ASEAN member states to act as one. In addition, ASEAN has a number of coordinating committees around the world in key economic and political locations, as a further embryonic attempt to harmonize its activities. Where ASEAN and SAARC remain reluctant to follow the EU diplomatic integration model is in the adoption of supranational arrangements, binding regional positions, and the creation of formal regional representations (Acharya 2004).

KEY POINTS

- The nature of regional diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia is driven by the level (and objectives) of regional integration and the structures for interaction with third countries and organizations.
- Regional diplomacy in these regions is characterized by a strong degree of intergovernmentalism.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

Africa is home to more regional integration initiatives than any other continent in the world as well as to the oldest existing customs union scheme—the Southern African Customs Union of 1910. Despite this, Africa has an extremely mixed record in regional integration and, subsequently, in regional diplomacy.

The African Union (AU), the successor to the Organization of African Unity, is the only pan-African regional organization with fifty-three of the fifty-four African states as members (Morocco is the only country not a member due to a political conflict with other AU members over the membership of Western Sahara, which has a special status allowing it access to functions and negotiations). The AU is formally, and explicitly, modeled on the EU, which it is striving to replicate. The AU has an Assembly of the Union made up of heads of state as the primary decision-taking body, along with the Executive Council, Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, Committee of Permanent Representatives, and Commission. All major countries in the world have diplomatic representation to the AU, housed in Addis Ababa. The AU is an umbrella organization covering the plethora of regional integration schemes that coexist in Africa—with the long-term intention of subsuming them all into one body. Currently, it is an important African political body and is assuming new diplomatic significance as well. For example, the AU has special diplomatic relations with both the United States and the EU and is a permanent observer at the UN General Assembly.

The indicative list of regional integration schemes in Africa shows that aside from the AU, the twelve other integration projects involving the fifty-four states of Africa have a combined 138 members. Thus, there is significant quantitative overlap in African regional integration (see figure 17.2).

The issue of overlapping membership is an important one to consider when thinking about the formation of regional diplomacies, because it helps to assess whether the region is a coherent and unified entity. In addition, as we have argued, the formation of a regional diplomatic system depends to a significant extent on the objectives and goals of the regional integration scheme. For example, the focus of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on drought control and development initiatives has an impact on its structure and diplomatic aspirations. Almost all the other regional groupings identified have strong and explicit economic integration motivations and objectives—thus, they are more concerned with low-politics issues,


CEMAC
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, R. of Congo, Gabon
IGAD
Uganda
Kenya
Somalia
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Sudan
ECCAS
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, D.R. Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, R. of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe
CEMAC
ECCAS
IGAD
CEPGL
CEPGL
Burundi
D.R.Congo
Rwanda
SADC
Angola
Botswana
D.R. Congo
Lesotho
Malawi
Madagascar
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Seychelles
EAC
SADC
COMESA
EAC
Burundi
Kenya
Rwanda
Tanzania
Uganda
COMESA
Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Figure 17.2 Overlapping membership in African regional integration.

NOTE: This figure does not depict all of Africa's regional integration schemes. It also does not take account of the qualitative nature of integration of each project.

as described earlier. The most direct implication of this is that in the majority of African countries, diplomacy is concentrated in the area of trade negotiations, with the bulk of political and security diplomacy being handled by the AU and other international organizations.

African regional integration is closely fashioned on the EU model, in terms of institutional structure and objectives. Consequently, some clear, although at times competing, regional diplomatic tendencies are emerging. Many of the African regional groups are striving toward economic and political integration, with the direct consequence that structures and institutions for creating and delivering regional diplomacy are being actively sought and built. The majority of the regional groups have turned to the EU as a blueprint for how to create the right structures for regional diplomacy, so closer analysis of the African schemes, such as the East African Community (EAC), often reveals almost identical institutional architectures, goals, objectives, and processes to develop diplomatic positions, One final important aspect of African regional integration is regional peacekeeping and cooperation with the UN, notably numerous Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping initiatives.

To conclude, there are two related caveats about African regional institutional diplomatic development. First, having almost identical institutions and objectives as the EU does not in any way guarantee an ability to develop and deliver regional diplomacy. Second, the ability to develop and deliver regional diplomatic positions on international issues is very difficult without a deep respect for regional law that ensures agreements are adhered to and a commitment to supranationality that supersedes national interests. African regional institutional diplomacy is well developed in terms of objectives, structures, and mechanisms, but it will take more time to solidify and represent coherent and strongly regional positions.

KEY POINTS

- Advancing regional diplomacy in Africa has depended on several factors, including:
- the cohesion of the regional group and the strength and depth of regional integration schemes,
- the presence of strong institutions and structures to develop and deliver regional diplomacy, and
- the resources for building regional capacity.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

South America, more than any other continent, has embraced regional integration as a reaction to global changes and developments, using it to gain influence and assert itself on the global stage. In addition, regional integration in South America has to contend with dominant US influence—meaning that many regional groups have an element of identity and independence that regional groups in other parts of the world do not have. This has given rise to a small number of coherent regional groups.

The most important regional group in South America is Mercosur, the world's third-largest regional grouping. Mercosur was created in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción. It had an ambitious initial program, borne of political desire, that included the creation of a free trade area, a customs union, and eventually, a common market—all closely modeled on the EU's history. While Mercosur has not achieved the status of a complete common market, it has made significant progress over its short life span, such that it represents an advanced regional integration body with political, economic, and security interests (Doctor 2007; Malamud 2003, 2005; Peña 2005).

Mercosur was built on the EU blueprint, sharing Europe's objectives and institutional architecture but without any form of supranationalism (Malamud 2005). It has presidential summits to drive the agenda forward, backed up by the Common Market Council, the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and an administrative secretariat based in Montevideo that has extensive third-country representation. Mercosur is active in regional and global diplomacy and has an expressed objective to be a key actor across trade, security, and political issues. It is a globally recognized regional entity. Mercosur has already negotiated a number of FTAs, engaged in a number of current negotiations, such as with the EU, and seeks to play an active political role in the Americas and beyond. Unlike many other regional groups, Mercosur actively seeks to construct a regional diplomatic role beyond trade. Thus, Mercosur has developed a very strong regional diplomatic presence in international forums. This presence, however, continues to be based on "presidential initiatives" between leaders of member states, notably Brazil, a practice that is not based on the EU model of common positions delivered by supranational civil servants.

The Andean Community (CAN) is the most institutionalized regional project in South America, with internal free trade applied to all products in all sectors, supranational institutions, and developed external links and relationships. The current CAN stems mostly from major internal changes made in the 1990s that created stronger, more flexible institutions based on the EU integration model. The current institutional architecture is the most ambitious regional project after the EU itself. CAN's architectural schema includes the Andean Presidential Council, the Andean Council of Ministers of External Affairs, the Andean Community Commission, the Tribunal of Justice, and the Andean Parliament. The most distinguishing feature of CAN is its supranationality, something no other South American regional initiative is even close to attaining. And its supranationality comes through "direct applicability," which means regulations do not need to be ratified at the national level once officially published. This aspect of regional integration has important potential consequences for the development of regional diplomacy, because it allows CAN to mirror developments in the EU more closely than regional groups relying on presidential initiatives and guidance.

The Central American Common Market (CACM) is the oldest regional initiative in South America, created by the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration in 1960. The Central American Integration System (SICA) reinvigorated this in 1993 as a renewed attempt to integrate a region that, despite close linguistic, geographic, cultural, and historical ties, had failed to integrate successfully. The EU model has heavily influenced CACM, like the other South American regional groups; hence, the institutional architecture of the CACM is headed by presidential summits. The implementation of these meetings is assured by the Council of Ministers. In addition, there is a Central American Parliament as well as a Central American Court of Justice, which is a permanent institution that guarantees the judicial security of the integration process. The daily task of running the integration system falls to the General Secretariat of SICA.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR/UNASUL) was established in 2008 and comprises twelve member countries. The official aim of this organization is to provide an organized platform for integrating the processes operating in Mercosur and CAN. Modelled on the EU, UNASUR aims to work towards establishing EU-style features, such as single passport and single currency. The UNASUR Permanent Secretariat (headquarters) is based in Quito, Ecuador, and its Parliament is to be set up in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The organization has four main bodies, including the Council of Heads of State and Government (meeting once a year), Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (meeting at least every six months), Council of Delegates, and Secretary General. Two committees of UNASUR—namely, the Center for Strategic Defense Studies and the South American Government Health Institute—support the development of its strategic visions. Goals of UNASUR are primarily intraregional integration in various sectors of the economies and the societies. The President pro tempore of UNASUR has the role of representing the organization in relations with third parties upon authorization by member states. As a relatively new organization, UNASUR is still in the process of establishing its presence and operation. Given its role in integrating the processes provided by Mercosur and CAN, however, and in widening integration among the member states beyond the realm of economics, it has the potential to become the key body of regional integration in South America (Herrero and Tussie 2015).

In sum, these four regional integration bodies in South America are different from many of their counterparts elsewhere in terms of their level of development and their ambitions. Additionally, they do not have overlapping membership (compared with groups in Africa and Asia that do), and they are explicitly modeled on the EU (in the same way groups in Africa are), with similar objectives and institutions. Because they are relatively advanced in regional integration, they have all developed numerous external relations and, through this, distinct diplomatic structures and identities. This is most notable in the case of Mercosur, which is active in the regional and global political and trade realms. Mercosur, in fact, has regional diplomatic structures, such as a committee of permanent representatives with third-country representation, but its regional diplomacy is strongly based on presidential summits and networking. Mercosur is intergovernmental and is represented by its heads of state—making it unlikely that Mercosur will follow recent developments in the EU's diplomatic model. Two regional groups in South America—namely, CAN and UNASUR—are, however, likely to closely pursue the EU model due to their commitment to supranationalism.

KEY POINTS

Advancing regional diplomacy in South America is dependent upon such measures as:

- a combination of trade negotiations and political/security discussions,
- supranational institutions that deliver more consistent regional diplomacy than presidential-driven integration, and
- further replication of the EU model to decrease presidential-driven diplomacy.

OTHER REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC SYSTEMS

Having reviewed developing regional diplomacies in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America, we complete the picture by outlining some other emerging regional diplomatic entities.

Both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are trading arrangements, with no current intention or structures, to develop and deliver non-trade regional diplomacy. In what follows, two regional groups will be assessed: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

The GCC was created in 1981, bringing together Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the objective of creating an economic and political union. Like many regional groups, the GCC is driven by a presidential summit, called the Supreme Council, with the Ministerial Council and Consultative Commission implementing the decisions of the presidents. It also has a commission for dispute settlement and an administrative secretariat. The GCC actively discusses economic, political, and security issues concerning the Middle East and beyond and, consequently, has had to create structures and mechanisms to find common diplomatic positions and ways to deliver them. The GCC has advanced to the stage of a common market and initiated a program to develop a common currency, highlighting its ability to deliver on integration promises through coordination and joint action. The GCC has acted in unison during trade negotiations with the EU, the United States, and Japan. In political and security relations in the Middle East, the GCC has evolved into a coherent and strong regional diplomatic actor. In sum, the GCC is actively developing as a region and also developing and delivering its own regional diplomacy based on presidential leadership. The GCC also has a delegation office in Brussels to interact with the EU, but it has progressed in a similar way to Asian regional integration, in that it has not explicitly copied the EU "model"—something that remains unlikely in the coming years, as it is so bound to the presidential nature of the process.

CARICOM was created in 1973 with four signatories (Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago). It grew quickly to encompass the current fifteen members and, like its South American and African counterparts, is heavily influenced by the EU model of integration. Among the objectives of CARICOM are economic integration to generate greater trade bargaining power and the coordination of foreign policy issues of mutual interest. To do this, CARICOM's institutional architecture is led by the Conference of Heads of Government and the Community

Council of Ministers, which are both supported by an administrative secretariat based in Georgetown, Guyana. CARICOM initiated extended discussions in 2010 to create a committee of permanent representatives to help solidify the work of the regional group and to speed up its processes.

Much like the GCC, CARICOM is a regional integration project for smaller countries with a great deal of shared history and ambition. CARICOM has developed a wide variety of internal projects and external relations on the same basis of presidential drive and will. For example, it completed an FTA with the EU in 2009—a process that drained substantial regional resources from CARICOM. For cost-saving and other related reasons, CARICOM proposed the creation of additional structures to deal with the formation of regional diplomatic positions on issues such as trade and climate change and within multilateral forums such as the UN—namely, a committee of permanent representatives. As the then CARICOM chairman, and prime minister of Jamaica (2007–2011), Bruce Golding explained, this development occurred because "domestic political structures cannot respond with that kind of 'automaticity' " (Richards 2010). The process of developing additional institutional regional diplomacy will not be easy, however, because fourteen sovereign states will have to make important political changes to bring about the new regional structure. This underscores the importance of a strong regional institutional architecture to support the formation and delivery of regional diplomacy, and also the difficulties in setting up such architecture (for more information on CARICOM regional diplomacy, see A. F. Cooper and Shaw 2009).

KEY POINTS

- Some regional bodies in other parts of the world do not strive to develop regional diplomacy. NAFTA, for example, is driven by economic imperatives rather than integration.
- Small states, such as those in CARICOM and the GCC, benefit from regional projects and diplomacy, because such efforts aim to pool their resources and increase their visibility and presence.
- Regional diplomacy relies on institutions that harmonize national positions.

CONCLUSION

As the chapter has shown, there are pervasive processes of regional integration in virtually all parts of the world. These processes generate an extra layer of regional diplomatic activities, forums, and codes, which deepen and complicate the structure of relations within the global organizational field of diplomacy. However, the nature of regional institutional diplomacies varies considerably (see table 17.1).

The main findings of this chapter are as follows: First, most of the processes remain strongly intergovernmental. An institutional architecture to develop and deliver regional diplomacy is vital. The copying of the EU template has also been shown to be no guarantee for the emergence of regional diplomacy. What seems to set some of the regional integration processes apart is the existence of supranational structures, defined at the beginning of this chapter.

Table 17.1 Comparative Regional Diplomatic Structure and Processes

STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES	EU	ASEAN	SAARC	AU	EAC	MERCOSUR	CAN	UNASUR	CARICOM
Intergovernmental structures of foreign-policy decision making	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supranational tools of foreign policy making	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Acting as host to diplomatic missions of third countries	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Represented by own separate missions to other regional integrationist entities	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Multinational diplomatic service	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Delegations (embassies)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
High Representative ("foreign minister")	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Diplomatic academy	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Legal personality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Seat at the UN	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Parallel structures of diplomatic representation at the regional and member state levels	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Second, regions with supranational integration dynamics seem to create the most advanced diplomatic structural arrangements. The EU has been in the vanguard here, while CAN (and UNASUR) in Latin America followed suit. These two geographic regions have been most active in serving as integrated regional entities in relation to third parties and in seeking recognition as such. The EU has served as an explicit integration model for regional integration in Africa and Latin America.

Third, many regional institutions mimic, to varying degrees, such organizational structures as the Committee of Permanent Representatives and various codes of conduct supporting cooperation and coordination, notably the ASEAN way, which parallels, while not copying, codes found in the EU. Such structures are essential in order to devise and deliver regional diplomacy. Finally, regions with strong integration and ambitious political objectives tend to be more active in creating and developing regional diplomatic structures.

From these main points, it can be seen that both the supranational and the intergovernmental structures of EU diplomacy have served as a source of reference, even if not inspiration, for other world regions. So far, there is no other region that appears close to constructing a regional institutional diplomacy along the lines of the EU, in the sense of not only featuring intergovernmental and supranational structures but also integrating those structures into one external affairs framework, as the EU has been attempting to do since the Lisbon Treaty. If other world regions go about establishing direct regional-level diplomatic links with EU-level diplomacy and, eventually, follow suit in their own integration processes in order to establish regional diplomatic structures compatible with that of Europe, then the EU model of regionally integrated diplomacy (outlined in table 17.1) may become a more accepted standard.

It is no surprise that the EU has sought to maintain its character as an international entity different from states, notably by providing extensive assistance for integration in other world regions. This, in part, explains why so many regions around the world at least look to the EU regional template. The EU's regional integration support has spilled over and will continue to impact diplomatic structures at the regional level. Although driven by a quest for its own legitimacy, the EU may be doing the UN's work in promoting regional integration processes around the globe (Wiseman 2011c: 11). Finally, in a fast-changing, globalizing world, a key challenge to regionalism around the world is whether, and how, major players such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, and the United States will be incorporated into, and actively recognize and engage with, this evolving system of regional diplomacies.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the main features of the EU diplomatic model?
2. What role do institutions play in regional diplomacy?
3. What aspects of the EU model have been most successfully replicated around the world?
4. What are the prerequisites for other world regions to develop their own regional diplomacy?
5. Compare and contrast the regional diplomacy of at least two world regions.
6. How important are international and interregional negotiations for the formation of regional diplomacy?
7. What is the relationship between regional integration and regional diplomacy?
8. What do you think are the main difficulties for the replication of the EU model?
9. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

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NOTE

1. They have even been the object of some ridicule. For instance, Jack Straw, in his role as the British foreign minister, had famously referred to EC diplomats as "all sorts of odd bods running these sorts of odd offices." See Watt (2004).

CHAPTER 18

The United Nations

Geoffrey Wiseman and Soumita Basu

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- Historical origins and emergence
- Main UN organs
- Evolution of diplomatic practices
- The UN diplomatic community
- Conclusion

READER'S GUIDE

This chapter examines diplomacy at the United Nations (UN). Set up after the Second World War, the UN emerged as a central stage (and actor) for mitigating international conflict and managing international cooperation, thus facilitating diplomatic efforts in multiple ways. Widely regarded as the main twentieth-century experiment in "multilateral diplomacy," it continues to evolve as both an intergovernmental organization and a key component of contemporary global governance. Yet the diplomatic underpinnings of its political processes have been mostly neglected by the literature on the UN, including international relations scholarship. This chapter traces the evolution of diplomatic activities at the UN from its founding in 1945, and it assesses such developments as the use of World Conferences and the significance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The tensions between national interests and shared international values are apparent in both major policy making and everyday practices at the UN. In this context, the chapter examines whether the norms of the UN diplomatic community can transcend national interests to secure more broadly conceived goals of international peace and progress.

INTRODUCTION

Some of the most highly skilled diplomats in the world represent their countries at the UN headquarters in New York. Indeed, a posting to the UN is among the most coveted in the profession. Opinions are divided, however, on the UN's value in world politics. For scholars of international relations, the UN is seen in different ways. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2008) identify five different images of the UN—a tool of the great powers, a facilitator of interstate competition, a governor of the society of states, a constructor of the social world, and a framework legitimizing specific decisions and principles governing international order—and their list is not exhaustive. But irrespective of the many images of the UN, students of diplomacy appreciate both the political efforts behind "getting things done" at a practical level and the organization's inefficiencies and inertia (Wiseman 2011c).

The UN's institutional context stands apart from all others because of both the many actors involved and the range of issues under its purview. As in **bilateral** contexts, there is diversity in the size of national diplomatic representations at the UN. In a moderate to large diplomatic mission, an individual diplomat is assigned to "cover" one or more of the main UN organs, such as the Security Council and the six main committees of the General Assembly.[1] In addition, diplomats liaise with the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN programs, funds, and agencies, as well as with the ever-growing number of NGOs working in and around the UN. Other UN diplomats in New York may focus on special bilateral diplomacy with certain member-state representatives or engage in negotiating drafts of UN resolutions. In all such activities, they keep a careful eye on the international media accredited to the UN in order to communicate their government's position on any given issue (see Lavrov 2005: 65–66). The outcome is an array of diplomatic processes and, in some cases, the achievement of seemingly contradictory goals relating to an intriguing tension underlying everything that happens at the UN: the competing impulses of promoting national interests and advancing international norms of cooperation.

This chapter traces the evolution of UN diplomatic practices and assesses recent important developments, such as the increasing use of "public diplomacy," or outreach to global publics, and the growing political significance of NGOs. It examines the UN's emergence as the primary multilateral organization in world politics and the relevance of the main UN organs from a diplomatic perspective, discusses the multiple diplomatic avenues at the UN and identifies changes in the institutional context and practices over time, and considers the evolution of the traditional UN diplomatic corps into an emerging UN "diplomatic community." Finally, it discusses prospects for UN diplomacy's future evolution.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND EMERGENCE

The UN's pre-twentieth-century origins can be traced a long way back. For example, multilateral diplomacy, the essence of UN diplomacy, was evident in the negotiations during the Congress of Westphalia from 1644 to 1648, the 1815 Congress of Vienna, and the congresses convened under the so-called **Concert of Europe** from 1815 to 1914 (see Cohen, chapter 1 in this volume). Many important technical conferences, such as the Universal Postal Union, were established during the latter part of the nineteenth century (Berridge 2005: 151–56; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011: 94–102). Thus, while multilateral diplomacy predates the UN, the world body represents a major step toward "institutionalized multilateralism" of contemporary world politics (Thakur 2002: 283). As such, it provides a conceptual step in the direction of forms of **global governance** beyond **multilateralism** (also see Badie, chapter 5 in this volume)

Broadly speaking, there are three ways to explain why the UN was created in 1945: a realist great power view, a liberal internationalist view, and a Western imperial dominance view:

1. The Realist Great Power View: In the aftermath of the First World War, US president Woodrow Wilson, along with several European leaders, promoted the idea of the League of Nations, a new international organization created by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 attended by some twenty-five state participants. The League was designed to prevent future wars, but the new organization, established in Geneva, was weakened by the absence of some of the day's major powers—notably, the United States and the Soviet Union—for extended periods. The Soviet Union's absence was not surprising, given the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. However, the United States' absence was, in light of Wilson's role in championing the League (notably to the US Congress in his famous Fourteen Points of January 1919). As it turned out, the League's fate appeared to be sealed with its inability to deal, inter alia, with Japan's 1931 occupation of Manchuria, Italy's 1936 occupation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and Hitler's 1938 annexation of Austria. With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the League was regarded as a failure.

Against this background of the League's failure to respond to outright military aggression sits the traditional explanation for the UN's creation at the end of the Second World War: that it was established by the victorious great powers (the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China), all determined to ensure a system that would prevent the kind of territorial aggression that had led to war in the first place. This time, all major powers would be members, and they would create mechanisms to ensure that their interests were secured.

2. The Liberal Internationalist View: A second explanation, reflecting the legacy of Wilsonian liberal values about national self-determination, democracy, and what became known as "collective security," is that the UN was created under the United States' diplomatic leadership. In this view, the United States managed the founding of the new body, determined to avoid the League's mistakes. Thus, when the UN was created at the 1945 San Francisco Conference (hosted, significantly, by the United States), its structure reflected both the prevailing power relations of the time and the aspirations of people everywhere for a return to peace (Patrick 2009; Schlesinger 2003). The UN began with fifty-one member states, more than double the number at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

3. The Western Imperial Dominance View: The two previous explanations have been challenged by world-order historian Mark Mazower (2009), who argues that the UN was founded to perpetuate British and American global dominance while accommodating the unwelcome emergence of the Soviet Union. High-minded talk of national self-determination and human rights, Mazower further argues, served only to conceal this reality. As fears of an emerging Cold War surfaced at that time, Soviet suspicions of Western motives also reflected the Western imperialism explanation.

As is so often the case, wars—whose outbreak implies the failure of diplomacy—produce new thinking about diplomacy in their termination or aftermath. In the twentieth century, this was indeed the case after the two World Wars. Therefore, it is unremarkable that the multilateral institutions emerging from those wars were intended to prevent devastating armed conflicts ("high politics"). However, it is noteworthy that the UN recognized, as hinted at in its wide-ranging institutional design, that wars are caused not just by dictators invading other countries but also by socioeconomic factors, such as poverty and resource scarcity ("low politics"). Still, the scholarly consensus is that the UN's design reflected a world of great powers as the primary means to keep the peace, even if there is disagreement about the motives of those powers.

Consisting of nineteen chapters divided into 111 articles, the UN Charter opened its preamble with the striking phrase "We the peoples of the United Nations." The charter's key principles, however, are less about people and more about the sovereign states that would make up the membership. The core principles were the "sovereign equality of states," "non-intervention" in the affairs of other member states, the "peaceful settlement of disputes," and the "non-use of force." These principles are reflected in many of the charter's articles, but under various articles in chapter 7, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," the UN Security Council was authorized to act on any measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. By allowing the use of force under this provision, the charter's framers left no doubt that the UN's main role was to prevent future wars. Moreover, the Security Council was intended to be the most important UN organ, managed by the great powers, whose own interests would be protected by their **veto** powers.

KEY POINTS

- Multilateral diplomacy has a long, pre-1945 history, but the creation of the UN's permanent headquarters, offices, and networks across the world heralded the arrival of institutionalized multilateralism in international relations.
- The UN was born of the great powers and focused primarily on peace and security (high politics).
- The UN's institutional design opened the door for consideration of socioeconomic issues (low politics) and for the rise of new diplomatic actors.

MAIN UN ORGANS

Under the UN Charter, six principal organs were created to carry out the organization's work—the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Secretariat led by the secretary-general.

Loosely endorsing the idea that the UN would represent all the world's "peoples," the *General Assembly* was created under the charter's Article 9 to consist of all member states, and reflecting the sovereign equality principle mentioned earlier, each member state would have one vote. Even though General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, the one-country, one-vote principle created a parliamentary environment in which diplomats (rather than making private representations to a foreign ministry official, as they do in a bilateral capital) sponsor public resolutions, lobby over their provisions, and wheel and deal in circumstances not unlike politicians in national parliaments. During the UN's early years, Western countries and their friends and allies dominated the General Assembly to such a point that they "circumvented deadlocks within the Council" by transforming "the Assembly's recommendations into actions," the best example being the passage of the US-sponsored "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950, which authorized a multinational force to be sent to Korea under the UN flag (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011: 198). However, a powerful hint of changes to come to this "Western" profile of the General Assembly was India's admission as a member in 1947. This newly independent member state staked strong declaratory claims against apartheid in South Africa, in particular, and colonialism, in general. In short, the General Assembly provided a parliamentary platform for new state diplomats to challenge Western dominance of the UN (see Prashad 2007: xvi, 27–28), compelling diplomats to speak more often and more openly in "public" (see box 18-1).

Article 24 of the UN Charter conferred on the *Security Council* executive responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. At the time of its founding, the council comprised five permanent members (P5)—China, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and six non-permanent members elected for two-year terms (in 1967, elected members increased to ten). Decision making in the Security Council was generally done behind closed doors, and council decisions were binding in nature. Due to the council's significance, member states generally sent their most senior diplomats to represent them at this forum.

The council's role as the most powerful UN organ, reinforced by the P5's veto rights, is encapsulated in the title of David Bosco's book *Five to Rule Them All* (2009). The five most powerful members therefore dominated diplomacy within the Security Council (see also Luck 2006; Prantl 2006; C. Ross 2007). However, with the rise of such new powers as Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, and South Africa, the role of the ten non-permanent members, elected for two-year periods, is attracting increasing attention (Langmore and Farrall 2016).

BOX 18-1

The Public Face of UN Diplomats

The UN diplomat plays a uniquely performative role on the world stage. Unlike most bilateral diplomacy, UN diplomats are often "performing" in plenary sessions and in committees, for each other and for wider world publics through television coverage, the press corps, and even visitors in the public gallery. This role as performer is a feature of the General Assembly's annual general debate, a notable historical case being Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 shoe-banging on a desk to protest what he believed were the West's and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's anti-Soviet policies. Also in this vein were Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez's ad hominem remarks about US president George W. Bush during the 2006 annual general debate and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's 2009 General Assembly speech in which he, inter alia, proposed the dismemberment of Switzerland.

The *Economic and Social Council* was established to promote human rights and economic and social cooperation between member states, reflecting in part the recognition that the high politics of security and war could often be explained by underlying socioeconomic factors such as poverty and human suffering, or the low politics of human rights and human security. Organizationally, ECOSOC was to be the umbrella organ for important and often powerful specialized agencies, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). ECOSOC provided a forum for debates about socioeconomic justice for the world's poor and disempowered. From a diplomatic perspective, it opened the UN to public participation in 1947 through the creation of an innovative process allowing for "accredited," or formally registered, NGOs to participate in certain aspects of ECOSOC's work (Rosenthal 2008).

The *Trusteeship Council* was established to oversee aspects of the "decolonization" process, a revolt against Western colonial power from the 1950s to the 1970s on a scale not envisaged in 1945 (Bull and Watson 1984). While the work of the Trusteeship Council, managed by the P5, mirrored the power configurations of the mid-twentieth century, the outcome of the council's efforts—attainment of self-governance or independence by erstwhile colonies—reinforced the UN's expanding membership and signaled the rising influence of new states. The new states embraced many of the UN's diplomatic practices, but they also added a North-South (rich versus poor) dimension to world politics hitherto defined by the East-West dynamics of the Cold War. With the formal decolonization process deemed complete, the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations in 1994 (Wilde 2008).

The *International Court of Justice* was created as the UN's court. Also referred to as the World Court, the ICJ, which is based in The Hague in the Netherlands, consists of fifteen judges. Because the court does not have compulsory jurisdiction over states (thus reinforcing the primacy of the sovereignty norm), its impact on diplomatic practice has not been as significant as that of the General Assembly and the Security Council. However, the General Assembly or the Security Council may request that the ICJ give an advisory opinion on any legal matter, including such controversial issues as the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Crawford and Grant 2008). In addition, states have in certain circumstances agreed to submit their dispute to the ICJ for a decision (Crawford and Grant 2008: 195–97). In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the necessary ratification of the 1998 Rome Statute. It is independent of the UN, but the Security Council may initiate proceedings. Also based in The Hague, the ICC can prosecute individuals, thus representing an expansion in the diplomatic and legal activities of the UN beyond sovereign states.

Under Article 97, the *secretary-general* was to be appointed—by the General Assembly on the Security Council's recommendation—as the UN's chief administrative officer, at the helm of the *Secretariat* set up to provide staff support for the organization (Jonah 2008). In practice, the P5 determine the candidate for the post of secretary-general, with the General Assembly approving their recommendation. Historically, proposals to formalize the selection process have been made but generally ignored or deflected (Urquhart 1995; Wiseman 2015a). The secretary-general's role as a potentially powerful diplomatic actor emerged after Dag Hammarskjöld's tenure (1953–61), following which it became clear that a strong secretary-general could in

BOX 18-2

United Nations Secretaries-General

Trygve Lie	Norway	1946–52
Dag Hammarskjöld	Sweden	1953–61
U Thant	Myanmar	1961–71
Kurt Waldheim	Austria	1972–81
Javier Pérez de Cuellar	Peru	1982–91
Boutros Boutros-Ghali	Egypt	1992–96
Kofi A. Annan	Ghana	1997–2006
Ban Ki-Moon	South Korea	2007–2016
António Guterres	Portugal	2017–present

certain circumstances be "more general than secretary" (Chesterman 2007; Kille 2006; Traub 1998, 2006). These circumstances could range from a divided P5 to an amenable international context. Kofi Annan's tenure (1997–2006) followed in the activist Hammarskjöld tradition (Traub 2006). However, Annan's successor, Ban Ki-Moon (2007–2016), was widely seen—with the possible exception of the climate change issue—as passive and uninspiring, including by many UN diplomats (Heilbrunn 2009; cf. Gowan 2011). The process that led to the selection of former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres as secretary-general in 2016 was notable, inter alia, for enhanced transparency, a shift away from the informal "regional-rotation" norm to a "best-candidate" norm, and an unprecedented and widely supported (albeit unsuccessful) public campaign to select the UN's first female secretary-general (for a full list of secretaries-general, see box 18-2). In the overall conduct of diplomacy at the UN, the Secretariat has become much more of a player behind the secretary-general and less of a faceless, bureaucratic staff unit for member states.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomatic practices in the Security Council have reinforced realism's great power assumptions.
- A proto-parliamentary system at the General Assembly, combined with decolonization, opened the door to non–great powers voicing their views in novel ways.
- ECOSOC's accreditation process recognized certain NGOs as having some standing in the world body, providing opportunities for non-state involvement.
- The secretary-general, supported by the Secretariat, is a potentially powerful diplomatic actor, but this claim varies greatly depending on the personality, competence, and leadership style of the secretary-general.

EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES

As described earlier, the UN was generally seen early on as being primarily concerned with international peace and security. However, the charter's preamble lays out the organization's commitment "to establish[ing] conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained." Non-binding preambular references to conflict prevention, human rights, and social and economic advancement foreshadowed subsequent shifts toward informal rather than formal change at the UN (Wiseman 2015a).

The UN offers governments a vital platform for promoting their *individual* foreign policy interests, but under the umbrella of the *universal* goals espoused in the UN Charter. Diplomats appointed to the UN have had to struggle with the oftentimes contradictory pull of these two—national interests and shared international values. Manifestations of this tension depend on the subject and aims of deliberation (for example, gender mainstreaming), the kind of UN platform used (for example, the General Assembly), and the range of actors involved (governments, UN agencies, and/or NGOs). These factors are significant in tracing the evolution of diplomatic norms and practices at the UN since 1945.

"Preventive diplomacy," a founding premise of the UN, has been emphasized by virtually every UN "administration" (see Claude 1971: 312–33; Ramcharan 2008). In the 1950s, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld described preventive diplomacy as involving UN efforts to alleviate cases of localized disputes and wars that might provoke wider confrontation between the two Cold War superpowers (Urquhart 1984: 256, 257, 265). Most famously, in *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992: 11) defined it as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." Formally, the UN provides a multilateral setting for peaceful settlement of disputes, but entrepreneurial secretaries-general can use the moral power of the office to push such concepts as preventive diplomacy.

Even at times of intense conflict, the symbolically neutral grounds of the UN headquarters can keep open channels of communication between conflicting states. As Jean Krasno (2004: 4) writes, "The UN is the only place where all Member States have permanent representatives as ambassadors throughout the year, so that when a crisis or issue arises, formal or informal conversations can take place conveniently and in a timely manner" (see also Karns and Mingst 2004: 97). The UN's dispute resolution mechanisms, including international agreements and the presence of external actors for mediation and negotiation, also facilitate this process. Further, particularly in recent years, the Security Council and **Special Representatives** of the secretary-general have engaged parties to a conflict directly, in New York as well as through short-term visiting missions to conflict areas (Hulton 2004: 241).

While international attention on the UN tends to be devoted to political maneuverings around resolution of armed conflicts (high politics) and responses to major humanitarian crises, the amalgam of UN diplomatic actors has been important in developing a vibrant socioeconomic agenda (low politics). Issues relating to education, health, environment, social change, and economic development became more pertinent with increasing participation of countries from Asia and Africa, especially during and after the 1950s. As discussed later, the priorities of these newly independent member states were different from those of the P5, who controlled the Security Council's agenda.

The UN allows country representatives the opportunity to collectively build international policies and legislation in the form of resolutions on human welfare and well-being. The General Assembly's six committees and the ECOSOC's committees and commissions provide the institutional space for such deliberations. The UN's significance as an enabler in this respect is a strong counterpoint to the dominant view that it was paralyzed during the Cold War because of deep ideological schisms between the Eastern and Western blocs. Its role may well have been curtailed on certain issues of high politics, but not on low politics, where the UN flourished, making major contributions to debates about such matters as human development (Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009).

In crowded UN meetings, groups of member states often present a collective stand on an issue. This partnership may be based on regional positions (Laatikainen and Smith 2017; Leigh-Phippard 1999), a shared agenda, or indeed, any mutually beneficial interest. For instance, the **Non-Aligned Movement** founded in 1961 by leaders from Egypt, India, Indonesia, and (the former) Yugoslavia. proved to be an influential force in the General Assembly (Prasad 2007: xvi, 13). It became a united front for countries choosing not to align with either the Eastern or the Western bloc during the Cold War. This paved the way for the Group of Seventy-Seven (G77) countries to dominate in the General Assembly in later years, advocating economic development.

National representatives also come together to deliberate on particular themes. This is best demonstrated in the formation of "Groups of Friends" (also known as "Friends of the Secretary-General") at the UN. These groups have played notable roles in preventive diplomacy and have sought to push forward specific thematic agendas at the UN (Prantl and Krasno 2004). Regional alliances outside the UN framework are also used strategically in this multilateral setting. For example, the European Union (EU) usually offers its own statement—beyond those of participating EU member states—at the open sessions of the Security Council and in the General Assembly. In these ways, the UN context fosters relations between smaller collectives of states.

Furthermore, national representatives find an avenue for expression at the UN World Conferences. These conferences, which have a long history (for example, the First World Conference on Women took place in 1975 in Mexico City), provide diplomats with additional avenues for participating in international policy making on particular themes. In the 1990s alone, there was a wide range of thematic conferences—for example, on the environment (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), population (Cairo, 1994), human settlements (Istanbul, 1996), and establishment of the ICC (Rome, 1998).

UN conferences gained greater popularity following the Cold War despite criticism about these being another extravagant UN spectacle where government representatives negotiate and commit to international agreements not subsequently honored at home. The significance of these events is evident in attempts made by governments to renegotiate the agreements at later conferences. This has been a concern in relation to women's issues, and a major reason why gender advocates at the UN have not organized a Fifth World Conference on Women since the fourth took place in Beijing in 1995. According to Berridge (2010: 144–45), the UN conferences provide two further opportunities for diplomacy: "public diplomacy," since these conferences are open to the media and have an international audience, and "behind-the-scenes bilateral diplomacy" (see also Fomerand 1996).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the changing nature of threats to international peace and security—such as the increasing number of intrastate armed conflicts and acute humanitarian crises—forced the UN, especially the Security Council, to reassess its agenda (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004). The entrepreneurship of such diplomats as Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom) and Anwarul K. Chowdhury (Bangladesh) was decisive in adapting the council's role to the changing international political context at the century's end. As a collective decision-making entity, the Security Council adopted resolutions on such themes as "children and armed conflict," "protection of civilians in armed conflict," and "women and peace and security." At the same time, it also sought to mobilize UN **peacekeeping** forces toward more assertive, even **coercive diplomacy**. In a wider multilateral context, such rethinking on security was reflected in the emergence of international norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001) (see box 18-3).

BOX 18-3

The UN's Role in the Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Norm

Non-intervention in states' domestic affairs is one of the UN's core founding principles. In the 1990s, however, the UN was increasingly confronted with state failure and/or complicity in violent armed conflicts, leading to widespread humanitarian crises. Following Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call to the international community for collective action in circumstances such as the mass civilian fatalities in Rwanda and Srebrenica (Bosnia), the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. Chaired by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and senior Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, the ICISS formally submitted the report *The Responsibility to Protect* to Annan in December 2001. The report identified circumstances in which it is appropriate for states, and for the international community more broadly, to take military action against those states that fail to protect their citizens from grave danger or suffering. It thus proposed the "responsibility to protect" people from such threats as ethnic cleansing and genocide. The international community has been reluctant to make this conceptual shift, however, and to shoulder this humanitarian responsibility. Asian states in particular have warned against the challenge to sovereignty posed by the report's recommendations. But with support from Annan and diplomatic lobbying for the recommendations, the principle of R2P—albeit a somewhat diluted version—was included in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit as well as in a Security Council resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 2006). In 2011, the UN Security Council–sanctioned and NATO-led air campaign against Qaddafi's Libya was couched, amid some controversy, in terms of the need to protect innocent civilians.

SOURCES: G. Evans and Sahnoun (2002); ICISS (2001); Thakur (2008: 398); Welsh (2008: 557). Other key texts on R2P include Bellamy (2009); G. Evans (2008b); Thakur and Maley (2015).

The discussion here demonstrates that the fundamental form of diplomacy practiced at the UN is multilateral (Pouliot 2011; Ruggie 1993). Yet under that broad multilateral umbrella, a significant amount of traditional, bilateral diplomacy is also conducted (Berridge 2010). Together, these encompass the general understanding of "diplomatic relations," which is taken to be between representatives of two states ("bilateral") or between three or more states at ad hoc or permanent conferences ("multilateral") (see Pouliot and Cornut, chapter 10 in this volume).

Increasingly, however, a third form, "polylateral diplomacy," which is between state and non-state representatives, has emerged at the UN and is now attracting wider scholarly interest (Wiseman 2004, 2007, 2010). As noted earlier, NGOs working at the UN are formally accredited with the ECOSOC and hold formal consultative status under Article 71 of the charter, and an increasing and impressive number of NGOs are using this mechanism. In addition to their participation in the UN's socioeconomic and human rights agenda, NGOs have facilitated the engagement of Security Council members with civil society organizations and individuals through Arria Formula meetings, critically on high-politics issues, such as the conflict in Sudan (see box 18-4). The inherent tensions that also characterize the interactions between the different sets of actors, not least due to differences in interests and composition, is captured by Bruce Cronin (2002) in his discussion of the intergovernmental and transnational "faces of the United Nations."

While our focus so far has been on the UN as a *platform*, it is necessary also to recognize its increasing role as an *actor* in international politics. Even though there are no ambassadors of or from the UN (in the traditional conception associated with national representatives), we can identify at least three ways in which the UN represents itself to the world and seeks to engage elites and wider publics via public diplomacy, or public information, strategies. First, the secretary-general and the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) communicate the organization's purpose and work to the wider world (see box 18-5). Second, the secretary-general appoints a significant number of Special Representatives to handle especially daunting

BOX 18-4

Civil Society and High Politics: The Arria Formula

The Arria Formula

> is an extremely informal procedure of the UN Security Council enabling its members to engage in discussion with non-members, including non-state parties. Under this formula meetings are held in private, away from the Council chamber, usually under the chairmanship of a Council member other than the current Council president, and without the attendance of officials or the keeping of any official records. The formula takes its name from Diego Arria, the Venezuelan ambassador who presided over the first meeting of this nature during his country's tenure of a seat on the Security Council during the period 1992–93.

SOURCE: Berridge and James (2003: 14)

BOX 18-5

The UN Department of Public Information (DPI): "The Public Voice of the United Nations"

The UN DPI describes its role as promoting "global awareness and greater understanding of the work of the United Nations, using various communication tools." The department was established in 1946 by General Assembly Resolution 13(1). Information is disseminated through the UN website, UN News Center, UN Radio, and UN publications, as well as through such innovative multimedia platforms as UNifeed, which involves extensive webcasting of UN activities. The department works closely with a global network of more than sixty UN Information Centers located around the world

SOURCE: Adapted from UN Information Centers (2008).

problems (Peck 2004). Third, the secretary-general appoints a small number of "Messengers of Peace" (for example, Muhammad Ali, Luciano Pavarotti, Yo-Yo Ma, Charlize Theron, Wangari Maathai, Leonardo DiCaprio, and Malala Yousafzai), and most UN agencies have increasingly used UN "goodwill ambassadors" to help promote UN goals in their specified areas (UNHCR ambassadors include Cate Blanchett and "special envoy" Angelina Jolie). All these "celebrity diplomats" agree to use their celebrity status to communicate UN agenda issues to an international audience (A. F. Cooper 2008b; Wheeler 2011). Beyond these three high-profile areas of public diplomacy, the UN is also seeking to expand and enhance its public outreach program through the use of the Internet and new social media.[2]

In these different ways, the UN—as platform and as actor—has not only mirrored enhanced traditional diplomatic norms based on state interests such as continuous dialogue but also made a vital contribution to the evolution of more expansive diplomatic practices in contemporary international politics. Through a diplomatic lens, the intensely political nature of the UN platform is evidence of the richness of this institutional context and the multiple ways in which it can facilitate diplomatic relations.

KEY POINTS

- International norms, such as preventive diplomacy, are important at the UN.
- From the mid-twentieth century, decolonization challenged the dominance of powerful states at the UN. Among other developments, this led to an expanded socioeconomic agenda.
- Region-based groupings are now an enduring component of UN diplomacy.
- UN World Conferences have gained wider attention (sometimes controversially) since the 1990s and, in the process, have opened the door to greater non-governmental participation in international policy-making debates.
- The UN has experimented with new kinds of less formal "ambassadors," such as the secretary-general's Special Representatives, Messengers of Peace, and Goodwill Ambassadors.

THE UN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY

The UN's near universality brings diplomats from 193 member states to its New York headquarters. Clearly, states value UN membership, not least because it legitimizes them as members of the wider international **society of states**, a role once performed through the international legal and diplomatic norms of recognition and the exchange of embassies in bilateral capitals. As shown above, this was especially true for the new states of the post-Second World War era (see A. Roberts and Kingsbury 1993).

The perceived importance of the UN "diplomatic corps" (consisting of member-state diplomats accredited to the UN) is underlined by the charter provision permitting missions to have up to five national representatives and allowing some (for example, the US mission) to have five senior diplomats at the ambassadorial level. For average-sized missions, the custom is to have two ambassadorial-level representatives, the Permanent Representative (the formal term for the UN ambassador) and the Deputy Permanent Representative. The quantitative dimension is representative of power configurations at the UN—for example, whereas some small member states are represented by a handful of diplomats, the United States has more than 100.

Beyond the vast expansion of UN membership (from 51 member states in 1945 to 193 in 2017) is the proliferation of numerous non-state actors who participate actively—formally and informally—in the UN diplomatic process. As described in other chapters of this book, traditional diplomacy focuses on the diplomatic corps, the "body of diplomats of all states [. . .] who are resident at one post" (Berridge and James 2003: 72). However, because varied actors are involved, it is more appropriate to refer to the UN "diplomatic community" rather than the "diplomatic corps" (Sharp and Wiseman 2007a: 267, 2016: 180–82). Thus, UN diplomacy is now tied to a larger and more complex diplomatic community of diplomats *and* non-state actors. Our focus is on the community in the UN headquarters in New York.[3] Four trends support this claim of a shift from corps to community.

First, UN diplomats have an image of, and a reputation for, being highly skilled. Member states are widely thought to send their best diplomats to the UN, and not only to serve as permanent representatives. The sense of having high-quality colleagues produces a community self-image of diplomatic professionalism and political clout back home. This is especially true for ambassadors representing the P5. Two prominent examples are the former Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who had previously served as Russia's UN ambassador, and former French prime minister Dominique de Villepin, who had played a visibly public role as France's ambassador to the UN during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War.

Second, the image of high-quality UN diplomats is reinforced by a high degree of "cross-fertilization"—that is, the mixing of diplomats from at least two different diplomatic corps at any given moment—which is now a systematic practice at the UN. For example, diplomats and UN officials based in Geneva routinely participate in New York meetings on such subjects as disarmament.

Third, a relatively high number of diplomats at the UN are "recycled"—in other words, they are reassigned, at a higher level, to a diplomatic post they held earlier in their careers. This practice provides missions with needed expertise and experience. The recycling concept can be expanded to include diplomats who join the Secretariat following a posting to the UN. Recycling likely enhances an already strong professional "epistemic sensibility" at the UN and strengthens the cooperation widely assumed to arise from direct personal contact (see also Johnston 2008). Further, the close physical presence or "propinquity" (Pouliot 2015: 88) of the UN and diplomatic missions and residences in the Turtle Bay/midtown area of Manhattan increases informal social contact between diplomats (see box 18-6 for more on the UN and New York).

Fourth, the preceding networks are also linked and reinforced by the work of civil society actors. These include influential New York–based philanthropic foundations, major university centers, key NGOs, UN associations, think tanks, institutes, and prominent individuals, all closely following UN affairs and actively seeking the participation of UN diplomats in their programs and activities.

The result is that a UN diplomatic community appears to have emerged in New York, one that links both state and non-state representatives in an elaborate and complex network. This networked diplomatic community is yet to be fully elaborated by scholars to discuss, for example, any epistemic or diplomatic norms shared by its participants, the informal hierarchies and power dynamics that exist and are developing within it, and importantly, possible influences on resolutions and related UN policy outcomes. Indeed, the idea of a diplomatic community is less formal and far more nebulous than that of a traditional diplomatic corps. Although the impact of the many simultaneous diplomatic activities may be difficult to grasp, it is possible to identify a new "hybrid" **diplomatic culture** from the interactions of the transnational civil society with the prevailing state-based diplomatic culture (Sharp and Wiseman 2007a: 266–67; Wiseman 2010: 39). (On the resilience of state-based diplomatic culture and the mimicking of diplomatic practices by non-state actors, see Wiseman 2015a: 328. On plural diplomatic cultures, see Dittmer and McConnell 2016).

BOX 18-6

Being a Diplomat in New York

Venue is important, if widely underestimated, as a diplomatic consideration, and the esteem granted to UN diplomats is also enhanced by having the UN headquarters in New York, a major US city. Being in New York, and in the United States, produces a social and political dynamic arguably more complex than that of any comparable multilateral capital, such as Vienna or Geneva, where host countries unreservedly welcome the UN's presence. Politically, the US-UN relationship has been mixed since 1945, complicated by the United States, as host country, being both the biggest financial contributor to the world body and often its biggest critic. The political sensitivity of the United States' role as host country is reflected in New York City's role as host city. Secretaries-general reinforce the UN–New York City relationship in public appearances, and New York City mayors officially welcome the UN presence but occasionally criticize it for its views on Israel. Moreover, UN diplomats are highly aware of the powerful constraining presence of Washington, DC, and of US society and its general antipathy to the UN. This antipathy was demonstrated by Donald J. Trump's dismissal of the UN, with his Tweet prior to taking office, that the UN had become "just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time. So sad!"

SOURCES: Fasulo (2004: 33–38); Luck (1999); Lyon (2016).

The extraordinarily high numbers of NGOs accredited to the UN are testament to the rich and complex interactions between the UN, state, and non-state representatives in New York, characteristic of the UN diplomatic community. Such exchanges are perhaps more prevalent at the UN than in most **bilateral capitals** and, with the possible exception of Brussels, in **multilateral capitals**. The formal accreditation with the ECOSOC is interesting from a diplomatic perspective, and the number of accredited NGOs with active consultative status at the UN has grown manifold in the past seven decades (from 40 in 1948 to 4,189 in 2017). In addition, the DPI's NGO section liaises with some 1,500 NGOs that are associated with it, while the UN's Non-Governmental Liaison Service facilitates UN engagement with more than 9,000 NGOs (Wapner 2008; Willetts 2000).

An additional noteworthy aspect of these working relationships is the now commonplace use—by missions and the Secretariat—of not only NGOs but also other members of the UN diplomatic community (universities, think tanks, and foundations) to convene meetings outside the formal UN rules and structures. Further, since the late 1990s, the UN has reached out to the private sector, notably through the innovative Global Compact on corporate responsibility (McIntosh, Waddock, and Kell 2004).

The UN Secretariat and diplomats are perhaps more open (to varying degrees among departments) than are foreign ministries to non-governmental, academic, and other public contacts, especially concerning low-politics policy matters. However, the degree of engagement tends to depend on the issue (see box 18-7). Member states are less inclined toward non-governmental involvement in matters of international

BOX 18-7

Passage of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security

On October 31, 2000, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security. This was the first time the Council recognized the gendered nature of armed conflicts and made recommendations, inter alia, for protection of women and for increasing their participation in conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction. The Security Council had no significant record of deliberating on such issues, and the role of gender advocates inside and outside the UN was significant in bringing together policy making on "women" (low politics) and "peace and security" (high politics) that had previously occupied separate places at the organization. The leadership of such international NGOs as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, International Alert, and Amnesty International, which came together to form the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, was particularly influential. Since 2000, seven follow-up Security Council resolutions on women and armed conflicts have been adopted—Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015). The record of the implementation of the resolutions has been mixed at best, but the "women, peace, and security" network at the UN—which includes advocates from NGOs, the UN, and member states—has kept the resolution 1325 agenda alive in the council.

SOURCES: Adrian-Paul et al. (2004); Basu (2016); Cockburn (2007); Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings (2004).

peace and security. Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas Weiss (2009: 33) argue that NGOs have been active in environmental negotiations but tend to be shut out of disarmament deliberations. Difficult as it may be, NGOs have made inroads into the Security Council as well. In 1997, Pierre Sané of Amnesty International became the first NGO representative to address the council. In 2006, film actor George Clooney met with council members to discuss Darfur.

KEY POINTS

- The image of high-quality UN diplomats is reinforced by a relatively high degree of cross-fertilization and recycling.
- The location of UN Headquarters in New York elevates the UN's image but is also a factor in its complicated relationship with the United States.
- The increasing role of UN officials and NGOs in UN diplomacy has led the UN "diplomatic corps" to evolve into the UN "diplomatic community."

CONCLUSION

Consistent with transformations at the UN since 1945, and marked particularly by such major historical shifts as decolonization and the end of the Cold War, diplomacy at the UN has evolved over the decades. The rising influence and activism of newer member states, expansion of the issue areas under purview, use of thematic World Conferences, and the growing significance of UN officials and NGOs in diplomacy are some developments that have been accompanied by changing diplomatic practices at the UN. Indeed, the diversity of issues and actors has led to a hybrid diplomatic culture at the UN.

Despite innovations in UN diplomatic practices, however, the UN's basic structure has not evolved with the changing international political climate and configurations. Most obviously, the P5 member states' privileged status has skewed the relations between government representatives who otherwise hold equal legal status in the international state system. Formal charter reform has been rare, and the often-discussed potential reform and enlargement of the Security Council seems more unlikely than ever in the current political climate. As a diplomatic venue, the UN represents a dynamic fusion of traditional structure with non-traditional actors and daunting global issues for deliberation.

In conclusion, we highlight three key elements that help predict diplomacy's evolution at the UN. First, the UN will likely continue to be generally recognized as the "centerpiece of global governance" (Karns and Mingst 2004: 97). Despite the UN's finite resources, the range of issues brought under its purview has increased manifold. Diplomats are forced to deliberate not only on issues of national interests but also, in partnership with other actors, on matters of international peace and progress. While the UN has been criticized for "more talk" and "less action," diplomats are set to deepen their engagement on a growing number of concerns and contribute to further development of international norms through "talking." Second, the public nature of much of UN diplomacy will further strengthen state–non-state diplomacy (what Geoffrey Wiseman calls polylateralism), signifying greater engagement with NGOs and the increasing—albeit discreet—influence of many UN officials who, among their other official roles, are an important conduit between member states and non-state actors. Third, significant formal UN reform has been rare, and its absence poses a major challenge to the UN's perceived effectiveness and legitimacy on a wide range of issues. However, the changing configuration of actors and the diversity of issues are leading to transformations in and around the UN, including in UN diplomacy. The UN diplomatic community, as a collective identity, is expanding, reinforcing, and even reconstituting the scope of diplomatic practices, carrying important lessons for multilateralism and global governance.

QUESTIONS

1. Identify and contrast the diplomatic underpinnings of the three explanations for the birth of the UN.
2. In what order of importance would you rank the six major UN organs? Explain the criteria you would use in your ranking.
3. Why is national representation at the UN important for governments?
4. Does the personality and preferences of the US president influence wider American views of the UN system?
5. What are the key components of the UN's public diplomacy efforts?
6. Discuss the role of the Secretariat and the secretary-general in facilitating the work of the UN diplomatic community.
7. Why and how have NGOs gained significance at the UN since the 1990s?
8. In what ways does the location of the permanent UN Headquarters in New York impact the work of the organization?
9. Critically evaluate the role of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
10. In view of the fast-paced institutionalization of multilateralism in the twentieth century, what is the relative significance of the UN in contemporary international politics?
11. Discuss the argument that a hybrid diplomatic community is replacing the diplomatic corps (as traditionally understood) at the UN.
12. What are the implications of the analysis in this chapter for your theoretical and practical understandings of contemporary diplomacy?

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

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NOTES

1. The General Assembly's six main committees include delegations of the *whole* membership, primarily because there is no party system or alternative method to divide the assembly into mutually exclusive groups (Peterson 2006: 59-60). Each committee specializes as follows: First Committee—Disarmament and International Security; Second Committee—Economic and Financial; Third Committee—Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural; Fourth Committee—Special Political and Decolonization; Fifth Committee—Administrative and Budgetary; and Sixth Committee—Legal.
2. A notable supporter of such new media efforts, and of the UN's public outreach in general, is the UN Foundation, created in 1998 with a major donation from CNN founder Ted Turner.
3. Other major UN centers are Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, and Santiago. Arguably, there are only a few truly multilateral cities (for example, Geneva and Vienna), as distinct from cities, some of which are capitals, that host major international organizations but generally are not identified as multilateral cities (for example, Washington, DC; Rome; and Nairobi).

Conclusion

Geoffrey Wiseman and Pauline Kerr

CHAPTER CONTENTS

- Introduction
- How is diplomacy becoming more complex?
- Why is diplomacy becoming more complex?
- Implications for future theories and practices
- Complex diplomacy futures

INTRODUCTION

An important finding of this book is that diplomacy is more complex today than it has ever been. What emerged inductively from the combined efforts of the first edition authors, and what now seems abundantly clear from this second edition, is that complexity has become such a prominent feature of both the way diplomacy is practiced in the real world and the way scholars think about diplomacy that the "complex diplomacy" concept emerges organically. In the Introduction to this edition, we argued that in the contemporary **trans-Westphalian** era in which we now live, complex diplomacy can be characterized by three interlinked constituent qualities: hyperconnectivity, adaptivity, and diversity. In this Conclusion, we argue that the empirical evidence from all the chapters supports our complexity point and the conceptual trilogy. So, too, do very recent events. For example, US diplomats' response to President Trump's 2017 temporary ban on citizens from seven Muslim countries illustrates how ideas, including dissenting ones, spread quickly in today's *hyperconnective* diplomatic networks. As the *New York Times* points out, a US diplomatic cable

> started out in Washington. Then it went to Jakarta. Then across Africa. One version even showed up on Facebook. Within hours, a State Department dissent cable, asserting that President Trump's executive order to temporarily bar citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries would not make the nation safer, traveled like a chain letter—or a viral video. [. . .] The cable wended its way through dozens of American embassies around the world, quickly emerging as one of the broadest

> protests by American officials against their president's policies. [. . .] The letter was apparently circulated through informal networks of diplomats and not through any State Department-wide email list. [. . .] One diplomat said that "many diplomats were using the letter as a vehicle to express broader concerns about the way the Trump administration has appeared to sideline the State Department" (Gettleman 2017).

Another recent *New York Times* article describes the *adaptive* responses of US diplomats to changing conditions on the ground in the Syrian war. After repeated efforts to negotiate a political transition and ceasefire failed, and as Syrian civilian casualties continued to escalate, US diplomats proposed a radical shift from just diplomatic means to credible threats of military action. In an internal State Department memo, more than 50 diplomats stated their belief that "[t]he moral rationale for taking steps to end death and suffering in Syria, after five years of brutal war, is evident and unquestionable." As the *New York Times* report pointed out, the memo was "sharply critical of the Obama administration's policy in Syria, urging the United States to carry out strikes against the government of President Bashar al-Assad" (Landler 2016a). In democracies, at least, diplomats have become more adaptive, by no means always reciting unquestioningly a realist, "national interest" script dictated from headquarters but occasionally responding to their own individual assessments and convictions.

The constituent quality of *diversity* within complex diplomacy has many dimensions. One is the wide range of actors now involved. For example, the negotiations leading up to and during the 2015 Conference of the Parties 21 (COP21) on climate change held in Paris involved many state-based agencies as well as numerous non-state actors from scientific, economic, business, and environmental communities around the world. The Palestinian quest for international recognition is another example illustrating the diversity of actors, methods, and institutional responses involved in complex diplomacy. In November 2012, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly accorded Palestine non-member, observer-state status in the world body. Then, in 2015, the General Assembly adopted a resolution allowing its two, very diverse, non-member observer states to raise their flag at the UN as symbolic recognition of their standing in world politics. In September 2015, the Palestinian flag was raised, less than a week after the other non-member observer state raised its flag: the Holy See, on the arrival of Pope Francis at the UN.

These recent examples demonstrate contemporary diplomacy's complexity. And they show that today, diplomacy is more connected, more adaptive, and more diverse than ever before.

HOW IS DIPLOMACY BECOMING MORE COMPLEX?

There is little doubt from the evidence presented in this book that diplomacy has a very long history, with origins that can be traced back at least 4,500 years to the city-state diplomacy of southern Mesopotamia, now modern Iraq. The basic expressions of ancient diplomacy—sovereigns sending accredited envoys to represent them to other sovereigns, and an emphasis on relationships, communications, reporting, negotiations, and protocol—are all recognizable in today's modern, state-based diplomatic culture.

At the same time, diplomacy as an "institution" has changed greatly and, in our view, continues to do so. We get the sense of an institution capable of reinventing itself to keep pace with the times—from the introduction of the resident mission in the fifteenth century to the establishment of the foreign ministry in the seventeenth century as a central bureaucracy for managing diplomats serving in other countries, from the establishment of the League of Nations as a form of institutionalized multilateral diplomacy after the First World War to the creation of the UN after the Second World War, and from embassies built or bought to convey sovereign independence to the embassy premises shared by certain like-minded countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Yet so many of our conclusions depend on a difficult question: What, exactly, do we mean by diplomacy? Today—although it must be stressed that there are many definitions of the term—*diplomacy* is conventionally understood as "the processes and institutions by which [a] country represents itself and its interests to the rest of the world" (Sharp and Wiseman 2012: 223). However, readers will note that many of the authors in this book conclude that diplomacy, as a state-based concept, is changing to encompass more than just states mutually recognizing each other and conducting formal relations in a *bilateral* setting and, notably in the twentieth century, in *multilateral* environments. Indeed, our authors further note that significant change is occurring in the twenty-first century, in new state–non-state, or *polylateral*, contexts. In addition, there is the definitional issue of distinguishing between foreign policy and diplomacy. Many of this book's contributors have tended to draw, or assume, the *foreign policy–diplomacy* distinction made most famously by Ernest Satow and Harold Nicolson (see Introduction), albeit without taking the distinction to an absolute extreme.

And then there are the effects of globalization, in both its benevolent and its malevolent forms, to consider while trying to better understand diplomacy's increasingly complex nature. We see little evidence for the claim that globalization spells the death of diplomacy. Indeed, another of the book's key findings is that nowadays, diplomacy, redefined, is everywhere (a point to which we return below). These empirical conclusions about diplomacy's current constitutive standing as a foundational institution in the making of world politics are reflected in the way that scholars think about or theorize diplomacy (a claim to which we also return below).

As illustrated below, each of the book's chapters tell much about how diplomacy is changing from its ancient origins to become more interconnected, adaptive, and diverse:

- how countries with a long history, such as China, adapted to diplomacy in good times and bad, and how today China is developing a diplomacy with Chinese characteristics;
- how scholars bring diverse and contending disciplinary frameworks to diplomacy that allow for integrated, hybrid, and new understandings of diplomacy;
- how academic debates consider foundational questions, such as how we define diplomacy, who may reasonably be considered a diplomat, and how theory relates to diplomatic practice;

- how complex diplomacy includes both state and social dimensions;
- how a diverse range of negotiators, both state and non-state, connected through different types of communication technologies, use diplomacy to prevent and mediate conflicts;
- how diplomats in foreign ministries and missions are adapting to becoming just one of a diverse range of actors comprising a national diplomatic system;
- how diplomacy is both threatened and emancipated by the hyperconnectivity provided by modern information and communication technologies;
- how consular officials are returning to prominence as citizens demand services and protection when they travel and do business abroad in a hyperconnected world;
- how everyday practices of diplomats in bilateral embassies impact foreign policy crisis management, and how, in multilateral settings, some state-based diplomats have more status and influence in the "pecking order" than others in ways that do not mirror states' material capabilities;
- how public diplomacy has grown both as a field of study and as a practice, largely due to hyperconnected interactions with diverse foreign publics;
- how economic diplomacy involves negotiation between such a diverse range of actors that it appears to challenge traditional understandings of diplomacy;
- how the relationship between diplomacy and the use of force is more intricate in an international environment, where the use of force is no longer just the prerogative of sovereign states;
- how diplomacy continues to be a "gendered institution," where the number of women in executive positions remains low and women are seen to be unsuitable for some postings;
- how the United States continues to grapple with its diplomatic engagement with the rest of the world, complicated even further under President Trump's populist, anti-globalization views;
- how China adapted to traditional diplomacy's focus on the sovereign state, and how this adaptation helped its rise;
- how the world is moving, by no means inexorably and uniformly, toward increased regional diplomatic institutions and processes; and
- how the UN has shifted from its original, state-based culture focused on the territorial security of member states to one that is more open to non-state participation and wider conceptions of diplomatic communities and diplomatic cultures.

In sum, in these and other ways, the book's chapters highlight that in the current, trans-Westphalian period, "complex diplomacy"—and its interlinked constituents of hyperconnectivity, adaptivity and diversity—provides one answer to the question "What is diplomacy?" That said, complex diplomacy's theoretical diversity accepts that—both as a set of state *and* social practices—diplomacy remains recognizably like it was many centuries ago.

WHY IS DIPLOMACY CHANGING AND BECOMING MORE COMPLEX?

It is not possible here to explain why all the changes in diplomatic practices chronicled in this book have taken place. We can, however, classify the main explanations in terms of international context, domestic-national context, and institutional context.

The International Context

In the international context, four explanatory factors recur in several of the book's chapters. The first is the *end of the Cold War*, including the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. This event had an almost immediate impact, creating several new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, such as Hungary and Poland. Moreover, the Soviet Union's breakup created fifteen "new" states, including very large ones, such as Russia, and very small ones, such as Georgia. Similarly, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia eventually created seven new states. In virtually all these cases, the new states were keen to establish a diplomatic presence on the international stage. Thus, foreign ministries were reinvigorated, and new embassies and consulates were established or restaffed to better represent redefined interests and identities to other recognized polities. In short, the Cold War's end produced more states, all of which turned to a universal diplomatic culture as an ordering framework in an uncertain world while simultaneously constituting distinctive regional and national styles.

The second factor, one that in fact transcends the term "international" itself and is central to this book, is *globalization*, including the associated communications and information revolutions of recent decades. In one view, globalization seemed at first to work against the traditional conduct of diplomacy via foreign ministries and embassies. Governments could gather all the information they needed from multiple news sources and the Internet without placing diplomats in costly embassies and consulates abroad. Also in this view, governments, especially their foreign ministries and networks of embassies and consulates, were becoming less important in solving global problems. Yet what seems to have happened over time is that foreign ministries adapted, admittedly some more than others, to the new hyperconnected world. UN corridors are full of diplomats bearing laptops, searching for information that may once have required a cable back home. Diplomats involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations are using their cell phones to check instructions with superiors at headquarters. Many ambassadors (and, controversially, President Trump) are using Twitter feeds. And foreign ministers are regularly texting each other on important issues. On the whole, diplomats have embraced new forms of communications and, in some sense, have become comanagers of the globalization process rather than its hapless victims (Seib 2016).

Whereas globalization is generally, but by no means conclusively, seen as changing, diminishing, and even harming the state's role in world politics, the third international factor is a perceived dramatic post–Cold War *shift in the traditional balance of world power*. Key to this development has been the rise of the so-called BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—but especially China. Other rising or important powers include such countries as Germany, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, and South Africa. At the same time, many see the United States entering a new era of relative decline (Quinn 2011) and the beginnings of the post-American world (Zakaria 2011; cf. Nye 2015). Whatever conclusion one draws about these power shifts, foreign ministries and diplomats are now required to respond flexibly in order to manage the new power relationships. Diplomats are needed by both rising and declining powers. One good example illustrating the complexity of these new power relationships is how the five permanent members of the UN Security Council now have to manage the elected ten members much more judiciously than ever before (Langmore and Farrall 2016). In short, we are seeing a double power shift: a changing balance of power between state and non-state actors (globalization) and between the main state actors in the system (traditional power balancing). This double shift helps explain changes in diplomatic culture.

The fourth international factor emerging from this book that helps explain why diplomacy has changed is *regionalization*. While attention has focused mainly on the three factors just described—the Cold War's end, globalization, and the rise of new power centers—a quieter change has taken place in the form of region building, or the regionalizing of world politics. We have seen the European Union (EU) push forward with impressive changes to its many diplomatic practices that suggest a form of "supranational diplomacy" is now conceivable, although the British exit from the EU, the 2015–16 migration crisis, and the rise of populist nationalism in several European countries suggest there should be deep caution in predicting a supranational European future. Other regional bodies around the world do not emulate the EU slavishly, but the evidence suggests that they look to it and draw lessons from it. As track-two (non-official) actors in East Asia well know, one lesson that official diplomats in their region appear to have drawn from the EU is that East Asian regionalism will continue to be better guided by national rather than supranational interests (Kerr and Taylor 2013). Irrespective of whether regional-institution building increases, stabilizes, or decreases worldwide, diplomatic actors and processes will underpin those activities. Moreover, as already suggested, these region-based diplomatic activities will likely carry distinctive regional characteristics.

The Domestic-National Context

The second way in which we can classify the main explanations given in this book for changes in diplomatic practices is in terms of fluctuating domestic-national contexts. Recent experience is that more countries have shifted from neglecting, or deriding, their diplomats to expecting more of them. The irony here is that while many governments have elevated the role of foreign ministries in policy making and delivery, many have not provided sufficient financial support to sustain a commensurate international policy infrastructure. A return to a deep American skepticism of traditional diplomatic practices (Wiseman 2011b) is portended by early statements and actions by the Trump White House, including proposals for drastic cuts in the State Department's budget while increasing that of the Defense Department (Borger 2017).

The Institutional Context

The third way to classify the explanations is in terms of institutional context. There is evidence that many foreign ministries, and the diplomats themselves, are responding positively to the challenges facing contemporary diplomacy (outlined in the Introduction to this volume) and to governments' expectations despite increased workloads and insufficient financial and human resources. Several governments, from Argentina to Sweden, have merged their foreign ministries with trade departments. Furthermore, many foreign ministries have undergone reforms to introduce modern management practices and more diverse recruitment policies, which promise to alter the traditional images of ambassadors and envoys (Hocking et al. 2012; Rana 2005).

Contributions to this book reveal a long history of continuity in institutional diplomatic practices, matched by a quite impressive history of change. This change arguably sped up in the twentieth century and, we conclude, has become even speedier over the past two decades. In sum, as we have argued, growing uncertainty in world politics is making diplomacy more complex.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE THEORIES AND PRACTICES

What do this book's empirical findings about diplomacy's increasing complexity imply for future theorizing about it, both as a state and a social practice? Not surprisingly, as we noted in our Introduction, different scholars have different views on how best to theorize diplomacy in complex, multifaceted contexts. We conclude that there are currently three major responses to this question, and that these responses might simultaneously be regarded as the three key theoretical trends in diplomatic studies. These three major trends are: a traditional, state-based view; a hybrid/multiactor view; and a cosmopolitan, or humanist, view.

In the traditional view, diplomacy is a state-based institution involving professionally trained and accredited diplomats who work in foreign ministries at home and at embassies, permanent missions, and consulates abroad (Berridge 2010, 2011). This view is rooted in diplomatic history but differs in its attempts to conceptualize, rather than to theorize, diplomatic practices while also chronicling them in historical and contemporary detail (Berridge and Lloyd 2012; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). As described in chapter 1, these "traditional" diplomats are usually associated with elites representing the state's "national interests" to the elites of other states in the international system. Curiously, in the influential structural realist view of international relations (IR) (Waltz 1979), diplomacy and diplomats are generally overlooked. More important for these theorists are hard power, military force, and coercion; less important are soft power, diplomacy, and persuasion (Kerr 2010). Moreover, realists, as is true of many kinds of IR theorists, tend to focus on structure and macro decisions rather than on agency and micro decisions. This neglect by structural realists, and indeed in the mainstream American international relations discipline (Rathbun 2014; Wiseman 2011a), seems greatly out of place given the evidence of diplomacy's relevance amassed in this book.

A second theoretical view of diplomacy, which emerged in the last two decades or so, acknowledges the continued relevance of state-based diplomacy but gives greater weight to a wider range of actors that "do" diplomacy of some sort. This "multiactor," "hybrid," or "integrative" (Hocking et al. 2012) view of diplomacy sees a greater role in international diplomacy being played by governmental ministries other than the foreign ministry, comprising a national or whole-of-government diplomatic system, actors that in turn relate diplomatically with a wider range of non-governmental groups and actors. This second group of multiactor theorists is currently perhaps the largest numerically of the three that we identify, and they share several assumptions that separate them from the traditionalists: (1) Analytically, this group assumes that the sovereign state retains significant influence, although with some variation depending on region and issue area; (2) normatively, this group assumes that new non-state actors' demands for a greater role in international policy making are reasonable; and (3) methodologically, the group accepts a high degree of research-method pluralism, close to analytic eclecticism (Cornut 2015c), with recent enthusiasm for studying not only macro foreign policy decisions but equally micro, everyday diplomatic practices (Neumann 2010, 2012; Pouliot 2011; Pouliot and Cornut 2015).

The hybrid/multiactor diplomacy theorists ask foundational questions such as "Who are the diplomats now?" (Langhorne 1997). For them, diplomats are not only accredited state representatives but also global civil society actors organized into groups that want to remain separate from, and have diplomatic relations with, other groups (Hocking et al. 2012; Sharp 2009). In our classification, this group of theorists is not only methodologically eclectic but also transdisciplinary. It comprises historians and globalization scholars (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011), IR scholars who focus on diplomacy (Hocking and Melissen 2015; Pigman 2010; Sharp 2009), IR scholars who draw heavily on anthropology and international political sociology (Neumann 2010, 2012; Pouliot 2011, 2016b), semiotic-reflectivists (Götz 2011), social constructivists (Løse 2001), and public diplomacy theorists (Gregory 2008b, 2016; Seib 2009, 2016; Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher 2013). It should be said that this group would by no means necessarily self-identify as "belonging" to the diplomatic studies field.

Another way of conveying the breadth and depth of this group of diplomacy theorists—and simultaneously conveying a sense of a robust, if far from self-identifying, field—is to recognize the wide-ranging diplomacy topics covered in the decade 2007–16. These topics include the diplomatic corps (Sharp and Wiseman 2007b), humanitarian diplomacy (Minear and Smith 2007), diplomatic networks as epistemic communities (Davis Cross 2007), celebrity diplomacy (A. F. Cooper 2008b), global governance and diplomacy (A. F. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008), guerrilla diplomacy (Copeland 2009), the diplomacies of small states (A. F. Cooper and Shaw 2009), American negotiating behavior and diplomatic style (Solomon and Quinney 2010; Wiseman 2011b), representation and communication (Pigman 2010), economic diplomacy (Bayne and Woolcock 2016), city diplomacy (Acuto 2013), diplomatic action by non-state actors (Kelley 2014), diplomacy in the digital age (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Hocking and Melissen 2015), diplomacy's role as an ordering and constitutive institution of world politics (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015), the future of diplomacy in the new communication age (Seib 2016), diplomatic afterlives of world leaders (A. F. Cooper 2015), public diplomacy toward adversarial states (Wiseman 2015b), secret diplomacy (Bjola and Murray 2016), diplomatic style (J. Robertson 2016), and international diplomatic pecking orders (Pouliot 2016b).

A third, emerging group of diplomacy theorists advance a "cosmopolitan," or "humanist," conception of diplomacy, according to which there is not one but many diplomacies, and not one but many diplomatic cultures (Constantinou 2013; Dittmer and McConnell 2016). Indeed, in Constantinou's (2013) humanist conception, anyone who is in social intercourse with others is capable of thinking and acting (in most circumstances) diplomatically. Even traditional diplomats, Constantinou argues intriguingly, are capable of responding to both statist and humanist impulses. Accordingly, diplomacy is more than states acting diplomatically, or states and non-state actor groups interacting routinely and diplomatically, but is a universal social phenomenon (Badie, chapter 5 in this volume; Constantinou 2013, 2016. On the notion of "sustainable diplomacies," see Constantinou and Der Derian 2010). Also intriguingly, Constantinou, Cornago, and McConnell (2016) argue that the pluralization of diplomatic actors beyond officially accredited, professional state representatives is producing the *trans*professionalization of diplomatic practices, by which they highlight "the 'new' skills and knowledges that non-state actors bring to the diplomatic realm, from expertise and specialized knowledge pertinent to the increasing prevalence of issue-based diplomacy to innovations in digital technology and advocacy strategies" (36). In other words, diplomatic training is no longer only about skills development for foreign service officers; it is required for non-state diplomatic actors as well.

All three approaches have advantages and disadvantages, of course. We anticipate that all three will coexist, in a state of healthy coexistence, as the dominant tendencies in both the theory and the practice of diplomacy. In short, we welcome the fact that some scholars are describing changes in traditional state-based diplomacy while others are describing and theorizing the emergence of new group-based, and even individual-humanist–based diplomatic practices. Evidence for this optimistic account of the diplomatic studies field, currently, is that *The Sage Handbook on Diplomacy* (Constantinou, Kerr, and Sharp 2016) contains chapters written by authors who fit all three of our categories.

While the above three-part classification is, as with all classification schemes, a little forced, our main claim is to endorse even more forcefully Paul Sharp's (2011: 716) statement that "there has never been a better time for studying diplomacy." In addition to the extensive publication record listed above, since 2011 new textbooks have appeared in addition to *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World* (Kerr and Wiseman 2013). Others include those by Bjola and Kornprobst (2013), Hare (2015), and Holmes with Rofe (2016). Moreover, two major handbooks underscore the scope and dynamism of diplomatic studies broadly defined (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013; Constantinou, Kerr, and Sharp 2016). This impressive publication record is complemented by the continuing impact of

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, the launch of the new journal *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, at least one new book series dedicated to diplomacy, and a growing number of journal articles in mainstream IR journals. In sum, there is strong evidence of a research surge in the field of diplomatic studies over the past decade (Murray 2008, 2013; cf. Hall 2010).

As editors, we have tried to synthesize the timeliness of diplomatic study with this emerging research literature in a book organized around the idea of *research-based teaching.* Like all social theory, diplomacy is dynamic, not static, so the latest research must be part of any approach to teaching.

COMPLEX DIPLOMACY FUTURES

Whether one takes the *state-based*, *hybrid/multiactor*, or the *universal-humanist* view, now is indeed a good time to be studying diplomacy. Not only is diplomacy more relevant in world politics, but it is now being seen as an international ordering institution, one that helps "make" world politics. Because of several factors described throughout the book and in this chapter—including, notably, globalization and instantly available information—diplomacy has taken on a complexity never seen before. In this second edition, we aimed to develop the "complex diplomacy" concept, showing its theoretical and practical dimensions and, therefore, we hope, its value to scholars and practitioners. Conceptually, we argued that complex diplomacy, in the trans-Westphalian era in which we now live, is characterized by three interlinked constituent qualities: hyper-connectivity, adaptivity, and diversity. *Hyperconnectivity* links states, groups, and individuals more quickly, for better or for worse. As diplomacy becomes more complex, the requirement for all kinds of diplomatic agents to be commensurately more *adaptive* within the constraints of international and global structures and systems is readily apparent. And completing complex diplomacy's trilogy of constituent qualities, the book's chapters reveal a striking *diversity* of both thought (theory) and action (practice).

That said, we can imagine complex diplomacy becoming still more complex—in our connected, adaptive, and diverse senses—and this suggests a profound need for ongoing research. We need to know more about the intricacies of what the traditional diplomats "do" daily, including the difficulty that diplomats from developing countries confront when trying to adapt to the technical demands of trade or climate negotiations. We need to know more about the diplomatic practices of rising powers, such as China, Brazil, and India, and about the diplomatic responses of those powers said to be in decline, such as the United States. We need to know more about differences in regional and national diplomatic practices, about the intricacies of relations between state and non-state actors, about non-state diplomatic cultures, about the trade-off between generalist and expert diplomatic knowledge, and about how far diplomatic practice can evolve digitally.

Developing complex diplomacy will require those who practice and study diplomacy to talk more systematically across the divide that separates them. Such a dialogue will allow both sides to understand the multifaceted nature of complex diplomacy: its trans-Westphalian character; the ancient rituals that remain oddly recognizable in an interdependent and connected world; its universal culture that nonetheless accommodates both regional, national, and even individual style; its flexibility and innovative capacities; its main accepted forms (bilateral, multilateral, and polylateral); its secretive impulses and stated aspirations to openness; its many new practitioners as well as whether—and, if so, how—they might be trained to represent their group or organization; its micro as well as macro practices; and its inherent limitations in a world where military force, or at least its threatened use, looms large. But most of all, the theorist and the practitioner should never lose sight of the diplomatic imagination: diplomacy's potential to promote a less conflict-prone, more cooperation-based global society increasingly characterized by complexity.

Glossary

Note: Definitions can be controversial, and scholars and practitioners alike hotly debate many of them. We encourage you to use these definitions as a starting point only for your inquiry and not as the last word on the subject at hand.

Accredited representative Term describing a diplomatic agent or head of mission who has been furnished with letters of credence signed by the agent's own head of state and addressed to the host country's head of state.

Agency The ability of persons or political entities to make free and rational decisions on their own behalf. Agency is often linked to rationality and forms an integral part of many conceptions of human subjectivity.

Alliance A formal coalition of two or more states that agree to collaborate on mutual security interests, usually codified through a treaty.

Ambassador A diplomatic representative ranked at the highest level, accredited to a foreign state and bearing the full title "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary."

ASEAN Regional Forum A formal multilateral security dialogue established in 1994 comprising twenty-seven countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the European Union.

Attractive power A synonym for "soft power," which is based on actors' capacity to shape the preferences of others by means of attraction.

Balance of power The existing distribution of power in the international system (often categorized as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar); also a doctrine associated with realist theory suggesting that the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states to maintain an equilibrium.

Bargaining Method of achieving a mutual agreement or compromise by introducing concessions, conditional offers, threats, and incentives.

Bilateral/bilateralism Interaction involving two parties. Often refers to relations in general or to trade agreements or military treaties between two states.

Bilateral capitals Term used by diplomats to refer to the capital cities of two countries conducting diplomacy, dialogue, or negotiation.

Bilateral mission A diplomatic entity, usually an embassy, responsible for formal relations between two states, generally in each other's capital city. Members of one or both of these missions do not always reside in the receiving state. Generally regarded as the quintessential traditional diplomatic institution.

Bipolar system Term describing an international order in which two states dominate all others. Often used to describe the Cold War era, in which the international system was organized around two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bureaucratic politics The interactions among individuals within a government and the bargaining that occurs between them. Policy decisions are linked to the hierarchy between these actors and the agency to which they belong, including the idea that "'where they stand depends on where they sit'" (Allison and Halperin 1972: 73).

Citizen diplomacy The engagement of individual citizens in private sector programs and activities that increase cross-cultural understanding and knowledge between people from different countries, leading to greater mutual understanding and respect and contributing to international relationships between countries.

Civil societies The term "civil society" generally refers to citizens or peoples. American scholar Ann Florini describes three kinds of international actors: sovereign states, firms, and civil society (the third sector). Civil society is equated with citizens or the people, as distinct from governments (the first sector) and profit-making businesses (the second sector).

Civil society groups/organizations Non-governmental groups/organizations that are private, not for profit, and frequently have specific political and/or societal goals. Many maintain an international presence and aim to monitor and influence the actions of states.

Clausewitzian The idea associated with Carl von Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian military thinker and the author of *On War*, a major work of strategy emphasizing war's role in shaping competition among states.

Coercive diplomacy The practice of employing threats or limited use of force to persuade an opponent to avoid, call off, or reverse a particular course of action. Some scholars use the term to refer exclusively to "compellence" and not "deterrence." The former threatens force unless an action is stopped; the latter threatens retaliation for an action not yet taken.

Collective security An arrangement in which member states of an international organization are jointly responsible for the security of one and all members; an alternative solution to the security dilemma, one that promotes institution building and communal action rather than traditional alliances and reliance on the balance of power. Generally associated with the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter, but alliances also present themselves as a form of collective security.

College of Commissioners The twenty-seven members (expected soon to be twenty-seven) of the European Commission. Although each commissioner is nominated by his or her national government, the commissioners do not specifically represent their own state but instead represent the interests of the European Union as a whole.

Colocation Placing several different entities or institutions within the same location. Often a single building that houses embassies from several states or a variety of government offices from a single state.

Commercial diplomacy The use of foreign services or other branches of government to promote trade or investment.

Communicate/communication The exchange of information or ideas between two or more parties, most commonly through written or verbal means. Communication and representation are defining features of diplomacy. For examples of particular methods of diplomatic communication, such as a note (*see* note), see I. Roberts (2011: 48–59).

Concert of Europe An informal security arrangement, or "regime," composed of five great powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia) that established basic, if informal, principles to manage and regulate conflict during the nineteenth century. The system was widely thought to have kept the peace in Europe from 1815 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

Conflict trap A cyclical effect that often results from intrastate conflict, suggesting that a country with a history of conflict is more likely to have conflict in the future. The cycle is difficult to break, because internal conflict has a tendency to weaken the economy, breed social distrust, and bring violence-prone leaders to power.

Consensus Achieving the agreement of all participants without calling for a vote. Allows for a proposal to be endorsed even though at least one participant might have reservations about it.

Constructivists Theorists who emphasize the norms and the social, political, and economic structures that influence and shape actors' interests and interactions; also examines efforts to reform or transform those structures.

Consulate/consulate-general A diplomatic office, subordinate to an embassy, established in an important city of another state, usually other than the capital city. A consulate's primary purpose is to provide services to its citizens traveling or residing there and to promote bilateral trade between the two states. In a larger city, the term "consulate-general" is used. Headed by a consul or a consul-general, respectively.

Continuous dialogue A key diplomatic norm, which asserts that states, even adversaries, should maintain regular communication and interaction, usually through mutual recognition and representation.

Credentials A document which authenticates a person's status and competence (Berridge and James 2001: 55).

Crisis management Using diplomacy to de-escalate an acute conflict that has a significant risk of leading to war; concept introduced by the US secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Crowdsourcing Outsourcing tasks traditionally performed by an employee or contractor to an undefined, large group of people or community through an open invitation to participate in the task.

Culture Knowledge and behavior learned and shared through processes of socialization that identify and distinguish groups from one another and result in different ways of perceiving and dealing with social reality.

Cybercrime Crime committed using computers and the Internet, including unauthorized access to computer systems, damage to computer data or programs, computer sabotage, unauthorized interception of data, computer-related fraud, spreading child pornography, and other related activities. Enforced internationally through the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force on July 1, 2004; additional signatories include Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States.

Cybersecurity Maintaining the integrity of cyber infrastructure through the protection of data and systems in networks that are connected to the Internet; includes protection from cyberwar, terrorist attack, and cybercrime.

Delegation A party sent to represent a state or other large entity at an international conference or gathering.

Démarche A formal message delivered in either oral or written form by a diplomat to host country officials, usually involving a protest of some kind.

Détente French word for relaxation; used to describe a relaxation of tension in previously strained relations between states by embracing negotiation rather than confrontation. Most commonly associated with the warming of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union led by Richard Nixon's administration in the early 1960s and 1970s. During the Cold War, détente was implemented through increased diplomatic exchanges, nuclear arms control agreements, and summit meetings. Critics argued that détente weakens a state's security by providing the opponent with an opportunity to gain advantage.

Diaspora Peoples who have moved permanently from their homeland but still identify with it in terms of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic traditions.

Digital divide The economic and social inequalities caused by a gap in the availability of technology, including computers, Internet access, and software capabilities. Although commonly used to describe the technological differences between developed and developing countries, the concept also includes divisions between young and old, urban and rural, male and female, and various professions.

Diplomacy of the public A form of collective dialogue aimed at the creation of a global communication space that is meant to result in a common language underpinning diplomatic efforts.

Diplomatic cable A message, usually classified according to its security importance, giving instruction to a mission or reporting results back to a capital.

Diplomatic corps Term mainly used to refer to the diplomats of different sovereign states who are resident in the capital city of another sovereign state. Also refers to the diplomats of member states who are present at the headquarters of major regional and international organizations. Heads of missions, secretaries, attachés, others with diplomatic functions, and sometimes personnel whose functions are of a more technical nature are conventionally regarded as members of the diplomatic corps (Sharp and Wiseman 2016: 171).

Diplomatic culture "The accumulated communicative and representational norms, rules, and institutions devised to improve relations and avoid war between interacting and mutually recognizing political entities" (Wiseman 2005: 409–10).

Diplomatic immunity Privileged legal status accorded to diplomatic representatives by the states that receive them. According to this status, diplomatic officials (1) are inviolable, meaning they cannot be arrested or detained and their offices cannot be entered or tampered with; (2) are immune from criminal jurisdiction, and often from civil and administrative jurisdiction as well; and (3) are exempt from taxes, inspections, and customs duties.

Diplomatic mediation Facilitated communication between parties involving a diplomatic actor.

Diplomatic mission *See* diplomatic post/mission.

Diplomatic passport An official travel document issued by a state to the members of its diplomatic service and their families permitting expedited treatment by customs officials and border police of other countries.

Diplomatic post/mission A diplomatic or consular establishment or presence in a given city or state.

Diplomatic reporting *See* report/reporting.

Diplomatic representation *See* represent/representation.

Diplomatic signaling All acts, verbal or non-verbal, intentional or unintentional, that communicate a message from a diplomat to a foreign government or audience; signals often involve ambiguity.

Diplomatic wife A woman who is married to a male diplomat and is expected to carry out central, but unrecognized and unpaid, duties.

Doha Development Round The multilateral trade negotiation round conducted under the auspices of the World Trade Organization; initiated in 2001. Doha's objectives are to lower trade barriers around the world, increase international trade, and promote global economic development.

Economic sanctions Using economic capabilities in a manipulative manner to achieve policy goals. A state imposing sanctions seeks to coerce the receiving state into behaving more compliantly. Often includes freezing banking assets, cutting financial aid, or banning trade.

Economic summitry Form of economic diplomacy that aims to coordinate international economic relations at the level of ministers or, more normally, the heads of government.

Embassy Building accommodating offices, and sometimes a residence, for a diplomatic mission headed by an ambassador.

Embedded liberalism Term used to describe the economic structure that emerged after the Second World War in which capitalist countries reconciled market efficiency with sociocultural values. A quasi-grand social bargain whereby all sectors of society agreed to open markets, which in some cases had become heavily administered, if not autarchic, in the 1930s. Included agreement to contain and share the social adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce (Ruggie 1982).

Emissary Diplomatic representative sent on a mission to another country.

Environmental diplomacy Negotiations aimed at addressing environmental challenges (whether cross-border or global) such as global warming, sustainable development, and biodiversity.

Envoy Originally a diplomat of less than ambassadorial rank; now used for an ambassador or special emissary between two heads of state.

Epistemological Claims about knowledge. To state that something is the case is to make such a claim. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of truth and knowledge and with how we know what we know.

Estrangement The condition of being separated, withdrawn, and/or alienated from something or someone. Typically, estranged entities were previously closer and more cooperative.

European Commission Comprises twenty-eight commissioners (expected soon to be twenty-seven) and a permanent staff of some 37,000 European civil servants. Main function is to propose EU legislation to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Also tasked with implementing EU legislation and the EU budget and acting in the general interest of the Union with complete independence from national governments.

European Council Comprises the heads of state or government of the member states and the president of the European Commission. It elects its president for a two-and-a-half-year period, and it meets at least four times a year. The primary function is to provide general political impetus and guidelines for the EU.

Extraterritorial rights/jurisdiction The exercise of legal jurisdiction by one state in the territory of another; related to diplomatic immunity in that the diplomat remains under the legal jurisdiction of the home, or sending, state and not that of the host, or receiving, state.

Financial diplomacy Negotiations conducted by a relatively small policy community of experts in ministries of finance or central banks concerned with managing the world economy and stabilizing markets.

Foreign Service Term used to describe the bureaucratic organization of professional diplomatic and consular officials. A foreign service is part of a country's ministry of foreign affairs. The US Foreign Service is part of the Department of State.

Foreign Service Officer (FSO) A commissioned member of the US Foreign Service; a diplomatic official responsible for implementing US foreign policy.

Functionalism A theoretical approach that suggests international conflict can be avoided, and even ended, by increasing international cooperation in economic and social issues. Functionalism argues that such cooperation will eventually be adopted by areas and states torn by political violence.

Gendered diplomacy The overall domination of diplomatic practice by male practitioners.

Gendered institutions The influence of gender on formal and less formal institutional processes and practices.

Global civil society Term used to describe the loose community of non-state and non-governmental actors—individuals, organizations, networks, and coalitions—that conduct political, economic, and social activity across national borders and outside of governmental and corporate structures. Different from *transnational* civil society, which has less global coverage.

Global commons Resource domains or areas that lie outside the political reach of any one nation-state.

Global governance "The totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, norms, procedures, and initiatives by which states and their citizens try to bring order and predictability to their responses to such universal problems as warfare, poverty, and environmental degradation" (Weiss 2009: 222).

Global North Term nowadays describing economically developed countries. Used in place of the term "First World" from the Cold War. Not all countries within this category are located in the Northern Hemisphere (for example, Australia and New Zealand); rather, it is a loose geographic metaphor.

Global public Composed of the citizens of the countries of the world who actively keep abreast of international social and political issues.

Global South Term describing countries with lower levels of economic development. Used in place of the term "Third World" from the Cold War, although there is a large variation in level of development between countries within the Global South.

Globalization A *process* involving increased political, social, economic, and cultural interconnectedness across regions and continents, linking formerly distant communities and transforming the traditional parameters of power. Also seen as the *outcome* of this process, whereby the international system experiences a decrease in state-based agencies in relation to global, ones rather than merely intergovernmental, operations. Commonly associated with the fall of communism at the end of the 1980s and the subsequent expansion of the free market economy. Also accompanied by the rapid evolution of global transportation and communication systems.

Globalized state A state that responds positively to globalization by welcoming its transformative force for the state's own gain. Instead of retreating in the face of globalization pressures, a globalized state adapts its behavior accordingly.

Group of Seven (G7)/Group of Eight (G8) An informal intergovernmental grouping of the world's leading industrialized democracies. Established in 1975 as the G5 (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), it subsequently grew to include Canada (1976), Italy (1977), and finally, the Russian Federation (1998). Originally designed to promote collaboration and problem solving on economic issues, primarily through annual summit meetings between heads of state/government, the G8 agenda has since expanded to address political issues as well.

Group of Twenty (G20) An international coalition of finance ministers and central bank governors from both industrialized and developing economies. Established in 1999 as a forum to address critical issues in the global economy through open and constructive discussion. Made up of representatives from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Hard law Precise, legally binding obligations that delegate an authority for interpreting and enforcing the law.

Hard power A form of political power derived from military strength, economic influence, or diplomatic pressure that influences the behavior of others (Campbell and O'Hanlon 2006).

Hegemonic stability theory Theory suggesting that the international political economy is more stable when a dominant power can establish norms and rules while using its power to encourage other states to comply.

Hegemony A system in which a single dominant leader, such as a superpower, exercises power and control (political and/or economic and even social) over other states; this dominant state is said to be the hegemon.

Hotline A secure, private method of direct communication maintained between world powers. Hotlines are often employed by heads of state, government officials, and diplomats in order to allow communication between opposed parties during times of crisis and/or uncertainty.

Human security Freedom from fear and freedom from want; an all-encompassing definition of security that considers physical safety, economic and social wellbeing, and respect for human dignity and human rights.

Immunities and privileges *See* diplomatic immunity.

Information operations The military use of electronic warfare, computer networks, psychological operations, and deception aimed at influencing an adversary's perceptions and decision making.

Interdependence Condition in which decisions made by states (or peoples) will necessarily affect other actors in the international system as well. Interdependence can be symmetric, where both sets of actors are affected equally, or asymmetric, where the impact varies between actors.

Intergovernmental Integration led by state governments, rather than by supranational institutions.

International anarchy Notion that there is no common power or central governing authority within the international system.

International hierarchy In contrast to the realist notion of international anarchy, in which there is no common power or central governing authority within the international system, a range of scholarly approaches increasingly refer instead to a notion of "a highly stratified global realm, pervaded with domination and authority struggles" (Pouliot 2016b: 256).

International organization (IO) "An association of states deriving its organizational character form its permanence, its quasi-governmental organs, and (generally speaking) its employment of international civil servants [. . .] It may be more or less universal in membership, have a regional focus, or even be composed of just two or three states" (Berridge and Lloyd 2012: 209).

International system "Formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole. Also known as 'system of states'" (Bull 2002: 9).

Internet governance The development and application of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.

Intersubjective Shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other. Intersubjectivity stresses the shared and communal status of language and meaning.

Investment diplomacy Negotiations concerning access for foreign investment or the protection of foreign investment in host states.

Joined-up Term referring to improved government based on different departments working together or to enhanced forms of collaboration cutting across hierarchies, different levels of government, or connecting the public and private sectors.

Legate Historically, a term used for a person sent on diplomatic business; also used in the twentieth century to refer to a papal emissary of the Holy See, now called a nuncio.

Legitimacy A legitimate authority is one that is respected or recognized both domestically and internationally. In diplomacy, legitimacy is linked to the concept of diplomatic, or international, recognition.

Letter of accreditation/credentials A formal letter presenting the credentials of a newly appointed ambassador, announcing the diplomat's authority to act on behalf of the sending head of state or government. *See* credentials.

Liberal international economic order The economic order established in the West, in which markets are the predominant means of shaping investment, production, and trade.

Mandates Territories placed under the oversight of the League of Nations after the powers that previously controlled them were defeated in the First World War.

Mercantilist Economic ideology emphasizing state interest. Aims to maintain a positive balance of trade by increasing exports and decreasing imports, expanding markets, and at times, implementing protectionist policies.

Mercantilist relative gains Economic ideology emphasizing that trade relative gains are more important than both parties' absolute gains.

Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) The government department responsible for conducting a state's foreign policy and coordinating its international activity, including any diplomatic activity.

Mission *See* diplomatic post/mission.

Mission diplomacy Conducting formal relations between sovereign states through the use of permanent embassies or legations in a receiving state, although some members of the mission may reside in a different country. Also refers to delegations sent to another country to conduct targeted and temporary diplomatic negotiations.

Mobile diplomat An officer who resides in a single post but travels frequently to serve other cities or regions, also known as a "circuit rider."

Multilateral/multilateralism The process by which three or more countries cooperate to address a common issue rather than acting on a unilateral or bilateral basis.

Multilateral capitals Capital cities that host, and are widely identified as hosting, major international organizations, such as Geneva and Vienna. Distinct from cities, some of which are capitals, that host international organizations but generally are not identified as multilateral cities, such as Rome, Nairobi, and Washington, DC.

Multilateral mission A diplomatic entity accredited to an international, or multilateral, organization, such as the United Nations; often referred to as a "permanent" or "special" mission.

Multilateral negotiations Negotiations between three or more states.

Multiple accreditation When an ambassador, or head of mission, lives in one country but is accredited to and represents the sending government in one or more other countries or international organizations. A common practice for smaller states.

Nation branding The application of corporate marketing concepts and techniques to countries, in the interests of enhancing their reputation in international relations.

Nation-state A sovereign political entity in which all members of the state also share a single national identity. The nation-state is the dominant political entity in modern international relations.

Neoliberal institutionalist An approach based on the social theory of neoliberal institutionalism, which emphasizes the interdependence between autonomous social and political institutions.

Neoliberalism A theoretical approach to domestic and international economic and social policy that stresses the importance of privatization and open markets. Neoliberalism seeks to privatize national control of industries and economies and frequently pursues international cooperation to further its goals.

Neorealism A theoretical approach to international relations that assumes relations between states and territories are prone to conflict and war. Neorealism takes survival to be the primary motivating factor behind states' behavior and regards any peace agreements between nations with skepticism. For a state that is sympathetic to neorealism, security will be of the greatest importance.

New diplomacy Term describing the latest methods of diplomacy. Used to describe resident missions in the late fifteenth century, the parliamentary style of diplomacy developed under the League of Nations after the First World War, and currently, non-traditional actors who assume diplomatic roles in global affairs.

Niche diplomacy Diplomacy based on clear foreign policy priorities so as to concentrate resources in specific areas with the expectation that they will generate more returns. Mostly associated with states having limited power and, therefore, no capacity to be active in all sectors.

Non-Aligned Movement Founded in 1961 and consisting overwhelmingly of Third World states that wanted to remain unaffiliated with either Cold War superpower and beyond the influence of former colonial powers. Today, with some 120 members, its primary aim is to promote security and Third World development.

Non-resident ambassador Ambassador who does not reside in, but who makes periodic visits to, the state to which he or she is accredited.

Non-state actor Any entity that attempts to have an influence on international politics but does not possess the sovereign authority of a territorial state; an all-encompassing term that includes international organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, armed domestic militias, or transnational terrorist organizations. For some theorists, an individual may also qualify as a non-state actor.

Nordic Women's Mediators' Network Initiative backed by the Nordic governments in 2015 to increase the number of women involved in international peace mediation efforts.

Norm A general standard that specifies right or proper conduct.

Note A formal, written communication between an embassy and a ministry of foreign affairs.

Nuncio An ambassadorial-level representative of the Holy See.

Open, rules-based international economic order Prescriptive rules of state behavior aimed at establishing appropriate forms of competition and methods of censure if states break rules (*see also* liberal international economic order).

Overseas posts A diplomatic or consular presence in a given city or state.

Papacy The office of the pope, whose jurisdiction is formally called the Holy See; physically located in the Vatican, a small enclave in Rome.

Peacekeeping Impartial, non-threatening, third-party missions that help to resolve a conflict at the request of the disputing parties. The United Nations' traditional principles of peacekeeping include consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate.

Peacemaking The process of conflict resolution through pacific settlement; includes any process used to create cooperation, compromise, and social institutions that contribute to building a sustainable peace.

Permanent representative The head of a permanent diplomatic mission to an international organization, such as the United Nations. Generally, referred to as "ambassador," although strictly speaking this is incorrect traditional diplomatic usage.

Permanent representations The accredited diplomatic missions to an international organization, such as the United Nations or the European Union.

Personality of laws Laws concerning the condition, state, or capacity of persons; as opposed to the *reality of laws*, which are laws that concern property or things.

Plurilateral negotiations Negotiations between a group of limited and normally like-minded governments.

Policy network A group of varied actors, both public and private, who have an active interest and expertise in a given policy sector. Sometimes seen as a specific type of governance in which policy is crafted by utilizing a variety of political resources in both the public and the private sphere.

Polity An organized society within a specific territory that corresponds to a particular governing authority.

Polylateralism "The conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organization) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities" (Wiseman 2010: 24).

Positivist Theoretical claiming that only knowledge based on sense experience and quantitative analytical methods yields authentic, objective knowledge. Positivism relies upon direct observation and often avoids abstract theory.

Postpositivist Theoretical critique of the positivist approach. It claims that human knowledge rests not on a solid, unquestioned foundation but on human conjectures, warranted traditions, and cultural norms. Postpositivism questions knowledge assumed to be objectively true and suggests that such knowledge rests upon contingent foundations.

Preventive diplomacy Diplomatic activity intended to minimize conflict or prevent escalation of disagreements into violence; includes confidence-building measures, fact-finding, and deployment of UN-authorized peacekeeping forces before conflict erupts.

Procurator Historically, a Roman legal officer sent to serve in a country under Roman civil law.

Propaganda The attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through a pattern of communication that is one-directional and excludes meaningful dialogue as a means of persuasion, as is the case with recent views of public diplomacy.

Protocol Rules of diplomatic procedure used to regulate the proper treatment of accredited state officials and diplomatic officers. Can also refer to an annex to a more formal document, such as a treaty.

Public diplomacy Traditionally seen as “the transparent means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and advancing its foreign policy goals” (USC Center on Public Diplomacy n.d.).

Public goods A good or service that is *non-rival*, meaning that multiple individuals can consume the same good without diminishing its value, and *non-excludable*, meaning that an individual cannot be prevented from consuming the good whether or not he or she pays for it.

Quad The name used at the World Trade Organization to describe the four major industrialized country markets: Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States.

Rationalist Term used by economists to describe decision making that ranks preferences by their ability to maximize gains and minimize losses and then selects the option that achieves the greatest overall gains. Also used by English School theorists to suggest that people, and states, share a commitment to the application of reason and restraint to human relations.

Realist Theoretical approach to international relations in which the sovereign state is the primary actor. The international system is seen as anarchic, and states’ actions are driven by the pursuit of power and fulfillment of the national interest. Conflict is seen as inevitable.

Reciprocity Principle in which state action is contingent on the previous action of other states in a “tit-for-tat” manner—good is returned for good, and bad for bad. Often applied to international law, in which states will cooperate only if other states are likely to do so as well.

Regime theory A theory of international relations suggesting that strong and widely supported international regimes can provide governance within the anarchic international system.

Regimes An implicit or explicit framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures that governs a specific regional or global policy area; more simply defined as an international governing arrangement.

Regional integration Growing political and/or economic interdependence between actors, mostly states, in a particular geographic region—for example, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the African Union.

Report/reporting Closed system of communication between members of a diplomatic mission and their home government (usually the ministry of foreign affairs); includes both routine and confidential information.

Represent/representation Diplomatic mission representing one state in another. Since the Second World War, almost all representations take place though the exchange of ambassadors, although the size and importance of embassies vary considerably. States are not obliged to exchange diplomatic representation, but refusing to do so could be seen as a hostile act.

Resident ambassador The head of a diplomatic mission who resides in the receiving state.

Resident embassy The building that houses a permanent diplomatic presence in a receiving state.

Revolutionary Term used by English School theorist Martin Wight to refer to radical thinkers such as the Bolshevik Leon Trotsky, who claimed that diplomacy and states serve established concentrations of power and that they should be overthrown, by force if necessary.

Satrap Historically, a Persian provincial governor. Nowadays, a term used with negative connotations to mean a subordinate official.

Sherpa The personal representative of a head of state or government who lays the preparatory organizational framework for an international summit, particularly economic summits such as the G20.

Smart diplomacy The practice of smart power beyond traditional diplomacy, with the employment of new technologies, public and private partnerships, as well as diaspora networks at the center of diplomacy.

Smart power Targeted influence that combines the timely and directed use of hard and soft power to achieve a state's objectives in the international system.

Social media Refers to Internet-based applications that facilitate the expression and exchange of social communication. Built upon Web 2.0 technology concepts but dealing explicitly with social intercourse. These applications are increasingly accessible, mobile, and immediate. Examples are Internet forums, weblogs, social blogs, and wikis. The term is used interchangeably with "Web 2.0." (*See* Web 2.0.)

Social power Notion challenging the soft power paradigm, building on a relationship-based and contextual understanding of power that examines "the capacity to establish norms and rules around which actors' actions converge" (van Ham 2010: 8).

Society of states Used interchangeably with "international society" in English School theory to describe "a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [which] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and [which] share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 2002: 13).

Sociologist A scholar who studies the development, structure, and function of human social interaction.

Soft law Non-binding legal arrangements or codes of conduct that are interpreted and "enforced" by their normative power rather than by a traditional sovereign authority.

Soft power Influence through attraction instead of coercion, pressure, or force (Nye 1990).

Sous-sherpa An official below the sherpa who is concerned with the preparatory work for economic summits. The term was used in G7/G8 economic summits but has now found wider use.

Sovereign A person or entity that possesses sovereignty is one that has supreme power or authority.

Sovereign state A body of territory that possesses sovereignty, usually recognized through membership of the United Nations.

Sovereignty The condition whereby a state claims ultimate legal authority over defined territory and the right to represent the people of that territory in the international community. It is the extent to which a polity is under no external pressure from other political entities regarding any aspect of its behavior or decision making.

Special Representative Official appointed to head a particular diplomatic or peacekeeping mission; often used by the United Nations secretary-general and the European Union.

Sphere of influence A geopolitical region within which a powerful state claims exclusive rights of influence and intervention.

Strategic communication An activity by defense departments or international security organizations involving horizontal and vertical coordination of a variety of information activities and aimed at supporting political and military objectives in foreign operations.

Summitry Diplomatic meetings between heads of state or heads of government; can be either ad hoc or regularly occurring.

Supranational Laws or institutions that supersede, or transcend, the authority of the sovereign state.

Suzerain Historically, a feudal lord to whom vassals pay tribute; most commonly refers to the Ottoman Empire.

Track-one Official government-to-government diplomatic interaction.

Track-two Refers to informal and unofficial contact or activities between non-state actors aimed at improving diplomatic relations, sometimes in collaboration with state officials.

Track-three Usually refers to "citizen diplomacy" (*see* citizen diplomacy).

Trade diplomacy Negotiations concerned with barriers to market access (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) as well as regulatory policies that affect the exchange of goods and services between countries.

Transactional negotiation behavior Focuses on trading or exchanging ideas, positions, or things of value, ideally to expand the common ground between the parties.

Transformational problem solving Aims to create new ideas, understandings, and cooperative ways of interacting that will overcome differences and problems between the negotiating parties.

Transnational Operating across national boundaries.

Trans-Westphalian The term implies a world in which consequential relations and interactions exist beyond, while also recognizing, the principle of territorially defined state sovereignty formalized in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) that ended Europe's Thirty Years' War between Protestants and Catholics. Trans-Westphalian diplomatic practices involve both sovereign state and non-state actors with standing in world politics.

Treaty A formal, mutually binding contract or agreement between two or more states.

Trust territories Territories under the oversight of the United Nations. Many were once mandate territories before the dissolution of the League of Nations.

Two-level game Theory suggesting that a state's ability to negotiate at the international level is often influenced and/or hindered by the state's simultaneous bargaining at the domestic level.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 The first UN Resolution to stress the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Overall, the UN has adopted seven resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.

Unreflexively To act without consciously evaluating the status or implications of the action. An unreflexive action is one that is performed unconsciously, often out of habit or ritual.

Vassal Historically, a landholder, subject to the rule of a feudal ruler or lord, who must follow certain obligations in order to maintain possession of the land.

Veto In general usage, the ability to stop a proposal or a piece of legislation from being accepted. At the United Nations, the five permanent member states of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—can prevent adoption of a non-procedural draft resolution that would otherwise have been passed. This is known as a veto.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Code of international law on consular posts and officers, particularly regarding facilities, immunities, and privileges. Established through a 1963 conference in Vienna.

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Code of international law regarding diplomatic actors and diplomatic missions, particularly addressing immunities and privileges. Established in 1961 through a conference in Vienna attended by eighty-one states.

Web 2.0 Refers to a shift in the design of browser-based software applications as well as an attendant shift in the way people engage with information on the Web. Rather than the non-interactive, static screens of data that characterized the early years of the Web (the "brochure" phase), Web 2.0 applications are dynamic, interactive, and collaborative. Users engaging with these applications move from simply "consuming" information to creating, modifying, and exchanging it. The term is often used interchangeably with "social media." *See* social media.

Whole-of-government A way of organizing government work in an integrated fashion based on horizontal linkages and coordination, thus counterbalancing government activities in separate functional silos.

Wireless technology (WiFi) The transfer of digital data without physical connection. Includes radio communication and cellular telephones but predominantly involves enabling portable computing devices to wirelessly connect to the Internet.

World Trade Organization (WTO) The multilateral institution created to administer the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Founded in 1995 and based in Geneva, the WTO is not part of the United but often cooperates with it and participates in its initiatives.

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